Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
JIWANI DEVI PARAKI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
FIRST LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR, CALCUTTA AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT30/08/1984
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
TULZAPURKAR, V.D.
PATHAK, R.S.
CITATION:
1984 AIR 1707 1985 SCR (1) 686
1984 SCC (4) 612 1984 SCALE (2)274
ACT:
West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary
Provision) Act 1947-Whether the State Government’s
requisition of the building under the 1947 Act for
indefinite periods by renewing the said temporary Act itself
amounts to indirect acquisition of property under the Land
Acquisition Act and hence the exercise of power under the
1947 Act is improper and malafide-West Bengal Land
Acquisition Act, Section 49 (1).
HEADNOTE:
The petitioner is the lessee of the premises No. 7/1A-
D, Lindsay Street, Calcutta which is situated in an
important commercial locality of Calcutta. The ground floor
and mezzanine floor of the said premises were requisitioned
by Government for establishing main Sales Show room of
respondent No. 4, namely west Bengal Handicrafts and
Development Corporation Ltd., by an order of requisition No.
21/58-Regn. dated 25.2.1958 under the West Bengal Premises
Requisition and Control (Temporary Provision) Act 1947.
Though this Act itself is a temporary Act, this has been
renewed from time to time, the last one renewing it upto
31st March, 1985.
Aggrieved by the piece-meal extension of the 1947 Act
and the requisitioning of his premises since 1985, the
petitioner challenged the same by a petition under Article
32 of the Constitution and contended that (a) the West
Bengal premises Requisition Control (Temporary Provision)
Act 1947 cannot be converted into permanent Act and
therefore requisition of his premises cannot be a permanent
requisition ; (b) Requisitioning the property in this manner
for more than 25 years amounts to indirect acquisition of
the property and is a fraud upon the power; and (c) It
violates both Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the
Constitution, since the petitioner who himself requires the
premises for his own business is prevented from using.
Disposing of the petition, the Court
^
HELD: 1. There are significant differences between
’requisition’ and ’acquisition’. Normally the expression
requisition is taking possession of the property for a
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limited period in contradistinction to acquisition. This
popular meaning has to be kept in mind in judging whether in
a particular case there has been in fact any abuse of the
power. The distinction between ’requisition’ and
’acquisition’ is also evident from Entry 42 in List III of
the Seventh Schedule, Original Article 31 clause (2) of the
Constitution recognised the distinction between compulsory
acquisition and requisition of the property. The two
687
concepts are different; in one title passes to the acquiring
authority, in the other title remains with the owner, the
possession goes to the requiring authority. One is the
taking over of the title and the other is the taking over of
the possession. Thus the orders of requisition and
acquisition have different consequences and affect the
owners concerned in different manners. But the State has the
power both of requisition as well as acquisition, subject to
one condition that is the property acquired or requisitioned
must be for public purpose; Mangilal Karwa v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1955 Nagpur p. 153 at p. 157 approved,
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and others
[1950] I SCR p. 869 referred to. [695H; G; 696A-B]
2. Under Section 49 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act,
1942 as amended by the West Bengal Act 32 of 1955, even a
part of the building or a house can be acquired provided the
conditions mentioned and the procedure specified therein are
followed and there is no absolute bar to the acquisition of
a part of a house or a building. [697F]
3:1 It will not be correct to say that in no case can
an order of requisition for permanent purpose be made but in
a situation where the purpose of requisitioning the property
is of a permanent character and where the Government has
also the power and the opportunity to acquire the property
or a part thereof especially upon the fulfilment of the
conditions of section 49 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act (as
amended by the West Bengal Act) to the extent applicable, if
the Government chooses not to exercise that power nor
attempts to exercise that power to achieve its purpose, than
that will be bad not because the Government would be acting
without power of requisition but the Government might be
acting in a bad faith. In other words, if there is power to
acquire as also the power of requisition and the purpose is
of permanent nature by having the property or a part thereof
for the Government then in such case to keep the property
under requisition permanently might be an abuse of the power
and a colourable exercise of the power not because the
Government lacks the power of requisition but because the
Government does not use the other power of acquisition which
will protect the rights and interests of the parties better.
[697H; 698A-C]
3:2 Where one is repository of two powers that is power
of requisition as well as power of acquisition qua the same
property and if the purpose can equally be served by one
which causes lesser inconvenience and damage to the citizen
concerned unless the repository of both the powers suffers
from any insurmountable disability, user of one which is
disadvantageous to the citizen without exploring the use of
the other would be bad not on the ground that the Government
has no power but on the ground that it will be a misuse of
the power in law. [698D-E]
3:3 In the instant case, it is indisputably true that
(a) The purpose of requisition is a public purpose; and (b)
That the only part of the building namely one room has been
requisitioned for the show room but the premises in question
has remained under requisition for over 25 years and the
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purpose of having the premises in question is of a permanent
and perennial nature. But that by itself without anything
more would not enable the court to draw
688
the inference that the exercise of the power was bad
initially nor, would be continuance of the requisition
became malafide or colourable by mere lapse of time. In
order to draw such an inference some more material ought to
have been placed before the Court. In the circumstances the
continuance of the requisitioning of the premises in
question must be permitted subject to fulfilment of the
conditions mentioned. [698H-F]
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 11222 of 1983.
(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)
Soli J. Sorabjee, Gopal Subramanyam, L. P. Agarwala, R.
P. Singh, N. P. Agrwala and V. Shekher for the Petitioner.
F. S. Nariman, Rathin Das for Respondent Nos. 1 & 2.
S. N. Kacker, D. K. Sinha and J. R. Das for Respondent
No. 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This is an application under
article 32 of the Constitution of India. Notice was issued
and the respondents have filed counters and have made
submissions on the application. The petitioner is the lessee
of the premises No. 7/1 A-D Lindsay street, Calcutta which
is situated in an important commercial locality of Calcutta.
The ground floor and mezzanine floor of premises No. 7/1-D,
Lindsay Street, Calcutta were requisitioned by Government of
West Bengal by order of requisition No. 21/58 Reqn. dated
25th February, 1958 which was substituted by requisition
order No. 123/60 Reqn. dated 10th November, 1960 issued
under the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control
(Temporary Provision) Act, 1947, hereinafter called the said
Act for establishing main Sales showroom of respondent No. 4
herein which is the West Bengal Handicraft and development
Corporation Limited (a West Bengal Government undertaking).
The area under requisition is 2521 sq. ft on ground
floor and 1677 sq. ft. on mezzanine floor aggregating to
4198 sq. ft. The rent compensation payable under the said
Act was fixed by the Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta on
or about 31st March, 1959 at Rs. 1, 450-per month inclusive
of taxes and repairs with effect from 10th June, 1958 which
was ultimately modified to Rs. 2,500- per month by the High
Court of Calcutta. It is alleged on behalf
689
of the petitioner that in fixing the monthly compensation
for acquisition by Land Acquisition Collector, the High
Court in appeal took into consideration the rate prevailing
in the year 1958, being the year in which the requisition
took place. A showroom of respondent No. 4 has been set up
there.
The contention of the petitioner is that from the very
beginning the State Government had the intention of keeping
the said requisitioned premises permanently. The petitioner
contends that the State Government had ample power to
acquire the said property under the Land Acquisition Act at
the time of issue of order of requisition. In spite of power
to acquire the premises in question, the State Government
resorted to requisition the same with the intention of
permanently acquiring property in an indirect manner thereby
the State Government has acted in improper exercise of
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powers and authority and has not exercised the power
bonafide, alleges the petitioner.
The petitioner further alleges that the object is
clearly to avoid the obligation to pay reasonable
compensation for acquisition and instead thereof continue
occupying the area by paying nominal monthly rent as
compensation. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the
order of requisition has been passed for extraneous purpose
and is arbitrary and malafide. The petitioner also alleges
that according to the present letting value prevailing in
the market, the value would be over Rs. 43,668-approximately
per month. We are, however, in this application not
concerned with that controversy. The petitioner has
submitted that requisition can be for temporary period and
for a temporary purpose, and the State Government under the
garb of requisition has really acquired the property and has
avoided the obligation to pay compensation for acquiring the
property which will be over Rs. 29 lakhs.
According to the petitioner, the West Bengal Act of
1947 which was intended to remain in force for a short
temporary period does not contain any provision for revision
of rent. The said Act came into force on or about 1st
January 1948. The said Act contains no provision for
acquisition of any property but deals solely with
requisition of property for making temporary provision. The
said Act by various Acts has been renewed from time to time,
the last of such renewal as per averments has been extended
upto 31st March, 1985. It is further the case of the
petitioner that the said
690
Act cannot be converted into a permanent Act and there
cannot be a permanent requisition.
According to the petitioner, by this process the
property in question has been kept under requisition for 25
years. This, it was submitted, is a fraud upon the power.
According to the petitioner, the State Government had the
option of acquisitioning the property. The State Government
had also full knowledge that the possession of the said area
was required for a permanent purpose or at least for an
indefinite period i.e. for setting up a show-room and in
spite of the same did not choose to acquire the property but
arbitrarily issued the order of requisition under the said
Act. Petitioner states a that he requires the premises in
question to carry on his own business and the said right is
being interfered with and therefore infringes upon
petitioner’s fundamental right. The petitioner contends that
it violates both article 14 and article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution. There are various allegations about damages
being done to the premises in question. We are not concerned
in this application with the said allegations.
The petitioner prays for an order of derequisition of
the premises.
On behalf of the respondents, the main contention is
that the said Act has been renewed from time to time and
there is no limitation to the power of requisition except
that the same must be for public purpose. According to the
respondents, the purpose in this case is indubitably a
public purpose and that public purpose remains. The
respondents contend that there is no limitation on the
exercise of that power.
On behalf of the applicant, reliance was placed on the
decision of this Court in H. D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra
and Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 1212 of 1984) -judgment delivered
by my learned brother Bhagwati to which I was a party. There
the question as was posed by Bhagwati, J. was whether an
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order of requisition of premises can be continued for an
indefinite period of time or it must necessarily be of
temporary duration. The case discussed the other contention
and repelled the attack on the order of requisition on the
ground that the order of requisition did not set out the
public purpose for which it was made. It was noted by us in
the
691
decision of H. D. Vora that the High Court had held that no
material was placed before it to show what was the public
purpose for which the order of requisition was made and in
fact there was no denial on the part of the state government
or the appellant of the averment made on behalf of the third
respondent that the appellant in that case was neither a
government servant nor a homeless person for whom the order
of requisition was purported to have been made. We found
that the view taken by the High Court was well-founded and
it was not possible to hold on the material before us that
the order of requisition was made for public purpose. On
behalf of the appellant, however it was contended that the
order of requisition in that case was challenged after a
lapse of over 30 years and as such that challenge was liable
to be dismissed but this Court in Vora’s case relied on
another ground namely, that an order of requisition was by
its very nature temporary in character and could not endure
for an indefinite period of time in the facts of that case,
and the order of requisition in that case therefore ceased
to be valid and effective after the expiration of a
reasonable period of time and that it could not, under any
circumstance, continue for a period o over 30 years.
Brother Bhagwati noted the difference recognised by law
between "requisition" and "acquisition" and it was further
stressed that where acquisition under Land Acquisition Act,
1894 was possible, the Government under guise of requisition
could not continue to use the property under requisition for
an indefinite period of time thereby in substance. acquiring
the property because that would be misuse by the Government
of its powers. It was observed in that case that if the
Government wanted to take over the property for an
indefinite period of time, the government should acquire the
property but it could nor use the power of requisition for
achieving that object. In those circumstances it was
observed that the power of requisition was exercisable by
the government only for a public purpose which was of
transitory character, if the public purpose for which the
premises were required was a perennial one or of permanent
character from the very inception, no order could be passed
requisitioning the premises and in such a case the order of
requisition if passed would be fraud upon the statute, for
the government would be requisitioning the property when
really speaking it wanted the property for acquisition, the
object of taking the property being not transitory but
permanent and in such circumstances it was held that an
order of requisition for a period of such a long time as 30
years as it had happened in that case made the order of
requisition
692
bad. Relying mainly on the aforesaid basis and the facts
alleged in this case, on behalf of the petitioner it was
urged before us that the order of requisition was bad and
arbitrary.
On behalf of the respondents, however, attention was
drawn to a decision of this Court in the case of Collector
of Akola and Ors. v. Ramachandra & Ors a decision of a Bench
of three learned judges, There, the land owned by the
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respondents was requisitioned under the Bombay Land
Requisition Act for a public purpose viz,, for establishing
a new village site to resettle victims of flood. The
respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court
challenging the validity one extended until then upto 1963,
the power to requisition thereunder would be with the
government only during the time that it subsisted: so an
order passed for a permanent purpose could not be in the
contemplation of the Act. The High Court accepted the
objection and quashed the order. It was held by this Court
in appeal that the power of requisition under the Act could
be exercised whether the public purpose was temporary or not
and the exercise of that power for the purpose of
rehabilitation of flood sufferers was neither in abuse of
the power nor unjustified under the Act. The words "for any
public purpose" in Section 2(1) were wide enough to include
any purpose of whatever nature and did not contain any
restriction regarding the nature of that purpose. It placed
no limitation on the competent authority as to what kind of
public purpose should be for the valid exercise of its power
nor did it confine the exercise of that power to a purpose
which was of temporary nature. The Court observed that there
was no antithesis between the power to requisition and the
power of compulsory acquisition under Land Acquisition Act.
Neither of the two Acts contained any provisions under which
it could be said that if one was acted upon, the other could
not be.
In that case the facts were that the government made an
order of requisition under temporary Act for rehabilitating
the flood victims and also initiated proceedings under the
Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 in respect of those very
lands and issued a notification under Section 4 thereof. It
was contended that the action of the government was bad.
The only question which was argued in that case was
whether an order of requisition could be made for a
permanent purpose.
693
The order of requisition in that case was challenged on the
ground that the purpose for which the order of requisition
was made, namely rehabilitation of flood affected victims,
was a permanent purpose and the order of requisition was
therefore bad from its inception, since an order of
requisition could be made only for a temporary purpose. The
argument of the petitioner who challenged the order of
requisition was, inter alia, that the competent authority
had no power to invoke the Land Requisition Act inasmuch as
the purpose for which it was exercised was of a permanent
character. This argument appealed to the High Court and the
High Court held that the order of requisition was
"unjustified under the Bombay Land Requisition Act". It was
only this argument which was considered by this Court and
this is how this Court formulated in that case the question
for its decision: "The only question arising in this appeal
thus is whether the Act authorises an order of
requisitioning even if the purpose for which it is made is
not a temporary purpose ?" This Court held that the only
restriction imposed by the statute on the power of
requisition conferred on the State Government was that this
power could be exercised " Only for a purpose which is a
public purpose" and "on the face of it the sub-section does
not contain any express limitation to the power to
requisition, the only limitation being that an order
thereunder can be passed for a public purpose only" and
there is no implied limitation that the requisitioning
authority has no power thereunder to pass an order where the
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purpose is not temporary". This Court said that the premises
requisitioned "may be used for a temporary purpose or for a
purpose which is not temporary in nature", and added that
the power of requisition is not" restricted to a temporary
purpose only". No question was raised before this Court in
that case as to whether an order of requisition can continue
for an indefinite duration. The argument before this Court
in H.D. Vora’s case was not that the order of requisition
was initially bad, when made, on the ground that it was for
a purpose which was a permanent purpose. It fact, no one
contended that the purpose of housing homeless person was
not a temporary purpose but a permanent purpose and
therefore the order of requisition was bad. The principal
argument advanced was that though the order of requisition
was good when made, it ceased to be valid and effective,
because it could not legitimately be continued for an
indefinite length of time. The order of requisition in that
case had been allowed to continue for a period of almost 30
years and that is why this Court said that the order of
requisition had ceased to be
694
valid and effective and the premises must therefore be
derequisitioned. It is no doubt true that some observations
have been made in the judgment in that case with regard to
the permanent or temporary character of the purpose for
which an order of requisition could be made and to that
extent what is said in that judgment may have to be slightly
modified, but the principal decision in that case was that
an order of requisition is by its very nature temporary in
character and cannot be allowed to continue for an
indefinite length of time, because then it would tantamount
to an order of acquisition and would amount to a fraud on
the exercise of the power of requisition, especially where
there is no impediment in making the acquisition and no
effort was made to acquire, must be regarded as a correct
enunciation of the law which does not in any way conflict
with what was laid down in the case of Collector of Akola v.
Ramachandra (supra). The latter decision merely laid down
that an order of requisition can be made for a permanent
purpose while the for mer dealt with a totally different
question, namely, whether, whatever be the character of the
purpose for which an order of requisition was made, the
question was, could the order of requisition be continued
for an indefinite length of time and it was held that the
order of requisition would cease to be valid and effective
after the expiration of a reasonable period of time, even if
it was valid when made, and what, in the circumstances of a
given case would be a reasonable period of time would depend
on the facts and circumstances of the case. There is
therefore no contradiction between the decision in Collector
of Akola v. Ramachandra and the latter decision in H.D.
Vora’s case.
It may not be inappropriate to note that there are
significant differences between ’requisition’ and
’acquisition’. These have different legal consequences and
these affect the owners concerned in different manners. But
the State has the power both of requisition as well as
acquisition, subject to one condition, i.e., the property
acquired or requisitioned must be for public purpose. In the
"Words and Phrases Judicially Defined" by Roland Burrows
K.C. Vol. 4 at p. 562, it was observed that the word
’requisition’ was not a term of art and does not cannot the
same state of things in every particular case.
In the Fourth Edition of Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary
at page 2355, it has been mentioned that ’requisition’ is as
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follows:-
695
"Requisitioning’ is not a term of art and has
different meanings. Its usual meaning is nothing more
than hiring without taking the property out of the
owner although the owner has no alternative whether he
will accept the proposition of hiring or not. It may,
however, involve the taking over of the actual
domination of a chattel (The Steaua Romana (1944)
P.43).
"Requisitioned house"; "requisitioned land" Stat.
Def., Requisitioned Houses and Housing (Amendment) Act
1955 (c.24), s. 18 (1)."
In the case of Mangilal Karwa v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, it was observed as follows:-
"If the term ’requisition’ has acquired any
technical meaning during the two World Wars it has been
used in for the sense of taking possession of property
for the purpose of the State or for such purposes as
may be specified in the statute authorizing a public
servant to take possession of private property for a
specified purpose for a limited period in
contradistinction to acquisition of property by which
title to the property gets transferred from the
individual to the State or to a public body for whose
benefit the property is acquired. In ’requisition’ the
property dealt with is not acquired by the State but is
taken out of the control of the owner for the time
being for certain specified purposes. Even for this
limited purpose, however, the owner becomes entitled to
compensation, because ’requisition’ of the property
amounts at least to a temporary deprivation of the
property."
Thus, normally the expression ’requisition’ is taking
possession of the property for a limited period in
contradistinction to ’acquisition’. This popular meaning has
to be kept in mind in judging whether in a particular case,
there has been in fact any abuse of the power.
Orders of requisition and acquisition have different
consequences. These have been noted by this Court in the
observations of Mukherjea,
696
J. in the decision in the case in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v.
The Union of India and Others and the distinction between
’requisition’ and ’acquisition’ is also evident from Entry
42 in List III of the Seventh Schedule. Original Article 31
clause (2) of the Constitution recognised the distinction
between ’compulsory acquisition’ and ’requisition’ of the
property. The two concepts are different: in one title
passes to the acquiring authority, in the other title
remains with the owner, the possession goes to the requiring
authority. One is the taking over of the title and the other
is the taking over of the possession.
It was further contended on behalf of the respondents
that part of the premises i.e. one room as in the instant
case before us, cannot be acquired. Therefore the ratio of
the decision in the case of H. D. Vora would not be
applicable because there was no power to acquire the
premises in question. Secondly, it was urged that the
petitioner in the instant case was not the owner of the
property at all and the question of acquisition of the
requisitioned premises does not arise at all. It was,
thirdly, contended that it was not possible in the facts and
circumstances of the case to get any other alternative
accommodation for the showroom of the State Handicraft and
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Development Corporation which indisputably is a public
purpose. It was emphasised that the West Bengal Premises
Requisition and Control (Temporary Provision) Act, 1947 does
not contain any power to acquire the premises in question.
The main thrust of the argument was that section 49 (1)
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides:
"The provisions of this Act shall not be put in
force for the purpose of acquiring a part only of any
house, manufactory or other building, if the owner
desire that the whole of such house, manufactory or
building shall be so acquired."
In other words it was urged that this provision almost
prevents the acquisition of a part of a house or building.
It may be pointed out that section 49 (1) of the Act
has been amended so far as West Bengal is concerned by the
West Bengal
697
Act 32 of 1955 with effect from 20.10.1955 and the amended
section 49 (1) so far as Calcutta is concerned runs thus:
"Section 49 (1): The provisions of this Act shall
not be put in force for the purpose of acquiring the
part only of any house, manufactory or other building,
if the acquisition of the part will render the full and
unimpaired use of the remaining portion of the house,
manufactory or building impracticable.
Provided that, if any question shall arise as to
whether the part proposed to be acquired will render
the full and unimpaired use of the remaining portion of
the house, manufactory or building impracticable, the
Collector shall refer the determination of such
question to the court and shall not take possession of
such part until after the question has been determined.
In deciding on such a reference the Court shall
have regard only to the question whether the land
proposed to be taken is reasonably required for the
full and unimpaired use of the remaining portion of the
house, manufactory or building."
The aforesaid provision suggests that even a part of a
building or a house can be acquired provided the conditions
mentioned and the procedure specified therein are followed
and there is no absolute bar to the acquisition of a part of
a house or a building as suggested by the counsel for the
respondents.
In view of the decision in the case of H. D. Vora in
the light of the decision of this court rendered by Bench of
three Judges in Collector, Akola and Ors. v. Ramachandra and
Ors. (supra) and bearing in mind the distinction between
’requisition’ and ’acquisition’ as also the provisions of
West Bengal amended section 49 (1) (quoted above), the
correct position in law would be that it will not be correct
to say that in no case can an order of requisition for
permanent purpose be made but in a situation where the
purpose of requisitioning the property is of a permanent
character and where the Government has also the power and
the opportunity to acquire the property or a part thereof
especially upon the fulfil-
698
ment of the conditions of section 49 (1) of the Land
Acquisition Act (as amended by the West Bengal Act) to the
extent applicable, if the Government chooses not to exercise
that power nor attempts to exercise that power to achieve
its purpose, then that will be bad not because the
Government would be acting without power of requisition but
the Government might be acting in a bad faith. In other
words, if there is power to acquire as also the power to
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requisition and the purpose is of permanent nature by having
the property or a part thereof for the Government then in
such case to keep the property under requisition permanently
might be an abuse of the power and a colourable exercise of
the power not because the a Government lacks the power of
requisition but because the Government does not use the
other power of acquisition which will protect the rights and
interests of the parties better.
Where one is repository of two powers that is power of
requisition as well as power of acquisition qua the same
property and if the purpose can equally be served by one
which causes lesser inconvenience and damage to the citizen
concerned unless the repository of both the powers suffers
from any insurmountable disability, user of one which is
disadvantageous to the citizen without exploring the use of
the other would be bad not on the ground that the Government
has no power but on the ground that it will be a misuse of
the power in law.
It is true that the purpose indisputably in the instant
case is a public purpose. It is also true that the only part
of the building namely one room has been requisitioned for
the show room but the premises in question has remained
under requisition for over 25 years and the purpose of
having the premises in question is of a permanent and
perennial nature. But that by itself without anything more
would not enable the court to draw the inference that the
exercise of the power was bad initially, nor would the
continuance of the requisition become mala fide or
colourable by mere lapse of time. In order to draw such an
inference some more material ought to have been placed
before the court. In the circumstances after having heard
counsel on either side fully we feel that the following
would be an appropriate order to be made in the instant
case:
1. The impugned requisition order is upheld but the
continu-
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ance of the requisition of the premises in question is
permitted subject to the conditions mentioned hereinafter.
2. The Government is directed to take steps to acquire
premises in question by complying with the conditions
mentioned and by following the procedure prescribed in
section 49 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as
substituted for the State of West Bengal by the West Bengal
Act 32 of 1955 and if possible issue an appropriate order
acquiring the same if Government wants the continued use of
the premises. Such steps should be completed within a period
of three years from today.
3. If, however, there are insurmountable difficulties
in acquiring the premises under section 49 (1), the
Government will be at liberty to apply to this court for
appropriate directions.
4. We also hope that the Government would take steps to
acquire any alternative property or premises under Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 in view of the fact that the purpose
of the Government is more or less permanent and such steps
should also be taken not beyond a period of three years as
aforesaid.
5. If the aforesaid conditions or directions are not
complied with, the petitioner will also be at liberty to
apply to this court for appropriate directions in accordance
with law.
6. In the meantime, the parties are at liberty to make
any appropriate application for the enhancement of rent or
compensation in accordance with law, if they are so entitled
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to, and this will also not prejudice the parties from
proceeding with any suit for damages etc. that may be
pending.
The parties will pay and bear their own costs.
The application is disposed of accordingly.
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Review Petition No. 641 of
1984.
Order
in
Writ Petition No. 11222 of 1983.
dated 15th April 1985
Since it has been brought to our notice (which should
have been done when the matter was heard) that the West
Bengal Act 32 of 1955 is not applicable to the facts of the
case, we direct that any reference to that Act wherever it
occurs shall be deleted and in particular, in para 2 of the
order portion of our Judgment we delete the words "as
substituted for the State of West Bengal by the West Bengal
Act of 1955". The rest of the order stands. The Review
Petition is disposed of accordingly.
S.R. Appeal dismissed.
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