Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
JYOTISH CHANDRA BISWAS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/08/2000
BENCH:
S. RAjendra Babu J. & Shivaraj V. Patil J.
JUDGMENT:
Shivaraj V. Patil,J.
L.......I.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.J
Leave sought for is granted. The Life Insurance
Corporation of India and its officers have brought this
appeal to this Court aggrieved by the judgment dated
8.10.1999, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
of Calcutta. The relevant facts, which are necessary for
the disposal of this appeal, are the following: While the
respondent was working as a Development Officer in the Life
Insurance Corporation of India at Calcutta (for short the
’Corporation’), a charge-sheet was issued to him on
15.2.1968 alleging that he remained unauthorisedly absent
from his duties for a total number of 61 days between the
period 18.10.1967 to 13.2.1968 and that he remained absent
from his station at Calcutta during the said period without
prior permission of the authorities. He was directed to
submit his written statement to the said charges.
Accordingly, he submitted his reply in writing.
Thereafter, the Divisional Manager, Calcutta of the
Corporation was appointed as Inquiry Officer to inquire
into the said charges levelled against the respondent. The
Inquiry Officer, on the basis of evidence, found the
respondent guilty of all the charges. The Zonal Manager
being the Disciplinary Authority concurring with the
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer issued a
communication dated 15.11.1968 to the respondent stating
that he proposed to dismiss him from service and directing
him to show cause within 21 days as to why the proposed
punishment should not be imposed. The respondent made a
further representation dated 11.1.1969. The Zonal Manager
having considered the representation passed the order dated
28.1.1969 dismissing the respondent from service of the
Corporation with immediate effect finding that there was
nothing new in the said representation of the respondent
dated 11.1.1969. The respondent having kept quiet for a
period of about five years, however, by his letter dated
9.1.1974 in addition to other contentions requested for his
re-employment in the Corporation. The Corporation by
letter dated 15.2.1974 (Annexure P-5) informed the
respondent that as per Regulation 12 of the Life Insurance
Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (for short
the ’Regulations’) no person, who has been dismissed from
the service of the Corporation, shall be re-employed.
Thereafter, the respondent filed the writ petition in the
High Court on 25.3.1975 questioning the validity and
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correctness of the order of termination of the services and
for consequential reliefs. The learned single Judge
dismissed the said writ petition observing that: - "on a
careful consideration of the records and proceedings in the
instant case, it appears to me that the impugned order and
the proceedings in which it was passed do not ex-facie
suffer from any defect. It also does not appear that the
said order was passed in violation of the principles of
natural justice. On the contrary, it appears that the
petitioner was given an opportunity at every stage of the
inquiry to make his representation. The allegations of
mala fide and erroneous procedure followed urged by the
petitioner in his application, in my view, has little
force. In any event, it appears that the petitioner is
guilty of unreasonable delay and laches inasmuch as he has
sought to impugn the order of dismissal passed in January,
1969, in March, 1975. There is no explanation for this
delay."
Respondent took up the matter in appeal before the
Division Bench of the High Court, which was allowed. The
Division Bench noticed that the respondent in the meanwhile
had superannuated and directed that he should be deemed to
have continued in service till his age of superannuation
and would be entitled to the terminal benefits together
with compensation of Rs.25,000/-. In the order the
Division Bench has stated thus: "The learned trial Judge
by a laconic order dismissed the application, inter alia,
holding that the petitioner is guilty of unreasonable delay
without explaining the same. As regards the other
findings, no reason has at all been assigned nor the
contention of the appellant to the effect that the Zonal
Manager being the appellant authority, he could not have
acted as a disciplinary authority had been taken into
consideration."
The Division Bench also observed that writ
application should have been allowed only on the ground
that the appellate authority had acted as a Disciplinary
Authority as a result whereof the appellant had been
deprived of a right to appeal. It was pointed out to us
that the respondent had not raised this ground before the
learned single Judge and as such no fault could be found
with the order of the learned single Judge. It was further
urged on behalf of the appellants that the learned single
Judge was right and justified in dismissing the writ
petition on the ground of delay and laches when there was
absolutely no explanation whatsoever for inordinate delay
of about six years in filing the writ petition; the
respondent either had accepted or reconciled with the order
of termination of his services by keeping quiet for a
period of five years and thereafter seeking for his
re-employment in the Corporation. The submissions were
made on behalf of the respondent supporting the judgment
under appeal. Further our attention was specifically drawn
to Regulations 39 and 40 and Schedule-I to contend that the
Zonal Manager being the appellate authority ought not have
passed the order of termination of services of the
respondent, depriving him of a right to appeal. The order
terminating the services of the respondent was passed on
28.1.1969. The writ petition was filed challenging the
said order on 25.3.1975, almost after a period of six
years. There was no explanation in the writ petition
whatsoever for this inordinate delay. The respondent
sought for his re-employment in the Corporation by his
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letter dated 9.1.1974 almost after a period of five years
from the date of termination of his services. It only
indicated that he accepted the order of termination of his
services, if not expressly but impliedly. In the writ
petition no ground was raised as to deprivation of right of
appeal to the respondent against the order of the
termination of his services. It is not the case of the
respondent that he was denied any opportunity offending
principles of natural justice. Inquiry was held pursuant
to the charge sheet; witnesses were examined; and even
the respondent examined three witnesses on his behalf. The
Inquiry Officer looking to the evidence brought on record
found the respondent guilty of the charges. It was also
not shown that any prejudice was caused to him in the
inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority concurring with the
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, after giving
further opportunity to the respondent, passed the order
terminating the services of the respondent. These being
the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion the
learned single Judge was right in dismissing the writ
petition. We find that the order of the learned single
Judge is a detailed and considered one. We find it
difficult to accept the observations made by the Division
Bench of the High court extracted above that the order
passed by the learned single Judge was laconic. When there
was no explanation whatsoever given by the respondent in
the writ petition for delay of about six years, the learned
single Judge was right in saying so and dismissing it.
When the ground that the respondent was deprived of a right
to appeal was not taken before the learned single Judge
either in the writ petition or in arguments, the Division
Bench was not right and justified in saying that the
learned single Judge did not assign any reason whatsoever
in support of his judgment in this regard. We fail to
understand how such a non-existing ground could be
considered by the learned single Judge. The respondent
having attained the age of superannuation retired during
the pendency of proceedings before the High Court and had
succeeded before the Division Bench of the High Court.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case
and that he was dismissed from services as early as in 1969
and was also deprived of other benefits, we think it is
just and appropriate to award cost to him. Thus viewed
from any angle the judgment of the Division Bench under
appeal cannot be sustained. Hence the appeal is allowed,
the judgment under appeal is set aside and the appellants
shall pay cost to the respondent quantified at Rs.25,000/-.