Shivamma (Dead) By Lrs. vs. Karnataka Housing Board

REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 1104

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11794 OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019)

SHIVAMMA (DEAD) BY LRS ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)



J U D G M E N T



Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2025.09.12
16:31:07 IST
Reason:

J.B. PARDIWALA, J.:
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided in the following parts: -
INDEX
I. BRIEF FACTUAL MATRIX .......................................................................... 4
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES. .............................................................. 7
A. Submissions on behalf of the appellant. ...................................................... 7

B. Submissions on behalf of the respondent State. ......................................... 9
III. ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION ................................................................. 13
IV. ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................... 13
A. Section 5 of the Limitation Act. .................................................................. 13
i. Meaning and Scope of the expression “Within Such Period” used in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. .............................................................. 14
a. Contradictory Views on the subject. .............................................. 16
b. Textual Import of the expressions “after the prescribed period” and
“for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such
period. ............................................................................................. 28
c. The expression “within such period” cannot be conflated with

“during such period” or “for such period”. ................................... 35
d. The contextual import of the expression “within such period” with
the Canons of Law of Limitation. ................................................. 38

e. Decisions which Rewa Coal Fields (supra) failed to take into
consideration. ................................................................................. 57
f. Condonation of Delay entails Extension of Limitation and not

Exclusion. ....................................................................................... 64
B. What is to be understood by “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the
Limitation. .................................................................................................... 73
i. Length of the delay may be instructive but not determinative. .............. 81
ii. Technical Considerations vis-à-vis Substantial Justice. ......................... 83

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C. In what circumstances can the exercise of discretion to condone the delay
be interfered with? ...................................................................................... 87

D. There is no room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. ................................................................ 102
i. View on the subject of Condonation of Delay prior to the decision of

Postmaster General. .............................................................................. 102
ii. Shift in jurisprudence on Condonation of Delay after the decision of
Postmaster General. .............................................................................. 120
iii. The ratio of the decision of Postmaster General. .................................. 135
iv. Whether exercise of discretion in view of the earlier position of law may
be interfered with? ................................................................................ 145
v. Public Policy vis-à-vis Public Interest in matters of delay on part of the
State or any of its instrumentalities. ...................................................... 149
E. Whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay? ........... 153
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 167





Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 3 of 170

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of
Karnataka at Kalaburagi dated 21.03.2017 in I.A. No. 1 of 2017 filed in the
Regular Second Appeal No. 200059 of 2017 (hereinafter the “ Impugned
Order ”), by which the High Court condoned the delay of 3966 days in
preferring the second appeal against the judgment and order passed by the
First Appellate Court in Regular Appeal No. 405 of 2004 arising from the
judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in Original Suit No. 1100 of
1989.


I. BRIEF FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarized as under: -
a. It appears from the materials on record that a parcel of land bearing
Survey No. 56/A, admeasuring 9 acres 13 guntas was originally owned
and possessed by the father of the appellant herein.
b. After the demise of the appellant’s father, some disputes arose between
inter-alia between the legal heirs of the original owner including the
appellant herein and one Sri Gurulingappa C. Patil, which led to the
institution of the partition suit being O.S. No. 74 of 1971.
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c. During the pendency of the aforesaid suit, Sri Gurulingappa C. Patil
purportedly “donated” 4 acres out of the aforesaid land which was the
subject matter of the suit (hereinafter the “ land in question ”) to the
Government of Karnataka.
d. Pursuant to the aforesaid, the respondent housing corporation sometime
in the year 1979 took over the possession of the land in question for the
purpose of establishing a housing colony.
e. On 03.04.1989, a compromise decree was passed in the aforesaid partition
suit by which the appellant herein became the absolute owner of the parcel
of land bearing Survey No. 56/A including the 4 acres of land in question.
f. However, since the possession of the land in question was not reverted to
the appellant herein, one another suit being O.S. No. 1100 of 1989 was
instituted, this time against the respondent housing corporation, praying
for the relief of declaration of title and possession of the land in question.
g. The said suit came to be dismissed by the Trial Court vide order dated
17.04.1997.
h. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred the Regular Appeal No.
rd
405 of 2004 (hereinafter the “ first appeal ”) before the 3 Addl. District
Judge, Gulbargam (hereinafter the “ First Appellate Court ”).
i. The First Appellate Court vide its judgment and order dated 03.01.2006
allowed the appeal and accordingly decreed the suit in favor of the
appellant, granting the declaration as prayed for in the suit. However, the
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First Appellate Court declined to grant the relief of possession in view of
the fact that substantial construction had already been undertaken on the
land in question by the respondent housing corporation, and thus, instead
directed the grant of compensation to the appellant herein.
j. Since no action was taken by the respondent no. 1 in accordance with the
decree drawn by the First Appellate Court, the appellant herein initiated
execution proceedings on 20.01.2011.
k. Remarkably, it was only on 14.02.2017, that the respondent no. 1 realized
the seriousness of the situation and accordingly a second appeal came to
be filed by it before the High Court along with an application for
condonation of delay of 3966 days against the judgment and decree
passed by the First Appellate Court vide its order dated 03.01.2006.
l. The High Court vide its impugned judgment and order dated 21.03.2017,
allowed the aforesaid application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 (for short, the “ Limitation Act ”) read with Section 151 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, the “ CPC ”) by the respondent no. 1
herein, and thereby condoned the delay.


4. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before this
Court with the present appeal.


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II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES.

A. Submissions on behalf of the appellant.
5. Mr. Akshat Shirvastava, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants
in his written submissions has stated thus: -

“ PREPOSTION / SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF
THE PETITIONER

A. That it is most respectfully submitted that the
respondent no. l failed to demonstrate any sufficient
cause and there is no explanation as to why the regular
second appeal could not have been filed by the
respondent no. l within the prescribed period of
limitation.

B. That it is most respectfully submitted that from the
perusal of the application filed by the respondent no. 1,
the last entry in the file of Karnataka Housing Board
dates back to 20.03.2008 and that there is no
subsequent entry with regard to the movement of files.

C. That it is most respectfully submitted that the
respondent no. 1 admits that due to the negligence of
its officers the appeal could not have been filed within
the prescribed period of limitation that there has been
a pedantic approach on the part of the officials of the
Housing Board and despite service of notice in the
execution proceedings way back on 20.04.2011, no
explanation is forthcoming as to what steps had been
taken by the Board immediately thereafter in filing the
appeal before the Hon'ble High Court.


D. That it is most respectfully submitted that this Hon'ble
Court in a plethora of judgments has explained the
expression "sufficient cause" u/s. 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn.
of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 in Para 24 & 25
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"24. What colour the expression "sufficient
cause" would get in the factual matrix of a
given case would largely depend on bona fide
nature of the explanation. If the court finds that
there has been no negligence on the part of the
applicant and the cause shown for the delay
does not lack bona fides, then it may condone
the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation
given by the applicant is found to be concocted
or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his
cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of
discretion not to condone the delay.

25. In cases involving the State and its
agencies/instrumentalities, the court can take
note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in
the decision-making process but no premium
can be given for total lethargy or utter
negligence on the part of the officers of the
State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and
the applications filed by them for condonation
of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of
course by accepting he plea that dismissal of
the matter on the ground of bar of limitation
will cause injury to the public interest."

E. Case laws relied by the Petitioner: -
1. Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn.
ofBrihan Mumbai, (2012) SCC 157
2. Brijesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2014) 11
SCC 351
3. Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10
SCC 531”


6. In such circumstances referred to above, it was prayed on behalf of the
appellant that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed.

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B. Submissions on behalf of the respondent State.

7. Ms. Kiran Suri, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents
in her written submissions has stated thus: -
“ SUBMISSIONS

I) The first submission is that Section 5 of the Llmitation Act
provides for condonation of delay if "sufficient cause" is
shown for "such period". While interpreting the word
"such period" under Limitation Act, there is some conflict
as to for which period sufficient cause is required to be
shown.

a) The following judgments provide that the word "such
period" would mean the explanation of delay from the
last day prescribed for filing of an appeal till the date
on which appeal is filed:-
i) AIR 1962 SC 361 (Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal
v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd). Para 8
ii) 1996 (3) sec 132 (State of Haryana v. Chandra
Mani and Ors). Para 3

b) The following judgments provide· that explanation of
delay has to be shown for the period of limitation means
if period of limitation is 90 days, then explanation as to
why the petitioner was unable to institute the
proceedings within 90 days and the events occurred
after 91 st day till the last day is of no consequence.
iii) 2024 SCC online SC 3612:(State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary) Para 7
iv) 1981 (1) SCC 495 (Ajit Singh Thakur Singh
AndAnr. v. State of Gujarat) Para 6

II) That Second submission is that when the Hon'ble High
Court has exercised its discretionary powers and
condoned the delay holding that there is sufficient cause
shown by the respondent No. 1 herein, Law is well settled
that "a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with
the discretion exercised by the courts below." It is further
submitted that "an appellate Court interferes not when the
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order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly
wrong."
i) 2023 (10) SCC 531 (Sheo Raj Singh(D) Tr. Lrs v.
Union Of India). Para 33
ii) 2003 (10) SCC 390 (Manjunath Anandappa Urf. v.
Tammanasa& Ors.) para 36 and 37
iii) 1980 (2) SCC 593 (Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd v.
Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha) Para 73

In the present case, the Hon'ble High Court has exercised
its discretionary power after considering the sufficient
cause and the same cannot be said to be clearly wrong so
as to require interference.

III) That third submission is that in case there have been
deliberate lapses on the part of the public officials and
public servants to defeat justice by causing delay, delay,
however huge may be, should be condoned and the latter
be decided on merits.
i) 2015 (3) SCC 569 (Executive Officer, Antiyur Town
Panchayat v. G. Arumugam (D) By Lrs.) para 3 and
4

IV) That fourth submission is when substantial justice and
technical considerations are pitted against each other, the
former would_ prevail specially when public interest is
involved. It is submitted that it is not the length of delay
but sufficiency of cause, which is relevant.
i) 1987 (2) SCC 107 (Collector Land Acquisition,
Anantnag &Anr. v. Mst. Katiji& Ors). para 3
ii) 2005 (3) SCC 752 (State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao &
Ors.) Para 8 & 9
iii) 2013 (12) SCC 649 (Esha Bhattaharyajeev.
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy) Para 21
iv) 2019 (10) SCC 408 (The State of Manipur v. Koting
Lamkang) Para 10


V) The fifth submission is that the Government cannot carry
on business upon principle of distrust and men in
responsible position are to be trusted. The deliberate
inaction on the part of the officials and mala fide of the
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officers, cannot be imputed to the government or
Government undertakings.
i) 1988 (2) SCC 142 (G. Ramegowda, Major and
others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer,
Bangalore) Para l5 to 17

VI) The sixth submission is that the discretion by the Hon'ble
High Court is exercised in 2017 and judgments in "(2020)
(10) SCC 654) (State of MP v. Beru Lal &(2020 (13) SCC
745 (University of Delhi v. Union of India & Ors." are
subsequent. Therefore, the exercise of power is to be seen
from the point of view of the cases of Katiji, Rameguda,
Chandra Mani cases etc.
i) 2023 (10) SCC 531 (Sheo Raj Singh (D) by Lrs) v.
Union of India &Anr.) Para 34


VII) The seventh submission is that if inordinate delay has
occurred and it has not resulted in the litigant being
benefitted by such delay, such belated approach must be
construed by adopting justice oriented approach. In the
present case, there had been negligence on the part of the
officials, who were supposed to protect the interest of KHB
and action has been taken against those officers by
suspending them and initiating disciplinary proceedings.

VIII) That KHB has taken decision to file an appeal in the year
2006 itself and had appointed litigation conducting officer
to engage advocate. KHB had again appointed litigation
conducting officer in 2011 to engage advocate and appear
in Execution petition. There was no reason for the KHB to
dis rust its officer. It is only in 2017 when a letter was
received from Deputy Commissioner to the Commissioner,
KHB that the commissioner came to know about their non-
representation and non filing of the appeal. Immediate
action is taken thereafter.

IX) It is submitted that Sh. AD. Inamdar was authorised by the
Commissioner to act as litigation conducting officer for
filing appeal and also to appear in EP on 02.04.2011.
SLAO sent letter dated 06.04.2011 to said AD Inamdar to
engage counsel and take appropriate action. The said
Inamdar appointed AEE as special officer. Even though
the Executive Engineer was authorized to engage the
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Advocate and contact the Advocate regularly, order sheet
of Execution Petition reveals that neither the Executive
Engineer nor the Assistant Executive Engineer have
engaged Advocate in Execution Petition. KHB came to
know the issue -of warrant of attachment of their movables
from Deputy Commissioner only on 28.01.2017. Both the
officers were suspended.

X) It is submitted that neither the land is purchased nor
acquired by the KHB nor any allotment is made by KHB.
The petitioner filed a suit for possession. The lower
appellant court moulded the relief and directed payment of
compensation. The payment of compensation without
acquisition of land by Respondent-1 is against public
interest and it also involves huge public money.
Respondent-1 cannot be directed to pay compensation
when they have not acquired the land. The persons in
possession are illegal occupants and the KHB has nothing
to do with that land or its occupants. It is relevant to note
that petitioners filed WP No. 82306/2011 praying for
mandamus direction R-1 and R-2 to acquire the land,
which was withdrawn on 19.07.2011.

XI) KHB has no objection if decree is passed for possession
against the persons in possession and not against the KHB.
It is also relevant to Note that the petitioner has not made
the persons in possession as party to the proceedings. The
delay of 3966 days will not clothe the petitioner with any
right in law when the petitioner is not entitled for any relief
against Defendant-I and Defendant-2.”

8. In such circumstances referred to above, it was prayed on behalf of the
respondent that there being no merit in the present appeal, the same may
be dismissed.







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III. ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION

9. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone
through the materials on record, the following questions fall for our
consideration: -
I) What is the meaning and import of the expression “ within such
period ” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
II) When can the exercise of discretion in condoning the delay by a
lower court be interfered with by a court in appeal?
III) Whether the High Court in the present case at hand was justified in
condoning the delay?
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

10. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, reads as under: -
“ 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under
any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the
prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the
court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such period.

Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was
misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in
ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be
sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

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11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which corresponds to the erstwhile Section
5 of the now-repealed Limitation Act, 1908, confers upon the courts the
discretionary power to admit any appeal or application (except that under
Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) if filed after the expiry of
the prescribed period of limitation, provided the erring party is able to show
to the court a sufficient cause for not filing the same within the stipulated
period of limitation, and the court is satisfied with sufficiency of such cause.
It is only in cases, where such “ sufficient cause ” for the resultant delay in
filing / presenting of the appeal or application is shown by the defaulting
party, and the courts are satisfied with the explanation and sufficiency of such
cause that the recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be taken by
the courts, and in exercise of its discretion the delay be condoned and thereby
admit the appeal or application.

i. Meaning and Scope of the expression “Within Such Period” used in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.


12. Ms. Suri, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents herein
vociferously contended that although it is a well settled position of law that
for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, the delay in the filing of an appeal or application beyond
the stipulated period of limitation has to be explained by demonstrating the
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existence of a “sufficient cause” yet there appears to be a divergence of
opinion as to the precise period for which the “sufficient cause” must be
demonstrated for seeking condonation.

13. It was submitted that, there is a cleavage of opinion expressed as regards the
meaning of the expression “ within such period ” occurring in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, wherein the expression has been understood to mean the
period commencing from the last date on which the appeal or application, as
the case may could have been filed i.e., the last day on which the period of
limitation would have expired, up to the actual date on which such appeal or
application is ultimately filed. In other words, the delay that has to be
explained is only for the interregnum period between the expiry of limitation
and the actual date of filing, and the court concerned should be satisfied about
the existence of a sufficient cause resulting in such delay for this period
alone. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in
Ramlal, Motilal & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported in AIR 1962
SC 361 and State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors. reported in (1996) 3
SCC 132 , respectively.

14. Whereas on the other hand, the same expression has been construed to mean
that “sufficient cause” must be shown to have existed not merely during the
period of delay post the expiry of limitation, but rather throughout the entire
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statutory period of limitation itself till the date of actual filing. According to
this line of authority, “ within such period ” for the purpose of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, means the entire duration from the date when the cause of
action accrued or the clock of limitation began to tick, until the date of actual
filing. To put it simply, if the party seeking condonation of delay has no good
explanation to offer for demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause”
during the period of limitation, which inhibited the timely filing of the appeal
or application, then even if there existed a “sufficient cause” after the expiry
of the limitation that contributed to the delay, the same would be
inconsequential insofar as Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned. In
this regard, reliance was placed on the decisions of Ajit Singh Thakur &
Anr. v. State of Gujrat reported in (1981) 1 SCC 495 and State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 ,
respectively.

a. Contradictory Views on the subject.

15. The expression “ within such period ” occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, first fell for the consideration of this Court in Rewa Coalfields (supra).
This Court speaking through P.B. Gajendragadkar J. (as his Lordship, then
was) held that the aforesaid expression means that existence of a sufficient
cause for the delay in filing the appeal or application, as the case may be, has
to be shown for the period from the last day of the limitation prescribed till
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the date of the actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be.
In other words, if the period of limitation is, say, 90-days, delay has to be
th
explained only for the 90 day till the day of actual filing of the appeal or
application, as the case may be. The said decision is in three parts: -
(i) First, it held that in the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the
expression “ within such period ” used therein, means the period from
the last day of the limitation that has been prescribed till the day on
which the appeal or application is filed. Thus, it held that for the
purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, the party has to assign sufficient cause for why he was unable to
file an appeal for the entire period covered from the last day of the
limitation prescribed till the day on which such appeal or application
came to be filed. The relevant observations read as under: -
“ 8. [...] The context seems to suggest that “within such
period” means within the period which ends with the last
day of limitation prescribed. In other words, in all cases
falling under Section 5 what the party has to show is why
he did not file an appeal on the last day of limitation
prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the party will
have to show sufficient cause not only for not filing the
appeal on the last day but to explain the delay made
thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing
sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be
called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered
by the period between the last day prescribed for filing
the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed. [...]”

(Emphasis supplied)

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(ii) Secondly, although, this Court acknowledged that the context in which
the aforesaid expression has been employed, seems to suggest that it
only means “ within the period which ends with the last day of
limitation prescribed ” yet, it was reluctant to adopt the aforesaid
interpretation, as it would be too unreasonable to expect or require a
party to take necessary action on the very first day after the cause of
action accrues. It observed if such an interpretation is adopted the same
would result in the expression “ within such period ” being construed as
“ during such period ”, an understanding which is repugnant to both the
bare text as-well as the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The
relevant observations read as under: -
“ 8. Now, what do the words “within such period”
denote? It is possible that the expression “within such
period” may sometimes mean during such period. But the
question is : Does the context in which the expression
occurs in Section 5 justify the said interpretation? [...]
The context seems to suggest that “within such period”
means within the period which ends with the last day of
limitation prescribed. [...] To hold that the expression
“within such period” means during such period would,
in our opinion, be repugnant in the context. [...] ”

(Emphasis supplied)

(iii) Thirdly, it observed that since a party is entitled to take its time and
file the appeal or application, as the case may be, on any day, during
the prescribed period of limitation, it would be unreasonable, where
there has been any delay in preferring such appeal or application, to
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then call upon the party to explain its conduct during the whole of the
said period. Accordingly, it rejected the contention that for the purpose
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay in filing of the appeal or
application, as the case may be, has to be explained for the entire
period of the limitation prescribed. The relevant observations read as
under: -
8. [...] If the Limitation Act or any other appropriate
statute prescribes different periods of limitation either for
appeals or applications to which Section 5 applies that
normally means that liberty is given to the party intending
to make the appeal or to file an application to act within
the period prescribed in that behalf. It would not be
reasonable to require a party to take the necessary action
on the very first day after the cause of action accrues. In
view of the period of limitation prescribed the party
would be entitled to take its time and to file the appeal on
any day during the said period; and so prima facie it
appears unreasonable that when delay has been made by
the party in filing the appeal it should be called upon to
explain its conduct during the whole of the period of
limitation prescribed. [...]
(Emphasis supplied)


(iv) Lastly, it held that the thumb rule of general consideration of the
diligence of parties in pursuing their legal remedies cannot be applied
for the purpose of construing the import of the expression “ within such
period ” employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This is because,
even after sufficient cause has been shown the court still has to enquire
whether it, in its discretion, should condone the delay. As such the only
place where such considerations of diligence and bona-fides of the
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party may be of relevance under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is at
the stage of deciding whether the discretionary power to condone the
delay should be exercised by the court or not, after sufficient cause has
been shown, to its satisfaction. However, this Court cautioned, that
considerations of bona fides or due diligence, which unlike in Section
14 of the Limitation Act, have not been expressly made material or
relevant under Section 5, ought not be applied to the same extent or
manner as under Section 14, so as to invite an enquiry into the reasons
for the party’s inaction during the entire prescribed period of
limitation. The relevant observations read as under: -
“8. [...] In our opinion, it would be immaterial and even
irrelevant to invoke general considerations of diligence
of parties in construing the words of Section 5. [...]

xxx xxx xxx

10. On the other hand, in Kedarnath v. Zumberlal the
Judicial Commissioner at Nagpur has expressed the view
that an appellant who wilfully leaves the preparation and
presentation of his appeal to the last day of the period of
limitation prescribed therefor is guilty of negligence and
is not entitled to an extension of time if some unexpected
or unforeseen contingency prevents him from filing the
appeal within time. According to this decision, though the
period covered between the last day of filing and the day
of actual filing may be satisfactorily explained that would
not be enough to condone delay because the appellant
would nevertheless have to show why he waited until the
last day. In coming to this conclusion the Judicial
Commissioner has relied substantially on what he
regarded as general considerations. “This habit of
leaving things to the last moment”, says the learned
Judge, “has its origin in laxity and negligence; and, in
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my opinion, having regard to the increasing pressure of
business in the law Courts and the many facilities now
available for the punctual filing of suits, appeals and
applications therein, it is high time that litigants and their
legal advisers were made to realise the dangers of the
procrastination which defers the presentation of a suit,
appeal or application to the last day of the limitation
prescribed therefor”. There can be no difference of
opinion on the point that litigants should act with due
diligence and care; but we are disposed to think that such
general consideration can have very little relevance in
construing the provisions of Section 5. The decision of the
Judicial Commissioner shows that he based his
conclusion more on this a priori consideration and did
not address himself as he should have to the construction
of the section itself. Apparently this view has been
consistently followed in Nagpur.

12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to
the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right.
The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent
for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved
nothing further has to be done; the application for
condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground
alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to
enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the
delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the
consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage
that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for
consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while
exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause
is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as
the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an
enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the
time available to it. In this connection we may point out
that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are
always material and relevant when the court is dealing
with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation
Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called
upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of
Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion,
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considerations which have been expressly made material
and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the
same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing
with applications which fall to be decided only under
Section 5 without reference to Section 14. [...] ”

(Emphasis supplied)

16. The ratio laid down in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) was followed by a three-
Judge Bench of this Court in Chandra Mani (supra), wherein this Court
reiterated that in showing sufficient cause to condone the delay, it is not
necessary to explain whole of the period between the date of the judgment
till the date of filing the appeal. It is sufficient for the purpose of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act to only explain the delay caused during the period between
the last of the dates of limitation and the date on which the appeal/application
is actually filed. The relevant observations read as under: -
“ 3. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, the ‘Act’)
extends prescribed period of limitation in filing an application or
an appeal except under the provisions of Order 21 of Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 (for short, the ‘Code’) and gives power to
the court to admit the appeal or application after the prescribed
period. The only condition is that the applicant/appellant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring
the appeal or making the application within such period.
In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. it was laid down that in
showing sufficient cause to condone the delay, it is not necessary
that the applicant/appellant has to explain whole of the period
between the date of the judgment till the date of filing the appeal.
It is sufficient that the applicant/appellant would explain the
delay caused in the period between the last of the dates of
limitation and the date on which the appeal/application is
actually filed.”

(Emphasis supplied)
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 22 of 170


17. Thus, as per the decisions of this Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) and
Chandra Mani (supra), respectively, the expression “ within such period ”
used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been construed to mean the period
commencing from the last date on which the prescribed period of limitation
would have expired, and extending up to the actual date on which such appeal
or application comes to be filed, and therefore, “ sufficient cause ” for the
delay in such filing has to be explained only for this circumscribed interval,
rather than for the whole of the period of limitation prescribed.

18. On the other hand, in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra) a two-Judge Bench of this
Court held that “ sufficient cause ” for the delay in filing of an appeal or
application, as the case may be, has to be established by some event or
circumstance that had arisen before the limitation expired. It observed that,
although a party is entitled to wait until the last day of the prescribed period
of limitation for filing an appeal or application, as the case may be, yet when
it allows the limitation to expire and then pleads sufficient cause for not filing
the same earlier, such a plea or explanation must be traced to a cause arising
within the period of limitation. The relevant observations read as under: -
“6. [...] Now, it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last
day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows
limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the
appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of
some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 23 of 170

was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or
circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute
such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances
subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the
filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to
expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause
arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there
was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the
delay.”
(Emphasis supplied)


19. It is pertinent to mention that the decision of this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur
(supra) did not refer or take into consideration, the earlier decision of this
Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra).

20. Arguendo, it could be said that the observation made in Ajit Singh Thakur
(supra), more particularly, that “ the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it
was not possible to file the appeal within time ” could not be said to be in
conflict with the observations made in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) that
sufficient cause has to be established from the last day of the limitation
prescribed till the day on which such appeal or application came to be filed,
inasmuch as, the starting point from when “sufficient cause” includes the
prescribed period of limitation i.e., the period before the limitation prescribed
had expired as per Ajit Singh Thakur (supra) and the last day on which the
limitation would have expired as per Rewa Coal Fields (supra), as the net
effect of embracing both these perspectives, is one and the same, that
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“sufficient cause” is required to be established for the period within the
prescribed limitation, which includes the last day on which the said period
would have expired, as clarified in Rewa Coal Fields (supra), till the date of
actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be.

21. However, we do not think, that when this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra)
said that “ no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can
constitute such sufficient cause ”, what it had in its mind was that the
sufficient cause must establish some event or circumstance, only for the last
day of the prescribed period of limitation, as held in Rewa Coal Fields
(supra). This is because, nowhere has this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra)
made any reference to the point of origin if a “ sufficient cause ” would suffice
to mean only the last day of the prescribed period of limitation. The ratio laid
in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra) to our mind, must be understood as a whole,
and in the context of two pertinent observations made by it; “ that a party is
entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal ” juxtaposed
with the observation “ but when it allows limitation to expire ”, which can only
mean one thing, that it is not sufficient to only explain the delay caused in
the period between the last of the dates of limitation and the date on which
the appeal/application is actually filed, and rather explanation must be
offered for what the concerned party was doing for the entire period of the
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prescribed limitation till the date of actual filing. We shall discuss the same
in a greater detail in the latter parts of this judgment.

22. In Basawaraj & Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in (2013)
14 SCC 81 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that “ sufficient cause ” as
used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, connotes that the party who failed to
file the appeal or application within the prescribed limitation period, must
demonstrate that such failure was not due to negligence, lack of diligence or
vigilance, nor the result of indolence or inactivity, and that it was not
occasioned by any lack of bona fides. The relevant observations read as
under: -
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could
not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word
“sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
“sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a
platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the
purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a
case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard
of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that
the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there
was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has
“not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the
facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for
the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to
be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that
he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his
case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court
should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The
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court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was
merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. [...]

xxx xxx xxx

11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot
be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient
cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. ”

(Emphasis supplied)

23. In Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), this very Bench had the occasion to
examine the meaning of the expression “within such period” used in Section
5 of the Limitation Act. Placing reliance on the decisions of this Court in Ajit
Singh Thakur (supra) and Basawaraj (supra), it was held that for the purpose
of Section 5, the party seeking condonation of delay has to explain why it
was unable to institute the proceedings within the prescribed period of
limitation. Events that occurred after the expiry of the period of limitation till
the date of actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be, would
be of no consequence insofar as condonation is concerned, if it is unable to
explain what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it. It
reiterated that no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation
can constitute such sufficient cause, where the party allowed the limitation
to expire unless it can trace such failure in allowing the limitation to expire
to a cause arising within the period of limitation. The relevant observations
read as under: -
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“7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not
ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that
whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the
instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be
explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is
a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the
same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the
party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to
institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What
events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no
consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the
st
way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1 day
th
and the 90 day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the
last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the
limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the
appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of
some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired
it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or
circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute
such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances
subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the
filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to
expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause
arising within the period of limitation. [...]”

(Emphasis supplied)

24. Thus, there appears to be a cleavage of opinion expressed as regard the
meaning and interpretation of the expression “ within such period ” occurring
in Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

b. Textual Import of the expressions “after the prescribed period” and
“for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such
period.

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25. At the cost of repetition, we deem it necessary to once again quote the
provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for a better exposition. The same
reads thus: -
“ 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under
any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the
prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the
court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such period.

Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was
misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in
ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be
sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

26. The text of the provision stipulates that where an appeal or application, as the
case may be, is not filed within the prescribed period of limitation, the same
may be admitted if “sufficient cause” for such failure is shown. The court
may, in its discretion, proceed to condone the delay, if it is satisfied, that the
appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, had “sufficient cause” for not
preferring the appeal or making the application, respectively, “ within such
period ”.

27. A plain yet careful reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, leaves very
little to imagination insofar as how the import of the phrase “ within such
period ” should be construed for the purpose of the said provision. The
aforesaid phrase cannot be singled out and construed devoid of the context
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 29 of 170

provided by the other expressions used throughout the provision. The
expression should be interpreted and understood in the precise context in
which it has been employed in the bare text of the provision. The provision
of Section 5, itself makes it amply clear how the phrase “ within such period ”
ought to be understood by supplying the necessary context and interpretive
key, through two significant phrases, namely; “ after the prescribed period ”
and “ for not preferring the appeal or making the application ”.

28. We say so because, the use of the word “ such ” in “ within such period ”
signifies that it is alluding to something that the legislature has already
alluded to within the provision, and thus, the significance of this phrase, has
to be necessarily construed in reference to the expressions “ after the
prescribed period ” and “ for not preferring ... or making ... within such
period ”.

29. The phrase “ within such period ” has been consciously prefaced by the
legislature with the expression “ for not preferring the appeal or making the
application ”. This prefatory expression denotes that period of window within
which the appeal or the application, as the case may be, was required or
expected to be instituted under the law. It signifies the original period within
which, the appeal or the application, should have been filed, if not for the
delay. It refers to none other than that period within which, the appeal or
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application, could have been instituted in the first place, had there been no
delay, or, to put it simply, the statutory period of limitation, within which,
such an appeal or application, should have ordinarily been filed.

30. The negative terminology couched in “ for not preferring ... or making ” is
suggestive of the lapse or default that the appellant or applicant, as the case
may be, has committed in preferring the appeal or application, respectively,
which is nothing but the failure to file it within the prescribed statutory period
of limitation. This is further reinforced when one considers the meaning that
would have been derived, if the negative language used in the provision is
stripped away, or in other words, by understanding the opposite meaning of
the aforesaid phrase, which the legislature has deliberately chosen not to
provide by use of the negative language “ for not ”.

31. By removing or inverting the said negative connotation from the phrase “ for
not preferring ... or making ”, the expression would then inevitably have
connoted that point of time at which the appeal or application, as the case
may be, ought to have been instituted or the period within which, the
appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, was otherwise well within its
right to prefer the appeal or make the application, respectively.

32. The aforesaid makes it crystal clear that the legislature, by employing the
phrase “for not preferring the appeal or making the application” , is
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unmistakably alluding to the original statutory period of limitation within
which the appeal or application, as the case may be, was required to be
instituted or simpliciter the prescribed period of limitation, for the purpose
of construing the expression “ within such period ”.

33. However, one must be mindful that the aforesaid is not the only time period
that has been mentioned in the language of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
In other words, the meaning of the expression “ within such period ” does not
refer to only the original period of limitation.

34. One another expression of significance that, the legislature has introduced,
within the text of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is “ after the prescribed
period”. This expression refers to the point of time when the appeal or
application, as the case may be, in question, has come to be instituted, which
is, after the statutory period of limitation expired. It denotes the period after
the prescribed limitation had run out till the actual date when the filing of the
appeal or application, as the case may be, took place.

35. By use of the phrase “ after the prescribed period”, it is clear that the
legislature, for the purpose of construing the expression “ within such period ”,
has contemplated to also include the time period after the expiry of the
prescribed period of limitation till the actual date of filing of the appeal or
application, as the case may be.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 32 of 170


36. In Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the phrases “ for not preferring the appeal
or making the application ” and “ after the prescribed period ” have been used
by the legislature conjointly to assign meaning to the expression “ within such
period ”. As already discussed, the former refers to the period in which the
appeal or the application was required by the law to be filed within, while the
latter signifies the period within which such appeal or application, is being
filed or in other words, the original prescribed period of limitation and the
period after the expiry of limitation till the actual date of institution,
respectively.

37. When one reads the phrase “ within such period ” together with the
expressions “ after the prescribed period ” and “ for not preferring the appeal
or making the application ”, it becomes as clear as a noon day, that the said
phrase i.e., “ within such period ” includes both the original period of
limitation prescribed as-well as the period of delay leading up to the actual
filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. There can be no
question of construing “ within such period ” as making a reference either to
only the original period of limitation or to only the actual period of delay
after the expiry of limitation.

38. It is a well settled rule of statutory interpretation that while construing a
provision, a meaningful effect should be given to each and every word used
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by the legislature within the text of the provision. In interpreting a provision,
a coherent meaning has to be culled out from the entire scheme of the Act
and the provisions contained therein. The entire text of the provision must be
read holistically with the entire Act, in toto, and harmoniously integrated
with the other provisions to preserve internal consistency. Stray lines or
words of a provision cannot be isolated or construed in fragments, detached
from the remaining words and expressions of the provision as-well as the
other provisions within the statute.

39. Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that both the expressions, by a
necessary implication indicate that the phrase “ within such period ” signifies
that the period covered therein extends to not only the original period within
which, the appeal or the application, as the case may be, should have been
filed, if not for the delay, but also the period taken in addition to the
prescribed period of limitation for filing such appeal or application, as the
case may be.

40. As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of seeking
condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may
be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be
explained by demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause” that resulted
in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the period
after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or
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application, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be
given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began
to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by
recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

c. The expression “within such period” cannot be conflated with “during
such period” or “for such period”.


41. We may now look into the decision of Rewa Coal Fields (supra), more
particularly the observations “ to hold that the expression “within such
period” means during such period would, in our opinion, be repugnant in
the context ”, made therein. Rewa Coal Fields (supra), in arriving at the
conclusion, that the expression “ within such period ” refers to the period after
the expiry of limitation, beginning from the last day of the limitation that has
been prescribed till the day on which the appeal or application is filed, had
held that, if the expression is interpreted to mean only the prescribed period
of limitation ending with the last day of limitation, then the same would
tantamount to reducing the expression “ within such period ” to “ during such
period ”, an understanding which is repugnant to the bare text as-well context
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

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42. With all humility at our command and with due deference if this is what was
in the mind of the learned Judges then we are afraid that is not the correct
position of law.

43. We shall discuss the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in detail, in
the latter parts of this judgment. For now, we shall test the meaning of the
expression “ within such period ” from the textual interpretation of the
provision.

44. Insofar, as the apprehension that Rewa Coal Fields (supra) harboured as
regards the expression “ within such period ” being conflated with “ during
such period ” if Section 5 is construed to mean that delay has to be explained
for the duration of the prescribed period of limitation, the same, to our minds
does not appear to be a correct understanding of the bare text of the provision.

45. No doubt, in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the legislature has not used the
expression “ during such period ” and instead, has consciously employed the
phrase, “ within such period ”, and thus, the expression cannot be solely
confined to mean only the prescribed period of limitation. To the extent of
the aforesaid, we are in complete agreement with Rewa Coal Fields (supra).

46. However, to say that the expression “ within such period ” has to then
necessarily be construed to mean only the period after the expiry of
limitation, beginning from the last day of the prescribed limitation till the day
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on which the appeal or application is filed, is not a correct appreciation of the
provision.

47. We must be mindful of the fact, that the legislature has consciously not
employed the phrase “ for such period ” within the provision so as to convey
that the period for which explanation has to be offered refers to only that
period which is in actual delay i.e., the period after the expiry of limitation,
beginning from the last day of the limitation that has been prescribed till the
day on which the appeal or application is filed, as has been inadvertently
understood by Rewa Coal Fields (supra).

48. If at all we are to go into the semantics of what has been used and what has
not been used by the legislature within the bare text of the said provision,
then we must also not ignore how the legislature refrained from employing
the phrase “ for such period ”. Merely because, the expression “ during such
period ” has not been used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is by no stretch
of imagination, a reason to construe that the phrase “within such period”
would cover within its ambit only that period which is in actual delay or
beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Had the intent of the legislature
been so, then it would have used the phrase “for such period” instead.

49. What can be discerned from the above discussion is that the meaning of the
expression, “ within such period ” cannot possibly be confined or restricted to
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mean any one extreme i.e., it can neither be construed to mean only the
prescribed period of limitation nor to denote only that period beyond the
prescribed limitation, sans the use of the phrase “ during such period ” or “ for
such period ”, respectively, by the legislature.

50. Thus, the only natural corollary that could be supplied to the aforesaid is that,
the phrase “ within such period ” must then necessarily be construed to refer
and encompass both; the original prescribed period of limitation as-well as
the period subsequent to its expiry, extending up to actual date of filing of
the appeal or application, as the case may be, i.e., the entire continuum
commencing from the point at which the limitation period first began to run,
until the eventual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. An
interpretation, which is also naturally apparent and forthcoming, when the
phrase “ within such period ” is read and understood in conjunction with the
expressions “ after the prescribed period ” and “ for not preferring the appeal
or making the application ”, as contained in the said provision.

51. We shall now look into the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, more
particularly the manner and the circumstances in which the court condones
the delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be.

d. The contextual import of the expression “within such period” with the
Canons of Law of Limitation.

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52. This Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) observed that since a party is entitled
to take its time and file the appeal or application, as the case may be, on any
day, during the prescribed period of limitation, it would be “ unreasonable
that when delay has been made by the party in filing the appeal it should be
called upon to explain its conduct during the whole of the period of limitation
prescribed ”. Although, it said that such consideration may be of relevance
for the purpose of deciding whether a particular case is one fit for the court
to exercise its discretion to condone the delay, yet the same would be a
question to be answered, only after sufficient cause is shown, as otherwise it
is of no significance, for the purpose of construing the period for which delay
has to be explained under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It further
elaborated that the general considerations of diligence of parties in pursuing
their legal remedies “ have very little relevance in construing the provisions
of Section 5 ” and that there cannot be any “ enquiry as to why the party was
sitting idle during all the time available to it ”.

53. It is for this reason, that this Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra), hesitated in
accepting the contention, that the period for which explanation has to be
given by demonstrating sufficient cause is the duration from the last day of
expiry of limitation leading up to the actual date of filing of the appeal or
application, as the case may be.

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54. We find ourselves, yet again, unable to agree to the aforesaid reasoning
assigned by this Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) for the reasons that we
shall assign hereinafter.

55. First, we must try to understand what was in the mind of this Court in Rewa
Coal Fields (supra) when it made the aforementioned observations as regards
examining into the diligence of parties for the purpose of condonation of
delay. What has been conveyed in so many words, by Rewa Coal Fields
(supra) is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, does not expressly lay down
parameters of bona-fides or diligence of the litigant, as opposed to Section
14 of the self-same Act, where the legislature has specifically employed the
words “ good faith ”.

56. What Rewa Coal Fields (supra) is trying to convey is that, if such parameters
which otherwise cannot be culled out from the text of the provision, can only
be read into “ sufficient cause ” that too for the limited purpose of deciding
whether the discretion to condone the delay be exercised or not, then such
parameters will be of no significance insofar as interpreting “ within such
period ” is concerned, for it is confined only to the “ sufficient cause ”, and if
that be the case, then the inaction of party for the entire prescribed period of
limitation, will too, be of no significance.

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57. Thus, the party would effectively be required to only come and explain the
delay in filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be, only from the
last day on which the limitation would have expired, till the actual date of
filing of such appeal or application.

58. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The object of limitation is
to put a quietus on stale and dead disputes. A person ought not to be allowed
to agitate his claim after a long delay.

59. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are
meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy
promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage
caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for
such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is
precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time,
newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal
remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each
remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending
uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. The law of
limitation is thus founded on public policy. [See: N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy , (1998) 7 SCC 123]
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60. The bedrock of law on limitation flows from two age-old Latin maxims;
interest reipublicae up sit finis litium and vigilantibus non dormientibus jura
subveniunt , which mean; “it is in the interest of the State that there be an end
to litigation” and “the law assists those who are vigilant, and not those who
sleep over their rights”, respectively. The former emphasizes that protracted
litigation puts a strain on the judicial system and undermines the law’s role
in dispute resolution, and so the public interest requires that disputes be
resolved in some final form rather than continuing indefinitely to drain the
resources of courts and the parties. While the later connotes that a person
who has slept on his rights may be denied enforcement of the same when the
resulting delay would cause an unfair prejudice.

61. What flows from the aforesaid is that the dominant objective underlying the
law of limitation is that any lis cannot be kept in a state of flux or uncertainty,
doubt or suspense. Public interest demands that at some point finality be put
to the litigation. It is in this context that the Limitation Act, prescribes the
specific points of time from which the period of limitation begins to run for
the institution of actions or recourse to litigation. On expiry of such period,
no action can be initiated save and except where the court condones the delay
for a sufficient cause. A party who is insensible to the value of civil remedies,
and who does not assert his claim with promptitude is denied the ability to
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enforce even an otherwise rightful claim. [See: DDA v. Tejpal & Ors ., (2024)
7 SCC 433]

62. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to Section 3 of the Limitation Act,
which reads as under: -
“ 3. Bar of limitation.—
(1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24
(inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and
application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed,
although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

(2) For the purposes of this Act,—
(a) a suit is instituted,—

(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is
presented to the proper officer;
(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his
application for leave to sue as a pauper is
made; and
(iii) in the case of a claim against a company
which is being wound up by the court, when
the claimant first sends in his claim to the
official liquidator;

(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall
be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have
been instituted—
(i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as
the suit in which the set off is pleaded;
(ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date
on which the counter claim is made in
court;

(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is
made when the application is presented to the proper
officer of that court.”

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63. Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for doubt that if a suit
is instituted, appeal is preferred or application is made after the prescribed
period, it has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or
defence has been set up. In other words, even in the absence of such plea by
the defendant, respondent or opponent, as the case may be, the court or
authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that
the suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation. Limitation goes to the
root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation, a
court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to
entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits. [See:
Noharlal Verma v. Distt. Coop. Central Bank Ltd., (2008) 14 SCC 445]

64. Section 3 sub-section (1) of the Limitation Act makes every proceeding filed
after the prescribed period , liable to be dismissed, subject however to the
provisions in Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. It mandates that it
would be the duty of the court to dismiss any suit instituted after the
prescribed period of limitation irrespective of the fact that limitation has not
been set up as a defence. If a suit is ex facie barred by the law of limitation,
a court has no choice but to dismiss the same even if the defendant
intentionally has not raised the plea of limitation. [See: V.M. Salgaocar and
Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao , (2005) 4 SCC 613 ]

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65. The above exposited fundamental pillars of the law on limitation, namely, (i)
that the sword of prosecution ought not to be hanging over an individual for
an indeterminate period and (ii) those who have been lethargic in
safeguarding their interests should not expect the law to come to their rescue,
are reflected in Section 3 of the Limitation Act, more particularly sub-section
(1) inasmuch as it enjoins a duty upon the courts to dismiss any suit instituted,
appeal preferred and application made, after the period of limitation
prescribed therefor by Schedule I irrespective of the fact whether the
opponent had set up the plea of limitation or not. It is the duty of the court
not to proceed with the application if it is made beyond the period of
limitation prescribed.

66. Thus, the Limitation Act is an embodiment of a clear legislative policy that
litigation must be commenced, prosecuted, and concluded within a definite
timeframe. Section 3 of the Limitation Act gives effect to this mandate in
categorical terms by obligating courts to dismiss every suit, appeal, or
application instituted beyond the prescribed period, irrespective of whether
limitation is raised as a defence. This provision is not a matter of discretion
but of duty, for it reflects the underlying public interest in ensuring certainty,
finality, and repose in legal disputes.

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67. Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act is only an exception to the aforesaid
unexceptionable rule. Likewise, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is no
different. It cannot be construed in isolation from Section 3 or from the
overarching rationale behind the said provision. When we say, that Section(s)
4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, which includes Section 5, is only an exception,
we do not for a moment say that it is an exception to the core axioms of
‘ interest reipublicae up sit finis litium’ and ‘ vigilantibus non dormientibus
jura subveniunt’ that underline the Limitation Act. The aforesaid form the
very jurisprudential underpinnings on why we even have prescribed periods
of limitation, and are the very basis for the existence of statutes on limitation
in every civilized country that has ever existed.

68. Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are only an exception insofar as the
mandate enshrined under Section 3 is concerned, which enjoins a duty upon
the courts to dismiss any suit instituted, appeal preferred, or application made
after the prescribed period of limitation. They as a matter of exception, enable
the courts to entertain a suit, appeal or application, filed even after the
prescribed period of limitation where the delay was owed to factors beyond
the reasonable control of the litigant. But this does not mean, that delays
occasioned or accompanied to some extent by negligence, inaction, or a lack
of care or vigilance of the litigant would also be liable to be excused, or at
the very least ignored by the court even if the delay in question happens to
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formulaically fulfil the statutorily prescribed parameters for excusing the
same.

69. To say otherwise, that Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act and by
extension Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is an exception to the rule requiring
litigants to be vigilant and diligent in their endeavours for pursuing legal
remedies, or that the negligence or inaction of a litigant during the prescribed
period of limitation have no place, insofar as Section(s) 4 to 24 are
concerned, would have a chilling effect of eradicating every basic tenet for
which a prescribed period of limitation exists and could result in manifest
injustice to those prejudiced by such laches or delays, if condoned. It would
tantamount to reducing Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act to tools for
subverting rather than effectuating the legislative intent to not excuse
negligence, inaction, or lack of diligence on the part of a litigant except where
the delay is occasioned by factors that lie beyond its reasonable control, and
thereby create a very skewed and distorted understanding of the Limitation
Act, where despite the aforesaid legislative intent being imbued in every
other provision of the Limitation Act, permeating across the scheme thereof,
the same would be discarded for a select set of provisions i.e., Section(s) 4
to 24, while being scrupulously enforced for all other provisions.

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70. Thus, Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, including Section 5, must be
understood in the broader framework of the law of limitation. They cannot
be construed as a gateway to overlook or overcome the sound principles of
‘ interest reipublicae up sit finis litium’ and ‘ vigilantibus non dormientibus
jura subveniunt’ that are the elementary constituents of the Limitation Act
and all its ideals. It is in the same breath that we say, that the provision of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, cannot be read in a manner which is either
derogatory to, or tends to dilute the aforesaid fundamental edifice of the law
of limitation to a mere ad-lib .

71. In this regard we may refer to the decision of this Court in Hameed Joharan
(Dead) & Ors. v. Abdul Salam (Dead) by LRs & Ors. , reported in (2001) 7
SCC 573 , wherein it was observed that the general policy of the law of
limitation encapsulated in the Limitation Act is to favour the use of legal
diligence. Expounding the maxim of ‘ vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura
subveniunt’ it was held that a court of law never tolerates an indolent litigant
since delay defeats equity. It further held that lapse of time is a species for
forfeiture of right. The relevant observations read as under: -
“14. Needless to record that engrossment of stamped paper
would undoubtedly render the decree executable but that does
not mean and imply, however, that the enforceability of the
decree would remain suspended until furnishing of the stamped
paper — this is opposed to the fundamental principle on which
the statutes of limitation are founded. It cannot but be the general
policy of our law to use the legal diligence and this has been the
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consistent legal theory from the ancient times: even the doctrine
of prescription in Roman law prescribes such a concept of legal
diligence and since its incorporation therein, the doctrine has
always been favoured rather than claiming disfavour. Law courts
never tolerate an indolent litigant since delay defeats equity —
the Latin maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura
subveniunt (the law assists those who are vigilant and not those
who are indolent). As a matter of fact, lapse of time is a species
for forfeiture of right. Wood, V.C. in Manby v. Bewicke (K&J at
p. 352) stated: (ER p. 1144)

“The legislature has in this, as in every civilized country
that has ever existed, thought fit to prescribe certain
limitations of time after which persons may suppose
themselves to be in peaceful possession of their property,
and capable of transmitting the estates of which they are
in possession, without any apprehension of the title being
impugned by litigation in respect of transactions which
occurred at a distant period,
when evidence in support of their own title may be most
difficult to obtain.””
(Emphasis supplied)

72. As aptly noted in Hameed Joharan (supra), lapse of time is a specie for
forfeiture of right, which is why where a litigant allows the limitation to
expire for any right or remedy, due to its own volition, be it in the form of,
inaction, lethargy, negligence or mistake, which could have been avoided, no
indulgence should ordinarily be shown by the courts in entertaining or
enforcing the assertion of such rights, de hors , the litigant otherwise
demonstrating a cause for such delay, which may as well also fit within any
of the parameters of the exceptions carved out within Section(s) 4 to 24 of
the Limitation Act.

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73. Thus, the reasoning of this Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) that the
parameters of ‘bona-fides’, ‘diligence’ or ‘inaction’ of the litigant have no
bearing on relevance for the purpose of construing Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, in the absence of any express language in this regard being couched in
the provision is flawed. These parameters flow directly from the maxim
‘ vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt ’ enshrined in the
Limitation Act, albeit to varying degrees depending upon the provision in
question, but by no stretch are they excluded from application, wantonly or
otherwise, in any provision thereof. Merely because the provision does not
explicitly lay down any of the aforesaid parameters cannot be construed to
mean that the legislative intent behind the provision also, was to not allude
to the same.

74. The legislature always speaks through the statute it enacts, and its intention
behind any provision or provisions thereof, is to be gathered from the
language used in the provision along with the avowed objects with which the
same came to be enacted. In construing or interpreting a provision, any
deviation from the legislative intent that backs the particular statute
containing the said provision cannot be done casually. Mere omission of few
stray words, does not detract or take away the lofty intent behind enacting
the statute and cannot always be interpreted to impute a contrary intent unless
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the same is apparent and supported by some other salutary object with which
such omission may have been made.

75. In this regard, it could be argued that the legislature may have intentionally
omitted the express mentioning of any of the aforesaid parameters pertaining
to party diligence in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to lay stress on two key
components of the law of limitation. First, that a party has a right to file an
appeal or application, as the case may be on any day within the prescribed
period of limitation and secondly, that the rules of limitation are not meant to
destroy or extinguish rights of litigants but only to curb deliberate dilatory
tactics.

76. If at all such was the intention behind the legislature, then the same is being
adequately subserved by virtue of the discretion bestowed onto the the courts
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

77. There was no need to exclude the applicability of these parameters from the
expression “ within such period ” or the overall provision of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, if all that the legislature intended was to ensure that expiry
of limitation should not result in extinguishment of rights of parties.

78. The legislature in its wisdom, has in order to lay emphasis that rights of a
party ought not to be defeated or relinquished by the expiry of limitation,
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conferred the discretion to courts to condone the same, subject to showing
sufficient cause.

79. But to read this entitlement to file the appeal or application, on any day of
the limitation, as instrument to construe the import of “ within such period ”,
would run counter to the object of limitation, which is to enthuse a sense of
responsibility and vigilance upon the litigants and avoid protraction of the
lis . It would, in our opinion, invariably give the litigants, a ‘free-pass’ to
resort to dilatory tactics for the substantial portion of the prescribed period
of limitation, with little to no consequence.

80. For illustration, any person, who is able to demonstrate that he or she, began
to take some steps towards preferring the appeal or making the application,
on the very last day of limitation, whereafter, he or she, ran into some snags
which otherwise, was a sufficient cause, for the subsequent delay, would be
entitled to condonation of the same. The courts in such a scenario, even after
being satisfied about the existence of a ‘sufficient cause’ may nevertheless
have the discretion to choose not to condone the same, but not for the reasons
of prior inaction of such litigant during the remaining period of limitation if
the dictum of Rewa Coal Fields (supra) is squarely followed. This is because,
Rewa Coal Fields (supra) also deprecates “ an enquiry as to why the party
was sitting idle during all the time available to it ” even after sufficient cause
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is shown to it, although not as a straitjacket formula, but still nevertheless
very rigidly.

81. On the contrary, recognizing the flip side of the proposition that rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties into the exercise of
discretion by the courts to admit any assertion of the same, after the
prescribed period of limitation, provided there is no inaction or negligence,
on the part of the litigant, rather than reading the same into “ within such
period ” or “ sufficient cause ”, to our minds, appears to be the least disruptive
interpretation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that would balance the
salutary object of any statute of limitation, in toto . It would not only ensure
that not even an ounce of dilatory tactics by a litigant is allowed to pollute
the streams of justice, but also curb the seriously falling standards of
diligence that the litigants today have towards assertion of their rights or
availment of remedies, and a growing tendency to leave things for the last
moment, at the cost of prejudice to other litigants, and without any modicum
of respect for the courts and judicial resources. At the same time, it will also
allow courts to save those rights and permit their enforcement or
adjudication, by a judicious exercise of their discretion in justified instances
of delays, that are not a byproduct or result of the litigant’s own inaction or
negligence.

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82. Thus, to our minds, the fixation by Rewa Coal Fields (supra) that “ within
such period ” covers only the period from the last day of limitation till the
actual date of filing, does not appear to be supported either by the bare text
of the provision or by the mere omission of an express contextual
concomitant, in the form of any parameters to avert to any inaction,
negligence or lack of diligence of a litigant under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, that could be suggestive of the legislative intent to avoid applicability of
such parameters for the condonation of delay thereunder.

83. We need not dwell any further on this. We may only say, that even in the
absence of any express mentioning of any of the aforesaid parameters, the
legislature’s intent is very limpid. The use of the prefix “ sufficient ” in Section
5 of the Limitation Act, itself for lack of a better word, sufficiently indicates
that the legislature was conscious of its use and import, and inherently
intends to convey the applicability of these parameters to these provisions.
Once it is clear, that such parameters of diligence or lack of any inaction etc.,
can be read into “ sufficient cause ” it can be no one’s case that, the same
would also not include averting to any inaction of the party during the
remaining period of limitation, and only to the last day of expiry of limitation,
as Rewa Coal Fields (supra) has understood.

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84. We say so, because both the expressions “ sufficient cause ” and “ within such
period ” are inextricably linked together. We have already alluded how the
expression “ within such period ” is to be construed. For the purpose of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the foremost requirement is to demonstrate
existence of a “ sufficient cause ” for the period covered by the expression
“ within such period ”, thereby meaning that, any inaction of the litigant
during the remaining prescribed period of limitation apart from the last day
of the limitation would be equally relevant for determining sufficiency of
cause or to be precise the lack thereof. To put it simply, if the inaction of a
party is relevant for the last day of the limitation to determine that there was
no sufficient cause as per Rewa Coal Fields (supra), then it would also,
invariably be relevant for the remaining period of the prescribed limitation,
as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation leading up to the actual
filing of the appeal, as the expression “ within such period ” used in Section
5, does not demarcate any difference between these intervals.

85. Rather, the expression “ within such period ” treats, ‘the prescribed period of
limitation’, ‘the last day of expiry of limitation’ and ‘the period after the
expiry of limitation till the date of filing’, as the same for the purpose of
condonation of delay, which is to say that, as long as there was a “ sufficient
cause ” continuing between all these three intervals, the court would have the
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discretion to condone the same, provided the sufficient cause is not the result
of negligence, inaction or lack of diligence of the litigant.

86. One another good reason that fortifies our mind to hold the aforesaid is due
to the very nature of the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The
said provision, as evident from its text, is only applicable in respect of
appeals or applications. Lis that arises from appeals or applications, more
often than not, do not partake the character of original proceedings. The
deliberations and contemplations that a party undertakes before availing the
remedy of the courts, is much lesser in threshold in case of appeals or
applications, than in proceedings of original nature.

87. The aforesaid unique distinction between the nature of original and appellate
proceedings for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, was
recognized by this Court in University of Delhi v. Union of India & Ors.
reported in (2020) 13 SCC 745 , with the following relevant observations: -
“25. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of 916 days
is twofold i.e. the non-availability of the Vice-Chancellor due to
retirement and subsequent appointment of new Vice-Chancellor,
also that the matter was placed before the Executive Council and
a decision was taken to file the appeal and the said process had
caused the delay. The reasons as stated do not appear very
convincing since the situation was of availing the appellate
remedy and not the original proceedings requiring such
deliberation when it was a mere continuation of the proceedings
which had already been filed on behalf of the appellant herein,
after due deliberation. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)
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88. It follows, that such appeals or applications, are generally preferred as
continuation of proceedings already instituted or within proceedings already
ongoing before a forum. In such instances, the degree of vigilance that is
expected is much higher, a party is required be prompt in making all possible
endeavours to take the next step by filing the appeal or application. The
inaction or laxity of the party in making such endeavours is all the more
significant for deciding if delay should be condoned or not, as, by the time
the stage of preferring the appeal or application, arises, it already has the
necessary knowledge to act upon quickly, by virtue of the prior or ongoing
proceedings. If despite it, a party chooses to wait till the very last date, it may
in all probability be the result of a deliberate action to dilate the proceedings
or the lack of any modicum of respect for the prescribed period of limitation.

89. Thus, the notion that a party who failed to timely avail its remedies, by way
of appeal or application, despite having sufficient awareness of the original
proceedings should be shown due deference in condonation of delay, and is
entitled to wait, without being questioned, till the last day of limitation, is
preposterous.


e. Decisions which Rewa Coal Fields (supra) failed to take into
consideration.

90. There are a conspectus of decisions, by this Court, which lay down that
general considerations of lack of diligence or vigilance, indolence or
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inactivity are of relevance for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
more particularly for both the expressions “ sufficient cause ” and “ within such
period ”. We need not discuss, all the decisions, and rather intend to only refer
and rely upon a handful of them.

91. In Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj , reported in (1954) 1 SCC
800 , a five-Judge Bench of this Court was inter-alia called upon to examine
Section 85 of the Representation of People’s Act, 1951, which is materially
similar to Section 5 of the erstwhile Limitation Act, 1908, which is pari
materia to its counterpart provision under the present Limitation Act. In the
said decision, this Court approvingly referred to a Full Bench decision of the
Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan reported in 1889 SCC
OnLine Mad 1 , to hold that the words “ sufficient cause ” in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act should receive “ a liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is
imputable” (emphasis). The relevant observations read as under: -

“Even if the matter had to be judged under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, it would have been a proper exercise of the power
under that section to have excused the delay. As was observed in
the Full Bench decision in Krishna v. Chathappan in a passage
which has become classic, the words “sufficient cause” should
receive “a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is
imputable to the appellant”. We have, therefore, no hesitation in
holding that the order dated 2-7-1952 is on the facts a proper one
to pass under the proviso to Section 85.”

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(Emphasis supplied)

92. Thus, as per the dictum laid by a five Judge Bench all the way back in 1954
in Dinabandhu Sahu (supra), considerations of negligence, inaction or want
of bon-fides, are relevant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, more
particularly for determining “ sufficient cause ”. Rewa Coal Fields (supra),
whilst making the observations that “ it would be immaterial and even
irrelevant to invoke general considerations of diligence of parties in
construing the words of Section 5 . .. If sufficient cause is shown then the court
has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This
aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant
facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may
fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the
discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be
limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify
an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available
to it” failed to take into account the earlier larger bench decision of this Court
in Dinabandhu Sahu (supra).

93. It would be apposite to refer to one another decision of this Court in Sitaram
Ramcharan Etc. v. M.N. Nagarshana & Ors. reported in 1959 SCC OnLine
SC 89 , which was, remarkably, rendered by the very same Bench that later
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rendered the decision of Rewa Coal Fields (supra). In the said case, the
appellants therein had filed applications for claim of overtime wages, that
they were entitled to receive on the strength of one decision of the Small
nd
Causes Court delivered on May 2 1952. However, since the applications
for claim of overtime wages, had been filed after expiry of the prescribed
period of limitation, an additional prayer for condonation of delay was made
under the second proviso to Section 15 sub-section (2) of the Payment of
Wages Act, 1936, which empowered the concerned authority to inter-alia
condone the delay was due to sufficient cause. The prayer for condonation fo
delay was rejected by the concerned authority and thereafter by the High
Court as-well.

In appeal, this Court placed reliance on Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, to construe the import of the term “ sufficient cause ”. Although, this
Court ambiguously observed that “ in dealing with the question of
condonation of delay ” the “ party has to satisfy the court that he had sufficient
cause” and “ this has always been understood to mean that the explanation
has to cover the whole of the period of delay ”, yet it never explained or
elaborated what duration of period would be covered. It did not allude
whether the same would include only the period from the last day of expiry
of limitation, till the date of actual filing, or only the prescribed period of
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limitation, or both, nor does the decision relied upon by it shed any light on
the same.
However, a closer look at the decision would reveal that, what was
in the mind of this Court was that explanation has to cover both the aforesaid
periods i.e., the entire duration from when the limitation period started till
the actual date of filing. Moreover, it also appears to have applied the general
considerations of inaction and lack of diligence of the parties for construing
“ sufficient cause ”. We say, so, because this Court held that the appellants
therein had failed to establish “ sufficient cause ” as they could not explain
nd
their inaction between May 2 1952 (which we may clarify, was the date
when the limitation period began to run) till the respective dates on which
they filed their applications, and thus, would be fatal to their prayer for
condonation of delay, and by extension the ultimate fate of their applications.
The relevant observations read as under: -

“4. [...] On May 2, 1952, the appellate decision delivered by the
Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, in the case of Ruby
Mills, however, construed Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and
Establishments Act and held that the employees falling under the
provisions of the said section were entitled to claim overtime
wages under Section 59 of the Factories Act. In other words, this
decision for the first time properly construed Section 70 of the
Bombay Act and held that the said section in substance extended
the provisions of Section 59 of the Factories Act to the employees
covered by Section 70.

xxx xxx xxx

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14. As we have already noticed the authority has held against the
appellants on two grounds, one that ignorance of law cannot be
a sufficient cause, and second that, even if it was, in fact the
appellants had not explained the delay made by them in making
the present applications after they knew of the decision in the
case of Ruby Mills on May 2, 1952. This latter conclusion is a
finding on a question of fact and its propriety or validity could
not have been challenged before the High Court and cannot be
questioned before us in the present appeals. Unfortunately it
appears that the attention of the learned judges of the High Court
was not drawn to this finding; otherwise they would have
considered this aspect of the matter before they proceeded to deal
with the interesting question of law raised before them.

15. Mr Phadke fairly conceded that he could not effectively
challenge the finding of the authority that no satisfactory
explanations had been given for the delay in question. He,
however, argued that the said finding would not effect the final
decision because, according to him, once it is held that ignorance
of law can be a sufficient cause, then the period until May 2,
1952, would be covered by the appellants' ignorance about the
true scope and effect of the provisions of Section 70 of the
Bombay Shops and Establishments Act. This position may be
conceded. It is true that the true effect of the said section was not
appreciated by either the workmen and Their union or the
employers or the authorities under the Factories Act, or even by
the industrial courts. But the question still remains whether the
appellants are not required to explain the delay made by them
after May 2, 1952. Mr Phadke says that it is not necessary for his
clients to explain this delay. His argument is that what the
relevant proviso really means is that if sufficient cause has been
shown for not making the application within the prescribed
period of six months then the application can be made any time
thereafter. The statutory bar created by the prescribed limitation
is removed once it is shown that there was sufficient cause for not
making the application within the said period; and once that bar
is removed, there is no further question of limitation and the
applicant cannot be called upon to explain the subsequent delay.
That is the effect of the argument urged by Mr Phadke on the
relevant proviso.

xxx xxx xxx
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 62 of 170


19. The proviso with which we are concerned has prescribed the
limitation of six months for the institution of the application itself,
and so the principle laid down in Lingley case can have no
application to the question which we have to decide. Indeed, the
present proviso is in substance similar to the provision in Section
5 of the Limitation Act and Mr Phadke has fairly conceded that
there is consensus of judicial opinion on the question of the
construction of Section 5. It cannot be disputed that in dealing
which the question of condoning delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act the party has to satisfy the court that he had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the
application within the prescribed time, and this has always been
understood to mean that the explanation has to cover the whole
of the period of delay (vide Ram Narain Joshi v. Parameswar
Narain Mehta. Therefore the finding recorded by the authority
that the appellants have failed to establish sufficient cause for
their inaction between May 2, 1952, and the respective dates on
which they filed their present applications is fatal to their claim.
That is why we think it unnecessary to consider the larger
question of law which Mr Phadke sought to raise before us.

(Emphasis supplied)

94. From the above, it is manifest that in Sitaram Ramcharan (supra) this Court
has in so many words, held that “ sufficient cause ” for the purpose of
condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would entail
explaining the existence of such “sufficient cause” within the prescribed
period of limitation till the actual date of filing of appeal or application, as
the case may be. It is also manifest that the general considerations of
negligence or inaction of the litigant during the prescribed period of
limitation would be equally relevant for the purpose of determining
“ sufficient cause ”. Thus, it appears that the very Bench which rendered Rewa
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 63 of 170

Coal Fields (supra) failed to refer to its own earlier decision in Sitaram
Ramcharan (supra).

f. Condonation of Delay entails Extension of Limitation and not
Exclusion.

95. Even otherwise, one another reason why we find ourselves unable to agree
with Rewa Coal Fields (supra) insofar as its observations as regards the
context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, may be understood
from one another angle.

96. The marginal note appended to Section 5 of the Limitation Act is titled
“ Extension of prescribed period in certain cases ”. The provision provides
that where an appeal or application, as the case may be, is not filed within
the prescribed period of limitation, the same may be admitted if “ sufficient
cause ” for such failure is shown. The court may, in its discretion, proceed to
condone the delay, if it is satisfied about the existence of such sufficient cause
that resulted in the delay. In doing so, the court condones the delay in such
filing by ‘extending’ the prescribed period of limitation in order to bring the
application or appeal, as the case may be, in the eyes of law, within the
limitation period, to then admit the same.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 64 of 170

97. What is pertinent to take note of is that the condonation of delay does not
result in exclusion of the period during which the sufficient cause persisted,
it instead talks about extension of the period from the date when the
prescribed period of limitation expired till the actual date of filing of the
appeal or application. This gives the very first clue, that the expression
“ within such period ” includes the prescribed period of limitation as-well. We
say so, because, when the court condones the delay, it only extends that
amount of period that would be required to bring the appeal or application,
as the case may be, in the eyes of law, within the limitation period. Even if
the “ sufficient cause ” occasioned on the very first day when the clock of
limitation began to tick, the court would effectively only extend for that
period, which was consumed after the expiry of limitation. Thus, the neither
the expression “ after the prescribed period of limitation ” nor the period
which is being extended by the court in condoning the delay, could be said
to be the sole constituent of the expression “ within such period ”.

98. It is no more res-integra , that for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, “ sufficient cause ” must have occasioned during the prescribed period of
limitation, and even Rewa Coal Fields (supra) concurs with the aforesaid,
although to the limited extent that, only the sufficient cause on the last day
of expiry of limitation is material.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 65 of 170

99. This Court in Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari reported in 1968 SCC
OnLine SC 139 held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act gives the courts a
discretion, where even if sufficient cause for the delay is made out, the court
may refuse to condone the delay. The relevant observations read as under: -
“ 7. The next question is whether the delay in filing the certified
copy or, to put it differently, the delay in refiling the appeal with
the certified copy should be condoned under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. If the appellant makes out sufficient cause for the
delay, the Court may in its discretion condone the delay. As laid
down in Krishna v. Chathappan “Section 5 gives the courts a
discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in
the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be
exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words
“sufficient cause” receiving a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor
want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant.”

(Emphasis supplied)

100. In Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Subrata Borah Chowlek, reported in (2010) 14
SCC 419 this Court reiterated that even upon showing a sufficient cause, a
party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it is
trite that in construing sufficient cause. The relevant observations read as
under: -
“6. Having heard the learned counsel, we are of the opinion that
in the instant case a sufficient cause had been made out for
condonation of delay in filing the appeal and therefore, the High
Court erred in declining to condone the same. It is true that even
upon showing a sufficient cause, a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it is trite that in
construing sufficient cause, the courts generally follow a liberal
approach particularly when no negligence, inaction or mala
fides can be imputed to the party.
(Emphasis supplied)
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 66 of 170


101. From the above discussion, it is clear that the period which is being
effectively extended is only ancillary to the “ sufficient cause ” that would
have occasioned. Even the bare text of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, makes
it abundantly clear that while “ sufficient cause ” has to be shown for the
duration covered by the expression “ within such period ”, nowhere does the
provision allude that the “period” which would be effectively extended by
the court, in exercise of its discretion for condoning the delay under Section
5 of the Limitation Act would be the period for which “ sufficient cause ” is
demonstrated. Rather, the expression “ may be admitted after the prescribed
period ” clearly indicates that it is only that period, which has been subsumed
after the expiry of limitation, as a result of the “sufficient cause” persisting,
which would be effectively getting extended by way of condonation. Thus,
while the expression “ sufficient cause ” and “ within such period ” are itself
inextricably linked together, both these expressions have nothing to do with
the manner in which the court proceeds to condone the delay i.e., the period
which the court extends in exercise of its discretion under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.


102. If the contention is accepted that “ sufficient cause ” has to be demonstrated
only for that length of the period that is required to be extended, in order to
admit the appeal or application, as the case may be, then it would result in
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 67 of 170

“ extension ” being conflated with “ exclusion ”. Although semantically both
may appear to be one and the same, and even the end-result that would ensue
if “ extension ” is read as “ exclusion ” would in substance be the same, as
ultimately it would be that period after the expiry of limitation till the actual
filing that would be extended or excluded to admit the appeal, yet there is
very fine but discernible difference between the two, which if not
appreciated, would completely warp the mechanism of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, as envisaged by the legislature.

103. If the court in condoning the delay in exercise of its powers under Section 5
of the Limitation Act is construed as excluding that period which was
consumed after the expiry of limitation, in order to bring it within the
“prescribed period of limitation”, for the limited purpose of admitting the
appeal or application, as the case may be, then this would bring one
significant change in how sufficient cause is to be demonstrated.

104. The net-effect of the aforesaid would be that, a litigant for seeking
condonation of delay, would only be required to demonstrate that “ sufficient
cause ” only for that amount of period which is necessary to be excluded so
that it is able to bring its appeal or application, as the case may be, within the
prescribed period of limitation. For illustration, say, the prescribed period of
limitation was 90-days, and the actual date of filing took additional 10-days.
Now, in such a scenario, if we read “ extension ” as “ exclusion ”, then
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 68 of 170

“ sufficient cause ” only has to be shown for the 10-days so that, once it is
th
excluded, his filing would be deemed as if it was filed on the 90 day.

105. Although the aforesaid, may not, on the surface seem like a drastic
consequence if “ extension ” is read as “ exclusion ”, yet, it would have an
underlying effect which would be contrary to the provision of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, which we shall now explain. If “ extension ” is read as
“ exclusion ” and a party is required to demonstrate “ sufficient cause ” only for
that duration necessary to be excluded, for the appeal or application, to once
again fall within the prescribed period of limitation, for it to be admitted, then
the entire exercise contemplated under Section 5, would in simple terms
involve showing “ sufficient cause ” such that after the exclusion, the litigant
is once again put back into the “ prescribed period of limitation ”.

106. In other words, if the above interpretation is adopted then the litigant would
only have to show “ sufficient cause ” for that period, which after excluding
would at the very least put him back into the outermost date on which he
could have filed the appeal or application i.e., the last day on which the
limitation would have expired.

107. However, the power that the court exercises in condoning the delay, is not
for the purpose of putting the litigant back into the position he would have
enjoyed during the prescribed period of limitation. This is because, during
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 69 of 170

the prescribed period of limitation, the litigant is entitled, as a matter of right,
to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, and the courts cannot
object or refuse to admit the same.

108. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, does not say that, once “ sufficient
cause ” is established and the court is also satisfied about the same, then the
appeal or application, has to be mandatorily be admitted. On the contrary, the
provision, by use of the word “ may ” lays emphasis that even after the court
is satisfied about the existence of a “ sufficient cause ”, it has the discretion to
decide, whether to admit the appeal or application, as the case may be, or not.
A catena of decisions of this Court including Rewa Coal Fields (supra) hold
that “ even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter of right ... if sufficient cause is
shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should
condone the delay ”.

109. If at all, what is contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is
exclusion of the period consumed after the expiry of limitation for the filling
of appeal or application, such that the litigant is put into the same position,
he enjoyed on the last day of limitation, or any other day within the prescribed
limitation, then where is the question of the courts still being able exercise
discretion for deciding to admit or not admit such appeal or application.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 70 of 170


110. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, also does not speak that the discretion
conferred to the courts is limited only for determining if sufficient cause
exists or not, and where it has in its discretion decided that such “ sufficient
cause ” existed, it has to then mandatorily condone the delay. As succinctly
put in Rewa Coal Fields (supra), even “ if sufficient cause is shown then the
court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay”.

111. The discretion that the courts have been conferred under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, is two-fold, for determining if “ sufficient cause ” existed and
where the former is answered in the affirmative, then whether the case is a
fit one for it to condone the delay, to admit the appeal or application as the
case may be. Which is why, the legislature consciously used the word
“ extension ” rather than “ exclusion ” in marginal note to Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.

112. To say, that the purpose for demonstrating “ sufficient cause ” is to exclude
only that extent of period which would once again put the litigant back into
the last day on which, he could have filed the appeal or application, would,
in our opinion, gravely misconstrue the entire mechanism of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. Thus, the expression “ within such period ” for this reason also
cannot be possibly construed to mean the period from the last day of expiry
of the limitation, till the actual date of filing of appeal or the application, as
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 71 of 170

understood by Rewa Coal Fields (supra). The phrase “ extension ” used in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not a misnomer.

113. It is for this reason that the decisions of this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur
(supra) and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) held that “ sufficient cause ” for
the delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, has to be
established by some event or circumstance that had arisen before the
limitation expired and that the party seeking condonation has to explain the
delay the entire continuum commencing from the point at which the
limitation period first began to run, until the eventual filing of the appeal or
application, as the case may be.

114. We may, with a view to obviate any confusion, clarify that the observations
made by this Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), particularly that “ what
events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence ” should
not be construed devoid of its context. When this Court in Ramkumar
Choudhary (supra) said that events after the expiry of limitation till the date
of actual filing would be of no consequence, the same was made in view of
the well-established rule that “ sufficient cause must be establish that because
of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired ”. The
aforesaid observations of “ what events occurred after the 91st day till the last
is of no consequence ” in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) were made in the
peculiar facts of that case, where the appellant had failed to assign any
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 72 of 170

“ sufficient cause ” occasioning during the period of limitation, which
rendered the events occurring after the expiry of limitation as irrelevant.

115. However, as is manifest from the entire discussion above, for the purpose of
condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay
has to be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the
entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of
filing. In other words, if the period of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is
th
filed belatedly on the 100 day, then explanation has to be given for the entire
100-days.

B. What is to be understood by “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the
Limitation.

116. As already discussed in the foregoing parts, for the purpose of seeking
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the party has to
demonstrate the existence of a “ sufficient cause ” “within the prescribed
period” to the satisfaction of the court. Thus, establishment of “sufficient
cause” is the first ingredient for the purpose of condonation of delay. Insofar,
as what is meant by the phrase “ sufficient cause ”, neither Section 5 nor the
Limitation Act itself provide any guidance on what its constituent elements
ought to be. Instead, Section 5 leaves the task of determining appropriate
reasons for seeking condonation of delay to judicial interpretation and
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 73 of 170

exercise of discretion upon the facts and individual circumstances of each
case.

117. While there is no arithmetical formula, through decades of judicial
application, certain yardsticks for judging the sufficiency of cause for
condonation of delay have evolved. Mere good cause is not sufficient enough
to turn back the clock and allow resuscitation of a claim otherwise barred by
delay. The court ought to be cautious while undertaking such an exercise,
being circumspect against condoning delay which is attributable to the
applicant. Although the actual period of delay might be instructive, it is the
explanation for the delay which would be the decisive factor.

118. The court must also desist from throwing the baby out with the bathwater. A
justice-oriented approach must be prioritised over technicalities, as one
motivation underlying such rules is to prevent parties from using dilatory
tactics or abusing the judicial process. Pragmatism over pedanticism is
therefore sometimes necessary, despite it appearing liberal or magnanimous.
The expression “ sufficient cause ” should be given liberal construction so as
to advance substantial justice.

119. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately
elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 74 of 170

of the institution of courts. Despite the liberal approach being adopted in such
matters, which was termed justifiable, this Court lamented that the message
had not percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy and,
accordingly, emphasis was laid on the courts adopting a liberal and justice-
oriented approach. [See: Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC
531 ]

120. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable
explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned
whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the
explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must
distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is
designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something.
It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person
to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really
not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an “explanation”
from an “excuse”. Although people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse”
as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two,
there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. [See: Sheo Raj Singh v.
Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531 ]


Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 75 of 170

121. This Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 , after
examining a plethora of decisions on what is meant by “ sufficient cause ”,
summarized its principles as under: -
“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can
broadly be culled out are:

21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented,
non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in
their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to
the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be
applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled
for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation
of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or
litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof
should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because
the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally
unfettered free play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a
delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of
prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 76 of 170

attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating
to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a
total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds
urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant
not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a
litigation.

21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with
fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to
the technicalities of law of limitation.

21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm
of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning
and not on individual perception.

21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing
a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines
taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be
drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner
harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone
delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on
merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be
dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual
philosophy which is basically subjective.

22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard
being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious
effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 77 of 170

adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.

22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters.


122. The exceptional provision of condonation of delay on grounds of “ sufficient
cause ” is couched as a manifestation of substantive justice. This Court in
Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. v. Special Deputy Collector (LA) ,
reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 , summarized the principles governing
the exceptions imagined under “ sufficient cause ” vis-à-vis substantive justice
as under: -
“ 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law,
as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident
that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there
should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to
remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or
availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to
exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict
sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot
be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation
contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone
the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that
exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not
be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for
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various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay,
negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it
does not mean that others are also entitled to the same
benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for
the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have
been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory
provision.”
( Emphasis supplied)

123. From above, it is manifest that that the phrase “ sufficient cause ” in Section
5 of the Limitation Act is an expression of elastic import, incapable of
precise definition, yet not without boundaries. Its purpose is to empower
courts to advance the cause of justice by preventing genuine litigants from
being shut out on account of unavoidable delays. At the same time, it is
equally clear that the phrase is not a charter for indolence or a device to
revive stale claims that the law of limitation otherwise extinguishes.

124. The burden to establish sufficient cause lies upon the party seeking
condonation, and the court must be satisfied that the cause is real, bona fide,
and free of negligence. Sufficiency of cause is to be determined
contextually, on the totality of circumstances, with due regard to the
conduct of the applicant and the prejudice caused to the opposite party. The
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inquiry is not mechanical but principled, resting on the dual pillars of bona
fides and diligence.

125. The expression “ sufficient cause ” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of
pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with
justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for
circumstances beyond their control.

126. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual
indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae
ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to
secure.

127. The expression “ sufficient cause ” must be construed in a manner that
advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation.
The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather
by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable
diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide,
plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned
towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual
approach is discernible, condonation has been refused.


Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 80 of 170

i. Length of the delay may be instructive but not determinative.

128. When it comes to condonation of delay, the length of delay is immaterial,
and what matters is the acceptability of the explanation. A short delay may
still warrant dismissal if unsupported by sufficient cause, whereas even a
long delay may be condoned if justified by circumstances demonstrating
bona fides.

129. Delay by itself is not inherently indicative of negligence. In certain cases,
unavoidable circumstances such as illness, fraud, miscommunication, or
bona fide mistake may stretch over long periods, yet remain excusable if
they are explained with candour and supported by material. Conversely, an
unexplained delay of even a few days may reveal inaction or deliberate
disregard of statutory timelines, and therefore disentitle the party to
indulgence.

130. The quantum of delay has no direct nexus in law with sufficiency of the
cause. The law are independent and diverse factors. Hence the extent of
delay should not determine whether the cause is sufficient or not. Section 5
of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only
if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter,
acceptability of the explanation is the criterion. The criterion for condoning
the delay is sufficiency of reason and not the length of the delay.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 81 of 170


131. The decisive factor is the adequacy of the cause shown, not the length of
delay. What is critical is whether the party seeking condonation acted with
reasonable diligence during the prescribed period and whether the reasons
advanced demonstrate a genuine inability to file within time. Thus, the test
is qualitative rather than quantitative.

132. This is not to say that the length of delay is irrelevant. A long delay naturally
casts a heavier burden on the applicant to furnish cogent, credible, and
convincing explanations. The proof required becomes stricter in proportion
to the delay. The longer the time elapsed, the stronger the justification that
must be put forth. Hence, length is instructive in determining the degree of
scrutiny, but it is not determinative of the outcome.

133. The length of the delay functions as a contextual indicator but not a
determinative factor. It alerts the court to the degree of rigour required in
examining the explanation, yet the ultimate focus remains on whether
“sufficient cause” has been shown. The doctrine thereby preserves both the
integrity of statutory timelines and the imperative of doing justice in
deserving cases.

134. Thus, in exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the
courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made
between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 82 of 170

of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to
the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious
approach but in the latter case, no such consideration may arise and such a
case deserves a liberal approach. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in
this regard. The court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case
keeping in mind that in construing the expression “sufficient cause”, the
principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance.

ii. Technical Considerations vis-à-vis Substantive Justice.

135. In construing “sufficient cause” it must be borne in mind that rules of
procedure are handmaids of justice. Procedural rigidity should not become
an instrument of injustice. In the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
this balance assumes special significance. Courts have repeatedly
underscored that while limitation provisions are founded on sound
principles of finality and certainty, their application cannot be divorced
from the overarching objective of ensuring that litigants are not shut out
from the doors of justice merely on account of technicalities.

136. When technical considerations of limitation conflict with the imperative of
substantial justice, the latter should ordinarily prevail. Rules of limitation
are not designed to destroy the rights of parties but to prevent inordinate
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 83 of 170

delay in seeking remedies. Thus, the interpretation of “sufficient cause”
must be liberal and purposive, aimed at advancing the cause of justice rather
than defeating it. This is why the courts, while construing applications for
condonation of delay, emphasize the bona fides of the applicant over the
sheer arithmetical length of the delay.

137. Where strict adherence to these rules results in injustice, the Court is duty-
bound to apply a liberal interpretation of “sufficient cause” so as to balance
technical requirements with the demands of justice. A litigant does not
stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late, and therefore, a pragmatic and
justice-oriented approach must inform the judicial discretion under Section
5. This decision continues to be the most frequently cited authority for the
proposition that the judiciary should incline towards justice rather than
technicality. Therefore, when courts interpret “sufficient cause,” they are
expected to exercise discretion in a manner that fosters justice, fairness, and
equity, keeping in mind the realities of litigation.

138. When a Court of Law deals with an application to condone the delay filed
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, such application will have to be
generally viewed in a liberal and lenient way to do substantial justice
between the parties. Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be liberally
construed and applied so as to advance substantial justice. It is undoubtedly
true that a justice oriented approach is necessary while deciding application
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 84 of 170

under Section 5 of Limitation. However, it cannot be said that in every case
delay must necessarily be condoned. It is a condition precedent for Section
5 of the Limitation Act that there must be a sufficient reason for condoning
the delay.

139. However, while substantial justice must be advanced, the law of limitation
is equally binding, and “sufficient cause” must be shown in substance, not
in empty form. This ensures that the balance between justice and certainty
is not skewed in favour of unmerited litigants.

140. However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on
merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for
condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to
whether “sufficient cause” has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal
or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the
underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look
into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries
between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication,
thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is
legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable
justification for the delay.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 85 of 170


141. Test of “sufficient cause” cannot be substituted by an examination of the
merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on
explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If
merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with
condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even
if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and
inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that
the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain.

142. Another practical reason why merits must not be considered at the stage of
delay condonation is that it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against
one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into
merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours
the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required
at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and
nothing more. This ensures that the ultimate adjudication of rights occurs
in a neutral and unprejudiced setting.

143. The law of limitation is meant to apply uniformly across cases, regardless
of the intrinsic strength or weakness of the claims involved. To import
merits into condonation proceedings would effectively dilute this
uniformity.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 86 of 170


C. In what circumstances can the exercise of discretion to condone the
delay be interfered with?

144. One another submission that was canvassed on behalf of the respondents
herein is that, where the court of first instance was satisfied as to the
existence of “ sufficient cause ” for not filing the appeal or application, as
the case may be, during the prescribed period of time and, on that basis,
exercised its discretion in condoning the delay, then, in such cases, a court
siting in appeal ought not to ordinarily interfere with the subjective view
and prerogative of the court below in condoning the delay.

145. Ms. Suri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted
that, in the present case, the High Court, whilst passing the impugned
judgment and order, was satisfied with the explanation given by the
respondents herein as to the existence of a sufficient cause which had
prevented them from filing the appeal within the period of limitation, and
that it was only after due consideration of all the material on record that the
High Court proceeded to exercise its discretion to condone the delay in the
filing thereof. She would submit that once the High Court, in its wisdom
had, found the case at hand to be a fit one for the exercise of its discretion
in condoning the delay, and had accordingly passed such an order, then this
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Court ought to refrain from interfering with the subjective view taken by
the High Court.

146. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel drew are attention to three
decisions of this Court in Sheo Raj Singh (D) Tr. Lrs. v. Union of India ,
reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 , Manjunath Anandappa urf. Shivappa
Hanasi v. Tammanasa & Ors. reported in (2003) 10 SCC 390 and Gujarat
Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha reported in (1980)
2 SCC 593 .

147. The expression “ may be admitted ” vests in the court a discretion, the
exercise of which is pre-conditioned to the proof of a “ sufficient cause ” for
the failure to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, within the
prescribed period of limitation. It enables a court to either admit or reject
any appeal or application, for being barred by limitation, even if “ sufficient
cause ” is shown to its satisfaction. The idea behind vesting the courts with
such discretion is to ensure that the power to condone any delay in the filing
of an appeal or application, as the case may be, is exercised only to advance
substantial justice, where no prejudice or injustice would meted from such
delay being condoned. Condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a
discretion of the court.

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148. The recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is
not an inter-parte proceeding. Condonation of delay essentially is a
question that the court has to decide on the basis of the material on records
and the relevant law. The role of the parties is only confined to brining on
record the relevant material to assist the court in exercising its discretion.
Unlike adversarial proceedings in a lis where competing claims and
counterclaims of parties are adjudicated, the adjudication under Section 5
is primarily inquisitorial in nature, with the court being called upon to
assess, on an objective consideration of facts and circumstances, whether
the explanation offered is sufficient and reasonable so as to warrant an
extension of time, from the material it has relied upon for furnishing such
explanation.

149. The Privy Council in Krishnasami Panikondar v. S.R.M.A.R. Ramasami
Chettiar reported in 1917 SCC OnLine PC 70 held that an order of a court
excusing the delay is not final or precluded from being questioned, and that
it is always open to reconsideration at the instance of the party so affected
by it. The relevant observations read as under: -
“It has been argued that the admission of the appeal by Sankaran
Nair, J., was final, and that the Division Bench had no
jurisdiction at the hearing of the appeal to reconsider the
question whether the delay was excusable. But this order of
admission was made not only in the absence of Ramasami
Chettiar, the contesting Respondent, but without notice to him.
And yet in terms it purported to deprive him of a valuable right,
for it put in peril the finality of the decision in his favour, so that
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 89 of 170

to preclude him from questioning its propriety would amount to
a denial of justice. It must, therefore, in common fairness be
regarded as a tacit term of an order like the present that though
unqualified in expression it should be open to reconsideration at
the instance of the party affected; and this view is sanctioned by
the practice of the Courts in India.”

(Emphasis supplied)


150. The aforesaid observations came to be endorsed by a Five judge-Bench of
this Court in Dinabandhu Sahu (supra). The relevant observations read as
under: -
8. [...] In this respect, the position under the proviso to Section
85 is materially different from that under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, under which an order excusing delay is not final,
and is liable to be questioned by the respondent at a later stage.
(Vide the decision of the Privy Council in Krishnasami
Pandikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar.)

151. In Shanti Prasad Gupta v. Dy. Director of Consolidation reported in 1981
Supp SCC 73 , this Court held since the issue, whether there is a sufficient
cause or not is a question of fact, where an order has been made under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the lower court in the exercise of its
discretion allowing or refusing an application to extend time, it cannot be
interfered with in revision, unless the lower court has acted with material
irregularity or contrary to law or has come to that conclusion on no
evidence. The relevant observations read as under: -
“ 3. We find that Contention (1) is not correct. The order against
which Gian Chand Bansari went in revision before the Director
did not fall within the purview of Section 9-A of the U.P.
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Consolidation of Holdings Act and, as such, was not appealable
under Section 11 of that Act. We however find a good deal of
force in the second contention of the appellant. Whether or not
there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay, is a question of
fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of a particular
case, and the proposition is well-settled that when order has been
made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the lower court in
the exercise of its discretion allowing or refusing an application
to extend time, it cannot be interfered with in revision, unless the
lower court has acted with material irregularity or contrary to
law or has come to that conclusion on no evidence. [...]”

(Emphasis supplied)

152. This Court in N. Balakrishnan (supra) held that once the court below
accepts the explanation of delay as sufficient, the superior court should not
disturb such finding unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly
untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. However, where the first court
refuses to condone the delay, there the superior court would be free to
consider the cause shown for the delay afresh to come to its own finding de
hors the conclusion of the court below. The relevant observations read as
under: -
“9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of
discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not
say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is
within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability
of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the
shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable
explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long
range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.
Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the
result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior
court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional
jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly
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untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different
matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such
cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause
shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court
to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion
of the lower court.

10. The reason for such a different stance is thus:

“The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the
dispute between the parties and to advance substantial
justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in
different situations is not because on the expiry of such
time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.””

(Emphasis supplied)

153. In Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini reported in (2003)
10 SCC 691 this Court held that the finding of the court below on the
question of availability of “ sufficient cause ” ought to be given weight and
should not normally be interfered with in superior jurisdiction. The relevant
observations read as under: -
“9. The courts have to adopt a justice-oriented approach
dictated by the uppermost consideration that ordinarily a litigant
ought not to be denied an opportunity of having a lis determined
on merits unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate inaction
or something akin to misconduct, disentitled himself from seeking
the indulgence of the court. The opinion of the trial Judge
allowing a prayer for setting aside abatement and his finding on
the question of availability of “sufficient cause” within the
meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of Order 22 and of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 deserves to be given weight, and once
arrived at would not normally be interfered with by superior
jurisdiction.”
(Emphasis supplied)

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154. A coordinate Bench of this Court in a recent decision of Sheo Raj Singh
(supra) speaking through Hon’ble Justice Dipankar Datta, held that there
exists a fine distinction between when a court is hearing application for
condonation of delay and when it is sitting in appeal over the exercise of
discretion granting condonation of delay. In the former, the only material
question is whether the delay be condoned or not, whereas in the latter the
question is confined to if there has been proper exercise of discretion in
favour of grant of such prayer. It further cautioned that a court of appeal
should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts
below. The relevant observations read as under: -
“33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are
not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in
appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the
prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former,
whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in
the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion
in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the
question. Law is fairly well-settled that “a court of appeal should
not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the
courts below”. If any authority is required, we can profitably
refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa,
which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes
Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha where it has been
held that:

“an appellate power interferes not when the
order appealed is not right but only when it is
clearly wrong”.”

(Emphasis supplied)

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155. In Manjunath Anandappa (supra) this Court reiterated that a court of
appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the
courts below. The relevant observations read as under: -
“36. It is now also well settled that a court of appeal should not
ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts
below.

37. In U.P. Coop. Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros., the law is
stated in the following terms:

“8. It is well established that where the discretion vested
in the court under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act
has been exercised by the lower court the appellate court
should be slow to interfere with the exercise of that
discretion. In dealing with the matter raised before it at
the appellate stage the appellate court would normally
not be justified in interfering with the exercise of the
discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had
considered the matter at the trial stage it may have come
to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been
exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial
manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken
a different view may not justify interference with the trial
court's exercise of discretion. As is often said, it is
ordinarily not open to the appellate court to substitute its
own exercise of discretion for that of the trial Judge; but
if it appears to the appellate court that in exercising its
discretion the trial court has acted unreasonably or
capriciously or has ignored relevant facts then it would
certainly be open to the appellate court to interfere with
the trial court's exercise of discretion. This principle is
well established; but, as has been observed by Viscount
Simon, L.C., in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Johnston

‘The law as to the reversal by a court of appeal
of an order made by a Judge below in the
exercise of his discretion is well established,
and any difficulty that arises is due only to the
application of well-settled principles in an
individual case.’”
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(Emphasis supplied)

156. In Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha
reported in (1980) 2 SCC 593 , this Court speaking through the inimitable
V.R. Krishna Iyer J. (as his Lordship then was), observed that “ an appellate
power interferes when the order appealed is not right but only when it is
clearly wrong ”. The erudite observations read as under: -
“73. While the remedy under Article 226 is extraordinary and is
of Anglo-Saxon vintage, it is not a carbon copy of English
processes. Article 226 is a sparing surgery but the lancet
operates where injustice suppurates. While traditional restraints
like availability of alternative remedy hold back the court, and
judicial power should not ordinarily rush in where the other two
branches fear to tread, judicial daring is not daunted where
glaring injustice demands even affirmative action. The wide
words of Article 226 are designed for service of the lowly
numbers in their grievances if the subject belongs to the court's
province and the remedy is appropriate to the judicial process.
There is a native hue about Article 226, without being
anglophilic or anglophobic in attitude. Viewed from this
jurisprudential perspective, we have to be cautious both in not
overstepping as if Article 226 were as large as an appeal and not
failing to intervene where a grave error has crept in. Moreover,
we sit here in appeal over the High Court's judgment. And an
appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not
right but only when it is clearly wrong. The difference is real,
though fine.

(Emphasis supplied)

157. However, the aforesaid observations must not be viewed in isolation from
the immediately preceding paragraph. The observations therein are
significant, for a holistic understanding. This Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes
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(supra) whilst holding the aforesaid, elaborated on when a court in appellate
jurisdiction may be compelled to interfere with the order of a court below.
It observed that where such order was vitiated by the fundamental flaws of
gross miscarriage of Justice, absence of legal evidence, perverse misreading
of facts, serious errors of law on the face of the order, jurisdictional failure,
and any other defects of like nature, the appellate court would be justified
to intervene. The relevant observations read as under: -
“72. Once we assume that the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to
enquire into the alleged misconduct was exercised, was there any
ground under Article 226 of the Constitution to demolish that
holding? Every wrong order cannot be righted merely because it
is wrong. It can be quashed only if it is vitiated by the
fundamental flaws of gross miscarriage of Justice, absence of
legal evidence, perverse misreading of facts, serious errors of
law on the face of the order, jurisdictional failure and the like.”

(Emphasis supplied)

158. Deciding whether there was any proper and judicious exercise of discretion
to condone the delay or not, is a slippery slope. Despite lengthy cautionary
tales from this Court of judicial restraint in wantonly interfering with the
subjective view of a court below, having been preached for time
immemorial, it is plausible for an appellate court to falter in adhering to the
same.

159. We are in complete agreement with the decision of this Court in Sheo Raj
Singh (supra) as regards the significance of the distinction in scope when a
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court is hearing application for condonation of delay and when it is sitting
in appeal over the exercise of discretion granting condonation of delay.

160. It is no more res integra that where a court below refused to condone the
delay, then the court sitting in appeal would be entitled to consider if delay
should be condoned or not afresh, notwithstanding the decision of the lower
court. However, some weight and importance would have to be given to the
reasons which swayed the court below from refusing to exercise its
discretion. Because refusal to condone the delay is also, nevertheless an
exercise of discretion to not exercise discretion. However, the scope,
available to the appellate court to substitute its findings in such scenarios
would enjoy a considerable degree of play in its joints.

161. However, where a court is sitting in appeal over the exercise of discretion
granting condonation of delay, it is only required to see if there was a proper
exercise of discretion by the courts below and if the same was for advancing
the cause of justice. But the question that we ask ourselves is, what is meant
by “proper exercise of discretion”? What does the enquiry into the propriety
of discretion encompass?

162. Proper exercise of discretion in condoning the delay connotes that the such
exercise was not improper or unwarranted. This as a naturally corollary
would open up an inquiry into the fundamental constituents or ingredients
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necessary for the exercise of power to condone delay. As such it would
require the appellate court to see if the sufficient cause had occasioned
during the prescribed period of limitation, if the explanation offered
inspires confidence, if the court below in construing “ sufficient cause ” had
ventured into extraneous considerations. Likewise, where a lower court’s
decision in accepting the “ sufficient cause ” is either contrary to the law or
suffers from any material irregularity or is vulnerable for lack of evidence,
then such an order condoning the delay would be a fit one to be interfered
with by the appellate court.

163. Thus, a two pronged inquiry is required by the appellate court; first, into
the existence of a “ sufficient cause ” and secondly, into the exercise of
discretion itself, where the first test is satisfied.

164. This would necessarily entail the appellate court to look into the material
on record, the contents of the explanation that had swayed the mind of the
court below. However, the extent to which the court sitting in appeal is to
look into the same is confined to ascertaining whether the view taken by
the court below is forthcoming and plausible or not. The observations “ but
if it appears to the appellate court that in exercising its discretion the trial
court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts
then it would certainly be open to the appellate court to interfere with the
trial court's exercise of discretion ” made in Manjunath Anandappa (supra)
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bolster this view. Thus, the appellate court must see if the material on record
inspires confidence for accepting the plea of “ sufficient cause ” and the
explanation offered in that regard for the entirety of the period from when
the limitation began till the actual date of filing. If the lower court had
accepted the explanation capriciously or without proper legal material to
support its decision, then the same may be interfered with.

165. However, we again at the cost of repetition, make it clear, that the entire
purpose this enquiry is only to see if the view that was arrived at by the
court below could have been taken by it, from the material on record, had
it been in seisin of the matter as a court of first instance, or had the court
below refused the prayer for condonation of delay. Once the appellate court
is of the opinion that the view arrived at by the court of below is plausible
and not contrary to the law, it would not be open for it to interfere with the
same, merely because another view is also equally plausible.

166. The role of the appellate court is limited to assessing the material on record,
and to satisfy itself that the order passed by the court below is not vitiated
due to any material irregularity, want of evidence, extraneous
considerations, failure to take into consideration any relevant fact, or being
contrary to the law of the land, which inevitably includes if the ingredients
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were met or not. It is to ensure that a plea
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of “ sufficient cause ” is not accepted superficially merely because some
explanation was offered by looking into the material that constituted such
sufficient cause.

167. Once, the material on record lend support to the view arrived at by the court
below, the enquiry of the appellate court into the material on record ends.
Thereafter, what remains to be seen is only the exercise of discretion by the
court below, which warrants a careful and delicate approach from the
appellate court. This is because acceptance of the explanation as a sufficient
cause is the result of a positive exercise of discretion and normally the
appellate court should not disturb such exercise of discretion, unless the
exercise of discretion was on wholly waterable grounds or arbitrary or
perverse.

168. In this regard, what the appellate court has to see is that the discretion that
was exercised by the court below, was not done in a mechanical or routine
manner and without any application of mind as to whether such an exercise
would advance the cause of justice or lead to miscarriage of justice. The
exercise of discretion must have been in a reasonable manner, and should
not have resulted in any grave prejudice to the other side. The test is to is if
the exercise of discretion was patently wrong or not, and ordinarily the
appellate court will be slow and circumspect to substitute its own opinion
on the exercise of discretion, once it is satisfied that the view of the court
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below in accepting the plea of sufficient cause was plausible. If it is found
that in exercising the discretion to condone the delay, the court below had
lost sight of a general rule or misdirected itself as to the applicability of the
rule, then it will be deemed to have misdirected itself as to the law
applicable to the case, and the appellate court will interfere and remit the
case or itself exercise the discretion.

169. To sum up, the appellate court cannot embark upon an inquiry to enter a
finding based on its likes or dislikes. The true test is to see, if it had been
up to the appellate court, could the delay have been plausibly condoned for
the same reason that was assigned by the court below, by looking into the
material on record to see if the ingredients of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act were fulfilled or not. If the ingredients of the provision is found to not
have been fulfilled, the appellate court can and ought to interfere with the
order of the court below.

170. However, if the aforesaid is answered in an affirmative, all that remains to
be seen is that the discretion that was exercised in condoning the delay was
not done mechanically, arbitrarily or capriciously, and was exercised for
the purpose of advancing the cause of justice. Only where the exercise of
discretion was clearly wrong, would the court sitting in appeal, interfere
with the same.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 101 of 170


D. There is no room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

171. The next submission that was advanced on behalf of the respondents herein
is that, in matters pertaining to condonation of delay, a certain degree of
leeway ought to be accorded to the Government and Public Authorities
owing to the innate complexities in the way the State apparatus functions.
The argument is that due to the inherent bureaucracy and involvement of
various departments of different hierarchy which are endemic to the
functioning of the State and its instrumentalities, unavoidable delays tend
to crop up even without any deliberate intention, and thus, the courts ought
to be pragmatic and liberal where the State or any of its instrumentalities is
seeking condonation of delay in the filing of the appeal or application, as
the case may be. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this
Court in G. Ramegowda, Major & Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition
Officer, Bangalore reported in (1988) 2 SCC 142 .

i. View on the subject of Condonation of Delay prior to the decision of
Postmaster General.

172. Prior to the landmark decision of this Court in Postmaster General v.
Living Media India Ltd. , reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 , the practice that
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was in place consistently leaned in favour of affording a degree of latitude
to the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay. The
rationale underlying such an approach was the recognition of the
peculiarities of governmental functioning, which, unlike private litigants, is
impersonal, heavily layered, and subject to multiple levels of procedural
clearances before culminating into a decision.

173. As early as in Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma ,
reported in (1996) 10 SCC 634 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court
emphasized that since the State represents the collective cause of the public,
any delay on its part ought not to be viewed through the same lens as that
of a private party. It observed that adoption of a strict standard of proof in
respect of the State or its instrumentalities, where no one takes personal
responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously, would lead to grave
miscarriage of public justice. Thus, it held that in such circumstances, the
correct approach to be adopted is to be pragmatic and condone the delay
without insisting upon explaining every day's delay. The relevant
observations read as under: -
“2. It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at
the behest of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain
the day-to-day delay. The transaction of the business of the
Government was being done leisurely by officers who had no or
evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes
personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously.
As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a
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decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take
expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This
case is one of such instances. It is true that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the
satisfaction of the court and in matters of Limitation Act made no
distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless
adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of
public justice. It would result in public mischief by skilful
management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. The
approach of the Court should be pragmatic but not pedantic.
Under those circumstances, the Subordinate Judge has rightly
adopted correct approach and had condoned the delay without
insisting upon explaining every day's delay in filing the review
application in the light of the law laid down by this Court. The
High Court was not right in setting aside the order. Delay was
rightly condoned.”
(Emphasis supplied)


174. Likewise, in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani , reported in (1996) 3 SCC
132 , this Court reiterated that some latitude must be shown to the State and
its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay. It observed that “ the
State represents the collective cause of the community ” and so a pragmatic
view ought to be adopted while dealing with applications for condonation
of delay filed by public authorities. It further emphasised that technicalities
of limitation should not result in grave injustice to the public interest,
especially where the delay was not tainted by mala fides. The relevant
observations read as under: -
“11 . It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more
than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court — be it by private
party or the State — are barred by limitation and this Court
generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay
finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits.
It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 104 of 170

are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in
an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying
for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on
account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and
passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less
difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the
State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic
that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow
pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to
table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay
— intentional or otherwise — is a routine. Considerable delay of
procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a
common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not
impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for
such default no person is individually affected but what in the
ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression
“sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with
pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the
technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's
delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the
functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant
to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-
oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits
unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate
standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis
private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient
cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute
legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are
involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require
adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or
give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of
decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued
by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be
made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State
cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The
individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether
he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application
since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal
machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered
from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days
in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for
condonation of the delay.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 105 of 170

(Emphasis supplied)

175. The above view came to be affirmed in the decision of State of Nagaland
v. Lipok AO , reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 , wherein this Court
acknowledged the bureaucratic realities that often account for delay in
governmental decision-making. It held that deference must be shown to the
fact that governmental actions are “ conducted by officers who cannot act
on their own but must obtain approvals at different levels ,” and thus, the
element of delay is almost “ inbuilt in the governmental decision-making
process .” Accordingly, it held that factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions requires
adoption of pragmatic and justice-oriented approach by the courts in
matters pertaining to condonation of delay. The relevant observations read
as under: -
“13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal
machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt
by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the
inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-
making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its
part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to
approve. The State which represents collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The
courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and
philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of
the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a
decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of
delay in presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned,
the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High
Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of
hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra [1987
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 106 of 170

Supp SCC 339] this Court had held that the court should not
adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application
for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was
condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal
in accordance with law.

14. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer [(1988) 2
SCC 142] it was held that no general principle saving the party
from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression
“sufficient cause” must receive a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the
appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice
where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona
fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In
litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another
aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually
affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public
interest. The decisions of Government are collective and
institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of
decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no
doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental
authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take
responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a
somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public interest was shown
to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of
its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-
purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what
constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might,
perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the
considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors
which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the
Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow
encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural
red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of
latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that
those who bear responsibility of Government must have “a little
play at the joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on
governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable limits
— is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered
unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
Government and private parties on the same footing in all
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 107 of 170

respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of
governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the
decision-making process. The delay of over one year was
accordingly condoned.

15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies
proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing
the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for
considerable time causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is
a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the
process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore,
certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals
brought by the State are lost for such default no person is
individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is
public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should,
therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented
approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause
for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar
to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental
conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of
pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court
should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly
without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid
by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict
standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate
level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether
any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or
whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the
officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for
settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt
action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the
appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses,
if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an
individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the
decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an
appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while
the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers
or servants.

16. The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana v.
Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132] and Special Tehsildar, Land
Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma [(1996) 10 SCC 634]. It was noted
that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 108 of 170

protract (sic) public justice, and it would result in public mischief
by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal.

17. When the factual background is considered in the light of
legal principles as noted above, the inevitable conclusion is that
the delay of 57 days deserved condonation. Therefore, the order
of the High Court refusing to condone the delay is set aside.”

(Emphasis supplied)

176. In Indian Oil Corpn. (supra) this Court held that although Section 5 of the
Limitation Act makes no distinction between the State and a private litigant
insofar as the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the court is
concerned, yet adoption of a strict standard of proof in case of the
Government, which is dependent on the actions of its officials, who often
have no personal interest in its cause, may lead to grave miscarriage of
justice and thus, certain amount of latitude may be permitted to them. The
relevant observations read as under: -
“9. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan [(2008) 14 SCC 582
: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 864] while observing that although no
special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in
similar circumstances is not shown to an individual suitor, one
cannot but take a practical view of the working of the
Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion
of its wheels, highlighted the following observations of this Court
in State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao [(2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC
(Cri) 906] : (Ahmed Jaan case [(2008) 14 SCC 582 : (2009) 2
SCC (Cri) 864] , SCC p. 588, para 11)

“11. ‘… 15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by
officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and
encumbered process of pushing the files from table to
table and keeping it on the table for considerable time
causing delay—intentional or otherwise—is a routine.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 109 of 170

Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process
of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore,
certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the
appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no
person is individually affected but what in the ultimate
analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression
“sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with
pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than
the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining
every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the governmental
conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption
of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process.’ [ As
observed in State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC
752, p. 760, para 15.]”

(See also Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma [(1996)
10 SCC 634] , State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC
132] .)

10. It is manifest that though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
envisages the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the court,
and makes no distinction between the State and the citizen,
nonetheless adoption of a strict standard of proof in case of the
Government, which is dependent on the actions of its officials,
who often do not have any personal interest in its transactions,
may lead to grave miscarriage of justice and therefore, certain
amount of latitude is permissible in such cases. ”

(Emphasis supplied)

177. In G. Ramegowda, Major (supra), this Court observed that public interest
suffers if appeals brought by the Government are thrown out due to the
lapse of the limitation period. Accordingly, it held that a certain amount of
latitude towards the Government is, therefore, not impermissible, for the
purpose of condonation of delay. The relevant observations made therein
read as under: -
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 110 of 170

“15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet
another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals
brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is
individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is
public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and
institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of
decisions of private individuals.

16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private
citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any
other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of
its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to
the matter where Government makes out a case where public
interest was shown to have suffeed owing to acts of fraud or bad
faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers
were clearly at cross-purposes with it.

17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes
“sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps,
be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that
go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to
and characteristic of the functioning of the government.
Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as
they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is,
therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear
responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the
joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental
functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is necessary
if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It
would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and
private parties on the same footing in all respects in such
matters. [...] ”
(Emphasis supplied)

178. What can be discerned from the aforesaid is that, the position of law, as it
originally stood, was that there existed a marked difference in a case where
the delay was attributable to a private litigant and a case where the delay
was occasioned on part of the State or its instrumentalities. This distinction
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 111 of 170

was founded on the impersonal character of public authorities, where no
one public officer has any vested individual interest in diligently espousing
the State’s cause. This resultantly rendered the actions of the State and its
instrumentalities qualitatively different from those of private individuals
who are motivated to act in their own cause.

179. Unlike a private litigant, where the State or any of its instrumentalities
happens to be the litigant in a lis , the decision to prefer an appeal or file an
application is seldom the result of a singular will; rather, it emerges from a
collective exercise involving procedural compliance, legal opinion,
administrative authorisation and responsible officers bound by rigid
protocols and established hierarchies. Consequently, it was an accepted
norm that unavoidable delays would inevitably arise in its litigation, not out
of any want of diligence or mala fides, but as a by-product of the
bureaucratic processes.

180. One another reason why this distinction assumed significances was for the
reason that, if the cause espoused by the Government is non-suited merely
on the ground of delay, the ultimate prejudice is not restricted just to the
Government as a litigant. The real brunt of such dismissal falls upon the
public at large, for it is the public exchequer and, consequently, public
interest that stand to suffer. Unlike in the case of private parties, where the
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 112 of 170

consequences of dismissal may remain confined to the litigants themselves,
the dismissal of a proceeding initiated by the State has a cascading effect,
as it directly impacts the community whose interests the State represents.
Adoption of a rigid and uncompromising standard towards the State in
matters of condonation of delay, would, in substance, punish the public for
delays that are occasioned by systemic and institutional constraints rather
than by deliberate inaction or negligence.

181. It is in light of the aforesaid, the understanding which prevailed was that,
for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in cases where
condonation of delay is sought by the State or any of its instrumentalities,
there the courts should not apply the standard of strict scrutiny that is
ordinarily applied to private parties. Instead, a pragmatic approach must be
adopted that acknowledges the practical realities of governmental
functioning and accords some latitude to the State, consistent with the
maxim; ‘ lex non cogit ad impossibilia’ i.e., the law does not compel the
impossible. The courts ought to remain mindful of the proverbially slow
pace at which governmental decisions often move, weighed down by
procedural encumbrances and institutional delays. A certain degree of
latitude, therefore, must be extended to the State and its instrumentalities in
matters concerning the condonation of delay, lest the rigidity of limitation
operate to the detriment of public interest.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 113 of 170


182. The ultimate test that was evolved whether substantial justice would suffer
if condonation were denied. Thus, the balance was tilted in favour of
condonation when the litigant was the State, as denial could prejudice
public interest, frustrate legitimate claims, or impact the public exchequer.
The jurisprudence therefore evolved to give primacy to public interest over
procedural rigidity .

183. However, the aforesaid understanding was never intended to be accepted as
an immutable proposition or treated as gospel truth. This is particularly
evident from a catena of other decisions of this Court that were rendered
around the same time.

184. Long before the decision of K.V. Ayisumma (supra) this Court in State of
W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality reported in (1972) 1 SCC
366 had observed that irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government
entity or a private person, the provisions of law applicable are the same and
as such same consideration that is shown by courts to a private party when
he claims the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should also be
adopted towards the State. The expression “ sufficient cause ” cannot be
construed too liberally, merely because the party is the Government and the
courts are not bound to accept readily whatever has been stated on behalf
of the State to explain the delay. The relevant observations read as under: -
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 114 of 170

“26. The legal position when a question arises under Section 5
of the Limitation Act is fairly well-settled. It is not possible to lay
down precisely as to what facts or matters would constitute
“sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. But it
may be safely stated that the delay in filing an appeal should not
have been for reasons which indicate the party's negligence in
not taking necessary steps, which he could have or should have
taken. Here again, what would be such necessary steps will again
depend upon the circumstances of a particular case and each
case will have to be decided by the courts on the facts and
circumstances of the case. Any observation of an illustrative
circumstance or fact will only tend to be a curb on the free
exercise of the judicial mind by the Court in determining whether
the facts and circumstances of a particular case amount to
“sufficient cause” or not. It is needless to emphasise that courts
have to use their judicial discretion in the matter soundly in the
interest of justice.

27. Mr D. Mukherji, learned Counsel for the first respondent, is
certainly well-founded in his contention that the expression
“sufficient cause” cannot be construed too liberally, merely
because the party is the Government. It is no doubt true that
whether it is a Government or a private party, the provisions of
law applicable are the same, unless the statute itself makes any
distinction. But it cannot also be gainsaid that the same
consideration that will be shown by courts to a private party
when he claims the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act
should also be available to the State.

28. In the case before us, it must be stated in fairness to the
learned Solicitor General that he has not contended that the State
must be treated differently. On the other hand, his contention is
that the reasons given by the appellant, which, according to him
will establish “sufficient cause” have not at all been adverted to,
much less, considered by the High Court. In our opinion, the
contention of the learned Solicitor General is perfectly justified
in the circumstances of this case. The High Court, certainly, was
not bound to accept readily whatever has been stated on behalf
of the State to explain the delay. But, it was the duty of the High
Court to have scrutinised the reasons given by the State and
considered the same on merits and expressed an opinion, one
way or the other. That, unfortunately, is lacking in this case.”

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 115 of 170

(Emphasis supplied)

185. Similarly in Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P. reported in 2011 SCC
OnLine SC 403 this Court deprecated the High Court in condoning the
delay in filing of the appeal therein, that was occasioned not by any
unavoidable circumstance, but by the sheer inefficiency and ineptitude of
the Government Pleaders concerned, merely because the party seeking
condonation happened to be the State. In doing so, this Court observed that
concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”,
“substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation, particularly in cases where the court concludes that there is no
justification for the delay. The relevant observations read as under: -
“26. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court
proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a course
was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation
offered by the respondents in the application seeking
condonation of delay. This is especially so in view of the remarks
made by the High Court about the delay being caused by the
inefficiency and ineptitude of the Government Pleaders.

27. The displeasure of the Court is patently apparent from the
impugned order itself. In the opening paragraph of the impugned
order the High Court has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the
Government Pleaders as without merit and ability. Such an
insinuation is clearly discernable from the observation that,
“This is a classic case, how the learned Government Pleaders
appointed on the basis of merit and ability (emphasis supplied)
are discharging their function protecting the interest of their
clients.” Having said so, the High Court, graphically narrated
the clear dereliction of duty by the Government Pleaders
concerned in not pursuing the appeal before the High Court
diligently. The High Court has set out the different stages at
which the Government Pleaders had exhibited almost culpable
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 116 of 170

negligence in performance of their duties. The High Court found
the justification given by the Government Pleaders to be
unacceptable. Twice in the impugned order, it was recorded that
in the normal course, the applications would have been thrown
out without having a second thought in the matter. Having
recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the High Court
proceeds to condone the unconscionable delay.

28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could
have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding
the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal
approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice”
cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.
Especially, in cases where the court concludes that there is no
justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted
by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance
and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst
adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to
notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere
intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant
sarcasms.”
(Emphasis supplied)
186. It is also not out of place to mention that the observations made by this
Court in the decisions of Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra) as
regards the distinction between the State or any of its instrumentalities vis-
à-vis a private individual, for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, should be understood in its proper context and true spirit.

187. This Court in Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra) explicitly held
that the State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be put on the same
footing as a private party for the purposes of condonation of delay under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It observed that an individual would always
be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 117 of 170

of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the
State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants,
bound by bureaucratic methodology. Thus, it held that although equality
before law is sacrosanct, equality does not mandate a refusal to recognise
institutional realities.

188. However, what is equally significant to note is that the aforesaid
observations of this Court in Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra)
were accompanied by a clear message to the State and all its
instrumentalities, that a leisurely and lethargic approach cannot continue
for all times to come. It had urged the State and all public authorities to
constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are
involved for decision by the courts, if not then then endeavour should be
made towards arriving at a settlement instead, rather than reagitating the
belated causes before the courts. It further observed that where the case
requires an appeal or application to be filed, despite the delay, then prompt
action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he
should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any.

189. This was followed by Indian Oil Corpn (supra) wherein this Court sowed
the seeds for the shift in approach of the courts in matters where
condonation of delay was sought by the State or its instrumentalities,
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 118 of 170

inasmuch as it held that the Government and its various functionaries
cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants, and held
that the pragmatic and justice-oriented approach of the courts should be
confined only to cases where there was no gross negligence or deliberate
inaction on part of the State.

190. From the aforesaid, it is manifest that prior to the decision of this Court in
Postmaster General (supra), the approach was characterised by judicial
sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of
condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At
the same time, there also existed contrary views such as Administrator,
Howrah Municipality (supra) and Lanka Venkateswarlu (supra) which
held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a
private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and
any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same.

191. Even in the decisions of Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra)
where this Court recognized the necessity for drawing a demarcation
between a State or any of its instrumentalities, on the one hand and a private
individual, on the other, for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
this Court simultaneously observed that such differential treatment cannot
continue for all times to come. We say so, because this Court, in the latter
parts of the aforesaid decisions, conveyed an emphatic message to all the
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 119 of 170

States and its instrumentalities to constitute legal cells for the timely
scrutiny of its cases, to explore the possibility of settlement instead of
pursuing belated claims, wherever possible and to ensure that filing of
appeals or application as the case may be, is undertaken expeditiously, and
the officer responsible for pursuing such action is made personally liable
for lapses, if any.

ii. Shift in jurisprudence on Condonation of Delay after the decision of
Postmaster General.

192. However, despite the aforementioned exhortations of this Court in
Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra), the same largely remained
unheeded as the State and its instrumentalities continued to approach the
courts after significant delays under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as
though it were a license for indolence and institutional lethargy.

193. It was in this backdrop, particularly, the persistent disregard to the laws of
limitation by the States and its instrumentalities that compelled this Court
in Postmaster General (supra) to deviate from the earlier practice of
extending unwarranted leniency governmental agencies, and to emphasise
that the law of limitation binds the State no less than the ordinary litigant.
The said decision is in three parts: -
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 120 of 170

(i) First, This Court held that claims of the Government and its
functionaries being an impersonal machinery and inherited with
bureaucratic methodology can no longer be accepted to excuse
delays under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in view of the modern
technologies being used and available. The relevant observations
read as under: -
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were
well aware or conversant with the issues involved
including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up
the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this
Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate
period of limitation when the Department was possessed
with competent persons familiar with court proceedings.
In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation,
we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned
mechanically merely because the Government or a wing
of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter
of condonation of delay when there was no gross
negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a
liberal concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and
circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of
various earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted
in view of the modern technologies being used and
available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody, including the Government.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 121 of 170

(ii) Secondly , this Court in Postmaster General (supra) held that it was
high time that the practice of condoning delay merely because the
litigant is a government entity was done away with, and that delay
should be condoned only where there is a reasonable and acceptable
explanation for such delay and was accompanied by a bona fide
effort. It further observed that the usual explanation of bureaucratic
inefficiency and of procedural red tapism can no longer be accepted.
The relevant observations read as under: -
“29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities
that unless they have reasonable and acceptable
explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort,
there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the
file was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
process.”
(Emphasis supplied)


(iii) Lastly, as regards the earlier line of thought that if meritorious causes
advanced by the State or any of its instrumentalities are dismissed on
the ground of delay, the resultant hardship would ultimately fall upon
the public exchequer and thereby the public at large, was
emphatically rejected by this Court. It held that condonation of delay
is a matter of exception and cannot be treated as an anticipated
privilege accruing to governmental bodies by reason of their
hierarchical structure or bureaucratic methodology. The law shelters
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 122 of 170

everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few. Thus, the plea of public interest cannot by any
stretch be used as a carte blanche for official inaction. It observed
that Government departments, far from being entitled to presumptive
indulgence, are in fact under a higher obligation to discharge their
functions with diligence, vigilance, and scrupulous regard to
limitation. The relevant observations read as under: -
“29. [...] The government departments are under a
special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties
with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is
an exception and should not be used as an anticipated
benefit for the government departments. The law shelters
everyone under the same light and should not be swirled
for the benefit of a few.”
(Emphasis supplied)

194. In Amalendu Kumar Bera v. State of West Bengal reported in (2013) 4
SCC 52 this Court held that although a liberal approach is to be adopted in
matters of condonation of delay, such indulgence cannot be extended in
cases where the delay is attributable to serious laches or negligence on the
part of the State. Delays as a result of the official business of the
government requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective.
It held that delay should not be condoned mechanically in the absence of
“ sufficient cause ” merely because the party happens to be the State. The
relevant observations read as under: -
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 123 of 170

“9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent
State. There is no dispute that the expression “sufficient cause”
should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented
approach rather than the technical detection of “sufficient
cause” for explaining every day's delay. However, it is equally
well settled that the courts albeit liberally considered the prayer
for condonation of delay but in some cases the court may refuse
to condone the delay inasmuch as the Government is not accepted
to keep watch whether the contesting respondent further put the
matter in motion. The delay in official business requires its
pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a recent
decision in Union of India v. Nripen Sarma [(2013) 4 SCC 57 :
AIR 2011 SC 1237] the matter came up against the order passed
by the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the
appellant Union of India. The High Court refused to condone the
delay on the ground that the appellant Union of India took their
own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment
should be appealed or not. The High Court also expressed its
anguish and distress with the way the State conducts the cases
regularly in filing the appeal after the same became operational
and barred by limitation.

10. In the instant case as noticed above, admittedly earlier
objection filed by the respondent State under Section 47 of the
Code was dismissed on 17-8-2010. Instead of challenging the
said order the respondent State after about one year filed another
objection on 15-9-2011 under Section 47 of the Code which was
finally rejected by the executing court. It was only after a writ of
attachment was issued by the executing court that the respondent
preferred a civil revision against the first order dated 17-8-2010
along with a petition for condonation of delay. Curiously enough
in the application for condonation of delay no sufficient cause
has been shown which would entitle the respondent to get a
favourable order for condonation of delay. True it is, that courts
should always take liberal approach in the matter of condonation
of delay, particularly when the appellant is the State but in a case
where there are serious laches and negligence on the part of the
State in challenging the decree passed in the suit and affirmed in
appeal, the State cannot be allowed to wait to file objection under
Section 47 till the decree-holder puts the decree in execution. As
noticed above, the decree passed in the year 1967 was in respect
of declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 124 of 170

respondent State from interfering with the possession of the suit
property of the appellant-plaintiff. It is evident that when the
State tried to interfere with possession the decree-holder had no
alternative but to levy the execution case for execution of the
decree with regard to interference with possession. In our
opinion their delay in filing the execution case cannot be a
ground to condone the delay in filing the revision against the
order refusing to entertain objection under Section 47 CPC. This
aspect of the matter has not been considered by the High Court
while deciding the petition for condoning the delay. Merely
because the respondent is the State, delay in filing the appeal or
revision cannot and shall not be mechanically considered and in
the absence of “sufficient cause” delay shall not be condoned.”

(Emphasis supplied)

195. The view taken in the decision of Postmaster General (supra) also came to
be endorsed and followed by this Court in State of U.P. v. Amar Nath
Yadav reported in (2014) 2 SCC 422 .

196. In State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Bherulal reported in (2020) 10 SCC
654 this Court expressed its deep anguish over the routine manner in which
the State and its instrumentalities continue to seek condonation of delay on
the pretext of bureaucratic inefficiencies. It held that the earlier decisions
that had afforded a degree of leeway for such inefficiencies no longer
reflects the correct position of law insofar as condonation of delay is
concerned. This Court held that in view of the decision of Postmaster
General (supra), any delay as a result of unavailability of the documents or
the process of arranging for them through bureaucratic process works is no
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 125 of 170

longer an acceptable reason or excuse to condone such delay. The relevant
observations read as under: -
“2. We are constrained to pen down a detailed order as it
appears that all our counselling to the Government and
government authorities has fallen on deaf ears i.e. the Supreme
Court of India cannot be a place for the Governments to walk in
when they choose ignoring the period of limitation prescribed.
We have raised the issue that if the government machinery is so
inefficient and incapable of filing appeals/petitions in time, the
solution may lie in requesting the legislature to expand the time
period for filing limitation for government authorities because of
their gross incompetence. That is not so. Till the statute subsists,
the appeals/petitions have to be filed as per the statutes
prescribed.

3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government
inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on
relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when
technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to
the Government [LAO v. Katiji]. This position is more than
elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster
General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [...]

4. A reading of the aforesaid application shows that the reason
for such an inordinate delay is stated to be only “due to
unavailability of the documents and the process of arranging the
documents”. In para 4, a reference has been made to
“bureaucratic process works, it is inadvertent that delay
occurs”.

xxx xxx xxx

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being
adopted in what we have categorised earlier as “certificate
cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of
dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue
and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest
Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality
and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a
process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly
deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 126 of 170

improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain
such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time
when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the
consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is
taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It
is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in
making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address
on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as
happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he
must first address us on the question of limitation.

(Emphasis supplied)

197. This Court in Bherulal (supra) further cautioned that where any public
authority persists in approaching the courts for condonation of delay on
such feeble and untenable grounds would not only be denied the indulgence
of condonation but would also be imposed with costs for wastage of judicial
time. The relevant observations read as under: -
7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to
do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays
that the Government or State authorities coming before us must
pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such
costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.

(Emphasis supplied)

198. This Court in University of Delhi v. Union of India , reported in (2020) 13
SCC 745 held that consideration for condonation of delay under Section 5
of the Limitation Act does not and cannot vary depending on the identity or
status of the party, whether it be the Government, a public body, or a private
litigant, so as to apply a different yardstick. The ultimate consideration
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 127 of 170

should be to render even-handed justice to the parties, irrespective of their
status. Furthermore, any explanation which betrays a casual or indifferent
approach on the part of the Government or its instrumentalities,
demonstrating a lack of regard for the mandate of limitation, cannot be
excused or condoned merely by invoking the impersonal character of
bureaucratic decision-making. The relevant observations read as under: -
“23. From a consideration of the view taken by this Court
through the decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by
and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of
condonation of delay. The consideration for condonation of delay
would not depend on the status of the party, namely, the
Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different
yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render
even-handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the
condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the
accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party
is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while
considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would
not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating
“sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the
backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by
the courts based on the fact situation. In Katiji [LAO v. Katiji,
(1987) 2 SCC 107] the entire conspectus relating to condonation
of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be
lost sight of is that the consideration therein was in the
background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation
of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted
against the consideration that was required to be made on merits
regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to
800%.

24. As against the same, the delay in the instant facts in filing the
LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can
be made only if there is reasonable explanation and the
condonation cannot be merely because the appellant is public
body. The entire explanation noticed above, depicts the casual
approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 128 of 170

of the position of law. That apart when there is such a long delay
and there is no proper explanation, laches would also come into
play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has
proceeded before filing an appeal. In addition in the instant facts
not only the delay and laches in filing the appeal is contended on
behalf of the respondents seeking dismissal of the instant appeal
but it is also contended that there was delay and laches in filing
the writ petition itself at the first instance from which the present
appeal had arisen. In that view, it would be necessary for us to
advert to those aspects of the matter and notice the nature of
consideration made in the writ petition as well as the LPA to
arrive at a conclusion as to whether the High Court was
justified.”
(Emphasis supplied)

199. A similar view was iterated in Government of Maharashtra (Water
Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse
Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2021) 6 SCC
460 wherein this Court placing reliance on Postmaster General (supra) held
that a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down
merely because the Government is involved. The relevant observations read
as under: -
“59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a
different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down.
This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living
Media (India) Ltd.”

200. In State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sunanda Mahakuda reported in (2021) 11
SCC 560 this Court held that the leeway which was earlier enjoyed by the
State and its instrumentalities on account of bureaucratic inefficiencies in
matters of condonation of delay is no longer available in view of the
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 129 of 170

technological advancement and the shift in jurisprudence as elucidated in
Postmaster General (supra). It observed that no case under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act could be said to be made out where there is no reason or
excuse given in respect of the period for which condonation is sought. The
relevant observations read as under: -
“3. A reading of the aforesaid shows that there is no reason much
less sufficient and cogent reason assigned to explain the delay
and the application has also been preferred in a very casual
manner. We may notice that there are number of orders of this
State Government alone which we have come across where
repeatedly matters are being filed beyond the period of limitation
prescribed. We have been repeatedly discouraging such
endeavours where the Governments seem to think that they can
walk in to the Supreme Court any time they feel without any
reference to the period of limitation, as if the statutory Law of
Limitation does not exist for them.

4. There is no doubt that these are cases including the present
one where the Government machinery has acted in an inefficient
manner or it is a deliberate endeavour. In either of the two
situations, this Court ought not to come to the rescue of the
petitioner. No doubt, some leeway is given for Government
inefficiency but with the technological advancement now the
judicial view prevalent earlier when such facilities were not
available has been over taken by the elucidation of the legal
principles in the judgment of this Court in Postmaster
General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. We have discussed these
aspects in State of M.P. v. Bherulal and thus, see no reason to
repeat the same again.

5. In the present case, the State Government has not even taken
the trouble of citing any reason or excuse nor any dates given in
respect of the period for which condonation is sought. The
objective of such an exercise has also been elucidated by us in
the aforesaid judgment where we have categorised such cases as
“certificate cases”.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 130 of 170

6. The object of such cases appears to be to obtain a certificate
of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue
and thus, say nothing could done because the highest Court has
dismissed the appeal. It is mere completion of formality to give a
quietus to the litigation and save the skin of the officers who may
be at fault by not taking action in prescribed time. If the State
Government feels that they have suffered losses, then it must fix
responsibility on officers concerned for their inaction but that
ironically never happens. These matters are preferred on a
presumption as if this Court will condone the delay in every case,
if the State Government is able to say something on merits.

7. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which
the application has been worded, we consider it appropriate to
impose costs of Rs 25,000 to be deposited with the Supreme Court
Advocates-on-Record Welfare Fund. The amount be deposited in
four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers
responsible for the delay in filing both the writ appeal and the
special leave petition and a certificate of recovery be also filed
in this Court within the same period of time.”

(Emphasis supplied)

201. Similarly, in State of U.P. v. Sabha Narain , reported in (2022) 9 SCC 266 ,
this Court once again deprecated the tendency of State and its
instrumentalities to proceed on the assumption that they may approach the
courts at their own convenience and sweet will, disregarding the period of
limitation prescribed by statute, as though the Limitation statute does not
apply to them. It held that the leeway which was at one point extended to
the Government/public authorities on account of innate functional
inefficiencies is no more the norm, particularly in the wake of the decision
of Postmaster General (supra). The relevant observations read as under: -
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 131 of 170

“3. We have repeatedly discouraged State Governments and
public authorities in adopting an approach that they can walk in
to the Supreme Court as and when they please ignoring the
period of limitation prescribed by the statutes, as if the Limitation
statute does not apply to them. In this behalf, suffice to refer to
our judgments in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v.
Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021)
1 SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] and State of Odisha
v. Sunanda Mahakuda [State of Odisha v. Sunanda Mahakuda,
(2021) 11 SCC 560 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 300 : (2022) 2 SCC
(L&S) 393] . The leeway which was given to the
Government/public authorities on account of innate
inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of this Court which
came at a time when technology had not advanced and thus,
greater indulgence was shown. This position is no more
prevalent and the current legal position has been elucidated by
the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media
India Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.,
(2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri)
580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] Despite this, there seems to be
little change in the approach of the Government and public
authorities.

4. We have also categorised such kind of cases as “certificate
cases” filed with the only object to obtain a quietus from the
Supreme Court on the ground that nothing could be done because
the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. The objective is to
complete a mere formality and save the skin of the officers who
may be in default in following the due process or may have done
it deliberately. We have deprecated such practice and process
and we do so again. We refuse to grant such certificates and if
the Government/public authorities suffer losses, it is time when
officers concerned responsible for the same, bear the
consequences. The irony, emphasised by us repeatedly, is that no
action is ever taken against the officers and if the Court pushes
it, some mild warning is all that happens.

5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which
the application has been worded, we consider appropriate to
impose costs on the petitioner(s) of Rs 25,000 for wastage of
judicial time which has its own value and the same be deposited
with the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Welfare Fund
within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 132 of 170

responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a
certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this
Court within the same period of time.”

(Emphasis supplied)

202. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy reported in 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 489 , this Court speaking through one of us (J.B. Pardiwala J.)
held that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or
Union of India when it comes to condoning a gross delay in filing of an
appeal or application, as the case may be. It held that unless the Department
has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide
effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept
pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural
red tape in the process. The relevant observations read as under: -
“25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a
State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross
delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach
the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the
relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and
say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay
being condoned. This litigation between the parties started
sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed.
However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the
fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone
the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the
respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely
a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on
the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We
should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 133 of 170

of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined
at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

xxx xxx xxx

30. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, (2012)
3 SCC 563, this Court, while dismissing the application for
condonation of delay of 427 days in filing the Special Leave
Petition, held that condonation of delay is not an exception and
it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government
departments. In that case, this Court held that unless the
Department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay
and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the
usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several
months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape
in the process cannot be accepted. [...]

(Emphasis supplied)

203. This Court in Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (supra) further held that when
it comes to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, delay should not be excused as
a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not a free-pass to
cause prejudice to the opposite party. The vital test for condoning the delay
is for the party that is praying for such condonation to prove that it was
reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter. The relevant observations
read as under: -
“35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that
delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party.
The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably
diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning
the delay is not satisfied in this case.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 134 of 170

iii. The ratio of the decision of Postmaster General.

204. We are conscious of a few decisions of this Court, particularly, Inder Singh
v. State of M.P . reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 600 , Sheo Raj Singh v.
Union of India , reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 and State of Manipur v.
Koting Lamkang reported in (2019) 10 SCC 408 wherein the decision of
Postmaster General (supra) was distinguished or not followed, and the
delay on account of the government entity therein was condoned. We shall
briefly take a look at these decisions.

205. In Koting Lamkang (supra) there was a delay of 312-days in preferring the
regular first appeal by the State Government therein. Both the courts below
had declined to condone the delay on the ground that there was no
explanation for a certain period of time. This Court whilst setting aside the
impugned order and condoning the delay in filing of the appeal, held that
interest of justice would be better served, if the delay is condoned and the
matter is allowed to be heard on merits, as otherwise it would be the public
interest which would likely suffer if the State is non-suited on the ground
of delay. We have gone through the decision multiple times. Nowhere has
this Court in Koting Lamkang (supra) referred to or taken note of the
change in position of law by the decision of Postmaster General (supra).
Thus, in our considered opinion, this decision falls smack of and is in teeth
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 135 of 170

of the ratio laid in Postmaster General (supra) that has been consistently
followed.

206. In Inder Singh (supra) there was a delay of 1537-days in filing of the
Second Appeal by the respondent state therein. While the First Appellate
Court refused to condone the delay for want of sufficient cause, the High
Court on the other hand, condoned the delay. In appeal, this Court whilst
affirming the condonation of delay by the High Court observed that the
respondent state therein had demonstrated “sufficient cause” for the delay
by virtue of having pursed a Review Petition, which itself had been delayed,
and further delay on account of COVID-19. Although, the decision of
Postmaster General (supra) was not alluded to, yet a closer reading of the
decision reveals that the explanation offered by the respondent state was
not the typical departmental delays or bureaucratic inefficiency, and rather
had assigned detailed, plausible account of delay, which is why the delay
was condoned. Even otherwise, what is of importance, is that, nowhere has
this Court in Inder Singh (supra) accorded any special treatment in
condonation of delay, by virtue of the party being a State, thus, we need not
dwell on this decision any further.

207. The decision of Sheo Raj Singh (supra) is of particular significance, and
may be the most instructive in understanding the decision of Postmaster
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 136 of 170

General (supra). In the said case, there was a delay of 479-days in
preferring the appeal. The explanation put forth by the respondent state for
the delay were of the nature of lamentable institutional inefficiency and the
deplorable bureaucratic inertia, which ultimately found favour with the
High Court, and accordingly the delay was condoned. In appeal, the
decision of the High Court was assailed on the touchstone of the decisions
of Postmaster General (supra) and a catena of other decisions that had held
that such an explanation of bureaucratic lethargy cannot be accepted.

208. This Court in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) exhaustively examined all the
decisions of this Court, prior to and after the decision of Postmaster
General (supra). It observed that although, the subsequent decisions of this
Court have not accepted governmental lethargy, tardiness and indolence in
presenting appeals as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet, because
the High Court had condoned the delay by accepting such explanation
before the decision of Postmaster General (supra) was rendered, the
exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the
liberal and justice oriented approach as expounded in the decisions which
earlier occupied the field. It was in light of the aforesaid that this Court,
refused to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High Court
therein. The relevant observations read as under: -
“33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are
not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 137 of 170

appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the
prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former,
whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in
the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion
in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the
question. Law is fairly well-settled that “a court of appeal should
not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the
courts below”. If any authority is required, we can profitably
refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa,
which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes
Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha where it has been
held that:

“an appellate power interferes not when the
order appealed is not right but only when it is
clearly wrong”.”

34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21-12-
2011. It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions
in Katiji, Ramegowda, Chandra Mani, K.V. Ayisumma
and Lipok AO were holding the field. It is not that the said
decisions do not hold the field now, having been overruled by any
subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in
the recent past [State of M.P. v. Bherulal 16 is one such decision
apart from University of Delhi which have not accepted
governmental lethargy, tardiness and indolence in presenting
appeals within time as sufficient cause for condonation of delay,
yet, the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested
on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented approach
expounded in the aforesaid decisions which have been referred
to above.

xxx xxx xxx

41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival
contentions, we feel that the High Court's decision 1 to condone
the delay on account of the first respondent's inability to present
the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not
suffer from any error warranting interference. As the
aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of
discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented
approach by the courts, where certain leeway could be provided
to the State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 138 of 170

appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period
of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon
the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby
secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the
working of the grand scheme of governmental functions have to
be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the
competing interests.
(Emphasis supplied)

209. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court
in State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal
Representatives & Ors. reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 , wherein this Court
explained the ratio of the decision in Postmaster General (supra). This
Court explained that as per Postmaster General (supra) there cannot be any
preferential treatment towards the State or any of its instrumentality, when
it comes to condonation of delay. It further explained that as long as there
is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a broad
and liberal approach should be adopted when dealing with an application
for seeking condonation of delay. Unless the explanation furnished for the
delay is wholly unacceptable or if no explanation whatsoever is offered or
if the delay is inordinate and third-party rights had become embedded
during the interregnum the courts should lean in favour of condonation. The
relevant observations read as under: -
“8. It is correct that condonation of delay cannot be a matter of
course; it is also correct that in seeking such condonation the
State cannot claim any preferential or special treatment.
However, in a situation where there has been no gross negligence
or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides this Court has always
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 139 of 170

taken a broad and liberal view so as to advance substantial
justice instead of terminating a proceeding on a technical ground
like limitation. Unless the explanation furnished for the delay is
wholly unacceptable or if no explanation whatsoever is offered
or if the delay is inordinate and third-party rights had become
embedded during the interregnum the courts should lean in
favour of condonation. Our observations in Postmaster
General v. Living Media India Ltd. and Amalendu Kumar
Bera v. State of W.B. do not strike any discordant note and have
to be understood in the context of facts of the respective cases.”

(Emphasis supplied)

210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly
where the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a
significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence
to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional
inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the
government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is
better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering
accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public
litigation.

211. The earlier decisions of this Court, particularly in K.V. Ayisumma (supra),
Chandra Mani (supra), Lipok AO (supra) and Indian Oil Corpn (supra)
insofar as they favoured a liberal approach towards the State or any of its
instrumentality in matters of condonation of delay, and showed indulgence
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 140 of 170

in condoning the same on ground of impersonal and slow-moving nature of
these entities, no longer reflects the correct position in law. No litigant, be
it a private party or a State or any of its functionaries, is entitled to a broader
margin of error, falling in the category of inaction, negligence or
casualness, in matters of limitation.

212. The law as it presently stands, post the decision of Postmaster General
(supra), is unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an
exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties,
must demonstrate bona fide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent
such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the
identity of the applicant.

213. From a combined reading of Bal Kishan Mathur (supra) and Sheo Raj
Singh (supra) it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General
(supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its
instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters
concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The
State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do
otherwise would not only compromise the sanctity of limitation. The earlier
view, insofar as it favoured a liberal approach towards the State or any of
its instrumentality is no more the correct position of law. Secondly, that the
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 141 of 170

habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape,
procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for
seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a
“ sufficient cause ” for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such
reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought
to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in
endless uncertainty in litigation.

214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision of Postmaster
General (supra) is that while excuses premised solely on bureaucratic
lethargy cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause, there may
nonetheless be circumstances where the explanation offered, though
involving bureaucratic procedures, reflects a genuine and bona fide cause
for the delay. In such instances, the true test is whether the explanation
demonstrates that the State acted with reasonable diligence and whether the
delay occurred despite efforts to act within time. Where such bona fides are
established, the Court retains the discretion to condone the delay.

215. In other words, Postmaster General (supra) does not shut the door on
condonation of delay by the State in all cases involving bureaucratic
processes. The real distinction lies between a case where delay is the result
of gross negligence, inaction, or casual indifference on the part of the State,
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 142 of 170

and a case where delay has occurred despite sincere efforts, owing to the
inherent complexities of governmental decision-making. While the former
category must necessarily be rejected to uphold the discipline of limitation,
the latter can still attract judicial indulgence where public interest is at stake
and the cause is shown to be reasonable.

216. In this regard, the vital test that has to be employed, wherever “ sufficient
cause ” is sought to be demonstrated on the ground of bureaucratic
inefficiencies is to distinguish between whether the same is an
“explanation” or an “excuse”. Although the two may appear to be one and
the same, yet there exists a fine but pertinent distinction between an
“excuse” and an “explanation”.

217. As illustrated in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) an “excuse” is often offered by a
person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort
of a defensive action. Calling something as just an “excuse” would imply
that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. An “explanation”
on the other hand would demonstrate genuineness in actions and reasons
assigned, and would other wise be devoid of any gross negligence,
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, or indifference or casualness in
conduct. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and,
therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence
of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts.
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218. However, equally important to note is that wherever, any explanation is
sought to be given on account of bureaucratic lethargy and inherent
complexities of governmental decision-making, the same more often than
not would invariably always is an “excuse”, as experience has shown us,
depicted from a long line of decisions of this Court. It is at this stage, where
the decision of Postmaster General (supra) assumes significance. It seeks
to convey the messages, that court should not be agnostic, to how the State
or its instrumentalities, often tend to take the recourse of condonation of
delay in a casual manner.

219. Which is why, as per the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) and a plethora
of other subsequent decision, the ordinary approach of the courts, in cases
where delay is sought to be condoned by offering the explanation of
bureaucratic lethargy or red-tapism, must be one of circumspection and
reluctance. The courts ought to loathe in accepting such explanations as
“sufficient cause”. They should apply their minds carefully, be slow in
condoning delays on such reasons, and exceptional instances, where the
explanation is found to be genuine, reflective of reasonable vigilance and
promptitude in conduct, and free from gross negligence, deliberate inaction,
lack of bona fides, or casual indifference, should such an explanation be
accepted.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 144 of 170

iv. Whether exercise of discretion in view of the earlier position of law
may be interfered with?

220. Before we close this issue, we may address ourselves on one contention,
vociferously canvassed on behalf of the respondents herein. It was
submitted that since, in the present case the discretion to condone the delay
was exercised by the High Court in 2017, and prior to the decisions of
Bherulal (supra) and University of Delhi (supra), the High Court cannot be
faulted with accepting the explanation offered by the respondents, tune with
the decisions earlier occupying the field. Accordingly, it was urged that the
exercise of discretion by the High Court must be tested on the anvil of the
decisions that occupied the field when the delay was ultimately condoned.
In this regard, reliance was placed on Sheo Raj Singh (supra).

221. As already discussed, in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) since the explanation of
bureaucratic inefficiencies was accepted and delay had been condoned by
the High Court by exercising its discretion before the decision of
Postmaster General (supra) came to be rendered, this Court in Sheo Raj
Singh (supra) held that the exercise of discretion by the High Court would
then, invariably have to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice
oriented approach as expounded in the decisions which earlier occupied the
field. We may at the cost of repetition again reproduce the relevant
observations of Sheo Raj Singh (supra) in this regard: -
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“34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21-12-
2011. It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions
in Katiji, Ramegowda, Chandra Mani, K.V. Ayisumma
and Lipok AO were holding the field. It is not that the said
decisions do not hold the field now, having been overruled by any
subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in
the recent past [State of M.P. v. Bherulal 16 is one such decision
apart from University of Delhi which have not accepted
governmental lethargy, tardiness and indolence in presenting
appeals within time as sufficient cause for condonation of delay,
yet, the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested
on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented approach
expounded in the aforesaid decisions which have been referred
to above.”
(Emphasis supplied)

222. At the outset, we may reject this contention outrightly. We say so, because
the decisions of this Court in Bherulal (supra) and University of Delhi
(supra) have followed the ratio laid in Postmaster General (supra), which
was rendered all the way back in 2012 i.e., much prior to when the delay
came to be condoned by the High Court in the case on hand.

223. Even if we assume, that the decision Postmaster General (supra) was not
in existence, the contention of the respondent deserves to be rejected for the
reasons we shall assign hereunder.

224. We have already elaborated in the earlier parts of this judgment on the two-
pronged inquiry that is required to be undertaken by the appellate court
when sitting in appeal over a lower court’s decision in condoning the delay,
which involves, first , looking into the existence of a “sufficient cause” and
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 146 of 170

secondly, into the exercise of discretion itself, where the first test is
satisfied. This threshold test, involves ascertaining whether the order passed
by the court below is not vitiated due to any material irregularity, want of
evidence, extraneous considerations, failure to take into consideration any
relevant fact, or being contrary to the law of the land (emphasis).

225. Where, however, the law, during the pendency of the appeal, has undergone
a shift, there the court sitting in appeal, would not only be bound by the
change in position of law, but would be well empowered to interfere with
the lower courts decision, on that ground alone, notwithstanding the fact,
that when the original decision was rendered, that was not the position of
law. If any authority is required, in this regard, one may profitably refer to
the decision of this Court in Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj
Kumar Arora & Ors. reported in [2025 INSC 498] wherein one of us (J.B.
Pardiwala J.) held that a decision of the court which either overrules or
results in a change in position of law, generally operates retrospectively.

226. The question, whether interference on ground of change in law during
pendency of proceedings, would really turn upon the context and nature of
the discretion exercised. Ordinarily, such an interference would not only be
justified but also warranted. But when it comes to condonation of delay, the
considerations are slightly different, inasmuch as the court is required to
prioritize a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach over technicalities.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 147 of 170

Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. Thus, in
such situations, the court may be refuse to interfere with the exercise of
discretion by the lower court in condoning the delay, as long as view that
was arrived at by the court below could have been taken by it, from the
material on record, keeping in mind the position of law that prevailed then.
However, this would depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of
each case, and the attending circumstances, and what inevitably follows is
that, there may be situations, where the appellate court may interfere,
keeping in mind the changed position of law. No hard and fast rule can be
laid down in this regard.

227. We may, with a view to obviate any confusion, clarify that ‘change in
position of law’ should not be conflated with the ‘position of law’ that
existed at the time of exercise of discretion to condone delay. In the former,
the courts may or may not, interfere with the condonation of delay, if the
same is in contradiction to a subsequent change in law, but in the latter, the
courts ought to interfere with condonation of delay, for such a view could
not have been plausibly arrived at by the lower court, in view of the law
that already existed at the time of condonation of delay.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 148 of 170

v. Public Policy vis-à-vis Public Interest in matters of delay on part of the
State or any of its instrumentalities.

228. Limitation laws are themselves grounded in public policy, as already
discussed in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, it is based on the
maxim ‘ interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium ’ i.e., “ it is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation ”. Therefore, public interest is better
served by timely governmental action than by condoning repeated lapses.
State cannot simultaneously seek to represent the interest of the public and
yet consistently fail to protect that very interest by allowing limitation
periods to lapse.

229. Public interest is best served by ensuring efficiency and diligence in
governmental functioning, rather than by condoning its lapses as a matter
of course. Thus, a liberal inclination towards the State or any of its
instrumentalities, in matters of condonation of delay, cannot be adopted,
merely on the presumption that, if the delay is not condoned, public interest
runs the risk of suffering, by a meritorious matter being thrown out. Public
interest lies not in condoning governmental indifference, but in compelling
efficiency, responsibility, and timely action.

230. To permit condonation of delay to become a matter of course for the
Government would have the deleterious effect of institutionalising
inefficiency. It would, in substance, incentivise indolence and foster a
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 149 of 170

culture where accountability for delay is eroded. If the State is assured that
its lapses will invariably be excused under the rubric of “public interest,”
there would remain little incentive for its officers to act with vigilance or
for its instrumentalities to streamline procedures for timely action. The
consequence would not be the advancement of public interest but rather its
betrayal.

231. Public interest, therefore, does not lie in condoning governmental
negligence, but in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely
decision-making. This Court has time and again emphasised that liberal
condonation of delay on behalf of the State, merely on the ground that
refusal might cause the dismissal of a potentially meritorious matter, is a
misplaced proposition. Public interest is not synonymous with the cause of
the Government; it is, instead, synonymous with the enforcement of rule of
law, certainty in legal rights, and an administrative machinery that functions
with diligence and accountability.

232. It must, therefore, be underscored that the guiding principle is not the
protection of governmental indifference but the promotion of responsible
governance. The State is under a higher duty to act in time, for in every
matter it litigates, it does so not in its private capacity, but as the trustee of
the people’s interest. Hence, repeated indulgence in condoning delays on
grounds of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding the very
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object of limitation statutes, which are enacted in every civilised
jurisdiction for the sake of finality, certainty, and public order.

233. Any other view, would invariably defeat the sound public policy embodied
in the Limitation Act and fail in enthusing efficiency in administration, and
bring a balance between accountability and autonomy of action, It would
result in giving immunity or carte blanche power to act as it pleases with
the public at whim or vagary and inevitably spell doom all over the
collective responsibility that the State and its instrumentalities are entrusted
with. Thus, we are of the considered opinion, that delay cannot be
condoned, merely because not doing so would result in non-suiting the State
and thereby run the ostensible risk of public interest suffering. Such by no
stretch can be the sole consideration for the purpose of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, as to do so would be to ignore the provision of Section 3
and the overarching public policy of giving quietus to lis, that forms the
bedrock of the Limitation Act.

234. Even otherwise, it is no more res-integra , that law of limitation has to be
applied all but the same and with all its rigour, even if it may harshly affect
a particular party. In Basawaraj (supra) this Court observed that a result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power
to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from
its operation. Even if the statutory provision may cause hardship or
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 151 of 170

inconvenience to a particular party the court has no choice but to give full
effect to the same. It is based on the legal maxim dura lex sed lex i.e., “ the
law is hard but it is the law ”. The relevant observations read as under: -
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power
to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. ‘A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has
no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory provision
may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but
the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the
same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is
hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks
to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. [...]”

(Emphasis supplied)

235. An application seeking condonation of delay is to be decided only within
the parameters laid down by this Court. In case there was no sufficient cause
to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, on lofty ideals amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the statute.

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E. Whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay?

236. We heard Mr. Akshat Shrivastava, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant. He would argue that the respondent no. 1 failed to assign any
“ sufficient cause ” for the gross delay, more particularly as to why the second
appeal could not be filled within the prescribed period of limitation. He
submitted that the High Court erred in allowing the application seeking
condonation of delay in the absence of any sufficient cause thereof. The
learned counsel contended that the filing of the second appeal by the
respondent housing corporation is nothing but gross abuse of process of law,
more particularly when the officials of the respondent housing corporation
did nothing for a period of almost 6-years, despite notice being served to
them at the time of execution of the decree on 28.03.2011. He would submit
that the condonation of such gross and inordinate delay by the High Court
could be said to be ex-facie illegal and against the very fundamental cannons
of the law of limitation and public policy.

237. Per contra , Ms. Kiran Suri, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
respondent no. 1, would argue that the High Court no error not to speak of
any error of law in condoning the delay and in accepting the sufficient cause
assigned for the same. She would submit that, when substantial justice and
technical considerations are pitted against each other, the latter must give
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 153 of 170

way to the former, more particularly when public interest is involved. She
further submitted that the delay was on account of the deliberate negligence
on the part of the officers, and in such circumstances the interest of
respondent no. 1, as an instrumentality of State, must not be put to a
disadvantage. She further brought to the notice of this Court that the
respondent no. 1 had already taken disciplinary action against the erring
delinquent officials.

238. The learned Senior Counsel also contended that the suit filed by the appellant
was one for possession, however, the First Appellate Court proceeded to
erroneously grant the relief of compensation, aggrieved by which the
respondent no. 1 had to prefer second appeal before the High Court. She
submitted that the persons who were found to be in unlawful possession of
the suit property had nothing to do with the respondent no. 1, and that it
would be very harsh to recover such compensation from the respondent no.
1, which functions on public exchequer.

239. Indisputably, there was a gross and inordinate delay of almost 11-years in
filing the second appeal. The respondent no. 1 maintains that the delay was
on account of five erring officials, including an Executive Engineer who was
designated as the litigation conducting officer. It is the case of the respondent
housing corporation that the day it came to learn about the decree passed by
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 154 of 170

the First Appellate Court dated 15.04.2006, its legal department on
27.05.2006 advised the respondent to prefer a second appeal. However, due
to the sheer negligence exhibited by the Executive Engineer in furnishing the
requisite information and documents to the Special Land Acquisition Officer
(hereinafter the “ SLAO ”), in spite of various correspondence requesting for
the same on 01.06.2006, 09.06.2006 and 20.07.2006, respectively the second
appeal could not be filed in time.

240. It further appears that the decision to file the second appeal was taken only
on 17.10.2006, which was anyway beyond the limitation period. Despite the
expiry of the limitation period, it is only after almost a year that the matter
was assigned to an advocate, on whose complaints of no assistance from the
Executive Engineer, the SLAO pursued the Executive Engineer again, vide
letter dated 16.10.2007, requesting him to provide the necessary files and
record of the case. It is the case of the respondent no. 1, that such
correspondences were exchanged until 2008.

241. The execution proceedings came to be initiated by the appellant on
20.01.2011, pursuant to which the first notice was issued to the respondent
no. 1 on 28.03.2011. Despite the callousness exhibited by the person holding
the office of the Executive Engineer, the same officer was appointed to make
representations for the respondent no. 1 in the proceedings. The
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Commissioner of the respondent no. 1 was informed about the aforesaid
proceedings on 28.01.2017 when an order of attachment was passed by the
Executing Court. Thereafter, a new officer was appointed to facilitate the
respondent’s litigation, and the second appeal was finally filed on 10.02.2017
before the High Court, along with an application under Section 5 of the 1963
Act read with Section 151 of the CPC.

242. To our utter shock and dismay, the High Court accepted the explanation of
sufficient offered by the respondent no. 1. We are at our wits “end” to
understand the aforesaid findings recorded by the High Court. It appears that
the respondent no. 1 has tried to make the Executive Engineer a scapegoat,
who undoubtedly acted in a most irresponsible and callous manner but did
not have to take the entire blame to himself. This is more apparent from the
fact that the disciplinary proceedings against the concerned Executive
Engineer allegedly responsible for the delay was initiated only on
10.03.2017, while the application for condonation of delay was filed exactly
a month before i.e., on 10.02.2017. It appears to us that the respondent no. 1
took such coercive actions only to ingratiate itself before the High Court to
demonstrate its bona fides and butter its cries of vigilance.

243. It was urged by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents
herein that the deliberate inaction or mala fides on the part of the officials
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cannot be imputed to the State or its instrumentalities, since the Government
cannot carry on business upon principle of distrust. In this regard, reliance
was placed on the decision of this Court in G. Ramegowda, Major (supra).

244. In G. Ramegowda, Major (supra) this Court observed that due to the
impersonal nature of the Government, it would be unfair and unrealistic to
put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such
matters. Thus, where a government makes out a case where public interest
was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of
its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes
with it, then the conduct of such officers should not be imputed to the
Government for refusing condonation of delay. The relevant observations
read as under: -
“17. [...] It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
government and private parties on the same footing in all
respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of
governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the
decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the
conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the
Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases
where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to
Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley,
M.R., in the In re National Bank of Wales Ltd. observed, though
in a different context:
“Business cannot be carried on upon principles of
distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by
those above them, as well as by those below them, until
there is reason to distrust them.”

In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite some time for the
government to realise that the law officers failed that trust.
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18. While a private person can take instant decision a
“bureaucratic or democratic organ” it is said by a learned Judge
“hesitates and debates, consults and considers, speaks through
paper, moves horizontally and vertically till at last it gravitates
towards a conclusion, — unmindful of time and impersonally”.
Now at the end, should we interfere with the discretion exercised
by the High Court? Shri Datar criticised that the delay on the
part of Government even after January 20, 1971 for over a year
cannot be said to be either bona fide or compelled by reasons
beyond its control. This criticism is not without substance.
Government could and ought to have moved with greater
diligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency of the
situation. The conduct of Government was perilously close to
such inaction as might, perhaps, have justified rejection of its
prayer for condonation. But as is implicit in the reasoning of the
High Court, the unarticulated thought, perhaps was that in the
interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clean the
awards under appeal should not be permitted to assume finality
without an examination of their merits. The High Court noticed
that the Government Pleader who was in office till December 15,
1970 had applied for certified copies on July 20, 1970, but the
application was allowed to be dismissed for default. In one case,
however, he appears to have taken away the certified copy even
after he ceased to be a Government Pleader.”

(Emphasis supplied)

245. As already discussed in the earlier parts of this judgment, State or any of its
instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters
concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. G.
Ramegowda, Major (supra) itself acknowledges that, ordinarily there is “ no
general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel or agents ”.
Even if “ there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona
fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 158 of 170

side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal ”. The relevant observations
read as under: -
“14. The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the
matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a
number of pronouncements of this Court. See: Ramlal, Motilal
and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd.; Shakuntala Devi
Jain v. Kuntal Kumari; Concord of India Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi; Lala Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it
is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of
its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or
lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is
no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-
barred appeal. ”

246. However, the reason why, this Court nonetheless, held that acts of fraud or
bad faith on the part of its officers or agents should not be imputed to the
Government atleast for condonation of delay was in view of the earlier
position of law, whereby the State and its instrumentalities were not placed
on the same pedestal as any ordinary private litigant, in view of the
impersonal character of the Government as an entity.

247. But the position of law is no longer this. As per Postmaster General (supra)
and the subsequent decisions of this Court, consideration for condonation of
delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not and cannot vary
depending on the identity or status of the party, whether it be the
Government, a public body, or a private litigant, so as to apply a different
yardstick.
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248. The subsequent decision of this Court in Tejpal (supra), after duly taking
note of the change in position of law, specifically rejected the contention that
acts of mala fides on the part of specific individuals should not be imputed
to the State or its instrumentalities. It held that to accept such a proposition
would amount to creating an artificial distinction between the private parties
and the Government entities vis-à-vis the law of limitation. The relevant
observations read as under: -

“54. It seems to us that acceding to the appellants' request on the
aforesaid account would also have undesirable consequences. If
delay were to be condoned merely on the basis of a broad general
assertion of bureaucratic indifference, without requiring
demonstration of bona fides or an act of mala fides on the part of
specific individuals, it would create an artificial distinction
between the private parties and the Government entities vis-à-vis
the law of limitation. This would not be in conformity with the
spirit of equality before law as guaranteed under our
Constitution. Allowing such latitude would further distort
incentives for the Government and encourage more laxity by the
bureaucracy in its general functioning, thereby undermining
quality governance. ”
(Emphasis supplied)

249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities
and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State
to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay
with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation
statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 160 of 170

privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a
culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration.

250. As far back as 1996, this Court in Chandra Mani (supra) held that where the
case requires an appeal or application to be filed, despite the delay, then
prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal
and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Thus, even
if for a moment, we accept that, mala-fide actions of few officers should not
be imputed to the Government, the position still remains that, once the State
or its instrumentality finds that, few of its officers were negligent, it should
promptly take action to file the appeal or application, as the case may be,
through its other officers and simultaneously take action against the
delinquent officers.

251. As already observed, in the present case at hand, despite the callousness
exhibited by the Executive Engineer, the respondent no. 1 herein took no
steps towards mitigating the delays and ensuring that the appeal was
preferring as soon as possible. On the contrary, the Executive Engineer was
appointed to make representations for the respondent no. 1 in the
proceedings. Even the disciplinary proceedings against the concerned
Executive Engineer came to be initiated much later, to be precise exactly a
month before the date on which the application for condonation of delay was
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 161 of 170

filed. In such circumstances, even if we do not impute the deliberate inaction
or mala fides on the part of the Executive Engineer to the respondent no. 1
herein, there is nothing to show that the respondent no. 1 acted in a
reasonably diligent manner.

252. Even if the case put up by the respondent no. 1 is to be accepted at its face
value, the respondent no. 1 could be said to have failed to assign any genuine
sufficient cause to justify the delay from the date of receiving intimation
about the order of the First Appellate Court, passed on 15.04.2006 till the
expiry of the limitation period, which was sometime in July 2006, because it
was only in the correspondence dated 17.10.2006 that the respondent no. 1,
while acknowledging the advice tendered by its advocate, reflected that it
would prefer a second appeal. We have little to no hesitation in saying that
on 17.10.2006, it was already too late in the day to take any decision or make
any forms of mind. Nonetheless, the second appeal was only filed on
10.02.2017, with a delay of almost 11 years.

253. As already noted in the foregoing parts of this judgment the respondent no.
1 could be said to have failed to explain the delay on its part from the date of
the receipt of the order of the First Appellate Court till the expiry of the
limitation period.

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254. We say so because if such observations by the High Court, to condone delay
in the interest of a State-machinery, were allowed to be sustained by us, it
would allow the State-machineries a leeway to systematically orchestrate
delays in the guise of laxity exhibited by their authorities. Given the majesty
and colossality a State-machinery would hold against a private litigant, it
would be grossly unfair to a litigant, who would be perpetually entangled in
the clutches of litigation, if enormous delays, like that of almost 11 years in
the present case, are permitted to be condoned. This Court has never turned
a blind eye to the gradients of substantive justice.

255. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State when it comes
to condoning the gross delay of more than 11-years. If the litigant chooses to
approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the
relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no
prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This
litigation between the parties started in 1989. We are in 2025. Almost 36
years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to
reap the fruits of his decree. The High Court has made a mockery of justice
by condoning this delay of 3966 days and once again ask the appellant to
undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

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256. As far as the contention of the respondent no. 1 is concerned apropos to the
merits of molding of relief by awarding of compensation by the First
Appellate Court, the same is squarely answered by the principles
encapsulated in Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), wherein it is categorically
maintained that the court considering a condonation of delay ought not go
into the merits of the case at hand.

257. We also wish to highlight that the High Court applied the legal position
incorrectly in the impugned order and performed an exercise of “merit-
hunting”. It gave a prima facie relevance to the argument of the respondent
no. 1 on the grounds that the suit of the appellant was not at all maintainable
in the first place. In paragraph 13 of the impugned order, the High Court
recorded that a semblance of right in favour of respondent no. 1 swayed its
mind to allow the condonation of delay, and it accepted the same as a
“ sufficient cause ”. We hold such observations to be erroneous and ex facie
bad in law. Similar contentions were rejected by this Court in State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal , reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654 , wherein the
appellant-State was seeking a condonation of delay of 663 days. This Court
sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the
Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of
limitation, and buttress reliance on cases of this Court wherein it allowed
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 164 of 170

condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of
peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below:
“ 3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government
inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on
relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when
technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to
the Government [...]

xxx xxx xxx

5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if
there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given
a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case.
It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases.
This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court
in an appropriate case to condone the delay.

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being
adopted in what we have categorised earlier as “certificate
cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of
dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue
and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest
Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality
and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a
process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly
deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no
improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain
such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time
when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the
consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is
taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It
is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in
making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address
on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as
happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he
must first address us on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to
do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays
that the Government or State authorities coming before us must
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 165 of 170

pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such
costs can be recovered from the officers responsible. ”

(Emphasis supplied)

258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or
not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they
want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party
has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in
such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with
the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the
bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is
only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of
the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

259. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound
public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of
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Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of
time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

260. From the above exposition of law, it is abundantly clear that the High Court
has erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days on account of certain
lapses at the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the
proceedings, along with finding certain merits in the case of the respondent
no. 1 against the maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that of the
relief molded by the First Appellate Court. We have no hesitation in stating
that such grounds are nowhere near to being “ sufficient cause ” as per Section
5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents
and authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even that of
single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by
sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a very different
footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not inclined to
accept the condonation of the delay by the High Court.


V. CONCLUSION

261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court
deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem
it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and
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laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and
we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays
shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper
case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to
establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout.
Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and
more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the
procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of
limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude
of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious,
if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should
not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts
ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants
cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of
their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at
pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice,
not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as
by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in
appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already
limited to questions of law.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 168 of 170


263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to
attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us
is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an
enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such
litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a
party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the
condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for
another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As
courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not
sent from pillar to post to seek justice.

264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be
permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.

265. In the result, this appeal stands allowed. The impugned judgment and order
of the High Court is hereby set aside. Apart from the costs of Rs 25,000/-
imposed by the High Court, to be paid by the respondent no. 1 to the
appellant, we impose an additional cost of Rs 25,000/- on the respondent no.
1, to be paid to the Karnataka State Legal Services Authority within a period
of four weeks from today.

266. The Court of Principle Judge (Junior Division), Kalaburagi, is directed to
proceed with the execution of the decree in favour of the appellant in E.P.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 169 of 170

No. 2 of 2011, and shall ensure that the proceedings conclude within a period
of 2 months from the date of this judgment.

267. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

268. Registry shall circulate one copy each of this judgment to all the High Courts.



....................................... J.
(J.B. Pardiwala)



....................................... J.
(R. Mahadevan)

New Delhi;
th
12 September, 2025.


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