NARAYANA GRAMANI AND ORS. vs. MARIAMMAL AND ORS.

          REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.5057  OF 2009 Narayana Gramani & Ors. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Mariammal & Ors.                …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the plaintiffs against the final judgment and order dated 09.07.2007 passed by the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Madras   in   Second Appeal No.652 of 1995 whereby the Single Judge of the   High   Court   allowed   the   second   appeal   filed   by defendant Nos.2 to 5 and set aside the judgment and Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ANITA MALHOTRA Date: 2018.09.11 17:44:37 IST Reason: decree   dated   05.08.1994   passed   by   the   Additional 1 Subordinate   Judge,   Chingalpattu   in   A.S.   No.72   of 1993 and dismissed the suit filed by the appellants herein.  2. In order to appreciate the issues involved in the appeal, which lie in a narrow compass, few facts need mention hereinbelow. 3. Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are the plaintiffs whereas appellant   No.   3   is   the   legal   representative   of   third plaintiff­Thirunavukkarasu,   who   died   pending litigation. The respondents are defendants in the civil suit.  4. The three plaintiffs claiming to be the members of one family filed a civil suit against the defendants for a declaration   and   permanent  injunction  in  relation   to the   land   situated   at   No.   294/1   Vembanur   Village, Kadapakkam Firka, (patta No. 491), Old Paimash No. 201/8   renumbered   as   S.   No   399/4,   Acs.   1.08 (hereinafter referred to as "suit land"). 2 5. The   plaintiffs   traced   the   title   to   the   suit   land through their predecessor­in­title coupled with Patta issued by the Estate Manager in relation to the suit land.   According   to   the   plaintiffs,   there   had   been   a family partition  inter se  the plaintiffs wherein the suit land fell to their share. The plaintiffs alleged that they have   been   in   possession   of   the   suit   land,   invested money and paying revenue taxes. The plaintiffs alleged that   the   defendants   are   trying   to   disturb   their possession   over   the   suit   land   without   any   legal authority and are also asserting their title over the suit land, which they do not have in their favour and hence there   arise   a   need   to   file   the   civil   suit   and   claim declaration   and   permanent  injunction  in  relation   to the suit land. 6. The defendants filed their written statement and denied   the   plaintiffs’   claim   over   the   suit   land. According to them,   they are the owners of the suit land having purchased the same vide sale deed dated 3 15.02.1967   for   Rs.200/­   from   one   Muthu   Mudaliar and his son Rajaram  Mudaliar who, according to the defendants,   were   the   owners   of   the   suit   land. Defendant No. 1 also claimed to be in possession of the suit land and cultivating the same. 7. The   Trial   Court   framed   two   issues,   viz.,   (1) Whether   the   plaintiffs   are   entitled   for   seeking declaration and permanent injunction; and (2) If so, for what reliefs.  Parties adduced their evidence (oral and documentary).   By   Judgment   and   decree   dated 23.11.1993, the Trial Court decreed the plaintiffs’ suit. It was held that the plaintiffs are able to prove their ownership   over   the   suit   land   on   the   basis   of   the documents   filed   by   them;   that   the   plaintiffs   are   in possession of the suit land; that they are, therefore, entitled to claim a declaration of their title over the suit land as its owners so also are entitled to claim permanent   injunction   against   the   defendants 4 restraining them from interfering in their (plaintiffs’) peaceful possession over the suit land.  8. The   defendants   felt   aggrieved   and   filed   first appeal before the Additional Sub­Judge (Appeal Suit No.   72/1993).   By   Judgment   dated   05.08.1994,   the Appellate Court dismissed the defendants’ appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. 9. The defendants pursued the matter further and filed second appeal in the High Court at Madras. The High   Court   admitted   the   second   appeal   on   the following substantial question of law: “Whether the  same  judge can dismiss an appeal on the ground that he has already rejected   the   appellants’   case   in   an   earlier appeal   against   different   parties   in   the absence of pleadings of rejudicata or estoppel by   judgment   by   neither   of   the   parties, especially   when   the   issue   is   pending   for decision   before   the   High   Court   by   way   of second appeal.” 5 10. By impugned judgment, the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the two courts below and, in consequence, dismissed the suit giving rise to filing of the present appeal by way of special leave in this Court by the plaintiffs. 11. The   short   question,   which   arises   for consideration in this appeal, is whether the High Court was justified in allowing the defendants’ appeal and, in consequence, dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit which was decreed by the two Courts below. 12. Mr. MSM Asaithambi, learned counsel appeared for the appellants. Despite notice, none appeared for the respondents. 13. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the appellants and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside the impugned judgment remand the case to the High Court   for   deciding   the   appeal   afresh   on   merits   in 6 accordance   with   law   after   framing   appropriate substantial question of law as indicated below. 14. Before   we   examine   the   facts   of   the   case,   it  is necessary to see the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), which empowers the High Court to decide the second   appeals.     Indeed,   it   is   explained   in   several decisions of this Court and thus remains no more  res integra. 15. Section 100 of the Code reads as under: 7

16. Sub­section   (1)   of   Section   100   says   that   the second appeal would be entertained by the High Court only   if   the   High   Court   is   "satisfied"   that   the   case 8 involves a "substantial question of law". Sub­ section (3) makes it obligatory upon the appellant to precisely state in memo of appeal the "substantial question of law" involved in the appeal. Sub­section (4) provides that   where   the   High   Court   is   satisfied   that   any substantial question of law is involved in the case, it shall formulate that question. In other words, once the High Court is satisfied after hearing the appellant or his   counsel,   as   the   case   may   be,   that   the   appeal involves   a   substantial   question   of   law,   it   has   to formulate that question and then direct issuance of notice to the respondent of the memo of appeal along with the question of law framed by the High Court. Sub­section (5) provides that the appeal shall be heard only on the question formulated by the High Court under sub­section (4). In other words, the jurisdiction of   the   High   Court   to   decide   the   second   appeal   is confined   only   to   the   question   framed   by   the   High Court under sub­section(4).  The respondent, however, 9 at the time of hearing of the appeal is given a right under sub­section (5) to raise an objection that the question framed by the High Court under sub­section (4) does not involve in the appeal. The reason for giving this right to the respondent for raising such objection at   the   time   of   hearing   is   because   the   High   Court frames the question at the admission stage which is prior   to   issuance   of   the   notice   of   appeal   to   the respondent.   In other words, the question is framed behind  the  back  of respondent  and, therefore, sub­ section(5) enables him  to raise such objection at the time of hearing that the question framed does not arise in the appeal.  The proviso to sub­section (5), however, also recognizes the power of the High Court to hear the appeal on any other substantial question of law which was not initially framed by the High Court under sub­ section (4).  However, this power can be exercised by the High Court only after assigning the reasons for framing such additional question of law at the time of 10 hearing   of   the   appeal.   (See     vs. Sanatosh   Hazari Purushottam Tiwari   [(2001) 3 SCC 179] and   Surat Singh  vs.  Siri Bhagwan & Ors.  [(2018) 4 SCC 562] 17. Keeping   in   view   the   scope   and   ambit   of   the powers of the High Court while deciding the second appeal when we advert to the facts of the case, we find that the High Court committed an error in allowing the defendants’   second   appeal   and   further   erred   in dismissing   the   plaintiffs’   suit   by   answering   the substantial question of law. This we say for more than one reason. 18. First, mere perusal of the impugned order would go   to   show   that   the   High   Court   had   admitted   the second   appeal   by   framing   only   one   substantial question of law, namely, whether the first Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the defendants’ first appeal   by   taking   into   consideration   one   earlier 11 litigation in relation to the suit land, which was not between the same parties.  19. The High Court held that the first Appellate Court was not justified because the earlier litigation was not between the present plaintiffs and the defendants but it was between the different parties and, therefore, any decision rendered in such litigation would not operate as   res judicata   in the present litigation between the parties.   This resulted in allowing of the appeal and dismissing the suit. 20. The High Court (Single Judge), in our opinion, failed   to   see   that   even   if   the   said   question   was answered in defendants’ favour, yet the plaintiffs’ suit could   not   have   been   dismissed   much   less   in   its entirety unless the High Court had further examined the main issue of ownership of the plaintiffs over the suit land, which was decided by the two Courts below in plaintiffs’ favour on merits. 12 21. In other words, we are of the view that it was necessary   for   the   High   Court   to   have   proceeded   to examine the issue relating to the plaintiffs’ title over the suit land, which was decided by the two Courts in plaintiffs’ favour holding that the plaintiffs were able to prove   their   title   over   the   suit  land   on   the   basis   of documentary evidence whereas the defendants failed to prove their title though asserted. 22. Second, the High Court committed another error when it failed to frame any substantial question of law on the issue of the plaintiffs’ ownership over the suit land.  23. So long as no substantial question of law was framed, the High Court had no jurisdiction to examine the said issue in its second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the High Court having framed only one question, which did not pertain to issue of ownership of the suit land, had no jurisdiction to examine the issue of ownership. It was not permissible in the light 13 of Section 100 (5) of the Code, which empowers the High Court to decide the appeal only on the question framed and not beyond it. 24. Third,  the   High  Court could   invoke   its  powers under proviso to sub­section (5) of Section 100 and frame one or two additional questions, as the case may be, even at the time of hearing of the second appeal.  It would have enabled the High Court to examine the issue   of   ownership   of   the   suit   land   in   its   correct perspective.   It  was,   however,   not   done   by   the   High Court. 25. Fourth,   the   High   Court,   while   examining   the question framed, also cursorily touched the ownership issue which, in our opinion, the High Court could not have   done   for   want   of   framing   of   any   substantial question of law on the ownership issue. That apart, the High Court also failed to see that the issue of  res  and the issue of ownership were independent judicata issues   and   the   decision   on   one   would   not   have 14 answered   the   other   one.   In   other   words,   both   the issues had to be examined independent of each other on their respective merits. It was, however, possible only after framing of substantial questions on both the issues as provided under Section 100(4) and (5) of the Code. This was, however, not done in this case. 26. In the light of aforementioned four reasons, we are   of   the   considered   opinion   that   the   impugned judgment is not legally sustainable and, therefore, it has to be set aside.  27. Since the High Court failed to examine the issue of ownership of the plaintiffs on its merits for want of framing   of   the   substantial   question(s)   of   law,   the matter   has   to   be   remanded   to   the   High   Court   for deciding the question as to whether two Courts below were right in their respective jurisdiction in holding that the plaintiffs were able to prove their title over the suit land on the basis of evidence (oral/documentary) 15 adduced   by   them   and,   if   so,   whether   such   finding should be upheld or not. 28. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the second appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law by properly framing the substantial question(s) of law on the question of ownership of the plaintiffs over the suit land and then to examine as to whether the findings on the said question recorded by two Courts suffer from any error(s) or not.  29. We,   however,   make   it   clear   that   we   have   not applied   our   mind   on   the   merits   of   the   controversy having formed an opinion to remand the case to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh as observed above and, therefore, the High Court will decide the appeal strictly in accordance with law uninfluenced by any of our observations.  16 30. Since the matter is quite old, we request the High Court to decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible preferably   within   6   months   from   the   date   of   this judgment.                             ………...................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]                                              ...……..................................J.                  [VINEET SARAN] New Delhi; September 11, 2018  17