Full Judgment Text
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2025 INSC 1367
Criminal Appeal No. of 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8075 of 2025)
YOGENDRA PAL SINGH … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAGHVENDRA SINGH ALIAS PRINCE
AND ANOTHER … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
R. MAHADEVAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. The challenge in the present appeal is to the judgment and order dated
1 2
09.01.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal
Misc. Bail Application No. 7768 of 2024, whereby the High Court granted bail
to Respondent No. l / accused, in connection with Case Crime No. 415 of 2023
registered at Police Station Kotwali, District Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh, for
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
BORRA LM VALLI
Date: 2025.11.28
16:57:36 IST
Reason:
1
Hereinafter referred to as “the impugned order”
2
Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2
offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B, and 328 of the Indian Penal
3 4
Code, 1860 read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 .
3. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant, who is the father of the
deceased Aastha @ Saarika, seeking cancellation of bail granted to Respondent
No. 1/ Accused – Husband, Raghvendra Singh @ Prince. The appellant’s
daughter died on 05.06.2023, i.e., within four months of her marriage, in highly
suspicious circumstances by allegedly consuming poison.
4. The facts, as projected by the appellant, are as follows:
4.1. The appellant's daughter Aastha @ Saarika was married to Respondent
No.1 – Raghvendra Singh @ Prince, on 22.02.2023 according to Hindu rites
and rituals. At the time of marriage, the appellant spent approximately Rs. 22
lakhs in cash, gave articles worth Rs. 10 lakhs and jewellery worth Rs. 15 lakhs
to the first respondent’s family.
4.2. Soon after marriage, the deceased was subjected to cruelty and
harassment by Respondent No. 1 and his family members on the pretext that the
dowry given was insufficient. The accused persons persistently demanded a
Fortuner car as additional dowry and subjected the deceased to mental and
physical torture.
4.3. When the deceased came to her parental home during the chhathi ritual,
she informed the appellant about the cruelty and demand for a Fortuner car. Ten
3
For short, “IPC”
4
For short, “D.P. Act”
3
days before her death, on 02.06.2023, she was again sent back to her
matrimonial home only after assurance by Respondent No. 1 that such
harassment would not be repeated.
4.4. On 04.06.2023, during a family function at Kaushambi, there was a
quarrel between Respondent No. 1 and the deceased. Later that night, around
01.30 am, the deceased telephoned her elder sister Diksha in a distressed state,
crying and seeking urgent help. At that time, she disclosed that Respondent No.
1 along with his relatives had forcibly administered some foul-smelling
substance to her, due to which she was feeling uneasy.
4.5. The deceased was immediately taken to Sadar Hospital, Fatehpur, where
she was found with froth emanating from her mouth. Despite medical
intervention, her condition deteriorated and she expired while being shifted to
Kanpur.
4.6. A post-mortem examination was conducted on 05.06.2023, but the cause
of death was not initially ascertained. Thereafter, the viscera was sent to a
forensic science laboratory for examination, and the FSL report confirmed the
presence of aluminium phosphide poison.
4.7. Despite serious allegations, the police did not arrest the accused
immediately. After investigation, charge sheet no.557 of 2023 dated 30.10.2023
was filed, implicating only Respondent No. 1/ husband, and excluding other
named in-laws.
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4.8. Respondent No. 1 approached the Sessions Court seeking bail, which was
dismissed by order dated 20.10.2023. However, the High Court, by the
impugned order, allowed his bail application.
4.9. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant is before this Court with the present
appeal.
5. Learned senior counsel for the appellant assailed the impugned order
granting bail to Respondent No. 1 on multiple grounds. It was submitted that the
High Court failed to consider the gravity of the offence, the nature of evidence
available against the accused, as well as the statutory presumption under Section
113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which squarely applies in cases of
dowry death occurring within seven years of marriage.
5.1. It was contended that the present case involves the most serious
allegations where the deceased was continuously harassed for dowry by
Respondent No. 1 / husband, and in the course of such harassment, was
poisoned to death on 05.06.2023, i.e., within four months of her marriage.
According to the learned senior counsel, the post-mortem report records an
ante-mortem injury – an abrasion on the left forearm – and the Forensic Science
Laboratory report categorically confirmed the presence of aluminium phosphide
poison, thereby corroborating the prosecution’s case of homicidal poisoning.
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5.2. Learned senior counsel placing reliance on the chargesheet, which
records that the accused’s uncle, Tej Bahadur Singh alias Ram Bahadur, is
politically active, having contested the 2017 Assembly Elections, and owns
several plots, agricultural lands, brick kilns, and multiple vehicles, submitted
that the family of the accused is highly influential and wields considerable clout
in the area. It is to be noted that though the uncle was initially arraigned as an
accused along with his wife, Vijay Shri, their names were later dropped from the
chargesheet, which according to the learned senior counsel, suggests that there
could be serious doubts regarding the fairness of the investigation.
5.3. It was further submitted that the investigation in this case has been carried
out in an impartial manner since the inception. Respondent No. 1/ husband was
arrested only after three months of the FIR, while the other named accused were
never arrested. The chargesheet filed on 30.10.2023 did not fairly reflect the
involvement of all accused. In fact, the Assistant Prosecution Officer, Fatehpur,
vide letter dated 16.11.2023, pointed out several deficiencies in the investigation
and requested the Joint Director, Prosecution, Fatehpur to seek a fresh legal
opinion after collecting the material evidence which had been ignored by the
investigating officer. This eventually led to the transfer of the investigation to
the CB-CID itself indicative of the gravity of the offence and the shortcomings
in the earlier investigation.
6
5.4. Learned senior counsel argued that in such circumstances, any leniency
shown towards the accused would severely prejudice the trial, as there exists a
strong likelihood of tampering with the evidence and influencing the
prosecution witnesses and the High Court, while granting bail, failed to
appreciate this real and imminent threat.
5.5. It was also contended that the High Court committed an error in relying
5
upon the judgments in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI and Manish Sisodia v.
6
Directorate of Enforcement , since both these cases are clearly distinguishable
based on the facts, nature of offence, period of incarceration, and the materials
available against the accused. The settled principles governing bail in cases of
dowry death under Section 304B IPC and the presumption under Section 113B
of the Evidence Act were altogether ignored by the High Court.
5.6. On the basis of these submissions, learned senior counsel for the
appellant prayed for cancellation of bail granted to Respondent No. 1, so as to
ensure a fair and effective trial.
6. Per contra , the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 / accused, at the
outset, submitted that the present appeal is not maintainable, as there is no
perversity, arbitrariness, or illegality in the well-reasoned order of the High
Court granting bail. Once the discretionary relief of bail has been exercised
5
2022 INSC 690
6
2024 INSC 595
7
judiciously on appreciation of material, it ought not to be interfered with by this
Court in the absence of gross illegality or miscarriage of justice.
6.1. It was contended that the incident dated 05.06.2023 was first reported by
the complainant vide G.D. Entry No. 019, which merely mentions the death of
the deceased under suspicious circumstances, without any reference to dowry
demand or cruelty. The FIR was lodged belatedly on 15.06.2023, after ten days
and after the last rites, raising doubts about its genuineness.
6.1.1. During the investigation, statements of the deceased’s family members
introduced allegations of dowry demand her a Fortuner car and cruelty by
Respondent No. 1 and his relatives. However, these allegations were absent in
the initial report. Similarly, the allegation that the deceased made a distress call
to her sister in the intervening night of 04/05.06.2023 complaining of being
administered some “smelly substance” remains uncorroborated, as no call
records substantiate the same.
6.1.2. The chargesheet dated 30.10.2023 was filed against Respondent No. 1
under Sections 498A, 304B, and 328 IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P.
Act. Notably, co-accused Tej Bahadur Singh and Vijay Shri, initially named in
the FIR, were exonerated as their presence at the relevant point of time was
established elsewhere, and they had no motive. Further investigation culminated
in a final report dated 30.04.2025, which reaffirmed their innocence. The
exoneration of these relatives significantly weakens the prosecution’s version,
8
making it improbable that the alleged offence was committed by Respondent
No.1 alone.
6.2. It was argued that the prosecution has relied solely on statements of
interested witnesses – the father, mother, and sisters of the deceased, which
according to the learned counsel, are not corroborated by independent or
documentary evidence, and thus cannot be treated as conclusive proof of dowry
harassment.
6.3. Learned counsel further submitted that the deceased was allegedly
unwilling to marry Respondent No. 1 as she was in love with one Abhay Singh
(brother-in-law of her elder sister).
6.4. It was submitted that the post-mortem report dated 05.06.2023 records a
single abrasion of 1 cm x 1 cm on the left forearm, and the FSL report indicates
aluminium phosphide ingestion as the cause of death. However, neither
document establishes that the poison was administered by Respondent No. 1.
The issue of whether poison was self-ingested or administered, and the
significance of the forearm injury, are matters of trial.
6.5. Lastly, it was highlighted that Respondent No. 1 has already undergone
more than 15 months of incarceration (from 22.09.2023 to 09.10.2025) and is
willing to cooperate with the trial.
6.6. On these grounds, it was urged that the order granting bail to Respondent
No. 1 calls for no interference by this Court.
9
7. Learned counsel for the State supported the case of the complainant,
submitting as follows:
(i) Based on the complaint given by the appellant alleging that his daughter
was killed by her in-laws on account of unmet dowry demands, FIR
No.415/2023 dated 15.06.2023 was registered at P.S. Kotwali, District Fatehpur
under Sections 498A, 304B, 120B and 328 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P.
Act against Respondent No. 1 and his family members.
(ii) The delay of ten days in lodging the FIR was explained by the appellant’s
mental condition, as he was in deep shock and grief after the sudden death of his
daughter.
(iii) The post-mortem conducted on 05.06.2023 revealed an abrasion on the
forearm, and the FSL report confirmed aluminium phosphide poisoning as the
cause of death.
(iv) Statements of key witnesses – Abhay Singh (brother-in-law), the
appellant (father), Premlata Singh (mother), and sisters (Sameeksha Singh and
Diksha Singh) – recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
7
1973 corroborated the allegations of dowry demand and cruelty mentioned in
the FIR.
(v) Upon the appellant’s representation, the investigation was transferred to
CB-CID, which reaffirmed the findings of the local police.
7
For short, “Cr.P.C”
10
(vi) Chargesheet No. 557 of 2023 dated 30.10.2023 was filed only against
Respondent No. 1, on which cognizance was duly taken by the Sessions Court.
(vii) The High Court failed to appreciate the seriousness of the offence – the
unnatural death of a young woman within four months of marriage, amid
specific allegations of dowry demands and poisoning. The High Court’s order
overlooked the gravity of the allegations and the societal menace of dowry
deaths.
7.1. It was therefore submitted that the bail granted to Respondent No. 1
ought to be cancelled in the interests of justice.
8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for
the parties and perused the materials available on record.
9. Apparently, criminal proceedings were initiated against Respondent No. 1
/ Husband pursuant to a complaint lodged by the appellant / father in connection
with the unnatural death of his daughter on 05.06.2023. FIR No. 415 of 2023
dated 15.06.2023 was registered against Respondent No. 1 and the in-laws of
the deceased for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B, 120B and 328
IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. Upon completion of investigation, the
chargesheet was filed only against Respondent No. 1 for offences under Section
498A, 304B and 328 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. Respondent No.
1 was arrested on 22.09.2023. His Bail Application (No. 2225 of 2023) was
rejected by the Sessions Court on 20.10.2023, following which he filed
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Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 7768 of 2024 before the High Court, which
allowed the same, by the order impugned herein.
10. The appellant, being the father of the deceased, is undoubtedly an
aggrieved person and thus possesses the requisite locus standi to maintain the
present appeal seeking cancellation of the bail granted to Respondent No. 1. The
unnatural death of his daughter within four months of marriage, allegedly on
account of dowry harassment, directly affects his rights as a complainant.
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10.1. In R. Rathinam v. State by DSP , this Court has categorically held that
the power under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. to cancel bail may be invoked not only
at the instance of the State but also by any aggrieved party.
10.2. Similarly, in Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. Munna @ Munna Jaiswal and
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another , this Court observed:
“7. It is now a settled law that complainant can always question the order
granting bail if the said bail is not validly passed. It is not as if once a bail is
granted by any court, the only way is to get it cancelled on account of its misuse.
The bail order can be tested on merits also. In our opinion, therefore, the
complainant could question the merits of the order granting bail.”
10.3. Applying the above legal position to the present case, the appellant, being
the complainant and father of the deceased, has a direct and substantial interest
in seeking cancellation of bail. Accordingly, the present case is clearly
maintainable before this Court.
8
(2000) 2 SCC 391
9
Criminal Appeal No. 2087 of 2008 decided on 19.12.2008
12
11. The law relating to cancellation of bail is well settled. Recently, in State
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of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, etc . , this Court comprehensively reviewed the
principles governing annulment and cancellation of bail. The Court
distinguished between annulment of bail due to legal infirmity in the order, and
cancellation of bail arising from post-bail misconduct or supervening
circumstances. It is well established that bail granted without due application of
mind to relevant factors – such as the gravity of the offence, prima facie
evidence, or the antecedents of the accused – may be annulled. Courts must
consider the totality of circumstances, balancing the presumption of innocence
against the seriousness of the crime, societal interest, and risk of the misuse of
liberty. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs are extracted below:
“ 15. The statutory framework governing cancellation of bail is well-settled.
Section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 empowers the High Court
or the Court of Sessions to direct the re-arrest of an accused who has been
released on bail, if such direction is deemed “necessary”. Similarly, Section 437
(5) enables a Magistrate to cancel bail granted under Section 437(1) or (2).
These provisions underscore the legislative intent that the power to grant bail is
not absolute but is always subject to judicial reconsideration in light of
emerging facts or legal infirmities in the original order.
16. It is equally well established that the considerations for grant of bail and for
its cancellation are not identical. While the grant of bail involves a preventive
evaluation of the likelihood of misuse of liberty, the cancellation of bail entails a
review of the prior decision – either on account of supervening circumstances or
because the original order was legally flawed. As laid down in State (Delhi
11
Administration) v. Sanjay Gandhi , “Rejection of bail when bail is applied for,
is one thing; cancellation of bail already granted is quite another”. This
principle reflects a recognition of the sanctity of liberty once granted, and the
requirement of compelling justification for its withdrawal.
10
2025 INSC 979
11
(1978) 2 SCC 411
13
17. However, it is equally well recognized that bail granted without due
application of mind to relevant factors – such as the gravity of the offence, the
strength of the evidence, or the conduct and antecedents of the accused – may be
cancelled. Even in the absence of subsequent misconduct, a bail order that is
perverse, unjustified, or legally untenable is vulnerable to interference. In Dolat
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Ram v State of Haryana , this Court held that “where a bail order is passed in
disregard of material facts or in an arbitrary manner, it can be set aside”.
18. Let us now examine the jurisprudence on when bail may be annulled or
cancelled. Two distinct categories have emerged in this regard:
(A) Annulment of Bail due to legal infirmity in the order; and
(B) Cancellation of Bail, i.e., revocation of bail due to post-grant misconduct or
supervening circumstances.
(A) Annulment of bail orders
18.1. This refers to the appellate or revisional power to set aside a bail order
that is perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles. It
is concerned with defects existing at the time the bail was granted, without
reference to subsequent conduct.
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18.2. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi , this court laid down guiding
principles:
“(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not only the nature of the
accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if the accusation entails
conviction and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations.
(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered with or the
apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant should also weigh with
the court in the matter of grant of bail.
(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence establishing the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie
satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.
(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the
element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of
bail, and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the
prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order
of bail.”
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18.3. In Puran v. Rambilas and another , it was held that a bail order can be
set aside even in the absence of post-bail misconduct if it is found to be
unjustified, illegal, or perverse.
12
(1995) 1 SCC 349
13
(2001) 4 SCC 280
14
(2001) 6 SCC 338
14
15
18.4. Similarly, in Dr. Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat and another , a
three-Judge Bench held that consideration of irrelevant materials renders the
bail order vulnerable and liable to be set aside.
16
18.5. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee , this Court held that
where the High Court grants bail mechanically and without application of mind
to material factors such as the gravity of the offence or antecedents of the
accused, such an order must be set aside.
18.6. In Prakash Kadam and others v. Ramprasad Viswanath Gupta and
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another , this Court distinguished between cancellation of bail by the same
court and annulment by an appellate / revisional court. It observed:
“18. In considering whether to cancel the bail the court has also to
consider the gravity and nature of the offence, prima facie case against
the accused, the position and standing of the accused, etc. If there are
very serious allegations against the accused his bail may be cancelled
even if he has not misused the bail granted to him. Moreover, the above
principle applies when the same court which granted bail is approached
for cancelling the bail. It will not apply when the order granting bail is
appealed against before an appellate/Revisional Court.
19. ….. There are several other factors also which may be seen while
deciding to cancel the bail.”
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18.7. In Neeru Yadav v. State of UP , this court annulled a bail order where the
High Court had ignored the criminal antecedents of the accused and relied
mechanically on parity. It held that consideration of irrelevant factors and
omission of relevant considerations renders the order perverse. As the court
noted:
“15. …. It is clear as a cloudless sky that the High Court has totally
ignored the criminal antecedents of the accused. What has weighed with
the High Court is the doctrine of parity. A history-sheeter involved in the
nature of crimes which we have reproduced hereinabove, are not minor
offences so that he is not to be retained in custody, but the crimes are of
heinous nature and such crimes, by no stretch of imagination, can be
regarded as jejune. Such cases do create a thunder and lightning having
the effect potentiality of torrential rain in an analytical mind. The law
expects the judiciary to be alert while admitting these kind of accused
persons to be at large and, therefore, the emphasis is on exercise of
discretion judiciously and not in a whimsical manner.”
15
2008 (6) SCALE 415
16
(2010) 14 SCC 496
17
(2011) 6 SCC 189
18
(2014) 16 SCC 508
15
It further clarified:
“18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat with profit that it is not
an appeal for cancellation of bail as the cancellation is not sought
because of supervening circumstances. The annulment of the order
passed by the High Court is sought as many relevant factors have not
been taken into consideration which includes the criminal antecedents of
the accused and that makes the order a deviant one. Therefore, the
inevitable result is the lancination of the impugned order.”
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18.8. In Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) , this Court reiterated that
while no exhaustive list can be laid down, courts must always consider the
totality of circumstances, including the seriousness of the offence, prima facie
evidence, and potential for interference with the trial.
20
18.9. In State of Kerala v. Mahesh , it was observed that even under Article
136, where interference with bail orders is rare, this Court will exercise its
powers if the bail order is found to be lacking application of mind or based on
irrelevant considerations.
….
18.15. Thus, it is clear that while cancellation of bail is a serious matter
involving deprivation of personal liberty, the law does permit annulment of a
bail order that is unjustified, legally untenable, or passed without due regard to
material considerations. The distinction between annulment of bail orders due
to perversity and cancellation for post-bail misconduct must be clearly
understood and applied, ensuring a careful, calibrated, and constitutionally
sound approach to the administration of criminal justice.
19. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the decision of this Bench in Pinki
21
v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , wherein, the bail granted to the
accused therein was cancelled, after a detailed consideration of the facts and
the gravity of the offence, namely, child trafficking as well as the legal
principles. The Court underscored that while personal liberty is a cherished
constitutional value, it is not absolute. Liberty must yield where it poses a threat
to the collective interest of society. No individual can claim a liberty that
endangers the life or liberty of others, as the rational collective cannot tolerate
anti-social or anti-collective conduct. Emphasizing that bail jurisprudence is
inherently fact-specific, the Court reiterated that each bail application must be
decided on its own merits, in light of the well settled on its own merits, in light
of the well-settled parameters governing grant or denial of bail….”
19
(2018) 12 SCC 129
20
AIR 2021 SC 2071
21
2025 INSC 482
16
12. In the present case, Respondent No. 1 /accused was subjected to criminal
prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B and 328 IPC
read with Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act, in connection with the unnatural
death of his wife, who is the daughter of the appellant. The appellant alleges
that his daughter was subjected to persistent torture and harassment for failure
to provide a Fortuner car as additional dowry.
13. The post-mortem report reveals an abrasion on the left forearm of the
deceased, approximately 8 cm above the wrist joint. The subsequent Forensic
Laboratory Report on the chemical analysis of the viscera may indicate
ingestion of a poisonous or unnatural substance. Therefore, the cause of death
cannot be conclusively ascertained at this stage and is to be determined by the
trial Court during the course of the trial.
14. The statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. prima
facie indicate that the deceased was subjected to persistent dowry demands and
cruelty at the hands of the accused. Abhay Singh, the brother-in-law of the
appellant’s elder daughter, stated that the deceased repeatedly complained of
harassment and abuse by her husband and in-laws on account of dowry
demands, including the demand for a vehicle. The appellant further deposed that
shortly before her death, the deceased disclosed to him that her husband and in-
laws had forcibly made her consume a “smelly substance”, after which she
17
collapsed and succumbed while being taken to Kanpur. This disclosure
constitutes a dying declaration of high evidentiary value, corroborated by other
witnesses.
14.1. The mother of the deceased, Premlata Singh, corroborated the appellant’s
statement, adding that she was in regular telephonic contact with her daughter,
who narrated continuous torture for dowry. The younger sister, Sameeksha
Singh, gave a concurrent statement, testifying that Respondent No. 1 used to
threaten the deceased not to disclose the abuse, and frequently used abusive
language. The elder sister, Diksha Singh, narrated the facts of the fateful night.
She testified that the deceased had called her repeatedly around 1.30 am, crying
and begging to be rescued. She further deposed that when her father asked the
deceased at the hospital about what had happened, the deceased again said that
her husband, uncle, and aunt had forcibly administered a “smelly substance” to
her.
15. Despite such grave allegations, the police remained inactive for an
inordinate period. Respondent No. 1 was arrested only on 22.09.2023, after a
delay of 104 days from lodging the FIR, and the appellant addressed a
representation to the Home Secretary seeking transfer to CB-CID. Such a delay
reflects serious lapses in the investigation and undue benefit to the accused.
18
16. Without considering these aspects, the High Court erroneously granted
bail to Respondent No. 1/ accused by observing that at the stage of bail only
prima facie satisfaction is required, and that an elaborate evaluation of the
merits of the case should be avoided. It invoked Article 21 of the Constitution,
holding that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and noted that there was no
material to suggest that the accused was likely to abscond or tamper with
witnesses.
17. The statutory framework embodied in Sections 304B and 498A IPC and
Section 113B of the Evidence Act further highlights the need for careful and
cautious consideration in such cases. Section 304B IPC classifies the death of a
married woman occurring within seven years of marriage, preceded by dowry-
related cruelty or harassment, as a “dowry death”, punishable with
imprisonment that may extend to life. Section 498A IPC criminalises cruelty by
the husband or his relatives, including harassment for unlawful demands of
dowry. In addition, Section 113B of the Evidence Act mandates a presumption
of dowry death once such foundational facts are established. Collectively, these
provisions reflect the legislature’s firm resolve to combat the social evil of
dowry and to safeguard married women from cruelty and harassment within
their matrimonial homes.
17.1. In the present case, the marriage took place on 22.02.2023, and the death
occurred on 05.06.2023 i.e. within four months of marriage. The dying
19
declarations to the father and elder sister, coupled with consistent testimony of
relatives and post-mortem noting of an abrasion suggestive of restraint, satisfy
the foundational requirements of Section 304B IPC. Consequently, the
presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act arises inexorably against
Respondent No. 1.
17.2. The High Court, however, failed to take this statutory presumption into
account, and instead relied solely on general bail principles. This approach
contradicts the law laid down in State of U.P. through CBI v. Amarmani
22
Tripathi , which requires courts to evaluate the gravity of the offence, the
nature of accusations and the prima facie evidence while considering bail.
23
18. In Kans Raj v. State of Punjab , this Court elaborated upon the
presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. It held that once the
prosecution establishes that the death of a woman occurred otherwise than
under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage, and that she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment “soon before her death” in connection with a
demand for dowry, a statutory presumption arises that the husband or his
relatives caused the dowry death. The burden then shifts to the accused to rebut
this presumption by showing the absence of dowry-related cruelty or lack of a
causal link between such cruelty and the death. The Court emphasised that once
the ingredients of Section 304B IPC are established, the presumption under
22
(2005) 8 SCC 21
23
(2000) 5 SCC 207
20
Section 113B of the Evidence Act becomes mandatory, and the proximity
between harassment and death is a decisive factor in its application. The
following paragraph is pertinent in this context:
“ 9. The law as it exists now provides that where the death of a woman is caused
by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within 7 years of marriage and it is shown that soon before her
death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative
for or in connection with any demand of dowry such death shall be punishable
under Section 304B. In order to seek a conviction against a person for the
offence of dowry death, the prosecution is obliged to prove that:
(a) the death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or had occurred
otherwise than under normal circumstances;
(b) such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage;
(c) the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by
any relative of her husband;
(d) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand
of dowry; and
(e) to such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been subjected to
soon before her death.
10. As and when the aforesaid circumstances are established, a presumption of
dowry death shall be drawn against the accused under Section 113B of the
Evidence Act. It has to be kept in mind that presumption under Section 113B is a
presumption of law. …”
15. ….. “Soon before” is a relative term which is required to be considered
under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be
laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of
proximity test. The term “soon before” is not synonymous with the term
“immediately before” and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as used
and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words
would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making
the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as
earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar
circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances
showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted
to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct
may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for
dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be “soon before death”
if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such
treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of
21
death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period.
Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand
and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The
demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date
of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be
treated as having become stale enough.”
19. The above principle was reaffirmed in Rajinder Singh v. State of
24
Punjab , to the effect that once the prosecution establishes the ingredients of
Section 304-B IPC, the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act
must be drawn. The words “soon before her death” have to be understood in a
practical manner, and the proximity of the cruelty to the death must be
established to invoke the presumption. The following paragraphs are apposite:
“ 24 … Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is
that the word "soon" does not mean "immediate". A fair and pragmatic
construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment
of Section 304B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression.
Time-lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand
for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of
the married woman under Section 304-B.
25 …
We hasten to add that this is not a correct reflection of the law. "Soon before" is
not synonymous with "immediately before".”
25
20. This Court in Baijnath v. State of M.P. , clarified the scope and
operation of the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act in
conjunction with Section 304B IPC. The relevant paragraphs are usefully
extracted below:
24
(2015) 6 SCC 477
25
(2017) 1 SCC 101
22
“ 24. …As the prosecution is on the charge of the offences envisaged in Sections
304B and 498A of the Code, the provisions for reference are extracted
hereunder:
“ 304B. Dowry death. -(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any
burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that
soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such
husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.-. For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have
the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28
of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend
to imprisonment for life.
…
498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to
cruelty. —Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also
be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb
or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or
any person related to her to meet such demand.”
25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by Section 304B of the Code,
the ingredients thereof are:
(i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily injury or by
any cause other than in normal circumstances, and
(ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and
(iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of the husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry.
The offence under Section 498A of the Code is attracted qua the husband or his
relative if she is subjected to cruelty. The Explanation to this Section exposits
“cruelty” as:
23
(i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb
or health (whether mental or physical) or
(ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or
any person related to her to meet such demand.
26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his
relative for or in connection with any demand for any property or valuable
security as a demand for dowry or in connection therewith is the common
constituent of both the offences.
27. The expression “dowry” is ordained to have the same meaning as in Section
2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression “cruelty”, as explained,
contains in its expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the
consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto. Be that as it
may, cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in
connection with any demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the gravamen of the two
offences.
28. Section 113B of the Act enjoins a statutory presumption as to dowry death in
the following terms:
“ 113B. Presumption as to dowry death. -. When the question is whether
a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that
soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,
the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.-. For the purpose of this section, “dowry death” shall have
the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860)”
29. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or
harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry
by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus
would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had
been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand
for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death.
Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the
otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of
dowry death by the person charged therewith.
24
30. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicate the burden of the
prosecution to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of the two offences by
direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption engrafted in
Section 113B of the Act against the accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by
the husband or her relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to
inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils
thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and
persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above
referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption
to cover up the shortfall in proof.
31. The legislative primature of relieving the prosecution of the rigour of the
proof of the often practically inaccessible recesses of life within the guarded
confines of a matrimonial home and of replenishing the consequential void, by
according a presumption against the person charged, cannot be overeased to
gloss-over and condone its failure to prove credibly, the basic facts enumerated
in the Sections involved, lest justice is the casualty.
32. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of Section 304B of
the Code and Section 113B of the Act have propounded that the presumption is
contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the
offence of Section 304B as in Shindo Alias Sawinder Kaur and another v. State
26 27
of Punjab and echoed in Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana . In the latter
pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of the essential ingredients of
dowry death under Section 304B of the Code is that the accused must have
subjected the woman to cruelty in connection with demand for dowry soon
before her death and that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that the accused
has committed the offence of dowry death under Section 113B of the Act. It
referred to with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao
28
v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304B
of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be
established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty and
harassment “in connection with the demand for dowry”.
26
(2011) 11 SCC 517
27
(2013) 16 SCC 640
28
(2003) 1 SCC 217
25
29
21. In Shabeen Ahmad v. State of U.P. , this Court cautioned that the grant
of bail in dowry death cases, despite strong incriminating material, undermines
public confidence in the justice delivery system. The Court observed that in
cases of dowry death, courts must remain alive to the broader societal
ramifications, as such offences strike at the very root of social justice and
gender equality. Permitting alleged prime perpetrators of such heinous crimes to
remain at liberty on bail, when evidence indicates active infliction of physical as
well as mental cruelty, may not only jeopardize the fairness of the trial but also
erode public faith in the administration of criminal justice.
22. Thus, the present case squarely falls within the category of annulment of
bail. The High Court’s omission to consider the gravity of the offence, the
corroborated dying declarations and the post-mortem evidence renders the
impugned order perverse and unsustainable. As held in Puran v. Rambilas , bail
orders passed in disregard of material evidence or settled principles are liable to
30
be set aside. This Court in Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. and another , clearly
observed:
“11. Though a conclusive finding in regard to the points urged by the parties is
not expected of the court considering the bail application, yet giving reasons is
different from discussing merits or demerits. As noted above, at the stage of
granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation
of the merits of the case is not to be undertaken. But that does not mean that
while granting bail some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being
granted is not required to be indicated.”
29
(2025) 4 SCC 172
30
(2004) 7 SCC 525
26
23. Dowry death is not merely an offence against an individual but a crime
against society at large. As emphasized in Social Action Forum for Manav
31
Adhikar v. Union of India , the alarming rise in such cases necessitates strict
judicial scrutiny. Permitting the accused to remain at large in the face of such
material would erode the deterrent object of Sections 304B and 498A IPC.
24. In view of the foregoing, the impugned order of the High Court is liable
to be set aside, and the bail granted to Respondent No. 1 deserves to be
annulled.
25. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that marriage, in its true essence,
is a sacred and noble institution founded on mutual trust, companionship, and
respect. However, in recent times, this pious bond has regrettably been reduced
to a mere commercial transaction. The evil of dowry, though often sought to be
camouflaged as gifts or voluntary offerings, has in reality become a means to
display social status and to satiate material greed.
25.1. The social evil of dowry not only corrodes the sanctity of marriage but
also perpetuates systemic oppression and subjugation of women. When such
demands transgress the bounds of reason and culminate in cruelty – or worse, in
the untimely death of a young bride – the offence transcends the private sphere
of the family and assumes the character of a grave social crime. It ceases to
31
(2018) 10 SCC 443
27
remain a mere personal tragedy and becomes an affront to the collective
conscience of society.
25.2. The phenomenon of dowry deaths represents one of the most abhorrent
manifestations of this social malaise, where the life of a young woman is
extinguished within her matrimonial home – not for any fault of her own, but
solely to satisfy the insatiable greed of others. Such heinous offences strike at
the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of
equality and life with dignity under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India. They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence
against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society.
25.3. In this backdrop, this Court is constrained to observe that judicial
passivity or misplaced leniency in the face of such atrocities would only
embolden perpetrators and undermine public confidence in the administration of
justice. A firm and deterrent judicial response is, therefore, imperative – not
only to uphold the majesty of law and do justice in the present case, but also to
send an unequivocal message that neither law nor society will countenance
barbarities born out of the evil of dowry.
26. With the above observations, this Criminal Appeal is allowed and the
impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The bail granted to Respondent
No. 1 is hereby cancelled, and he is directed to surrender to custody forthwith,
failing which, the concerned authorities shall take him into custody
28
immediately. It is, however, clarified that this judgment is confined to the issue
of cancellation of bail, and the trial shall proceed independently, on its own
merits, and strictly in accordance with law.
27. Connected Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
…………………………J.
[B.V. NAGARATHNA]
…………………………J.
[R. MAHADEVAN]
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 28, 2025
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2025 INSC 1367
Criminal Appeal No. of 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8075 of 2025)
YOGENDRA PAL SINGH … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAGHVENDRA SINGH ALIAS PRINCE
AND ANOTHER … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
R. MAHADEVAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. The challenge in the present appeal is to the judgment and order dated
1 2
09.01.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal
Misc. Bail Application No. 7768 of 2024, whereby the High Court granted bail
to Respondent No. l / accused, in connection with Case Crime No. 415 of 2023
registered at Police Station Kotwali, District Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh, for
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
BORRA LM VALLI
Date: 2025.11.28
16:57:36 IST
Reason:
1
Hereinafter referred to as “the impugned order”
2
Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2
offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B, and 328 of the Indian Penal
3 4
Code, 1860 read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 .
3. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant, who is the father of the
deceased Aastha @ Saarika, seeking cancellation of bail granted to Respondent
No. 1/ Accused – Husband, Raghvendra Singh @ Prince. The appellant’s
daughter died on 05.06.2023, i.e., within four months of her marriage, in highly
suspicious circumstances by allegedly consuming poison.
4. The facts, as projected by the appellant, are as follows:
4.1. The appellant's daughter Aastha @ Saarika was married to Respondent
No.1 – Raghvendra Singh @ Prince, on 22.02.2023 according to Hindu rites
and rituals. At the time of marriage, the appellant spent approximately Rs. 22
lakhs in cash, gave articles worth Rs. 10 lakhs and jewellery worth Rs. 15 lakhs
to the first respondent’s family.
4.2. Soon after marriage, the deceased was subjected to cruelty and
harassment by Respondent No. 1 and his family members on the pretext that the
dowry given was insufficient. The accused persons persistently demanded a
Fortuner car as additional dowry and subjected the deceased to mental and
physical torture.
4.3. When the deceased came to her parental home during the chhathi ritual,
she informed the appellant about the cruelty and demand for a Fortuner car. Ten
3
For short, “IPC”
4
For short, “D.P. Act”
3
days before her death, on 02.06.2023, she was again sent back to her
matrimonial home only after assurance by Respondent No. 1 that such
harassment would not be repeated.
4.4. On 04.06.2023, during a family function at Kaushambi, there was a
quarrel between Respondent No. 1 and the deceased. Later that night, around
01.30 am, the deceased telephoned her elder sister Diksha in a distressed state,
crying and seeking urgent help. At that time, she disclosed that Respondent No.
1 along with his relatives had forcibly administered some foul-smelling
substance to her, due to which she was feeling uneasy.
4.5. The deceased was immediately taken to Sadar Hospital, Fatehpur, where
she was found with froth emanating from her mouth. Despite medical
intervention, her condition deteriorated and she expired while being shifted to
Kanpur.
4.6. A post-mortem examination was conducted on 05.06.2023, but the cause
of death was not initially ascertained. Thereafter, the viscera was sent to a
forensic science laboratory for examination, and the FSL report confirmed the
presence of aluminium phosphide poison.
4.7. Despite serious allegations, the police did not arrest the accused
immediately. After investigation, charge sheet no.557 of 2023 dated 30.10.2023
was filed, implicating only Respondent No. 1/ husband, and excluding other
named in-laws.
4
4.8. Respondent No. 1 approached the Sessions Court seeking bail, which was
dismissed by order dated 20.10.2023. However, the High Court, by the
impugned order, allowed his bail application.
4.9. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant is before this Court with the present
appeal.
5. Learned senior counsel for the appellant assailed the impugned order
granting bail to Respondent No. 1 on multiple grounds. It was submitted that the
High Court failed to consider the gravity of the offence, the nature of evidence
available against the accused, as well as the statutory presumption under Section
113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which squarely applies in cases of
dowry death occurring within seven years of marriage.
5.1. It was contended that the present case involves the most serious
allegations where the deceased was continuously harassed for dowry by
Respondent No. 1 / husband, and in the course of such harassment, was
poisoned to death on 05.06.2023, i.e., within four months of her marriage.
According to the learned senior counsel, the post-mortem report records an
ante-mortem injury – an abrasion on the left forearm – and the Forensic Science
Laboratory report categorically confirmed the presence of aluminium phosphide
poison, thereby corroborating the prosecution’s case of homicidal poisoning.
5
5.2. Learned senior counsel placing reliance on the chargesheet, which
records that the accused’s uncle, Tej Bahadur Singh alias Ram Bahadur, is
politically active, having contested the 2017 Assembly Elections, and owns
several plots, agricultural lands, brick kilns, and multiple vehicles, submitted
that the family of the accused is highly influential and wields considerable clout
in the area. It is to be noted that though the uncle was initially arraigned as an
accused along with his wife, Vijay Shri, their names were later dropped from the
chargesheet, which according to the learned senior counsel, suggests that there
could be serious doubts regarding the fairness of the investigation.
5.3. It was further submitted that the investigation in this case has been carried
out in an impartial manner since the inception. Respondent No. 1/ husband was
arrested only after three months of the FIR, while the other named accused were
never arrested. The chargesheet filed on 30.10.2023 did not fairly reflect the
involvement of all accused. In fact, the Assistant Prosecution Officer, Fatehpur,
vide letter dated 16.11.2023, pointed out several deficiencies in the investigation
and requested the Joint Director, Prosecution, Fatehpur to seek a fresh legal
opinion after collecting the material evidence which had been ignored by the
investigating officer. This eventually led to the transfer of the investigation to
the CB-CID itself indicative of the gravity of the offence and the shortcomings
in the earlier investigation.
6
5.4. Learned senior counsel argued that in such circumstances, any leniency
shown towards the accused would severely prejudice the trial, as there exists a
strong likelihood of tampering with the evidence and influencing the
prosecution witnesses and the High Court, while granting bail, failed to
appreciate this real and imminent threat.
5.5. It was also contended that the High Court committed an error in relying
5
upon the judgments in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI and Manish Sisodia v.
6
Directorate of Enforcement , since both these cases are clearly distinguishable
based on the facts, nature of offence, period of incarceration, and the materials
available against the accused. The settled principles governing bail in cases of
dowry death under Section 304B IPC and the presumption under Section 113B
of the Evidence Act were altogether ignored by the High Court.
5.6. On the basis of these submissions, learned senior counsel for the
appellant prayed for cancellation of bail granted to Respondent No. 1, so as to
ensure a fair and effective trial.
6. Per contra , the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 / accused, at the
outset, submitted that the present appeal is not maintainable, as there is no
perversity, arbitrariness, or illegality in the well-reasoned order of the High
Court granting bail. Once the discretionary relief of bail has been exercised
5
2022 INSC 690
6
2024 INSC 595
7
judiciously on appreciation of material, it ought not to be interfered with by this
Court in the absence of gross illegality or miscarriage of justice.
6.1. It was contended that the incident dated 05.06.2023 was first reported by
the complainant vide G.D. Entry No. 019, which merely mentions the death of
the deceased under suspicious circumstances, without any reference to dowry
demand or cruelty. The FIR was lodged belatedly on 15.06.2023, after ten days
and after the last rites, raising doubts about its genuineness.
6.1.1. During the investigation, statements of the deceased’s family members
introduced allegations of dowry demand her a Fortuner car and cruelty by
Respondent No. 1 and his relatives. However, these allegations were absent in
the initial report. Similarly, the allegation that the deceased made a distress call
to her sister in the intervening night of 04/05.06.2023 complaining of being
administered some “smelly substance” remains uncorroborated, as no call
records substantiate the same.
6.1.2. The chargesheet dated 30.10.2023 was filed against Respondent No. 1
under Sections 498A, 304B, and 328 IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P.
Act. Notably, co-accused Tej Bahadur Singh and Vijay Shri, initially named in
the FIR, were exonerated as their presence at the relevant point of time was
established elsewhere, and they had no motive. Further investigation culminated
in a final report dated 30.04.2025, which reaffirmed their innocence. The
exoneration of these relatives significantly weakens the prosecution’s version,
8
making it improbable that the alleged offence was committed by Respondent
No.1 alone.
6.2. It was argued that the prosecution has relied solely on statements of
interested witnesses – the father, mother, and sisters of the deceased, which
according to the learned counsel, are not corroborated by independent or
documentary evidence, and thus cannot be treated as conclusive proof of dowry
harassment.
6.3. Learned counsel further submitted that the deceased was allegedly
unwilling to marry Respondent No. 1 as she was in love with one Abhay Singh
(brother-in-law of her elder sister).
6.4. It was submitted that the post-mortem report dated 05.06.2023 records a
single abrasion of 1 cm x 1 cm on the left forearm, and the FSL report indicates
aluminium phosphide ingestion as the cause of death. However, neither
document establishes that the poison was administered by Respondent No. 1.
The issue of whether poison was self-ingested or administered, and the
significance of the forearm injury, are matters of trial.
6.5. Lastly, it was highlighted that Respondent No. 1 has already undergone
more than 15 months of incarceration (from 22.09.2023 to 09.10.2025) and is
willing to cooperate with the trial.
6.6. On these grounds, it was urged that the order granting bail to Respondent
No. 1 calls for no interference by this Court.
9
7. Learned counsel for the State supported the case of the complainant,
submitting as follows:
(i) Based on the complaint given by the appellant alleging that his daughter
was killed by her in-laws on account of unmet dowry demands, FIR
No.415/2023 dated 15.06.2023 was registered at P.S. Kotwali, District Fatehpur
under Sections 498A, 304B, 120B and 328 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P.
Act against Respondent No. 1 and his family members.
(ii) The delay of ten days in lodging the FIR was explained by the appellant’s
mental condition, as he was in deep shock and grief after the sudden death of his
daughter.
(iii) The post-mortem conducted on 05.06.2023 revealed an abrasion on the
forearm, and the FSL report confirmed aluminium phosphide poisoning as the
cause of death.
(iv) Statements of key witnesses – Abhay Singh (brother-in-law), the
appellant (father), Premlata Singh (mother), and sisters (Sameeksha Singh and
Diksha Singh) – recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
7
1973 corroborated the allegations of dowry demand and cruelty mentioned in
the FIR.
(v) Upon the appellant’s representation, the investigation was transferred to
CB-CID, which reaffirmed the findings of the local police.
7
For short, “Cr.P.C”
10
(vi) Chargesheet No. 557 of 2023 dated 30.10.2023 was filed only against
Respondent No. 1, on which cognizance was duly taken by the Sessions Court.
(vii) The High Court failed to appreciate the seriousness of the offence – the
unnatural death of a young woman within four months of marriage, amid
specific allegations of dowry demands and poisoning. The High Court’s order
overlooked the gravity of the allegations and the societal menace of dowry
deaths.
7.1. It was therefore submitted that the bail granted to Respondent No. 1
ought to be cancelled in the interests of justice.
8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for
the parties and perused the materials available on record.
9. Apparently, criminal proceedings were initiated against Respondent No. 1
/ Husband pursuant to a complaint lodged by the appellant / father in connection
with the unnatural death of his daughter on 05.06.2023. FIR No. 415 of 2023
dated 15.06.2023 was registered against Respondent No. 1 and the in-laws of
the deceased for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B, 120B and 328
IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. Upon completion of investigation, the
chargesheet was filed only against Respondent No. 1 for offences under Section
498A, 304B and 328 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. Respondent No.
1 was arrested on 22.09.2023. His Bail Application (No. 2225 of 2023) was
rejected by the Sessions Court on 20.10.2023, following which he filed
11
Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 7768 of 2024 before the High Court, which
allowed the same, by the order impugned herein.
10. The appellant, being the father of the deceased, is undoubtedly an
aggrieved person and thus possesses the requisite locus standi to maintain the
present appeal seeking cancellation of the bail granted to Respondent No. 1. The
unnatural death of his daughter within four months of marriage, allegedly on
account of dowry harassment, directly affects his rights as a complainant.
8
10.1. In R. Rathinam v. State by DSP , this Court has categorically held that
the power under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. to cancel bail may be invoked not only
at the instance of the State but also by any aggrieved party.
10.2. Similarly, in Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. Munna @ Munna Jaiswal and
9
another , this Court observed:
“7. It is now a settled law that complainant can always question the order
granting bail if the said bail is not validly passed. It is not as if once a bail is
granted by any court, the only way is to get it cancelled on account of its misuse.
The bail order can be tested on merits also. In our opinion, therefore, the
complainant could question the merits of the order granting bail.”
10.3. Applying the above legal position to the present case, the appellant, being
the complainant and father of the deceased, has a direct and substantial interest
in seeking cancellation of bail. Accordingly, the present case is clearly
maintainable before this Court.
8
(2000) 2 SCC 391
9
Criminal Appeal No. 2087 of 2008 decided on 19.12.2008
12
11. The law relating to cancellation of bail is well settled. Recently, in State
10
of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, etc . , this Court comprehensively reviewed the
principles governing annulment and cancellation of bail. The Court
distinguished between annulment of bail due to legal infirmity in the order, and
cancellation of bail arising from post-bail misconduct or supervening
circumstances. It is well established that bail granted without due application of
mind to relevant factors – such as the gravity of the offence, prima facie
evidence, or the antecedents of the accused – may be annulled. Courts must
consider the totality of circumstances, balancing the presumption of innocence
against the seriousness of the crime, societal interest, and risk of the misuse of
liberty. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs are extracted below:
“ 15. The statutory framework governing cancellation of bail is well-settled.
Section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 empowers the High Court
or the Court of Sessions to direct the re-arrest of an accused who has been
released on bail, if such direction is deemed “necessary”. Similarly, Section 437
(5) enables a Magistrate to cancel bail granted under Section 437(1) or (2).
These provisions underscore the legislative intent that the power to grant bail is
not absolute but is always subject to judicial reconsideration in light of
emerging facts or legal infirmities in the original order.
16. It is equally well established that the considerations for grant of bail and for
its cancellation are not identical. While the grant of bail involves a preventive
evaluation of the likelihood of misuse of liberty, the cancellation of bail entails a
review of the prior decision – either on account of supervening circumstances or
because the original order was legally flawed. As laid down in State (Delhi
11
Administration) v. Sanjay Gandhi , “Rejection of bail when bail is applied for,
is one thing; cancellation of bail already granted is quite another”. This
principle reflects a recognition of the sanctity of liberty once granted, and the
requirement of compelling justification for its withdrawal.
10
2025 INSC 979
11
(1978) 2 SCC 411
13
17. However, it is equally well recognized that bail granted without due
application of mind to relevant factors – such as the gravity of the offence, the
strength of the evidence, or the conduct and antecedents of the accused – may be
cancelled. Even in the absence of subsequent misconduct, a bail order that is
perverse, unjustified, or legally untenable is vulnerable to interference. In Dolat
12
Ram v State of Haryana , this Court held that “where a bail order is passed in
disregard of material facts or in an arbitrary manner, it can be set aside”.
18. Let us now examine the jurisprudence on when bail may be annulled or
cancelled. Two distinct categories have emerged in this regard:
(A) Annulment of Bail due to legal infirmity in the order; and
(B) Cancellation of Bail, i.e., revocation of bail due to post-grant misconduct or
supervening circumstances.
(A) Annulment of bail orders
18.1. This refers to the appellate or revisional power to set aside a bail order
that is perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles. It
is concerned with defects existing at the time the bail was granted, without
reference to subsequent conduct.
13
18.2. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi , this court laid down guiding
principles:
“(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not only the nature of the
accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if the accusation entails
conviction and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations.
(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered with or the
apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant should also weigh with
the court in the matter of grant of bail.
(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence establishing the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie
satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.
(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the
element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of
bail, and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the
prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order
of bail.”
14
18.3. In Puran v. Rambilas and another , it was held that a bail order can be
set aside even in the absence of post-bail misconduct if it is found to be
unjustified, illegal, or perverse.
12
(1995) 1 SCC 349
13
(2001) 4 SCC 280
14
(2001) 6 SCC 338
14
15
18.4. Similarly, in Dr. Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat and another , a
three-Judge Bench held that consideration of irrelevant materials renders the
bail order vulnerable and liable to be set aside.
16
18.5. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee , this Court held that
where the High Court grants bail mechanically and without application of mind
to material factors such as the gravity of the offence or antecedents of the
accused, such an order must be set aside.
18.6. In Prakash Kadam and others v. Ramprasad Viswanath Gupta and
17
another , this Court distinguished between cancellation of bail by the same
court and annulment by an appellate / revisional court. It observed:
“18. In considering whether to cancel the bail the court has also to
consider the gravity and nature of the offence, prima facie case against
the accused, the position and standing of the accused, etc. If there are
very serious allegations against the accused his bail may be cancelled
even if he has not misused the bail granted to him. Moreover, the above
principle applies when the same court which granted bail is approached
for cancelling the bail. It will not apply when the order granting bail is
appealed against before an appellate/Revisional Court.
19. ….. There are several other factors also which may be seen while
deciding to cancel the bail.”
18
18.7. In Neeru Yadav v. State of UP , this court annulled a bail order where the
High Court had ignored the criminal antecedents of the accused and relied
mechanically on parity. It held that consideration of irrelevant factors and
omission of relevant considerations renders the order perverse. As the court
noted:
“15. …. It is clear as a cloudless sky that the High Court has totally
ignored the criminal antecedents of the accused. What has weighed with
the High Court is the doctrine of parity. A history-sheeter involved in the
nature of crimes which we have reproduced hereinabove, are not minor
offences so that he is not to be retained in custody, but the crimes are of
heinous nature and such crimes, by no stretch of imagination, can be
regarded as jejune. Such cases do create a thunder and lightning having
the effect potentiality of torrential rain in an analytical mind. The law
expects the judiciary to be alert while admitting these kind of accused
persons to be at large and, therefore, the emphasis is on exercise of
discretion judiciously and not in a whimsical manner.”
15
2008 (6) SCALE 415
16
(2010) 14 SCC 496
17
(2011) 6 SCC 189
18
(2014) 16 SCC 508
15
It further clarified:
“18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat with profit that it is not
an appeal for cancellation of bail as the cancellation is not sought
because of supervening circumstances. The annulment of the order
passed by the High Court is sought as many relevant factors have not
been taken into consideration which includes the criminal antecedents of
the accused and that makes the order a deviant one. Therefore, the
inevitable result is the lancination of the impugned order.”
19
18.8. In Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) , this Court reiterated that
while no exhaustive list can be laid down, courts must always consider the
totality of circumstances, including the seriousness of the offence, prima facie
evidence, and potential for interference with the trial.
20
18.9. In State of Kerala v. Mahesh , it was observed that even under Article
136, where interference with bail orders is rare, this Court will exercise its
powers if the bail order is found to be lacking application of mind or based on
irrelevant considerations.
….
18.15. Thus, it is clear that while cancellation of bail is a serious matter
involving deprivation of personal liberty, the law does permit annulment of a
bail order that is unjustified, legally untenable, or passed without due regard to
material considerations. The distinction between annulment of bail orders due
to perversity and cancellation for post-bail misconduct must be clearly
understood and applied, ensuring a careful, calibrated, and constitutionally
sound approach to the administration of criminal justice.
19. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the decision of this Bench in Pinki
21
v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , wherein, the bail granted to the
accused therein was cancelled, after a detailed consideration of the facts and
the gravity of the offence, namely, child trafficking as well as the legal
principles. The Court underscored that while personal liberty is a cherished
constitutional value, it is not absolute. Liberty must yield where it poses a threat
to the collective interest of society. No individual can claim a liberty that
endangers the life or liberty of others, as the rational collective cannot tolerate
anti-social or anti-collective conduct. Emphasizing that bail jurisprudence is
inherently fact-specific, the Court reiterated that each bail application must be
decided on its own merits, in light of the well settled on its own merits, in light
of the well-settled parameters governing grant or denial of bail….”
19
(2018) 12 SCC 129
20
AIR 2021 SC 2071
21
2025 INSC 482
16
12. In the present case, Respondent No. 1 /accused was subjected to criminal
prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B and 328 IPC
read with Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act, in connection with the unnatural
death of his wife, who is the daughter of the appellant. The appellant alleges
that his daughter was subjected to persistent torture and harassment for failure
to provide a Fortuner car as additional dowry.
13. The post-mortem report reveals an abrasion on the left forearm of the
deceased, approximately 8 cm above the wrist joint. The subsequent Forensic
Laboratory Report on the chemical analysis of the viscera may indicate
ingestion of a poisonous or unnatural substance. Therefore, the cause of death
cannot be conclusively ascertained at this stage and is to be determined by the
trial Court during the course of the trial.
14. The statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. prima
facie indicate that the deceased was subjected to persistent dowry demands and
cruelty at the hands of the accused. Abhay Singh, the brother-in-law of the
appellant’s elder daughter, stated that the deceased repeatedly complained of
harassment and abuse by her husband and in-laws on account of dowry
demands, including the demand for a vehicle. The appellant further deposed that
shortly before her death, the deceased disclosed to him that her husband and in-
laws had forcibly made her consume a “smelly substance”, after which she
17
collapsed and succumbed while being taken to Kanpur. This disclosure
constitutes a dying declaration of high evidentiary value, corroborated by other
witnesses.
14.1. The mother of the deceased, Premlata Singh, corroborated the appellant’s
statement, adding that she was in regular telephonic contact with her daughter,
who narrated continuous torture for dowry. The younger sister, Sameeksha
Singh, gave a concurrent statement, testifying that Respondent No. 1 used to
threaten the deceased not to disclose the abuse, and frequently used abusive
language. The elder sister, Diksha Singh, narrated the facts of the fateful night.
She testified that the deceased had called her repeatedly around 1.30 am, crying
and begging to be rescued. She further deposed that when her father asked the
deceased at the hospital about what had happened, the deceased again said that
her husband, uncle, and aunt had forcibly administered a “smelly substance” to
her.
15. Despite such grave allegations, the police remained inactive for an
inordinate period. Respondent No. 1 was arrested only on 22.09.2023, after a
delay of 104 days from lodging the FIR, and the appellant addressed a
representation to the Home Secretary seeking transfer to CB-CID. Such a delay
reflects serious lapses in the investigation and undue benefit to the accused.
18
16. Without considering these aspects, the High Court erroneously granted
bail to Respondent No. 1/ accused by observing that at the stage of bail only
prima facie satisfaction is required, and that an elaborate evaluation of the
merits of the case should be avoided. It invoked Article 21 of the Constitution,
holding that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and noted that there was no
material to suggest that the accused was likely to abscond or tamper with
witnesses.
17. The statutory framework embodied in Sections 304B and 498A IPC and
Section 113B of the Evidence Act further highlights the need for careful and
cautious consideration in such cases. Section 304B IPC classifies the death of a
married woman occurring within seven years of marriage, preceded by dowry-
related cruelty or harassment, as a “dowry death”, punishable with
imprisonment that may extend to life. Section 498A IPC criminalises cruelty by
the husband or his relatives, including harassment for unlawful demands of
dowry. In addition, Section 113B of the Evidence Act mandates a presumption
of dowry death once such foundational facts are established. Collectively, these
provisions reflect the legislature’s firm resolve to combat the social evil of
dowry and to safeguard married women from cruelty and harassment within
their matrimonial homes.
17.1. In the present case, the marriage took place on 22.02.2023, and the death
occurred on 05.06.2023 i.e. within four months of marriage. The dying
19
declarations to the father and elder sister, coupled with consistent testimony of
relatives and post-mortem noting of an abrasion suggestive of restraint, satisfy
the foundational requirements of Section 304B IPC. Consequently, the
presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act arises inexorably against
Respondent No. 1.
17.2. The High Court, however, failed to take this statutory presumption into
account, and instead relied solely on general bail principles. This approach
contradicts the law laid down in State of U.P. through CBI v. Amarmani
22
Tripathi , which requires courts to evaluate the gravity of the offence, the
nature of accusations and the prima facie evidence while considering bail.
23
18. In Kans Raj v. State of Punjab , this Court elaborated upon the
presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. It held that once the
prosecution establishes that the death of a woman occurred otherwise than
under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage, and that she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment “soon before her death” in connection with a
demand for dowry, a statutory presumption arises that the husband or his
relatives caused the dowry death. The burden then shifts to the accused to rebut
this presumption by showing the absence of dowry-related cruelty or lack of a
causal link between such cruelty and the death. The Court emphasised that once
the ingredients of Section 304B IPC are established, the presumption under
22
(2005) 8 SCC 21
23
(2000) 5 SCC 207
20
Section 113B of the Evidence Act becomes mandatory, and the proximity
between harassment and death is a decisive factor in its application. The
following paragraph is pertinent in this context:
“ 9. The law as it exists now provides that where the death of a woman is caused
by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within 7 years of marriage and it is shown that soon before her
death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative
for or in connection with any demand of dowry such death shall be punishable
under Section 304B. In order to seek a conviction against a person for the
offence of dowry death, the prosecution is obliged to prove that:
(a) the death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or had occurred
otherwise than under normal circumstances;
(b) such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage;
(c) the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by
any relative of her husband;
(d) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand
of dowry; and
(e) to such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been subjected to
soon before her death.
10. As and when the aforesaid circumstances are established, a presumption of
dowry death shall be drawn against the accused under Section 113B of the
Evidence Act. It has to be kept in mind that presumption under Section 113B is a
presumption of law. …”
15. ….. “Soon before” is a relative term which is required to be considered
under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be
laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of
proximity test. The term “soon before” is not synonymous with the term
“immediately before” and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as used
and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words
would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making
the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as
earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar
circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances
showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted
to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct
may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for
dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be “soon before death”
if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such
treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of
21
death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period.
Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand
and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The
demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date
of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be
treated as having become stale enough.”
19. The above principle was reaffirmed in Rajinder Singh v. State of
24
Punjab , to the effect that once the prosecution establishes the ingredients of
Section 304-B IPC, the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act
must be drawn. The words “soon before her death” have to be understood in a
practical manner, and the proximity of the cruelty to the death must be
established to invoke the presumption. The following paragraphs are apposite:
“ 24 … Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is
that the word "soon" does not mean "immediate". A fair and pragmatic
construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment
of Section 304B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression.
Time-lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand
for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of
the married woman under Section 304-B.
25 …
We hasten to add that this is not a correct reflection of the law. "Soon before" is
not synonymous with "immediately before".”
25
20. This Court in Baijnath v. State of M.P. , clarified the scope and
operation of the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act in
conjunction with Section 304B IPC. The relevant paragraphs are usefully
extracted below:
24
(2015) 6 SCC 477
25
(2017) 1 SCC 101
22
“ 24. …As the prosecution is on the charge of the offences envisaged in Sections
304B and 498A of the Code, the provisions for reference are extracted
hereunder:
“ 304B. Dowry death. -(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any
burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that
soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such
husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.-. For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have
the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28
of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend
to imprisonment for life.
…
498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to
cruelty. —Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also
be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb
or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or
any person related to her to meet such demand.”
25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by Section 304B of the Code,
the ingredients thereof are:
(i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily injury or by
any cause other than in normal circumstances, and
(ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and
(iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of the husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry.
The offence under Section 498A of the Code is attracted qua the husband or his
relative if she is subjected to cruelty. The Explanation to this Section exposits
“cruelty” as:
23
(i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb
or health (whether mental or physical) or
(ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or
any person related to her to meet such demand.
26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his
relative for or in connection with any demand for any property or valuable
security as a demand for dowry or in connection therewith is the common
constituent of both the offences.
27. The expression “dowry” is ordained to have the same meaning as in Section
2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression “cruelty”, as explained,
contains in its expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the
consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto. Be that as it
may, cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in
connection with any demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the gravamen of the two
offences.
28. Section 113B of the Act enjoins a statutory presumption as to dowry death in
the following terms:
“ 113B. Presumption as to dowry death. -. When the question is whether
a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that
soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,
the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.-. For the purpose of this section, “dowry death” shall have
the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860)”
29. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or
harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry
by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus
would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had
been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand
for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death.
Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the
otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of
dowry death by the person charged therewith.
24
30. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicate the burden of the
prosecution to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of the two offences by
direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption engrafted in
Section 113B of the Act against the accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by
the husband or her relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to
inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils
thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and
persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above
referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption
to cover up the shortfall in proof.
31. The legislative primature of relieving the prosecution of the rigour of the
proof of the often practically inaccessible recesses of life within the guarded
confines of a matrimonial home and of replenishing the consequential void, by
according a presumption against the person charged, cannot be overeased to
gloss-over and condone its failure to prove credibly, the basic facts enumerated
in the Sections involved, lest justice is the casualty.
32. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of Section 304B of
the Code and Section 113B of the Act have propounded that the presumption is
contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the
offence of Section 304B as in Shindo Alias Sawinder Kaur and another v. State
26 27
of Punjab and echoed in Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana . In the latter
pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of the essential ingredients of
dowry death under Section 304B of the Code is that the accused must have
subjected the woman to cruelty in connection with demand for dowry soon
before her death and that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that the accused
has committed the offence of dowry death under Section 113B of the Act. It
referred to with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao
28
v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304B
of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be
established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty and
harassment “in connection with the demand for dowry”.
26
(2011) 11 SCC 517
27
(2013) 16 SCC 640
28
(2003) 1 SCC 217
25
29
21. In Shabeen Ahmad v. State of U.P. , this Court cautioned that the grant
of bail in dowry death cases, despite strong incriminating material, undermines
public confidence in the justice delivery system. The Court observed that in
cases of dowry death, courts must remain alive to the broader societal
ramifications, as such offences strike at the very root of social justice and
gender equality. Permitting alleged prime perpetrators of such heinous crimes to
remain at liberty on bail, when evidence indicates active infliction of physical as
well as mental cruelty, may not only jeopardize the fairness of the trial but also
erode public faith in the administration of criminal justice.
22. Thus, the present case squarely falls within the category of annulment of
bail. The High Court’s omission to consider the gravity of the offence, the
corroborated dying declarations and the post-mortem evidence renders the
impugned order perverse and unsustainable. As held in Puran v. Rambilas , bail
orders passed in disregard of material evidence or settled principles are liable to
30
be set aside. This Court in Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. and another , clearly
observed:
“11. Though a conclusive finding in regard to the points urged by the parties is
not expected of the court considering the bail application, yet giving reasons is
different from discussing merits or demerits. As noted above, at the stage of
granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation
of the merits of the case is not to be undertaken. But that does not mean that
while granting bail some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being
granted is not required to be indicated.”
29
(2025) 4 SCC 172
30
(2004) 7 SCC 525
26
23. Dowry death is not merely an offence against an individual but a crime
against society at large. As emphasized in Social Action Forum for Manav
31
Adhikar v. Union of India , the alarming rise in such cases necessitates strict
judicial scrutiny. Permitting the accused to remain at large in the face of such
material would erode the deterrent object of Sections 304B and 498A IPC.
24. In view of the foregoing, the impugned order of the High Court is liable
to be set aside, and the bail granted to Respondent No. 1 deserves to be
annulled.
25. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that marriage, in its true essence,
is a sacred and noble institution founded on mutual trust, companionship, and
respect. However, in recent times, this pious bond has regrettably been reduced
to a mere commercial transaction. The evil of dowry, though often sought to be
camouflaged as gifts or voluntary offerings, has in reality become a means to
display social status and to satiate material greed.
25.1. The social evil of dowry not only corrodes the sanctity of marriage but
also perpetuates systemic oppression and subjugation of women. When such
demands transgress the bounds of reason and culminate in cruelty – or worse, in
the untimely death of a young bride – the offence transcends the private sphere
of the family and assumes the character of a grave social crime. It ceases to
31
(2018) 10 SCC 443
27
remain a mere personal tragedy and becomes an affront to the collective
conscience of society.
25.2. The phenomenon of dowry deaths represents one of the most abhorrent
manifestations of this social malaise, where the life of a young woman is
extinguished within her matrimonial home – not for any fault of her own, but
solely to satisfy the insatiable greed of others. Such heinous offences strike at
the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of
equality and life with dignity under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India. They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence
against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society.
25.3. In this backdrop, this Court is constrained to observe that judicial
passivity or misplaced leniency in the face of such atrocities would only
embolden perpetrators and undermine public confidence in the administration of
justice. A firm and deterrent judicial response is, therefore, imperative – not
only to uphold the majesty of law and do justice in the present case, but also to
send an unequivocal message that neither law nor society will countenance
barbarities born out of the evil of dowry.
26. With the above observations, this Criminal Appeal is allowed and the
impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The bail granted to Respondent
No. 1 is hereby cancelled, and he is directed to surrender to custody forthwith,
failing which, the concerned authorities shall take him into custody
28
immediately. It is, however, clarified that this judgment is confined to the issue
of cancellation of bail, and the trial shall proceed independently, on its own
merits, and strictly in accordance with law.
27. Connected Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
…………………………J.
[B.V. NAGARATHNA]
…………………………J.
[R. MAHADEVAN]
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 28, 2025