THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA vs. TASNEEM RIZWAN SIDDIQUEE

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 05-09-2018

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1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1124 OF  2018 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.2846/2018) The State of Maharashtra & Ors.      …..Appellant(s)   :Versus: Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee     ....Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The  appellants  have  assailed the  decision of  the High st Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 21  March, 2018 in Writ Petition No.1353 of 2018, whereby the High Court allowed the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by CHETAN KUMAR Date: 2018.09.05 12:54:48 IST Reason: writ petition preferred by the respondent, for issue of writ of habeas   corpus   directing   the   appellants   to   produce   her 2 husband who, according to the respondent, was illegally and unlawfully detained by the police in connection with FIR No.I­ 31/2018.    The decision of the High Court is assailed essentially on 3. two   counts.   First,   that   no   writ  of   habeas   corpus   could be issued in respect of a person who was in police custody in connection with a criminal case under investigation, pursuant to   an   order   of   remand   passed   by   the   court   of   competent jurisdiction. Second, in any case, the High Court should have refrained   from   making   scathing   observations   against   the concerned   police   officials   and   the   said   remarks   should   be expunged.  4. Briefly stated, the facts leading to the filing of this appeal th are   that   on   24   January,   2018,   a   secret   information   was received by the local police that one Mukesh Pandian, who is a private detective, was obtaining call detail records of different people and was selling them in return for hefty amount of money. The police caused the arrest of Mukesh Pandian and sought call details of Vodafone  Company. First Information 3 Report,   bearing   No.I­31/18   was   registered   against   Mukesh Pandian   for   offences   punishable   under   Section   420   of   the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 66, 72 and 72(a) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. During the investigation, additional offences under Section 26 of the Indian Telegraphs Act, 1885 and Sections 201, 171, 467, 468 and 120­B of IPC were added. Later on, police arrested one Prasant Palekar and found   various   mobile   chats   in   his   mobile   including   with Rizwan Alam Siddique (husband of the respondent herein) and other persons. The chat record collected by the police during the investigation, between Rizwan Alam Siddique and Prasant Palekar,   disclosed   that   Rizwan   Alam   Siddique   had   asked Prasant   Palekar   for   call   details   record   of   the   wife   of   one Nawazuddin   Siddique,   indicative   of   involvement   of   Rizwan Alam Siddique in the commission of offence. As a result, a th notice was issued to Rizwan Alam Siddique on 14  February, 2018 under Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in response   to   which   he   informed   the   police   that   he   will   be st travelling till 21   February, 2018 and will appear before the 4 nd police after 22   February, 2018. As assured, Rizwan Alam rd Siddique visited the police station on 23  February, 2018 for recording of his statement. As the investigation progressed, presence of Rizwan Alam Siddique was found to be necessary by the Investigating Officer who, therefore, tried to get in touch th with him by sending messages on his mobile phone on 15 March, 2018. Rizwan Alam Siddique responded to the said messages   and   showed   his   willingness   to   participate   in   the investigation. However, according to the Investigating Officer he did not cooperate with the police and for which reason, by th way of abundant precaution, on 16   March, 2018 the police issued notice under Section 41­A of Cr.P.C. which notice was attempted to be served but refused by Rizwan Alam Siddique. Further,   when   the   Investigating   Officer   along   with   his subordinates went to the premises of Rizwan Alam Siddique to serve the said notice, it transpired that Rizwan Alam Siddique was destroying the evidence in his mobile phone as well as in his   laptop   and,   therefore,   the   Investigating   Officer   took   a conscious decision to arrest him by taking assistance from the 5 nearest   police   station   i.e.   Versova   Police   Station.   After   his arrest, he was produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate on th 17   March,   2018   within   the   statutory   period.   The jurisdictional   Magistrate   gave   the   police   custody   of   Rizwan rd Alam Siddique until 23   March, 2018     after recording his satisfaction for such police remand.  5. The respondent, however, rushed to the High Court and th th filed   a   writ   petition   on   18 /19   March,   2018,   being   Writ Petition   No.1353/2018   praying   for   a   direction   to   the appellants (respondents in the writ petition) to produce her husband   before   the   Court   and   to   justify   his   detention   in accordance with procedure established by law. Further relief claimed   was   to   set  her   husband   Rizwan   Alam   Siddique  at th liberty.   The writ petition was moved on 20   March, 2018 when the Court in its order recorded as follows: “4. Mr.   Merchant   would   submit   that   once   this notice is issued, then, in terms of sub­section (1), the police   officer   was   satisfied   that   the   arrest   of   the petitioner's   husband   is   not   required   and   that   the matter falls under the provisions of sub­section (1) of Section 41. He, therefore, was pleased to issue a notice directing   the   petitioner's   husband   to   appear   before him at such place as is specified in the notice.  6 5. The factual argument is that this notice is dated 16th March 2018 and it informs the husband of the petitioner   to   appear   before   the   officer   signing   this notice   on   17th   March   2018.   Mr.   Merchant   would submit   that   sub­section   2   of   Section   41­A contemplates issuance of such notice but such phrase would have to be construed as “service or execution of notice”, else sub­section 1 would be rendered otiose. Therefore, until the person fails to comply  with the terms of notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by the competent Court in this behalf, unable to arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice. If there was compliance with the notice by the petitioner's   husband,   then,   no   question   arises, according   to  Mr.  Merchant,  of  presentation  of  such petition, but it is the respondents' assertion that when they   sought   to   serve   this   notice   on   the   petitioner's husband, he refused. That is how the panchanama is drawn.  6. Since Mr. Merchant says and on the basis of the pleadings   in   the   petition,   that   there   was   a panchanama drawn and a copy of which is at pages 41 and 42 of the paper book, we have carefully perused it. It is in Marathi. 7. The whole panchanama has been perused with the assistance of Mr. Yagnik, learned APP, who with all his persuasive ability, could not find any sentence therein to the effect that the petitioner's husband refused to accept this notice when it was served on him at his place of work/his office. In these circumstances and particularly when the notice at page 42 also contains below the signatures of panchas and the senior police inspector, the signature of the accused, then, whether it   is   a   signature   acknowledging   the   notice   and   it's receipt or is it asserting, as is now stated across the bar by Mr. Yagnik, his refusal. Once such a statement is absent in the panchanama, then, we prima facie find it very difficult to agree with Mr. Yagnik.  8. However, Mr. Yagnik prays for time to produce the contemporaneous   record,   which   according   to   him, would   indicate   that   the   noticee/husband   of   the 7 petitioner refused to accept the notice referable to and styled as one under sub­section (1) of Section 41­A of Cr.P.C. On a query as to where is the original record or the contemporaneous record, the answer of Mr. Yagnik is   that   today   in   the   ongoing   legislative   assembly session,   there   is   a   query   and   which   has   to   be answered by the concerned Minister and he requires the original documents so also officer's presence in the legislature secretariat. That is how the whole record has been taken to the legislative assembly secretariat. Mr. Yagnik, therefore, seeks time till tomorrow, which is 21st March 2018 at 11.00 a.m.. We post this matter tomorrow,   21st   March   2018   at   11.00   a.m.   only   to enable Mr. Yagnik to produce such record and answer the queries of the Court; else, all the consequences in law shall follow.  9.   This   opportunity   is   granted   to   Mr.   Yagnik   only because the document at pages 41 and 42 denotes that not only the petitioner's husband was present at his office but he and his staff handed over the articles and details of his e­mail identity, mobile and related information.   The   panchanama   records   that preparation   of   the   same   had   commenced   at   20.10 hours and ended at 22.10 hours on 16th March 2018.  10. Stand over to 21st March 2018 at 11.00 a.m.” st 6. Again, the matter was listed on 21   March, 2018 when the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   perused   the   record produced by the Public Prosecutor, including the entry in the police diary, the remand report and other documents. It held that the said record did not show necessary compliance of the mandate of law before the arrest of Rizwan Alam Siddique. 8 After recording that finding, it went on to observe that such arrest infringes the valuable right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and, therefore, acceded to the request of the   respondent   to   set   Rizwan   Alam   Siddique   at   liberty forthwith. At the same time, the High Court went on to make scathing observations against the police officials as recorded in   paragraphs   4­6   of   the   impugned   judgment,   which   read thus: “4. A brief hearing today resulted in Ms. Pai seeking time to  take  instructions  and after  speaking   to  the Deputy Commissioner  of Police.  At her request, the matter was taken up at 1.00 p.m. and when it was called   out,   on   instructions   from   the   Deputy Commissioner of police, who is present in court, it is stated   that   the   said   Deputy   Commissioner   has   no objection to the petitioner being released, if so directed by this court.  5. Once we have noted, in terms of our earlier order and even at today's hearing that he is not obliging this court by making any statement, then, he must admit that  he  has  taken  law  in his hands  and he  would voluntarily proceed to release the petitioner's husband from   custody.   This   was   the   expectation   from   this police officer and if he had apologised genuinely and bonafide and sought time to release the petitioner's husband, we would not have directed any action to be taken against him. However, he remains adamant and persists that only if this court says that the petitioner's husband   should   be   released,   he   would   have   no objection to such release. He would bring now to the court, the proceedings before the Magistrate and the contents   of   the   remand   report,   which,   according   to 9 him, permit him to detain the petitioner's husband in custody till 23rd March, 2018.  6. We do not think any assistance can be derived from the entries in the diary or the remand proceedings. We do   not   think   that   the   order   of   the   Magistrate remanding the petitioner's husband to police custody till 23rd March, 2018 can bind this court and if the true and correct facts had been brought to the notice of the concerned judicial officer, possibly, he would not have passed the order on the request of this police officer. Therefore, while we direct, after holding that the petitioner's husband was unlawfully detained, his release from the custody forthwith, we also direct the superior police officials, particularly the functionary in the   Department   of   Home,   Government   of   India   to launch disciplinary proceedings and the petitioner and her husband may initiate or file civil suit and criminal prosecution against this police officer for taking the law   in   his   hands.   Such   prosecution   shall   continue uninfluenced by any proceedings that may be initiated against   the  petitioner's   husband  for   having   violated the law.” 7.   Aggrieved by this decision, the appellants have filed the present   appeal   on   two   counts,   as   already   indicated   in paragraph 3 above. The respondent, on the other hand, has supported the decision of the High Court and submits that the appeal is devoid of merit. It is also brought to our notice that Rizwan   Alam   Siddique   has   already   been   released   after   the impugned judgment. In response to this submission, counsel 10 for the appellants would submit that the appellants are more concerned about the scathing observations made by the High Court   against   the   police   officials   and   would   be   more   than content if liberty is granted to the police to proceed against the said Rizwan Alam Siddique in accordance with law.  8.   We   have   heard   Mr.   Nishant   Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. C.A.   Sundaram,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the respondent. The question as to whether a writ of habeas corpus could 9. be maintained in respect of a person who is in police custody pursuant   to   a   remand   order   passed   by   the   jurisdictional Magistrate in connection with the offence under investigation, this issue has been considered in the case of  Saurabh Kumar  1 through his father Vs. Jailor, Koneila Jail and Anr. ,   and 2    It Manubhai Ratilal Patel Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. is no more  res integra . In the present case, admittedly, when the writ petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was 1 (2014) 13 SCC 436 2 (2013) 1 SCC 314 11 th th filed by the respondent on 18 /19  March, 2018 and decided st by the High Court on 21  March, 2018 her husband Rizwan Alam Siddique was in police custody pursuant to an order passed   by   the   Magistrate   granting   his   police   custody   in th connection with FIR No.I­31 vide order dated 17  March, 2018 rd and which police remand was to enure till 23  March, 2018. Further,   without   challenging   the   stated   order   of   the Magistrate,  a writ  petition  was filed limited  to  the relief of habeas corpus. In that view of the matter, it was not a case of continued illegal detention but the incumbent was in judicial custody   by   virtue   of   an   order   passed   by   the   jurisdictional Magistrate, which was in force, granting police remand during investigation of a criminal case. Resultantly, no writ of habeas corpus could be issued.  10. Reverting   to   the   prayer   for   expunging   the   scathing observations made in the impugned judgment, in particular paragraphs 4­6, reproduced earlier, it is submitted that the said observations were wholly unwarranted as the concerned Deputy   Commissioner   of   Police   who   was   present   in   Court, 12 could   not   have   given   concession   to   release   Rizwan   Alam Siddique   in   the   teeth   of   a   judicial   order   passed   by   the rd Magistrate   directing   police   remand   until   23   March,   2018. Moreover, it is evident that the High Court proceeded to make observations without giving any opportunity, whatsoever, to the concerned police officials to explain the factual position on th th affidavit. The writ petition was filed on 18 /19  March, 2018 th and was moved on 20   March, 2018 when the Court called upon the Advocate for the appellants to produce the record on st the next day i.e. 21  March, 2018.  The impugned order came st to be passed on 21  March, 2018, notwithstanding the judicial rd order of remand operating till 23   March, 2018.   The High Court, in our opinion, should not have taken umbrage to the submission made on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner of Police that the respondent’s husband could be released if so directed by the Court. As aforesaid, the DCP has had no other option but to make such a submission. For, he could not have voluntarily released the accused who was in police custody pursuant to a judicial order in force. The High Court ought not 13 to   have   made   scathing   observations   even   against   the Investigating Officer without giving him opportunity to offer his explanation on affidavit.  Suffice it to observe that since no writ of habeas corpus 11. could be issued in the fact situation of the present case, the High Court should have been loath to enter upon the merits of the arrest in absence of any challenge to the judicial order rd passed   by   the   Magistrate   granting   police   custody   till   23 March, 2018 and more particularly for reasons mentioned in that order of the Magistrate. In a somewhat similar situation, this Court in  State represented by Inspector of Police and 3   deprecated   passing   of Ors.   Vs.   N.M.T.   Joy   Immaculate disparaging and strong remarks by the High Court against the Investigating Officer and about the investigation done by them. Accordingly,   we   have   no   hesitation   in   expunging   the observations   made   in   paragraphs   4   to   6   of   the   impugned judgment against the concerned police officials in the facts of the present case.   3 (2004) 5 SCC   729 14 12. As aforesaid, even though this appeal succeeds, since the respondent’s husband Rizwan Alam Siddique has already been released   after   the   impugned   judgment,   the   Investigating Officer may proceed against him in connection with the stated crime registered as FIR No.I­31/2018 strictly in accordance with law and not merely because the impugned order has been set aside.  We may not be understood to have expressed any opinion regarding the guilt or otherwise of the respondent’s husband or correctness of the charges levelled against him.  Accordingly, this appeal is allowed in the aforementioned 13. terms.   .………………………….CJI. (Dipak Misra) …………………………..….J.           (A.M. Khanwilkar) …………………………..….J.          (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud) New Delhi; September 05, 2018.