LALANKUMAR SINGH vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1757  OF 2022 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8882 of 2015] LALANKUMAR SINGH & ORS. …APPELLANT (S) VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA       …RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T  B.R. GAVAI, J. 1. Leave granted.  2. This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated th 25   June 2015 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High   Court  of  Judicature   of   Bombay,   at  Aurangabad,   in Criminal Writ Petition No.288 of 2015, thereby dismissing the said criminal writ petition filed by the appellants herein th and upholding the order of issuance of process dated 30   March   2009   passed   by   the   learned   Chief   Judicial 1 Magistrate,   Beed (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   learned   CJM”) and the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, th Beed dated 25   November 2014   dismissing the Criminal Revision being Criminal Revision Petition No.115 of 2013 filed by the appellants thereagainst.  3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as under:  3.1 The   Appellants   are   the   Directors   of   M/s   Cachet Pharmaceuticals   Private   Ltd.   (hereinafter   referred   to   as “CPPL”).   CPPL   was   granted   permission   to   manufacture ‘Hemfer Syrup’ which falls under Schedule C & C(1) to the Drugs & Cosmetics Rules, 1945 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Rules”). th 3.2 On 30  August 2006, Sh. N. A. Yadav, the then Drugs Inspector,   Food   and   Drugs   Administration,   Beed, Maharashtra, visited the premises of M/s. Priya Agencies at Beed and purchased ‘Hemfer Syrup’, from which he had st drawn samples of the drug.  On 31  August 2006, he sent one such sample to the Government Analyst, Maharashtra 2 State Drug Control Laboratory Mumbai so as to have the th drug tested.   On 26   February 2007, he received a test th report   dated   13   February   2007   from   the   Government Analyst stating that the sample was not of standard quality as   the   content   of   Cyanocobalamin   was   less   than   the permissible   limit,   i.e.,   39%  of   the   label   amount.   On   the same day, the manufacturer of the drug, i.e., CPPL, was informed by a registered post about the test report.  th On 29  March 2007, Sh. Vijay Jain, Deputy Manager, 3.3 QA   of   CPPL   requested   the   Drug   Inspector   to   send   the samples again for analysis. Pursuant to an application filed by M/s Alkem Laboratories, the distributor of CPPL, the learned CJM, Beed sent the samples of ‘Hemfer Syrup’ for th th re­analysis   on   24   April  2007.     On   10   July   2007,   the Learned CJM, Beed received the test report from the Central Drug Laboratory, Calcutta stating therein that the sample was not of standard quality as it did not conform to the accepted limits of  Cyanocobalamin  content. 3 st 3.4 Vide letter dated 21  August 2008, the Drug Inspector called upon CPPL to furnish the particulars of Directors, Articles of Association, Memorandum of Association, copies of   License   to   manufacture   and   sell   drugs,   particulars   of technical persons, and all such information as was needed to   be   provided   under   the   Drugs   &   Cosmetics   Act,   1940 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”).   In reply to this letter, CPPL informed the Drug Inspector that the report th dated 10   July 2007 was signed by “In­Charge Director” and not the Director of Central Drugs Laboratory and thus requested   him   to   send   a   proper   report   signed   by   the Director of the Central Drugs Laboratory. th Vide   letter   dated   12   January   2009,   the   Drug 3.5 Inspector again called upon CPPL to furnish particulars that th were   previously   sought.     Vide   letter   dated   12   February 2009,   CPPL   provided   the   information   and   documents requested by the Drug Inspector and it was categorically stated therein that the ‘Hemfer Syrup’ was manufactured under the supervision and technical guidance of Sh. Ashok 4 Kumar, the FDA approved manufacturing chemist for liquid orals.  3.6 Mr. Ashok Kumar (Accused No. 9) wrote an individual th letter   dated   13   February   2009   to   the   Drug   Inspector stating therein that the said batch of ‘Hemfer Syrup’ was manufactured   under   his   supervision   and   that   the   drug complied   with   the   requisite   standards.     Similarly,   Mr. th Naresh Roy (Accused No. 10) also wrote a letter dated 13 February 2009 to the Drug Inspector stating therein that the said batch of the ‘Hemfer Syrup’ was tested under his supervision and from the test results it appeared that the drug complied with the requisite standards.  Pursuant to the orders to take legal action against the 3.7 manufacturer of the drug by the Joint Commissioner (H.Q.) and   Controlling   Authority,   Food   &   Drug   Administration, Mumbai, the Complaint bearing RCC No. 233 of 2009 came to be filed before the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Beed under Section 18(a)(i) read with Sections 16 and 34 of the said Act and punishable under Section 27(d) of the said Act. In   the   said   complaint,   the   present   Appellants   being 5 Directors of the Company were arrayed as Accused Nos. 5 to 8.  3.8 The learned CJM, Beed issued Summons to all the accused, including the Appellants herein vide Order dated th 30   March 2009. The Appellants filed a Criminal Revision Petition against  the summoning  order before the  learned Sessions   Judge,   Beed   on   the   ground   that   there   are   no specific averments in terms of Section 34 of the said Act as to the role played by the Directors and thus sought for the Summoning   Order   to   be   quashed.   However,   the   learned Sessions Judge, Beed rejected the said Criminal Revision Petition   noting   that   there   is   a   specific   averment   in   the complaint   that   the   appellants   are   concerned   with   the manufacture, distribution and sale of ‘Hemfer Drug’.  3.9 The   Appellants   preferred   a   Criminal   Writ   Petition before the Bombay High Court assailing the order passed by the   learned   Sessions   Judge.   The   High   Court,   vide   the impugned   judgment,   dismissed   the   said   Criminal   Writ Petition   on   the   ground   that   all   the   Directors   were 6 conducting   the   business   of   CPPL   and   thus,   they   were involved in the manufacturing process.  3.10 Hence, the present appeal. We have heard Shri C.U. Singh and Shri Anupam Lal 4. Das, learned Senior Counsels appearing on behalf of the appellants   and   Shri   Siddharath   Dharmadhikari,   learned counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondent­State   of Maharashtra.  Shri C.U. Singh and Shri Anupam Lal Das, learned 5. Senior   Counsels   submit  that   Section   34   of   the   said   Act specifically provides that only such person who, at the time of the commission of the offence, was in­charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.   6. Shri   C.U.   Singh,   learned   Senior   Counsel,   further submits that Rule 76 of the said Rules prescribes a Form of licence to manufacture drugs specified in Schedule C and 7 C(1), excluding those specified in Part XB and Schedule X, or   drugs   specified   in   Schedule   C,   C(1)   and   X   and   the conditions for the grant of such licence.  He further submits that, before a license in Form 28 or Form 28B is granted, certain conditions are required to be complied with by the applicant.  He submits that under sub­rule (1) of Rule 76 of the said Rules, the manufacture is required to be conducted under   the   active   direction   and   personal   supervision   of competent technical staff consisting at least of one person who   is   a   whole­time   employee   and   who   possesses   the requisite qualification as prescribed under the said Rules. He further submits that under sub­rule (4) of Rule 76 of the said Rules, an applicant is required to provide and maintain adequate   staff,   premises   and   laboratory   equipment   for carrying out such tests of the strength, quality and purity of the substances as may be required to be carried out by him under the provisions of Part X of the said Rules.  He further states that under sub­rule (4A) of Rule 76 of the said Rules, the head of the testing unit is required to possess a degree in   Medicine   or   Science   or   Pharmacy   or   Pharmaceutical 8 Chemistry of a University recognised for the said purpose. He   is   also   required   to   have   experience   in   the   testing   of drugs, which in the opinion of the licensing authority is considered adequate.  He submits that Form 28 is a license to   manufacture   for   sale   or   distribution   of   drugs   in accordance with Rule 76 of the said Rules.  Learned Senior Counsel   submits   that   in   Form   28,   the   names   of   the approved competent technical staff are required to be given. He further submits that condition No.3 of the Conditions of Licence   requires   that   if   there   is   any   change   in   the competent   technical   staff,   the   same   shall   be   forthwith reported to the licensing authority.   7. Learned Senior Counsel submits that Schedule M to the said Rules provides for good manufacturing practice and requirements   of   premises,   plant   and   equipment   for pharmaceutical products.  Learned Senior Counsel submits that clause 6.1 of Part I of Schedule M specifically provides that the manufacture shall be conducted under the direct supervision   of   competent   technical   staff   with   prescribed qualifications   and   practical   experience   in   the   relevant 9 dosage form and/or active pharmaceutical products.   It is further the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that as per clause 6.2 thereof, the head of the Quality Control Laboratory   is   required   to   be   independent   of   the manufacturing unit.  It also requires that the testing shall be   conducted   under   the   direct   supervision   of   competent technical staff, who shall be whole time employees of the licensee.  8. Shri Singh further submits that in the licence which is duly   signed   by   the   designated   licensing   authority,   the names of the approved competent technical staff are already th given.   It is further submitted that in the reply dated 13 February   2009   to   the   Drug   Inspector,   Food   &   Drug Administration,   M.S.   Beed,   Mr.   Naresh   Roy,   Assistant Manager   Q.A.   (Accused   No.10)   had   stated   that   the   raw material was analysed in the Quality Control Department by Mr.   Aftab,   Chemist   under   his   supervision.     It   is   further informed that the finished product of the said batch of the drug   was   analysed   by   Mr.   M.K.   Sharma   under   his supervision.     Mr.   Naresh   Roy   (Accused   No.10)   further 10 informed that he was approved by the Rajasthan FDA as a competent person.   9. Learned   Senior   Counsel   submits   that   similarly,   Mr. Ashok   Kumar,   Assistant   Manager,   Production   (Accused No.9)   had   also   informed   the   Drug   Inspector   by th communication   dated   13   February   2009   that   he   was approved by the Rajasthan FDA.  The goods were released after the final approval from Quality Control.   He further states that the manufacturing record of the said batch was prepared by him and it bears his signature.   10. Shri   Singh   further   submits   that   merely   mentioning that   the   present   appellants,   being   the   Directors   of   the accused company, were responsible to the company for the conduct   of   the   business   of   the   company   would   not   be sufficient   to   initiate   proceedings   against   them.     It   is submitted that, unless and until there is a specific averment as to what was the role in the conduct of the business of the company, a person cannot be proceeded against solely on the ground that he was a director of the company.  He relies 11 on   various   judgments   of   this   Court   in   support   of   this proposition.   11. Shri C.U. Singh further submits that there is no formal order of issuance of the process passed by the learned CJM. It is submitted that, while issuing process, a duty is cast upon the Magistrate to arrive at a subjective satisfaction that there is sufficient ground to proceed.  He submits that there is no such order which would reflect the application of mind   by   the   learned   CJM   and   on   this   ground   also,   the impugned order is liable to be set aside.  12. Shri Siddharath Dharmadhikari, learned counsel, on the contrary, submits that perusal of the complaint, and specifically paragraphs 3 and 25 thereof would reveal that there is sufficient compliance of requirement of Section 34 of the said Act.   He submits that the complaint has to be read as a whole and cannot be read in a piecemeal manner. Learned counsel relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of  U.P. Pollution Control Board vs. Mohan Meakins 1 in support of the proposition that there is Ltd. and others   1 (2000) 3 SCC 745 12 no legal requirement for the trial Court to pass a detailed order while issuing process.  He also relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of  Dinesh B. Patel and others vs. 2 State of Gujarat and another   to buttress his submission that the averments made in the complaint are sufficient to proceed against the present appellants.  In the case of  13. State of Haryana vs. Brij Lal Mittal 3 and others , this Court observed thus: “ 8.  Nonetheless,   we   find   that   the impugned judgment of the High Court has got to be upheld for an altogether different reason.   Admittedly,   the   three   respondents were   being   prosecuted   as   directors  of   the manufacturers with the aid of Section 34(1) of the Act which reads as under: “34.  Offences   by   companies .—(1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed  by a company,  every  person who   at   the   time   the   offence   was committed,   was   in   charge   of,   and   was responsible   to   the   company   for   the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable   to   be   proceeded   against   and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub­section shall render any such 2 (2010) 11 SCC 125 3 (1998) 5 SCC 343 13

It could thus be seen that this Court had held that 14. simply because a person is a director of the company, it does   not   necessarily   mean   that   he   fulfils   the   twin requirements of Section 34(1) of the said Act so as to make him liable.  It has been held that a person cannot be made liable unless, at the material time, he was in­charge of and 14 was also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business.   15. In the case of  S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta 4 , this   Court   was   considering   the Bhalla   and   another   question as to whether it was sufficient to make the person liable for being a director of a company under Section 141 of the   Negotiable   Instruments   Act,   1881.     This   Court considered the definition of the word “director” as defined in Section 2(13) of  the Companies Act,  1956.    This   Court observed thus: “ 8.  ……. There is nothing which suggests that   simply   by   being   a   director   in   a company, one is supposed to discharge particular   functions   on   behalf   of   a company. It happens that a person may be a director in a company but he may not know anything about the day­to­day functioning of the company. As a director he   may   be   attending   meetings   of   the Board of Directors of the company where usually   they   decide   policy   matters   and guide   the   course   of   business   of   a company.   It   may   be   that   a   Board   of Directors   may   appoint   sub­committees consisting of one or two directors out of the Board of the company who may be made   responsible   for   the   day­to­day functions   of   the   company.   These   are 4 (2005) 8 SCC 89 15 matters which form part of resolutions of the   Board   of   Directors   of   a   company. Nothing is oral. What emerges from this is that the role of a director in a company is   a   question   of   fact   depending   on   the peculiar facts in each case. There is no universal   rule   that   a   director   of   a company   is   in   charge   of   its   everyday affairs.   We   have   discussed   about   the position   of   a   director   in   a   company   in order to illustrate the point that there is no magic as such in a particular word, be it   director,   manager   or   secretary.   It   all depends   upon   the   respective   roles assigned   to   the   officers   in   a   company. …..” 16. It was held that merely because a person is a director of a company, it is not necessary that he is aware about the day­to­day functioning of the company. This Court held that there is no universal rule that a director of a company is in charge of its everyday affairs.  It was, therefore, necessary, to aver as to how the director of the company was in charge of day­to­day affairs of the company or responsible to the affairs of the company.   This Court, however, clarified that the   position  of   a  managing   director   or   a  joint   managing director in a company may be different.  This Court further held that these persons, as the designation of their office 16 suggests, are in charge of a company and are responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.  To escape liability, they will have to prove that when the offence was committed, they had no knowledge of the offence or that they exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.   17. In the case of  Pooja Ravinder Devidasani vs. State 5 of Maharashtra and another  this Court observed thus: “ 17.  ……   Every   person   connected   with the Company will not fall into the ambit of the provision. Time and again, it has been   asserted   by   this   Court   that   only those persons who were in charge of and responsible   for   the   conduct   of   the business of the Company at the time of commission of an offence will be liable for criminal action. A Director, who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the   conduct   of   the   business   of   the Company at the relevant time, will not be liable for an offence under Section 141 of the   NI  Act.  In  National Small Industries Corpn.  [ National   Small   Industries   Corpn. Ltd.  v.  Harmeet   Singh   Paintal ,   (2010)   3 SCC 330 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 677 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1113] this Court observed: (SCC p. 336, paras 13­14) 5 (2014) 16 SCC 1 17

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18. It could thus clearly be seen that this Court has held that merely reproducing the words of the section without a clear statement of fact as to how and in what manner a director of the company was responsible for the conduct of 20 the business of the company, would not  ipso facto  make the director vicariously liable.   19. A similar view has previously been taken by this Court 6 in the case of  K.K. Ahuja vs. V.K. Vora and another .   In   the   case   of   20. State   of   NCT   of   Delhi   through Prosecuting Officer, Insecticides, Government of NCT, 7 this   Court   reiterated   the Delhi   vs.   Rajiv   Khurana ,   position thus: “17.  The ratio of all these cases is that the   complainant  is  required  to  state   in the   complaint   how   a   Director   who   is sought to be made an accused, was in charge of the business of the company or responsible   for   the   conduct   of   the company's business. Every Director need not   be   and   is   not   in   charge   of   the business of the company. If that is the position with regard to a Director, it is needless to emphasise that in the case of non­Director   officers,   it   is   all   the   more necessary to state what were his duties and   responsibilities   in   the   conduct   of business of the company and how and in what manner he is responsible or liable.” 6 (2009) 10 SCC 48 7 (2010) 11 SCC 469 21 21. Recently, in the case of  Ashoke Mal Bafna vs. Upper India Steel Manufacturing and Engineering Company 8 Limited ,  this Court observed thus: “ 9.  To   fasten   vicarious   liability   under Section 141 of the Act on a person, the law   is   well   settled   by   this   Court   in   a catena   of   cases   that   the   complainant should specifically show as to how and in what   manner   the   accused   was responsible. Simply because a person is a Director of a defaulter Company, does not make him liable under the Act. Time and again, it has been asserted by this Court that only the person who was at the helm of affairs of the Company and in charge of and   responsible   for   the   conduct   of   the business  at the time of commission of an offence  will be liable for criminal action. (See  Pooja Ravinder Devidasani  v.  State of Maharashtra  [ Pooja   Ravinder Devidasani  v.  State   of   Maharashtra , (2014)   16   SCC   1   :   (2015)   3   SCC   (Civ) 384 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 378 : AIR 2015 SC 675] .) 10.  In other words, the law laid down by this Court is that for making a Director of a   Company   liable   for   the   offences committed   by   the   Company   under Section   141   of   the   Act,   there   must   be specific   averments   against   the   Director showing as to how and in what manner 8 (2018) 14 SCC 202 22 the   Director   was   responsible   for   the conduct of the business of the Company.” In the light of these observations, let us examine the 22. averments made in the complaint insofar as the present appellants are concerned: “3.   That,   Accused   no.   5   to   8   are   the Directors   of   the   M/s   Cachet Pharmaceuticals   Pvt.   Ltd.   village   Thana Baddi, Tehsil Nalagarh dist. Solan (H.P.) Pin   code   173205   head   office   415, Shahanahar,   Worli,   Mumbai   ­   400018, and looking after day to day activities of the company.  That,   Accused   no.   4   is   the   Pvt.   Ltd. Company and is doing the   business of manufacturing, buying, selling, importing and   exporting   of   and/or   dealers   in Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics, Beauty aids, Oils,   Chemicals,   Food   products   and provisions,   Veterinary   and   Surgical Equipments,   Medicinal   preparations including Spirit. That, Accused no. 4 has mfg. unit at no. (1) Village Thana Baddi, Tehsil Nalagarh Dist. Solan (H.P.) Pin code 173205 and no. (2) at C­582, Ricco Ind. Area Bhiwadi, Dist. Alwar, Rajasthan.  That, Accused no.4 are holding drug mgf. License No. MNB/05/267 in form 25 and licence   no.   MB/05/268   in   form   28 granted   on   17.3.2006   valid   upto 16.3.2011. 23 * 25. That, on 12.2.2009, the complainant visited and inspected the premises of M/s Cachet Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. village Thana Baddi, Tehsil Nalagarh Dist. Solan (H.P.) Pin code 173205 that is accused no.4.  At the time of inspection, Shri Ajay Prakash Gupta Vice President Technical, accused   no.   9   and   10   were   present. During   enquiry,   it   was   revealed   that Accused   no.   4   to   10   manufactured "Hemfer   syrup   Mfg.   Lic.   No. MB/05/268/B.   No.   HMS/6015   CMfg. Date May­2006 which has been declared to  be   NOT   OF   STANDARD  QUALITY   at the   premises   of   M/s   Cachet Pharmaceuticals   Pvt.   Ltd.   village   Thana Baddi, Tehsil Nalagarh Dist. Solan (H.P.) Pin   code   173205   that   is   accused   no.4 under licence No. MB/05/268 and sold the   above   said   drugs   to   M/s   Priya Agencies   Behind   Dr.   Vaidya   Hospital Jalna   Road,   Beed,   Dist.   Beed   through M/s Alkem Laboratories Ltd. situated at reality   warehousing   Pvt.   Ltd.,   Gut No.2323/1 property no. 115, Pune Nagar road, At. Post Wagholi, Tai. Haveli, Dist. Pune ­ 412207.” It   can   thus   be   seen   that   there   are   no   specific 23. averments insofar as the present appellants are concerned. It is further to be noted that the present appellants are 24 neither the managing director nor the whole­time directors of the accused company.   24. It is further to be noted that, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 76 of the said Rules read with Form 28, the Accused Nos. 9 and 10 have specifically been approved by the licensing authority in Form 28.   Accused No.9 was approved   as   a   person   under   whose   active   direction   and personal supervision the manufacture would be conducted as required under sub­rule (1) of Rule 76 of the said Rules. Similarly, Accused No.10, who was approved as a head of the testing unit, was to be in­charge for carrying out the test of the strength, quality and purity of the substances as may be required under the provisions of Part X of the said Rules. We are therefore of the considered view that the complaint is totally lacking the requirement of Section 34 of the said Act.   25. The impugned orders are liable to be quashed and set aside on another ground also.  25 26. Perusal   of   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single Judge of the High Court would itself reveal that the learned CJM has not even cared to pass a formal order of issuance of process.  It will be relevant to refer to the following part of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court: “….Though, it is true that on the certified copy produced by the petitioners there is no   such   formal   order   but   copy   of Roznama (daily notings of the proceeding) shows that such order was made on 30­ 3­2009.   The   Roznama   dated   30­3­2009 reads as follows : (i) Complaint filed by Vilas Vishwanath  Dusane. (ii) Copy of list of documents containing  44 document. Order was made on Exhibit 1 (of issue process).   Take   entry   in   register   of criminal   cases   and   issue   summons against   accused.   List   the   matter   for appearance of accused on 18­6­2009. This record is sufficient to infer that the order   of   issue   process   was   made   and after that summons were issued against accused   to   ask   them   to   appear   in   the Court.” 26 27. It could thus clearly be seen that the learned Single Judge of the High Court held that though there was no formal   order   of   issuance   of   process,   the   record   was sufficient to infer that the order of issue process was made. 28. The   order   of   issuance   of   process   is   not   an   empty formality.  The Magistrate is required to apply his mind as to whether sufficient ground for proceeding exists in the case or not.  The formation of such an opinion is required to be stated in the order itself.   The order is liable to be set aside if no reasons are given therein while coming to the conclusion   that   there   is   a   prima   facie   case   against   the accused.  No doubt, that the order need not contain detailed reasons.  A reference in this respect could be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of  Sunil Bharti Mittal 9 which reads thus: vs. Central Bureau of Investigation ,  “ 51.  On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance   of   an   offence,   there   is sufficient   ground   for   proceeding.   This section   relates   to   commencement   of   a criminal   proceeding.   If   the   Magistrate 9 (2015) 4 SCC 609 27 taking cognizance of a case (it may be the Magistrate receiving the complaint or to whom   it   has   been   transferred   under Section 192), upon a consideration of the materials before him (i.e. the complaint, examination of the complainant and his witnesses, if present, or report of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie case   for   proceeding   in   respect   of   an offence, he shall issue process against the accused. 52.  A wide discretion has been given as to grant or refusal of process and it must be   judicially   exercised.   A   person   ought not   to   be   dragged   into   court   merely because a complaint has been filed. If a prima facie case has been made out, the Magistrate ought to issue process and it cannot   be   refused   merely   because   he thinks that it is unlikely to result in a conviction.  However,   the   words   “sufficient 53. ground   for   proceeding”   appearing   in Section 204 are of immense importance. It   is   these   words   which   amply   suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due   application   of   mind   that   there   is sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and formation of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie case   against   the   accused,   though   the order need not contain detailed reasons. 28 A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie incorrect.” A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case 29. of  Ashoke Mal Bafna (supra) .   In   the   present   case,   leaving   aside   there   being   no 30. reasons in support of the order of the issuance of process, as a matter of fact, it is clear from the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, that there was no such order passed at all.  The learned Single Judge of the High Court, based on the record, has presumed that there was an order of issuance of process. We find that such an approach is unsustainable in law.  The appeal therefore deserves to be allowed.   31. In the result, the appeal is allowed.   The impugned th order of issuance of process dated   30  March 2009 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Beed   and the order th passed   by   the   learned   Sessions   Judge,   Beed   dated   25 November   2014   dismissing   the   Criminal   Revision   being Criminal Revision Petition No.115 of 2013 are quashed and 29 set aside.  The complaint against the present appellants is dismissed.     Needless   to   state   that   the   complaint   shall proceed against rest of the accused in accordance with law. ..............................J.  [B.R. GAVAI]  .............................J.  [   C.T. RAVIKUMAR]  NEW DELHI; OCTOBER 11, 2022 30