Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4483 OF 2010
RANBIR SINGH APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
EXECUTIVE ENG.P.W.D. RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
K.M. JOSEPH, J.
1. Heard Shri Manjeet Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant and also Shri Samar Vijay Singh, learned AAG
for the respondent. By the impugned judgment the High
Court has interfered with the award passed by the Labour
th
Court, Hisar dated 13 October, 2006 and directed that
appellant would be entitled to lump sum compensation of
Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) which was
to be paid within three months of the order. The High
Court notes the claim of the appellant to be that he was
appointed verbally in June, 1983, and that, his service
was terminated on verbal orders on 01.04.1991, after he
had worked for eight years.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JAGDISH KUMAR
Date: 2021.09.07
16:43:34 IST
Reason:
2. The case of the appellant was that he was working
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with the respondent for a period of nearly eight years
and service was terminated without complying with Section
25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter
referred to as, ‘the Act’). The Labour Court rejected the
contention of the respondent that the appellant had not
worked for 240 days and found that appellant had indeed
worked for 240 days. It is found that there is non-
compliance of Section 25F of the Act and the Labour Court
awarded reinstatement of the appellant with 25 per cent
back wages. As already noticed, it is this award which is
set aside by the High Court.
3. Shri Manjeet Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant would seek to rely upon the judgment of this
Court in Ajaypal Singh v. Haryana Warehousing
| Corporatio n | 1 | . |
|---|---|---|
persons juniors to him were also dealt with in a
different fashion, and in their case, they are working
and they have, in fact, been regularised also. Learned
counsel submits that the appellant should be reinstated
in terms of the order of the Labour Court. Per Contra ,
Shri Samar Vijay Singh, learned AAG for the respondent
pointed out that the acceptance of the contention of the
appellant involved violation of the law laid down by this
| Secretary, | State of Karnataka and others v. |
|---|
| Umadev i | (3) and other s |
|---|
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(2015) 6 SCC 321
2 (2006) 4 SCC 1
2
attention to the decision of this Court in State of
| Uttarakhand and another v. Raj Kuma r | 3 |
|---|---|
that, in such circumstances, an order of reinstatement
may not be justified.
4. It is true that in the Ajay Pal Singh (supra), the
Bench of this Court, by judgment rendered in the year
2015, took the view that, when the termination is
effected of service of a daily wager, there must be
compliance of Section 25F. This Court, in fact, went on
also to note that unlike a private body, in the case of a
public body, while it may be open to resort to
retrenchment of the workmen on the score that there is
non-compliance of Articles 14 and 16 in the appointment,
in which case, in the order terminating the services,
this must be alluded to, it would still not absolve the
public authority from complying with the provisions of
Section 25F of the Act and, should it contravene Section
25F, it would amount to an unfair trade practice. We do
notice, this judgment has been reiterated in a subsequent
judgment also in Durgapur Casual Workers Union and others
| v. Food Corporation of India and other s | 4 |
|---|---|
5. However, we notice that there is another line of
decisions, and the latest of the same, which is brought
to our notice by Shri Samar Vijay Singh, learned AAG, is
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(2019) 14 SCC 353
4 (2015) 5 SCC 786
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Raj Kumar (supra). We may refer only to paragraphs-9 and
10:
| “9.In our opinion, the case at hand is<br>covered by the two decisions of this Court<br>rendered in BSNL v.Bhurumal [BSNL v.<br>Bhurumal, (2014) 7 SCC 177 : (2014) 2 SCC<br>(L&S) 373] and Distt. Development Officer v.<br>Satish Kantilal Amrelia [Distt. Development<br>Officer v. Satish Kantilal Amrelia, (2018) 12<br>SCC 298 : (2018) 2 SCC (L&S) 276] . | |
|---|---|
| 10. It is apposite to reproduce what this<br>Court has held in BSNL [BSNL v. Bhurumal,<br>(2014) 7 SCC 177 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 373] :<br>(SCC p. 189, paras 33-35) | |
| “33. It is clear from the reading of<br>the aforesaid judgments that the<br>ordinary principle of grant of<br>reinstatement with full back wages, when<br>the termination is found to be illegal<br>is not applied mechanically in all<br>cases. While that may be a position<br>where services of a regular/permanent<br>workman are terminated illegally and/or<br>mala fide and/or by way of<br>victimisation, unfair labour practice,<br>etc. However, when it comes to the case<br>of termination of a daily-wage worker<br>and where the termination is found<br>illegal because of a procedural defect,<br>namely, in violation of Section 25-F of<br>the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court<br>is consistent in taking the view that in<br>such cases reinstatement with back wages<br>is not automatic and instead the workman<br>should be given monetary compensation<br>which will meet the ends of justice. |
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| Rationale for shifting in this direction<br>is obvious. | |
|---|---|
| 34. The reasons for denying the relief<br>of reinstatement in such cases are<br>obvious. It is trite law that when the<br>termination is found to be illegal<br>because of non-payment of retrenchment<br>compensation and notice pay as<br>mandatorily required under Section 25-F<br>of the Industrial Disputes Act, even<br>after reinstatement, it is always open<br>to the management to terminate the<br>services of that employee by paying him<br>the retrenchment compensation. Since<br>such a workman was working on daily-wage<br>basis and even after he is reinstated,<br>he has no right to seek regularisation<br>[see State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3)<br>[State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3),<br>(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] ].<br>Thus when he cannot claim regularisation<br>and he has no right to continue even as<br>a daily-wage worker, no useful purpose<br>is going to be served in reinstating<br>such a workman and he can be given<br>monetary compensation by the Court<br>itself inasmuch as if he is terminated<br>again after reinstatement, he would<br>receive monetary compensation only in<br>the form of retrenchment compensation<br>and notice pay. In such a situation,<br>giving the relief of reinstatement, that<br>too after a long gap, would not serve<br>any purpose. | |
| 35. We would, however, like to add a<br>caveat here. There may be cases where<br>termination of a daily-wage worker is |
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found to be illegal on the ground that
it was resorted to as unfair labour
practice or in violation of the
principle of last come first go viz.
while retrenching such a worker daily
wage juniors to him were retained. There
may also be a situation that persons
junior to him were regularised under
some policy but the workman concerned
terminated. In such circumstances, the
terminated worker should not be denied
reinstatement unless there are some
other weighty reasons for adopting the
course of grant of compensation instead
of reinstatement. In such cases,
reinstatement should be the rule and
only in exceptional cases for the
reasons stated to be in writing, such a
relief can be denied.””
6. In the light of the state of the law, which we take
note of, we notice certain facts which are not in
dispute. This is a case where it is found that, though
the appellant had worked for 240 days, appellant’s
service was terminated, violating the mandatory
provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The authority
involved in this case, apparently, is a public authority.
At the same time, it is common case that the appellant
was a daily wager and the appellant was not a permanent
employee. It is relevant to note that, in the award
answering Issue No.1, which was, whether the termination
of the appellant’s service was justified and in order,
and if not, what was the amount of back wages he was
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entitled to, it was found, inter alia , that the appellant
could not adduce convincing evidence to establish
retention of junior workers. There is no finding of
unfair trade practice, as such. In such circumstances, we
think that the principle, which is enunciated by this
Court, in the decision, which is referred to in Raj Kumar
(supra), which we have referred to, would be more
appropriate to follow. In other words, we find that
reinstatement cannot be automatic, and the transgression
of Section 25F being established, suitable compensation
would be the appropriate remedy.
7. In such circumstance, noticing that, though the
appellant was reinstated after the award of the Labour
Court in 2006, the appellant has not been working since
2009 following the impugned order, and also taking note
of the fact that the appellant was, in all likelihood,
employed otherwise, also the interest of justice would be
best subserved with modifying the impugned order and
directing that in place of Rs. 25000/- (Rupees Twenty
Five Thousand), as lumpsum compensation, appellant be
paid Rs.3.25 lakhs (Rupees Three Lakhs and Twenty Five
Thousand), as compensation, taking into consideration
also the fact that the appellant had already been paid
Rs. 25000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) as
compensation.
8. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. We
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modify the impugned judgment by directing that over and
above, compensation directed of Rs. 3.25 lakhs (Rupees
Three Lakhs and Twenty Five Thousand), shall be paid to
the appellant.
9. This will be done within a period of eight weeks
from today.
10. The appeal is partly allowed as above. The
aforesaid payment shall effectuate a full and final
settlement of all claims of the appellant.
………………………………………………………………………J.
[K.M. JOSEPH]
………………………….………………………………………J.
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 2, 2021.
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