Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 440
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1796-1828 OF 2024
NEW MANGALORE
PORT TRUST & ANR. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
CLIFFORD D SOUZA ETC.ETC. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1
1. The appellants New Mangalore Port Trust has
assailed the correctness of the judgment and order
dated 22.11.2019 passed by the High Court of
Karnataka at Bengaluru dismissing a bunch of writ
petitions preferred by NMPT assailing the correctness
of the judgment and order dated 15.03.2017 passed
by the District Judge allowing the appeal of the
respondents and quashing the order of the Estate
Officer of NMPT raising demand against the
respondents.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2025.04.03
17:00:58 IST
Reason:
1
NMPT
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 1 of 26
2. The facts in brief relevant for proper adjudication of
these appeals are summarised hereunder:
2.1. NMPT allotted land to the respondents
(hereinafter referred to as Licensees) for
loading and unloading goods subject to
payment of licence fee which is to be revised
every five years with the approval of Tariff
Authority for Major Ports (TAMP).
2.2. Allotment to the respondent for the licensees
had been made in the year 2003. By
notification dated 20.06.2005 licence fee was
revised w.e.f. February, 2002. Thereafter, the
next revision was notified on 23.07.2010
approving the revision of licence fee w.e.f.
20.02.2007 again for a period of five years.
2.3. Pursuant to the said revision, demand was
raised for realising the arrears of licence fee
for the period 20.02.2007 till 23.07.2010 i.e.
the date of the notification. Beginning March,
2011, the Assistant Estate Manager/Estate
Officer issued demand notice to all the
Licensees. The Licensees challenged the
notification dated 23.07.2010 before the High
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 2 of 26
Court by way of writ petitions filed in the year
2011-2012 primarily on the ground that it
was not permissible to revise the licence fee
retrospectively. The learned Single Judge
vide judgment dated 28.06.2013 dismissed
the bunch of writ petitions holding that the
licence fee could be revised retrospectively
and upheld the notification dated
23.07.2010.
2.4. Aggrieved by the same the Licensees
preferred writ appeals before the Division
Bench of the Karnataka High Court at
Bengaluru. These group of appeals are still
pending however without any interim orders.
2.5. After the judgment of the Single Judge dated
28.06.2013, the Assistant Estate Manager
issued a demand notice on 15.01.2015, copy
whereof is filed as Annexure P-5. It would
also be relevant to mention that there are
other notices also issued but the notice dated
15.01.2015 is specifically mentioned as there
is a reply given to it by the Licensees. The
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 3 of 26
notice dated 15.01.2015 is reproduced
hereunder:-
“FINAL NOTICE
No.30/44/2015/EBL.1/TAMP
To Date: 15.01.2015
M/s Export Trade Link Agencies
Lal Bagh
MANGALORE – 575 003
Sir,
Sub: Payment of difference in Licence fee
on account of revision of Scale of Rate
w.e.f. 20.02.2007
Ref:
1) TAMP ORDER G NO.184 dated
23.07.2010.
2) T.O. letter even No.dtd/07.11.2014
Please refer to the letter cited
above, wherein it was requested to
remit the difference of licence
fee/penal licence fee including
Service Tax amounting to
Rs.55,32,234/- on account of
revision of SoR w.e.f. 20.02.2007, But
you have not remitted the said
amount.
Hence you are once again
requested to make necessary
arrangement for remittance of
difference in Licence Fee and Service
Tax within 15 days from the date of
receipt of this letter failing which
penal interest @ 13% shall be payable
from the due date till the payment is
received and action for recovery of
dues will be initiated as per law.
Thanking you
Yours faithfully
Sd/- 15.01.2015
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 4 of 26
Asstt. Estate Manager (Gr.I)”
2.6. The Licensees responded to the same vide
letter dated 04.02.2015 and objected to the
demand raised on the ground that as the
issue is still pending before the Division
Bench of the High Court, no question arises
for the payment of the difference in licence fee
for the period 20.02.2007 till 23.07.2010.
The same would prejudice their case. The
question whether licence fee could have been
revised with retrospective effect and
recovered was still to be decided by the High
Court in the pending writ appeal. It was thus
requested that the NMPT may not demand
the difference in licence fee for the period
prior to 23.07.2010 till such time the appeal
is not decided. The said communication
dated 04.02.2015 is reproduced hereunder: -
“The Asst. Estate Manager (Gr.I)
New Mangalore Port Trust,
Mangalore,
Sir,
Subject: Writ Petition
No.36972/2011, order dated
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 5 of 26
28.06.2013 of Hon’ble High Court of
Karnataka
Ref: i) Payment of difference licence fee
on account of revision of scale of rates
w.e.f. 20.02.2007, on the basis of
Tamp order No. G184, dated:
23.07.2010.
ii) Your Letter bearing
No.3/44/2015/EBL.1/TAMP, dated
15.01.2015.
With reference to the above said
subject, we would like to inform you
that we had challenged the TAMP
order dated: 23.07.2010, before the
Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka,
Bangalore by filing the writ petition
No.34541 & 34784/211 and the said
writ petition was dismissed on
28.06.2013 by the Hon’ble High Court
of Karnataka, Bangalore. We have
challenged the order
dated:28.06.2013 passed in the writ
petition by the Hon’ble High Court of
Karnataka, Bangalore before the
division bench by filing the writ appeal
no.4400 & 4401/2013, the said writ
appeal was posted on 10.11.2014 for
preliminary hearing/admission and
the Hon’ble Court after hearing the
matter by the council appearing for
our company and by the council
appearing for New Mangalore Port
Trust the appeal was admitted by the
Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka on
10.11.2014, therefore the above said
subject matter i.e. the notification
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 6 of 26
dated: 23.07.2010 (TAMP) is under
challenge before the Hon’ble High
Court and the Court has already
admitted the matter the said subject
matter pending before the Hon’ble
High Court therefore immediately the
question doesn’t arise for payment of
difference license fees to be paid to
you as per your letter, it will prejudice
our case since we are not liable to pay
the difference license fees with
retrospective effect, whether we are
liable to pay or not that question has
to be decided by the court in the
pending writ appeal.
Therefore, we are requesting you to
not to demand difference license fees
amount with retrospective effect as
per the TAMP order, dated
23.07.2010, during the pendency of
the appeal before the Hon’ble High
Court of Karnataka, Bangalore and
the question of remittance of money
demanded by you as per you Letter,
dated 15.01.2015 for a sum of
Rs.5,73,833/- present does not arise,
since appeal is pending before the
Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka,
Bangalore.”
2.7. The Assistant Estate Manager Grade-1 was
also nominated as Estate Officer under
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
2
Occupants) Act, 1971 . The Estate Officer
2
The PP Act
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 7 of 26
vide communication dated 12.08.2015 gave a
notice under sub-section (3) of section 7 of
the PP Act to the Licensees calling upon them
to show cause on or before thirty days from
the date of receipt of the notice why an order
requiring to pay the said arrears of rent
together with simple interest should not be
made. The Licensees again came up with
their reply on 07.09.2015 taking up the same
defence that their writ appeal was pending
before the Division Bench of the Karnataka
High Court at Bengaluru and till such time it
is not decided, any demand would prejudice
their case. The question of demanding the
difference of license fee for the period prior to
23.07.2010 was yet to be decided by the
Division Bench in the pending writ appeal.
2.8. Since the response is the same as given in the
earlier reply dated 04.02.2015 we are not
reproducing the same. The Estate Officer
again issued a notice dated 15.02.2016
granting them three weeks further time to
show cause and it further stated that the
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 8 of 26
compound interest at the rate of 9% (nine
percent) would also be payable under the
statutory provisions. This notice was also
replied on 25.02.2016 by the Licensees
resisting any demand during the pendency of
the writ appeal citing the same reasons as
given earlier.
2.9. The Estate Officer not satisfied with the reply
and noting the fact that there was no stay
granted in the pending writ appeals
proceeded to pass an under section 7(1) of
the PP Act granting a month’s time to make
the payment failing which it would be
recovered as land revenue.
2.10. The Licensees preferred a miscellaneous
appeal under section 9 of the PP Act before
the District Judge at Mangalore. The District
Judge clubbed all the appeals and decided
the same vide judgment dated 15.03.2017,
allowing all the appeals holding that the
proceedings under section 7(1) was barred by
time and accordingly, set aside the demand.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 9 of 26
District Judge, the NMPT filed writ petitions
before the High Court which have since been
dismissed by the impugned judgment giving
rise to the present appeals.
3. We have heard Mr. Yatindra Singh, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant and on behalf of
the respondents Shri Vikas Singh and Ms. Haripriya
Padmanabhan, learned senior counsels, and have
perused the material on record.
4. The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant
are briefly summarised hereunder:
a) The licensees did not raise the plea of limitation
in their reply to the show cause notice under
Section 7(3) of the PP Act. For the first time they
raised it in the appeal. Under the PP Act no
limitation is prescribed for passing an order
under Section 7(1).
b) The judgment in the case of NDMC vs. Kalu
3
Ram, although wrongly decided holding that
there would be limitation of three years
applicable to recovery proceedings under the PP
3
(1976) 3 SCC 407
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 10 of 26
Act, but without going into that question in view
of the facts of the present case, the proceedings
for recovery under the PP Act were within the
limitation period of three years. This
submission is based upon Section 18 of the
Limitation Act. It is submitted that the
respondent, in writing, had acknowledged the
debt vide their reply dated 04.02.2015 to the
demand notice dated 15.01.2015 and therefore
the limitation would stand extended up to
03.02.2018.
c) Admitted facts and admitted documents can be
relied upon to argue a question of law before
this Court even if not raised before the Courts
below. The submission is that though the
benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act was
not claimed specifically before the Court below,
but in view of the admitted facts based on
admitted documents, this Court may consider
extending the benefit of Section 18 of the
Limitation Act. Once this benefit is extended,
the limitation for recovery of arears of rent
would extend up to 03.02.2018 and even
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 11 of 26
beyond in view of further acknowledgement of
the debt in response to the show cause notice
and reply given by the respondents on
07.09.2015 and 25.02.2016 for a further period
of three years.
d) The Division Bench and the High Court held the
recovery proceedings to be barred by limitation
taking the date of notification of the revised
tariff i.e. 23.07.2010 as the cause of action for
the recovery of arrears. After excluding the
period during which interim order was
operating i.e. 1 year and 293 days, the
limitation would extend up to 11.05.2015 but
as the show cause notice was issued on
21.08.2015, it was beyond the prescribed period
of limitation.
e) The respondents challenged the notification of
revised tariff dated 23.07.2010 by way of several
petitions before the learned Single Judge of the
Karnataka High Court, in which interim order
was also passed. The said bunch of petitions
was dismissed on 28.062013. Aggrieved by the
same, respondent preferred intra-court appeals
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 12 of 26
which were admitted and are still pending
before the Division Bench of the High Court of
Karnataka. Throughout in their correspondence
to the various demands and the show cause
notices, the only defence taken by the
respondents was that the demand should not be
pressed at this stage as it would prejudice their
case pending in the appeal before the Division
Bench of the Karnataka High Court. The tenor
of the defence is clear. Then subject to the
outcome of the appeals, the demand could be
raised if the respondents failed.
f) It is further submitted that in view of the
specific stand taken in their replies, the
respondents cannot now urge that the recovery
proceedings were barred by limitation.
g) In view of the admitted position that the intra-
court appeals are pending before the Division
Bench of the High Court, this Court may
consider setting aside the quashing of the
recovery proceedings on the ground of limitation
and may remand the proceedings before the
High Court to be clubbed with the pending
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 13 of 26
appeals and both the matters may be decided
simultaneously. If the intra-court appeals of the
respondents are allowed and the revision of
tariff retrospectively is set aside, that is the
notification dated 23.07.2010, to the extent that
its retrospective application is set aside,
automatically the writs filed by the appellant
before the High Court would stand dismissed.
However, if the respondents’ appeals are
dismissed by the Division Bench, then the writ
petition filed by the appellant before the High
Court, deserves to be allowed and the
respondents would be liable to pay the arears of
rent along with admissible interest.
h) Lastly, it was submitted that the respondents
were well aware of the revision of the tariff and
thus would have realised the enhanced tariff. If
they succeed on this technical ground, they
would be guilty of unjust enrichment.
i) On the above submissions, learned senior
counsel prayed that the appeals be allowed after
setting aside the impugned order of the High
Court.
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 14 of 26
5. Mr. Vikas Singh and Ms. Haripriya Padmanabhan,
learned senior counsels appearing for the
respondents, vehemently submitted that the appeals
are liable to be dismissed. None of the arguments
advanced by the appellant are tenable in law. Their
arguments are summarised hereunder:
a) The appellant, having failed to raise the plea of
acknowledgment and extension of limitation
under Section 18 of the Limitation Act either
before the Estate Officer, the District Judge or
the High Court and not even in the pleadings
before this Court, cannot raise this plea during
the course of oral arguments. The submission
relating to applicability of Section 18 of the
Limitation Act deserves to be rejected outright.
b) The question of limitation would be a mixed
question of law and fact and, as such, a party
seeking benefit of an extension provision should
specifically plead and lead evidence in support
of their submissions. In the absence of any such
pleading before any of the forum, no benefit can
be extended to the appellants seeking
applicability of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 15 of 26
c) The communication dated 04.02.2015 never
admitted the liability/debt. In fact, it clearly
denied the liability/demand on the ground that
there could be no retrospective revision of tariff.
It is, thus, wrong on the part of the appellant to
argue that the communication dated
04.02.2015 acknowledged the liability/debt.
d) The demands raised prior to 12.08.2015 were
not under any statutory provision. These
demands were being raised by the lessor to the
lessee. The statutory authority under the PP Act
for the first time, issued show cause notice on
12.08.2015, which admittedly was beyond a
period of three years if the benefit of section 18
of the Limitation Act is not extended. Had there
been a notice under Section 7(3) of the PP Act
prior to 11.05.2015 to which a reply had been
given by the respondents may be for deferment
of the demand in view of the pending appeal
before the Division Bench, it could be urged on
behalf of the appellant that they were entitled to
the benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
There being no such show cause notice prior to
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 16 of 26
11.05.2015, any proceedings for recovery would
be barred by law. Both the notices under
Section 7(3) dated 12.08.2015 and the order
passed under Section 7(1) on 21.07.2016 were
beyond the prescribed period of limitation and,
thus, proceedings have been rightly quashed by
the District Judge as confirmed by the High
Court.
e) It may be true that the Assistant Estate
Manager also happened to be the Estate Officer
under the PP Act, it cannot be presumed that
rather no benefit can be extended to the
appellant that the previous notices issued by
the Assistant Estate Manager could be treated
to be notice under the provisions of the PP Act.
f) For all the reasons recorded above, the
submission is that the appeals deserve to be
dismissed.
6. Having considered the submissions and having
perused the material on record, we now proceed to
deal with the respective arguments.
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 17 of 26
7. Common argument raised on behalf of both sides is
to the effect that objections had not been taken at the
right time and at the initial stage. On behalf of the
appellant, it was submitted that in reply to the show
cause notice under section 7(3) of the PP Act, no
objection regarding the plea of limitation had been
taken. However, in the appeal, ground for limitation
was taken for the first time. Similarly on behalf of the
respondents, it was submitted that the plea of section
18 of Limitation Act was not raised right up to the
stage of filing the appeal before this Court, but it was
taken only during the course of arguments. As the
facts and the material on record, i.e. the
correspondences between the parties, are not in
dispute, we are rejecting the said submission of both
the sides and thus would be dealing with the plea of
limitation also.
8. The District Judge had allowed the appeal of the
respondents and quashed the demand notice on the
finding that it was barred by limitation. Taking the
date of cause of action to be 23.07.2010, and after
excluding the period during which there was an
interim order operating in the writ petition pending
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 18 of 26
before the Single Judge filed by the respondents, the
limitation of 3 years would expire on 11.05.2015. The
said limitation of 3 years is provided under Article 52
to the Schedule of the Limitation Act. The High Court
also took the same view and accordingly held that the
proceedings under the PP Act having been initiated
by issuance of notice for the first time on 12.08.2015
the same would be barred by limitation. It also placed
reliance on the judgement of this Court in the case of
4
New Delhi Municipal Committee vs. Kalu Ram . In
the absence of Kalu Ram (supra), the Limitation Act
would not apply because the PP Act does not
explicitly incorporate it. While Section 9 of the PP Act
provides a limitation period for filing appeals, Section
7 thereof contains no such provision. However, Kalu
Ram clarifies that the Limitation Act does apply to
proceedings under the PP Act. On behalf of the
appellants, it was briefly argued that Kalu
Ram (supra) was incorrectly decided and required to
be revisited by a larger Bench, but this was raised
merely as a passing reference.
4
AIR 1976 SC 1637
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 19 of 26
9. On behalf of the respondents, it has been submitted
that in view of the admitted facts that no notice was
issued under the PP Act by the Estate Officer prior to
11.5.2015, the impugned proceedings under section
7 of the PP Act were rightly held to be barred by law.
10. In effect, both sides agree that the Limitation Act will
apply to the proceedings under the PP Act. The
respondents cannot argue that only section 3 of the
Limitation Act along with the limitation provided
under Article 52 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act
will apply and not section 18 of the same Act. Once
the Limitation Act applies, all its provisions will be
applicable to the proceedings under the PP Act. It is
true that the plea of benefit of section 18 of the
Limitation Act was not raised before the High Court
and therefore not considered but nevertheless, as we
have already rejected the objection of the
respondents that the arguments relating to the
benefits of section 18 of Limitation Act may not be
considered by this Court, we proceed to deal with the
same and analyze as to whether the benefit could or
could not be extended to the appellant as claimed.
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 20 of 26
11. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to
reproduce section 18 of the Limitation Act:
“ Effect of acknowledgment in writing.
(1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed
period for a suit or application in respect of any
property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in
respect of such property or right has been made in
writing signed by the party against whom such
property or right is claimed, or by any person
through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh
period of limitation shall be computed from the time
when the acknowledgment was so signed.
(2) Where the writing containing the
acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be
given of the time when it was signed; but subject to
the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1
of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be
received.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it
omits to specify the exact nature of the property
or right, or avers that the time for payment ,
delivery, performance or enjoyment has not
yet come or is accompanied by a refusal to
pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is
coupled with a claim to set off, or is addressed
to a person other than a person entitled to the
property or right,
(b) the word "signed" means signed either personally
or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf,
and
(c) an application for the execution of a decree or
order shall not be deemed to be an application
in respect of any property or right.”
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 21 of 26
12. Section 18 of the Limitation Act is very clear that
where liability is acknowledged in respect of any
property or right, a fresh limitation may be computed
from the time when the acknowledgment was so
signed. Clause (a) of the explanation to Section 18
declares that an acknowledgment would be sufficient
for various reasons to be stated therein, which
includes the time for payment has not yet come as
one of the reasons. In the present case this reason
squarely applies. The respondents were throughout
alleging that the time had not been come as the
appeals were pending before the Division Bench. This
acknowledgement was given in response to the
demand by the lessor (appellant) made well within
the limitation of 3 years. The lessor as such would be
entitled to the benefit of extension of limitation taking
benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
13. The respondents have vehemently argued that this
point had never been raised before any of the forum
below nor in the pleadings before this Court.
However, the fact remains that the communication
dated 04.02.2015 is not disputed by the respondents.
There is no dispute on the contents either of the said
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 22 of 26
communication. If that be so, under admitted
position, and in view of Clause (a) of explanation to
Section 18 of the Limitation Act, the acknowledgment
of the liability stands established. Thus, the
limitation would extend to 03.02.2018.
14. It has also been urged on behalf of the respondents
that they never admitted the liability, rather they had
specifically denied it. This submission is based on the
ground that the revised tariff vide notification dated
23.07.2010 had been challenged before the High
Court with respect to its retrospective application.
This submission of the respondents is of no help to
them. The respondents do not dispute the revised
tariff under the notification dated 23.07.2010. Their
challenge was only to the retrospective application of
the same. The Single Judge had dismissed the writ
petition filed by the respondents against which an
intra-court appeal before the Division Bench of the
Karnataka High Court was filed and is still pending.
There are no interim orders in the said appeal. The
respondents had been objecting to the demand on the
ground of pendency of this intra-court appeal. As
such there was no denial to pay nor the amount was
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 23 of 26
disputed. The respondents were bound by the
notification dated 23.07.2010 till such time it was set
aside by any Court of law. Having failed before the
Single Judge, the respondents, were liable to comply
with the notification dated 23.07.2010.
15. At the time of the filing of the writ petition by the
appellants before the High Court, the intra-court
appeals preferred by the respondents were already
pending. The learned Single Judge could have
considered deferring the hearing of the writ petition
till the disposal of the intra-court appeals as the
outcome of the intra court appeals would have a
direct bearing on the writ petition filed by the
appellants.
16. Once the issue relating to retrospective applicability
of revised tariff has been upheld by the learned Single
Judge and the writ petitions filed by the respondents
were dismissed, against which intra-court appeals at
the instance of the respondents were pending, the
High Court ought not to have proceeded with the
hearing of the writ petition. Rather, it should have
awaited the outcome of the pending intra-Court
appeals relating to retrospective application of the
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 24 of 26
notification dated 23.07.2010. Subject to the final
outcome of the said intra-court appeals, the writ
petition should have been decided. This was all the
more necessary for the High Court in view of the
consistent stand taken by the respondents that the
demands raised by the appellant vide various notices
issued prior to 12.08.2015 or thereafter may be
deferred awaiting the outcome of the appeals.
17. The respondents were well aware that they had lost
from the Single Judge as their petitions had been
dismissed but still, they had been resisting the
demand only on the basis of the pendency of the
appeals before the Division Bench. This objection was
taken only to delay the payment of the dues of the
revised tariff. The respondents therefore ought not to
have benefitted out of the technical objection raised
by them regarding the limitations when they were
themselves bound by the decision of the learned
Single Judge and had no other objection or denial to
the demand except that of the pending appeals before
the Division Bench.
18. In the above facts and circumstances, we are not
entering into the other arguments advanced by the
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 25 of 26
parties. We are restoring the writ petition of the
appellants to be heard after the decision in the intra-
court appeals. In case the appeals are allowed by the
Division Bench then there would no question of any
recovery retrospectively. The demands would be
liable to be withdrawn. However, if the respondents
fail in their appeals, they would be liable to pay the
demand in accordance to law along with interest
admissible under law.
19. We accordingly allow the appeals, set aside the
impugned order of the High Court and restore the
writ petitions before the High Court to be heard after
disposal of the pending intra-court appeals filed by
the respondents.
……………………………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
……………………………………J.
(PRASANNA B. VARALE)
NEW DELHI
APRIL 03, 2025
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 26 of 26
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1796-1828 OF 2024
NEW MANGALORE
PORT TRUST & ANR. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
CLIFFORD D SOUZA ETC.ETC. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1
1. The appellants New Mangalore Port Trust has
assailed the correctness of the judgment and order
dated 22.11.2019 passed by the High Court of
Karnataka at Bengaluru dismissing a bunch of writ
petitions preferred by NMPT assailing the correctness
of the judgment and order dated 15.03.2017 passed
by the District Judge allowing the appeal of the
respondents and quashing the order of the Estate
Officer of NMPT raising demand against the
respondents.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2025.04.03
17:00:58 IST
Reason:
1
NMPT
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 1 of 26
2. The facts in brief relevant for proper adjudication of
these appeals are summarised hereunder:
2.1. NMPT allotted land to the respondents
(hereinafter referred to as Licensees) for
loading and unloading goods subject to
payment of licence fee which is to be revised
every five years with the approval of Tariff
Authority for Major Ports (TAMP).
2.2. Allotment to the respondent for the licensees
had been made in the year 2003. By
notification dated 20.06.2005 licence fee was
revised w.e.f. February, 2002. Thereafter, the
next revision was notified on 23.07.2010
approving the revision of licence fee w.e.f.
20.02.2007 again for a period of five years.
2.3. Pursuant to the said revision, demand was
raised for realising the arrears of licence fee
for the period 20.02.2007 till 23.07.2010 i.e.
the date of the notification. Beginning March,
2011, the Assistant Estate Manager/Estate
Officer issued demand notice to all the
Licensees. The Licensees challenged the
notification dated 23.07.2010 before the High
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 2 of 26
Court by way of writ petitions filed in the year
2011-2012 primarily on the ground that it
was not permissible to revise the licence fee
retrospectively. The learned Single Judge
vide judgment dated 28.06.2013 dismissed
the bunch of writ petitions holding that the
licence fee could be revised retrospectively
and upheld the notification dated
23.07.2010.
2.4. Aggrieved by the same the Licensees
preferred writ appeals before the Division
Bench of the Karnataka High Court at
Bengaluru. These group of appeals are still
pending however without any interim orders.
2.5. After the judgment of the Single Judge dated
28.06.2013, the Assistant Estate Manager
issued a demand notice on 15.01.2015, copy
whereof is filed as Annexure P-5. It would
also be relevant to mention that there are
other notices also issued but the notice dated
15.01.2015 is specifically mentioned as there
is a reply given to it by the Licensees. The
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 3 of 26
notice dated 15.01.2015 is reproduced
hereunder:-
“FINAL NOTICE
No.30/44/2015/EBL.1/TAMP
To Date: 15.01.2015
M/s Export Trade Link Agencies
Lal Bagh
MANGALORE – 575 003
Sir,
Sub: Payment of difference in Licence fee
on account of revision of Scale of Rate
w.e.f. 20.02.2007
Ref:
1) TAMP ORDER G NO.184 dated
23.07.2010.
2) T.O. letter even No.dtd/07.11.2014
Please refer to the letter cited
above, wherein it was requested to
remit the difference of licence
fee/penal licence fee including
Service Tax amounting to
Rs.55,32,234/- on account of
revision of SoR w.e.f. 20.02.2007, But
you have not remitted the said
amount.
Hence you are once again
requested to make necessary
arrangement for remittance of
difference in Licence Fee and Service
Tax within 15 days from the date of
receipt of this letter failing which
penal interest @ 13% shall be payable
from the due date till the payment is
received and action for recovery of
dues will be initiated as per law.
Thanking you
Yours faithfully
Sd/- 15.01.2015
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 4 of 26
Asstt. Estate Manager (Gr.I)”
2.6. The Licensees responded to the same vide
letter dated 04.02.2015 and objected to the
demand raised on the ground that as the
issue is still pending before the Division
Bench of the High Court, no question arises
for the payment of the difference in licence fee
for the period 20.02.2007 till 23.07.2010.
The same would prejudice their case. The
question whether licence fee could have been
revised with retrospective effect and
recovered was still to be decided by the High
Court in the pending writ appeal. It was thus
requested that the NMPT may not demand
the difference in licence fee for the period
prior to 23.07.2010 till such time the appeal
is not decided. The said communication
dated 04.02.2015 is reproduced hereunder: -
“The Asst. Estate Manager (Gr.I)
New Mangalore Port Trust,
Mangalore,
Sir,
Subject: Writ Petition
No.36972/2011, order dated
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 5 of 26
28.06.2013 of Hon’ble High Court of
Karnataka
Ref: i) Payment of difference licence fee
on account of revision of scale of rates
w.e.f. 20.02.2007, on the basis of
Tamp order No. G184, dated:
23.07.2010.
ii) Your Letter bearing
No.3/44/2015/EBL.1/TAMP, dated
15.01.2015.
With reference to the above said
subject, we would like to inform you
that we had challenged the TAMP
order dated: 23.07.2010, before the
Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka,
Bangalore by filing the writ petition
No.34541 & 34784/211 and the said
writ petition was dismissed on
28.06.2013 by the Hon’ble High Court
of Karnataka, Bangalore. We have
challenged the order
dated:28.06.2013 passed in the writ
petition by the Hon’ble High Court of
Karnataka, Bangalore before the
division bench by filing the writ appeal
no.4400 & 4401/2013, the said writ
appeal was posted on 10.11.2014 for
preliminary hearing/admission and
the Hon’ble Court after hearing the
matter by the council appearing for
our company and by the council
appearing for New Mangalore Port
Trust the appeal was admitted by the
Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka on
10.11.2014, therefore the above said
subject matter i.e. the notification
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 6 of 26
dated: 23.07.2010 (TAMP) is under
challenge before the Hon’ble High
Court and the Court has already
admitted the matter the said subject
matter pending before the Hon’ble
High Court therefore immediately the
question doesn’t arise for payment of
difference license fees to be paid to
you as per your letter, it will prejudice
our case since we are not liable to pay
the difference license fees with
retrospective effect, whether we are
liable to pay or not that question has
to be decided by the court in the
pending writ appeal.
Therefore, we are requesting you to
not to demand difference license fees
amount with retrospective effect as
per the TAMP order, dated
23.07.2010, during the pendency of
the appeal before the Hon’ble High
Court of Karnataka, Bangalore and
the question of remittance of money
demanded by you as per you Letter,
dated 15.01.2015 for a sum of
Rs.5,73,833/- present does not arise,
since appeal is pending before the
Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka,
Bangalore.”
2.7. The Assistant Estate Manager Grade-1 was
also nominated as Estate Officer under
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
2
Occupants) Act, 1971 . The Estate Officer
2
The PP Act
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 7 of 26
vide communication dated 12.08.2015 gave a
notice under sub-section (3) of section 7 of
the PP Act to the Licensees calling upon them
to show cause on or before thirty days from
the date of receipt of the notice why an order
requiring to pay the said arrears of rent
together with simple interest should not be
made. The Licensees again came up with
their reply on 07.09.2015 taking up the same
defence that their writ appeal was pending
before the Division Bench of the Karnataka
High Court at Bengaluru and till such time it
is not decided, any demand would prejudice
their case. The question of demanding the
difference of license fee for the period prior to
23.07.2010 was yet to be decided by the
Division Bench in the pending writ appeal.
2.8. Since the response is the same as given in the
earlier reply dated 04.02.2015 we are not
reproducing the same. The Estate Officer
again issued a notice dated 15.02.2016
granting them three weeks further time to
show cause and it further stated that the
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 8 of 26
compound interest at the rate of 9% (nine
percent) would also be payable under the
statutory provisions. This notice was also
replied on 25.02.2016 by the Licensees
resisting any demand during the pendency of
the writ appeal citing the same reasons as
given earlier.
2.9. The Estate Officer not satisfied with the reply
and noting the fact that there was no stay
granted in the pending writ appeals
proceeded to pass an under section 7(1) of
the PP Act granting a month’s time to make
the payment failing which it would be
recovered as land revenue.
2.10. The Licensees preferred a miscellaneous
appeal under section 9 of the PP Act before
the District Judge at Mangalore. The District
Judge clubbed all the appeals and decided
the same vide judgment dated 15.03.2017,
allowing all the appeals holding that the
proceedings under section 7(1) was barred by
time and accordingly, set aside the demand.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 9 of 26
District Judge, the NMPT filed writ petitions
before the High Court which have since been
dismissed by the impugned judgment giving
rise to the present appeals.
3. We have heard Mr. Yatindra Singh, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant and on behalf of
the respondents Shri Vikas Singh and Ms. Haripriya
Padmanabhan, learned senior counsels, and have
perused the material on record.
4. The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant
are briefly summarised hereunder:
a) The licensees did not raise the plea of limitation
in their reply to the show cause notice under
Section 7(3) of the PP Act. For the first time they
raised it in the appeal. Under the PP Act no
limitation is prescribed for passing an order
under Section 7(1).
b) The judgment in the case of NDMC vs. Kalu
3
Ram, although wrongly decided holding that
there would be limitation of three years
applicable to recovery proceedings under the PP
3
(1976) 3 SCC 407
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 10 of 26
Act, but without going into that question in view
of the facts of the present case, the proceedings
for recovery under the PP Act were within the
limitation period of three years. This
submission is based upon Section 18 of the
Limitation Act. It is submitted that the
respondent, in writing, had acknowledged the
debt vide their reply dated 04.02.2015 to the
demand notice dated 15.01.2015 and therefore
the limitation would stand extended up to
03.02.2018.
c) Admitted facts and admitted documents can be
relied upon to argue a question of law before
this Court even if not raised before the Courts
below. The submission is that though the
benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act was
not claimed specifically before the Court below,
but in view of the admitted facts based on
admitted documents, this Court may consider
extending the benefit of Section 18 of the
Limitation Act. Once this benefit is extended,
the limitation for recovery of arears of rent
would extend up to 03.02.2018 and even
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 11 of 26
beyond in view of further acknowledgement of
the debt in response to the show cause notice
and reply given by the respondents on
07.09.2015 and 25.02.2016 for a further period
of three years.
d) The Division Bench and the High Court held the
recovery proceedings to be barred by limitation
taking the date of notification of the revised
tariff i.e. 23.07.2010 as the cause of action for
the recovery of arrears. After excluding the
period during which interim order was
operating i.e. 1 year and 293 days, the
limitation would extend up to 11.05.2015 but
as the show cause notice was issued on
21.08.2015, it was beyond the prescribed period
of limitation.
e) The respondents challenged the notification of
revised tariff dated 23.07.2010 by way of several
petitions before the learned Single Judge of the
Karnataka High Court, in which interim order
was also passed. The said bunch of petitions
was dismissed on 28.062013. Aggrieved by the
same, respondent preferred intra-court appeals
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 12 of 26
which were admitted and are still pending
before the Division Bench of the High Court of
Karnataka. Throughout in their correspondence
to the various demands and the show cause
notices, the only defence taken by the
respondents was that the demand should not be
pressed at this stage as it would prejudice their
case pending in the appeal before the Division
Bench of the Karnataka High Court. The tenor
of the defence is clear. Then subject to the
outcome of the appeals, the demand could be
raised if the respondents failed.
f) It is further submitted that in view of the
specific stand taken in their replies, the
respondents cannot now urge that the recovery
proceedings were barred by limitation.
g) In view of the admitted position that the intra-
court appeals are pending before the Division
Bench of the High Court, this Court may
consider setting aside the quashing of the
recovery proceedings on the ground of limitation
and may remand the proceedings before the
High Court to be clubbed with the pending
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 13 of 26
appeals and both the matters may be decided
simultaneously. If the intra-court appeals of the
respondents are allowed and the revision of
tariff retrospectively is set aside, that is the
notification dated 23.07.2010, to the extent that
its retrospective application is set aside,
automatically the writs filed by the appellant
before the High Court would stand dismissed.
However, if the respondents’ appeals are
dismissed by the Division Bench, then the writ
petition filed by the appellant before the High
Court, deserves to be allowed and the
respondents would be liable to pay the arears of
rent along with admissible interest.
h) Lastly, it was submitted that the respondents
were well aware of the revision of the tariff and
thus would have realised the enhanced tariff. If
they succeed on this technical ground, they
would be guilty of unjust enrichment.
i) On the above submissions, learned senior
counsel prayed that the appeals be allowed after
setting aside the impugned order of the High
Court.
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 14 of 26
5. Mr. Vikas Singh and Ms. Haripriya Padmanabhan,
learned senior counsels appearing for the
respondents, vehemently submitted that the appeals
are liable to be dismissed. None of the arguments
advanced by the appellant are tenable in law. Their
arguments are summarised hereunder:
a) The appellant, having failed to raise the plea of
acknowledgment and extension of limitation
under Section 18 of the Limitation Act either
before the Estate Officer, the District Judge or
the High Court and not even in the pleadings
before this Court, cannot raise this plea during
the course of oral arguments. The submission
relating to applicability of Section 18 of the
Limitation Act deserves to be rejected outright.
b) The question of limitation would be a mixed
question of law and fact and, as such, a party
seeking benefit of an extension provision should
specifically plead and lead evidence in support
of their submissions. In the absence of any such
pleading before any of the forum, no benefit can
be extended to the appellants seeking
applicability of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 15 of 26
c) The communication dated 04.02.2015 never
admitted the liability/debt. In fact, it clearly
denied the liability/demand on the ground that
there could be no retrospective revision of tariff.
It is, thus, wrong on the part of the appellant to
argue that the communication dated
04.02.2015 acknowledged the liability/debt.
d) The demands raised prior to 12.08.2015 were
not under any statutory provision. These
demands were being raised by the lessor to the
lessee. The statutory authority under the PP Act
for the first time, issued show cause notice on
12.08.2015, which admittedly was beyond a
period of three years if the benefit of section 18
of the Limitation Act is not extended. Had there
been a notice under Section 7(3) of the PP Act
prior to 11.05.2015 to which a reply had been
given by the respondents may be for deferment
of the demand in view of the pending appeal
before the Division Bench, it could be urged on
behalf of the appellant that they were entitled to
the benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
There being no such show cause notice prior to
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 16 of 26
11.05.2015, any proceedings for recovery would
be barred by law. Both the notices under
Section 7(3) dated 12.08.2015 and the order
passed under Section 7(1) on 21.07.2016 were
beyond the prescribed period of limitation and,
thus, proceedings have been rightly quashed by
the District Judge as confirmed by the High
Court.
e) It may be true that the Assistant Estate
Manager also happened to be the Estate Officer
under the PP Act, it cannot be presumed that
rather no benefit can be extended to the
appellant that the previous notices issued by
the Assistant Estate Manager could be treated
to be notice under the provisions of the PP Act.
f) For all the reasons recorded above, the
submission is that the appeals deserve to be
dismissed.
6. Having considered the submissions and having
perused the material on record, we now proceed to
deal with the respective arguments.
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 17 of 26
7. Common argument raised on behalf of both sides is
to the effect that objections had not been taken at the
right time and at the initial stage. On behalf of the
appellant, it was submitted that in reply to the show
cause notice under section 7(3) of the PP Act, no
objection regarding the plea of limitation had been
taken. However, in the appeal, ground for limitation
was taken for the first time. Similarly on behalf of the
respondents, it was submitted that the plea of section
18 of Limitation Act was not raised right up to the
stage of filing the appeal before this Court, but it was
taken only during the course of arguments. As the
facts and the material on record, i.e. the
correspondences between the parties, are not in
dispute, we are rejecting the said submission of both
the sides and thus would be dealing with the plea of
limitation also.
8. The District Judge had allowed the appeal of the
respondents and quashed the demand notice on the
finding that it was barred by limitation. Taking the
date of cause of action to be 23.07.2010, and after
excluding the period during which there was an
interim order operating in the writ petition pending
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 18 of 26
before the Single Judge filed by the respondents, the
limitation of 3 years would expire on 11.05.2015. The
said limitation of 3 years is provided under Article 52
to the Schedule of the Limitation Act. The High Court
also took the same view and accordingly held that the
proceedings under the PP Act having been initiated
by issuance of notice for the first time on 12.08.2015
the same would be barred by limitation. It also placed
reliance on the judgement of this Court in the case of
4
New Delhi Municipal Committee vs. Kalu Ram . In
the absence of Kalu Ram (supra), the Limitation Act
would not apply because the PP Act does not
explicitly incorporate it. While Section 9 of the PP Act
provides a limitation period for filing appeals, Section
7 thereof contains no such provision. However, Kalu
Ram clarifies that the Limitation Act does apply to
proceedings under the PP Act. On behalf of the
appellants, it was briefly argued that Kalu
Ram (supra) was incorrectly decided and required to
be revisited by a larger Bench, but this was raised
merely as a passing reference.
4
AIR 1976 SC 1637
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 19 of 26
9. On behalf of the respondents, it has been submitted
that in view of the admitted facts that no notice was
issued under the PP Act by the Estate Officer prior to
11.5.2015, the impugned proceedings under section
7 of the PP Act were rightly held to be barred by law.
10. In effect, both sides agree that the Limitation Act will
apply to the proceedings under the PP Act. The
respondents cannot argue that only section 3 of the
Limitation Act along with the limitation provided
under Article 52 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act
will apply and not section 18 of the same Act. Once
the Limitation Act applies, all its provisions will be
applicable to the proceedings under the PP Act. It is
true that the plea of benefit of section 18 of the
Limitation Act was not raised before the High Court
and therefore not considered but nevertheless, as we
have already rejected the objection of the
respondents that the arguments relating to the
benefits of section 18 of Limitation Act may not be
considered by this Court, we proceed to deal with the
same and analyze as to whether the benefit could or
could not be extended to the appellant as claimed.
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 20 of 26
11. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to
reproduce section 18 of the Limitation Act:
“ Effect of acknowledgment in writing.
(1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed
period for a suit or application in respect of any
property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in
respect of such property or right has been made in
writing signed by the party against whom such
property or right is claimed, or by any person
through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh
period of limitation shall be computed from the time
when the acknowledgment was so signed.
(2) Where the writing containing the
acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be
given of the time when it was signed; but subject to
the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1
of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be
received.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it
omits to specify the exact nature of the property
or right, or avers that the time for payment ,
delivery, performance or enjoyment has not
yet come or is accompanied by a refusal to
pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is
coupled with a claim to set off, or is addressed
to a person other than a person entitled to the
property or right,
(b) the word "signed" means signed either personally
or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf,
and
(c) an application for the execution of a decree or
order shall not be deemed to be an application
in respect of any property or right.”
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 21 of 26
12. Section 18 of the Limitation Act is very clear that
where liability is acknowledged in respect of any
property or right, a fresh limitation may be computed
from the time when the acknowledgment was so
signed. Clause (a) of the explanation to Section 18
declares that an acknowledgment would be sufficient
for various reasons to be stated therein, which
includes the time for payment has not yet come as
one of the reasons. In the present case this reason
squarely applies. The respondents were throughout
alleging that the time had not been come as the
appeals were pending before the Division Bench. This
acknowledgement was given in response to the
demand by the lessor (appellant) made well within
the limitation of 3 years. The lessor as such would be
entitled to the benefit of extension of limitation taking
benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
13. The respondents have vehemently argued that this
point had never been raised before any of the forum
below nor in the pleadings before this Court.
However, the fact remains that the communication
dated 04.02.2015 is not disputed by the respondents.
There is no dispute on the contents either of the said
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 22 of 26
communication. If that be so, under admitted
position, and in view of Clause (a) of explanation to
Section 18 of the Limitation Act, the acknowledgment
of the liability stands established. Thus, the
limitation would extend to 03.02.2018.
14. It has also been urged on behalf of the respondents
that they never admitted the liability, rather they had
specifically denied it. This submission is based on the
ground that the revised tariff vide notification dated
23.07.2010 had been challenged before the High
Court with respect to its retrospective application.
This submission of the respondents is of no help to
them. The respondents do not dispute the revised
tariff under the notification dated 23.07.2010. Their
challenge was only to the retrospective application of
the same. The Single Judge had dismissed the writ
petition filed by the respondents against which an
intra-court appeal before the Division Bench of the
Karnataka High Court was filed and is still pending.
There are no interim orders in the said appeal. The
respondents had been objecting to the demand on the
ground of pendency of this intra-court appeal. As
such there was no denial to pay nor the amount was
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 23 of 26
disputed. The respondents were bound by the
notification dated 23.07.2010 till such time it was set
aside by any Court of law. Having failed before the
Single Judge, the respondents, were liable to comply
with the notification dated 23.07.2010.
15. At the time of the filing of the writ petition by the
appellants before the High Court, the intra-court
appeals preferred by the respondents were already
pending. The learned Single Judge could have
considered deferring the hearing of the writ petition
till the disposal of the intra-court appeals as the
outcome of the intra court appeals would have a
direct bearing on the writ petition filed by the
appellants.
16. Once the issue relating to retrospective applicability
of revised tariff has been upheld by the learned Single
Judge and the writ petitions filed by the respondents
were dismissed, against which intra-court appeals at
the instance of the respondents were pending, the
High Court ought not to have proceeded with the
hearing of the writ petition. Rather, it should have
awaited the outcome of the pending intra-Court
appeals relating to retrospective application of the
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 24 of 26
notification dated 23.07.2010. Subject to the final
outcome of the said intra-court appeals, the writ
petition should have been decided. This was all the
more necessary for the High Court in view of the
consistent stand taken by the respondents that the
demands raised by the appellant vide various notices
issued prior to 12.08.2015 or thereafter may be
deferred awaiting the outcome of the appeals.
17. The respondents were well aware that they had lost
from the Single Judge as their petitions had been
dismissed but still, they had been resisting the
demand only on the basis of the pendency of the
appeals before the Division Bench. This objection was
taken only to delay the payment of the dues of the
revised tariff. The respondents therefore ought not to
have benefitted out of the technical objection raised
by them regarding the limitations when they were
themselves bound by the decision of the learned
Single Judge and had no other objection or denial to
the demand except that of the pending appeals before
the Division Bench.
18. In the above facts and circumstances, we are not
entering into the other arguments advanced by the
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 25 of 26
parties. We are restoring the writ petition of the
appellants to be heard after the decision in the intra-
court appeals. In case the appeals are allowed by the
Division Bench then there would no question of any
recovery retrospectively. The demands would be
liable to be withdrawn. However, if the respondents
fail in their appeals, they would be liable to pay the
demand in accordance to law along with interest
admissible under law.
19. We accordingly allow the appeals, set aside the
impugned order of the High Court and restore the
writ petitions before the High Court to be heard after
disposal of the pending intra-court appeals filed by
the respondents.
……………………………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
……………………………………J.
(PRASANNA B. VARALE)
NEW DELHI
APRIL 03, 2025
C.A. Nos.1796-1828 of 2024 Page 26 of 26