Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
HARIBHAU DAGDU TANDALE
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATION LIMITED & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/10/1996
BENCH:
M.M. PUNCHHI, K. VENKATASWAMI.
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Venkataswami, J.
This Appeal by Special Leave is preferred against a
Division Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court in W.P. NO.
390/82 dated 13th April, 1982. The learned Judges by the
judgment under appeal have confirmed an Order of the State
Government passed while exercising appellate as well as suo
moto revisional jurisdiction in a matter arising out of The
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter
called "the Act").
The third respondent herein purporting to exercise his
powers under Section 102(1)(a) issued an interim winding up
order dated 17.6.1974 and called upon the first respondent-
society to show cause why a final order winding up the
society should not be passed. The third respondent also
simultaneously appointed the second respondent herein as
Special Liquidator under Section 103 of the Act.
The first respondent in response to the notice dated
17.6.1974 gave a detailed reply objecting to the proposed
final order of winding up and appointment of Special
Liquidator under Section 103 of the Act. The first
respondent. while requesting for vacation of the interim
order requested for a personal hearing before passing final
order. The third respondent, however, without affording the
personal hearing requested by the first respondent and
though the statute required giving of such personal hearing,
confirmed the interim order under Section 102 of the Act on
12.8.1974.
The first respondent meanwhile aggrieved by the interim
order of the third respondent dated 17.6.1974 preferred an
appeal to the State Government as provided under Section 104
of the Act on 16.7.74. Initially, the fourth respondent
(State Government) granted a stay on 26.8.74 but the same
was vacated on 27.9.75 on the ground that the second
respondent Liquidator has already assumed charge of the
affairs of the society. While the appeal was pending before
the fourth respondent and inspite of the fact of filing or
appeal was brought to the notice of the second respondent,
the special Liquidator brought an extent of 5 acres 31
gunthas of land belonging to the society for sale. The
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appellant herein offered to purchase the said land for Rs.
22,000/- by his tender dated 10.7.75. A sale deed was
finally executed in favour of the appellant on 11.9 78.
Pursuant to the sale, the appellant was put in possession of
the said land also. At that stage, when the Government came
to know of the sale, issued notices to the second and third
respondent invoking the suo moto power under Section 154 and
called for the records of the sale transaction for the
purpose of examing as to whether the transaction was legal.
The appellant gave a detailed reply to the State Government
inter alia contending that the Government have no authority
to invoke the suo moto power to question the sale in his
favour. The Government considered the appeal of the first
respondent filed under section 104 of the Act and also the
suo moto revision together and after personally hearing the
appellant and respondents 1 to 3 held that ’when the appeal
was pending with the appellate authority the subordinate
authority has no right to dispose of any immovable and
movable property which may adversely affect if the
liquidation order were to be set aside by the appellate
authority’. The fourth respondent further observed ’that the
perusal of the records show that no hearing was given to the
society and thereby the principles of natural justice had
been violated. After giving reasons the fourth respondent
also found that the order of winding up itself was uncalled
for and consequently set aside the same. The sale in favour
of the appellant was also set aside and the Liquidator was
directed to hand over the charge of the society to the
committee from whom he has taken the charge. The Government
further directed the Liquidator to help the committee to
take possession of the land from the appellant after paying
all the necessary dues i.e. the price of the land paid by
the appellant and other expenses, if any, incurred by the
appellant.
Aggrieved by the order of the fourth respondent - State
Government -dated 3.1.1982, the appellant moved the Bombay
High Court to set aside the same and to sustain the sale in
his favour. As noted earlier the learned Judges of Bombay
High Court for well-considered reasons, overruling the
arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant, confirmed the
order of the State Government and dismissed the Writ
Petition. The present appeal is against the order of the
Bombay High Court.
Mr. Bhimrao Naik, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for
the appellants has pressed before us the following points in
assailing the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court.
The points were that no appeal lay to the Government (fourth
respondent) against an interim order of winding up and
appointment of Liquidator. The fourth respondent was not
justified in invoking suo moto revisional powers for setting
aside the confirmation order of winding up passed
underSection 102(2) of the Act; that the Government have not
seriously applied their mind, is apparent from the
orderitself. Because though the appeal filed by the society
was against the interim order, the Government have set
aside the confirmation order of winding up. In any event,
Section 103(6) specifically provides that all acts done and
proceedings taken by the liquidator shall be binding on the
society even if the interim order has subsequently been
cancelled and that being the position, the sale by the
liquidator ought not to have been set aside merely on the
ground that interim winding up order was not sustainable. He
also contended that the interim order of winding up having
been made final Subsequently by the third respondent by an
independent order dated 12.8.78 and the society having not
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challenged the final order, the appeal before the State
Government against the interim order must be deemed to have
become infructuous as the interim order merges with the
final order.
Mr. I.G. Shah, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for
the first respondent-society took us through the judgment of
the Bombay High Court and relied on the reasons given
thereon as his arguments.
On a careful consideration of the rival arguments and
after carefully going through the judgment of the Bombay
High Court, we are of the view that the learned Judges of
the Bombay High Court have given well-founded reasonings for
sustaining the order of the State Government and we shall
given our reasons immediately.
For appreciating the contentions raised before us, it
is necessary to set out relevant portions of Section 102,
103, 104, 105 and 106 of the Act. Chapter 10 in the Act
deals with liquidation. Section 102(1)(a) raads as
follows:
" (1) If the Registrar-
(a) after an inquiry has been held
under section 83 or an inspection
has been made under section 84 or
on the report of the auditor
auditing the accounts of the
society, or".
(b).........
(c).........
is of the opinion that a society
ought to be wound up, he may issue
an interim order directing it to
be wound up.
Admittedly the order of winding up was based on the
report of the auditor. Hence, the other parts of Section
102(1) are unnecessary.
The relevant portion of Section 103 reads as follows:-
103. (1) When an interim order is
passed under the last preceding
section or a final order is passed
under that section, for the winding
up of a society, the Registrar may,
in accordance with the rules,
appoint a person to be Liquidator
of the society, and fix his
remuneration.
(2) On issue of the interim order,
the officers of the society shall
hand over to the Liquidator the
custody and control of all the
property, effects and actional
claims to which the society is or
appers to be entitled, and of all
books, records and other documents
pertaining to the business of the
society and, shall have no access
to any ofthem.
(3) *
(4) *
(5) The whole of the assets of
the socioety shall on the
appointment of Liquidator under
section vest in such Liquidator,
and notwithstanding anything
contained in any law for the time
being in force, if any immovable
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property is held by a Liquidator on
behalf of the society, the title
over the land shall be complete as
soon as the mutation of the name of
his office is effect, and no Court
shall question the title on the
ground of dispossession, want of
possession or physical delivery of
possession.
(6) In the event of the interim
order vacated, the person appointed
as Liquidator shall hand over the
property, effects and actionable
claims and books, records and other
documents of the society to the
officers who had delivered the same
to him. The acts done, and the
proceedings taken by Liquidator,
shall be binding on the society,
and such proceedings shall, after
the interim order has been
concelled under the preceding
section, be continued by the
officers of the society.’
(104) The committee or any member,
of the society ordered to be
woundup, may, within two months
from the date of the issue of the
order made under section 102,
appeal to the State Government:
Provided that no appeal shall lie
against an order issued under sub-
clause (i), (ii) and (iii) of
clause (c) of sub-section (1) of
section 102.
(2) *
105. (1) The Liquidator appointed
under section 103 shall have power,
subject to the rules and the
general supervsion, control and
direction of the Registrar,-
(a)
(b)
(c) to sell the immovable and
movable property and actionable
claims of the society by public
auction or private contract, with
power to transfer the whole or part
thereof to any person or body
corporate, or sell the same in
parcels;
106. After expiry of the period
for appeal against the order made
under sub-section (10 of Section
102 or where the appeal has been
dismissed, the order for winding up
shall be effective and shall
operate in favour of all the
creditors and of all the
contributories of the society, as
if it had been made on the joint
petition of creditors land
contributories. When a winding up
order becomes effective, the
Liquidator shall proceed to realise
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the assets of the society by sale
or otherwise, and no dispute shall
becommenced or, if pending at the
date of the winding up order, shall
be proceeded with, against the
society, except by leave of the
Registrar and subject to such terms
as the Registrar may impose. The
Registrar, may of his opinion,
however, entertain or dispose of
any dispute by or against the
society."
A careful reading of the above provisions show that as
soon as an interim order of winding up was passed and a
Liquidator was appointed, he gets only the custody and
control of all the property, effects and actionable claims
to which the society appears to be entitled, and of all
books, records and other documents pertaining to the
business of the society. It is only under Section 103(5) the
assets of the society vest in the Liquidator. No doubt under
Section 105(1)(c), the Liquidator is empowered to sell
immovable and movable property of the society by public
auction or private contract but this power must be read in
conjunction with the power to sell given under Section 106
which says that after a winding up becomes effective, the
Liquidator shall proceed to realise the assets of the
society by sale or otherwise. The winding up order becomes
effective only after the expiry of the period for appeal
against the order made under sub-section (1) of Section 102
or where the appeal has been dismissed. In other words, if
an appeal is filed and the same is pending, the winding up
order will not become effective and the Liquidator shall not
proceed to realise the assets of the society by sale or
otherwise. This is exactly the reason given by the
Government while setting aside the sale stating that when
the appeal was pending, the Liquidator should not have
proceeded with the sale especially when he had knowledge of
the pendency of the appeal. The High Court also has given
considered reasons to reconcile the sale under Section 105
and the sale under Section 106 of the Act. The High Court
observed as under:
"The power of sale conferred on the
Liquidator under clause (a) of sub-
section (1) of section 105 shall
have to be read along with the
powers of sale contemplated under
section 106 of the Act. Section
106, on the fact of it. deals with
the powers of the liquidator after
the order of winding up becomes
effective. The legislature could
not have thought it necessary to
confer powers of sale both under
Section 105 and under Section 106
of the Act. If both the Section
confer the power of sale it becomes
the duty of the Court to find out
the respective spheres for exercise
of these powers. Looked at from
this point of view, section 105
appears to have been intended to
cover cases where sale of the
proeprty cannot await the disposal
of the appeal, while Section 106
deals with the power of sale when
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the winding up order has become
final and, therefore, effective. It
is difficult toconceive that the
Liquidator could have intended to
authorise the sale of the property
without any urgency whatsoever,
even when the appeal was pending.
Pending appeal can result both in
the confirmation of the lnterim
winding up orde as well as in the
vacating thereof. The sale powers
under Section 105 could have been
intended only to meet such cases
where sale of perishable articles
or some other property of such
nature cannot for some reason or
the other wait till the disposal of
the appeal."
We agree with the above reasoning of the High Court. We
are not able to agree with the learned Senior Counsel for
the appellant that no appeal lay against the interim winding
up order and simultaneous appointment of the Liquidator. It
is common ground that the third respondent invoked Section
102 on the basis of the report of the Auditor. Therefore,
the relevant provision for passing winding up order is
102(1) (a). Section 104 expressly provided an appeal to the
Government against an order under Section 102 which
includes order under section 102(1)(a). However proviso
excludes such appeal being available to orders under
sub-clause (i)(ii) or (iii) of clause (c) of sub-section (1)
of Section 102. In the light of the above, it is futile to
contend that no appeal lay against an order passed under
Section 102(1)(a).
The Government while considering the appeal of the
first respondent under Section 104 and on coming to know of
the developments pending appeal namely the sale of society’s
land invoked the power under Sec. 154 to find out the
propriety and legality of the sale. It is not the case of
the appellant that an appeal lies against the sale by the
liquidator. Therefore, the exercise of power by the
Government under Section 154 cannot be faulted. Here again
there is no substance in the argument of the learned Senior
Counsel. The other contention that the interim order merges
with final order and therefore, in the absence of any
separate appeal against the final order, the appeal against
interim order will become infructuous, is also without
substance. If the foundation is knocked of, structure
standing on it cannot stand in the air, automatically falls
down. The interim order is expressly liable to be confirmed
or vacated by the authority who passed the interim order.
That being the position, the appellate authority who has a
right to decide the correctness of an interim order cannot
be denuded from considering the same on the ground that a
final order has been passed pending appeal. The merger
theory will not apply to the instant case, Therefore, the
High Court was right in rejecting such a contention. The
contention basd on Section 103(6) also not acceptable as
"acts done" contemplated in that section will cover only
legaly carried out acts and not otherwise. Here the sale by
liquidator pending appeal before Government was in
contravention of sectioins 105 and 106. Hence no help can he
derived from section 103(6) of the Act.
In the result, none of the arguments advanced before us
on behalf of the appellant, appeal to us. The appeal is
therefore, dimissed. However, there will be no order as to
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costs.