NEERAJ DUTTA vs. STATE(GOVT.OF N.C.T.OF DELHI)

Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1669 OF 2009  Neeraj Dutta             …Appellant versus State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)       ...Respondent J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T ABHAY S. OKA, J. FACTUAL ASPECTS The appellant was convicted by the Special Judge, Delhi 1. for the offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses (i) and (ii) of Section13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of   Corruption   Act,   1988   (for   short,   ‘the   PC   Act’).     The   co­ accused,   Mr.   Yogesh   Kumar,   was   convicted   by   the   Special Signature Not Verified Judge for the offence punishable under Section 12 of the PC Digitally signed by Indu Marwah Date: 2023.03.17 15:59:02 IST Reason: Act.  The   co­accused   was   acquitted   by   the   High   Court.   The 1 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 appellant was sentenced to undergo a rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/­ for the offence punishable under sub­section (2) of Section 13 of the PC Act.  For the offence punishable under Section 7, she was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and   to   pay   a   fine   of   Rs.5,000/­.     Sentences   in   default   of payment   of   fine   were   also   imposed.     The   conviction   of   the appellant has been upheld by the High Court by the impugned judgment. 2. The complainant – Mr. Ravijit Singh died before the trial commenced. In fact, PW­7, the Investigation Officer, deposed that   the   complainant   was   murdered.   In   his   complaint,   the complainant stated that he was doing business of sale and purchase of cars in a shop situated at Vikas Puri, New Delhi. His case is that there was no electricity meter installed in his th shop   and   therefore,   on   6   May   1996   he   applied   for   an th electricity meter.    In the complaint filed by him on 17  April 2000,   in   the   form   of   his   statement   recorded   by   the   Anti­ Corruption Bureau, he stated that pursuant to the application th dated 6  May 199 6 , a meter was installed in his shop and after a few months, he found that the meter was removed.  As the 2 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 shopkeepers in the area had got the electricity meters installed th through the appellant, he met her.   On 17   April 2000, he received a telephone call at 7:30 a.m. from the appellant who was   working   as   an   Inspector   in   the   D.V.B./electricity department in the local area.  She called him at her residence to discuss the issue of the electricity meter.   At 8:00 a.m., when   the   complainant   met   her,   she   demanded   a   sum   of Rs.15,000/­ for getting the meter installed and ultimately after negotiations,   she   settled   the   demand   at   Rs.10,000/­. According to the complainant, the appellant stated that she would come to his shop between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. when the complainant should hand over the papers for the electricity meter and Rs.10,000/­ as a bribe.   The complainant stated that he had no option but to accept her demand for a bribe. The   prosecution’s   case   is   that   on   the   basis   of   the 3. aforesaid complaint, a trap was laid.  PW­5, Mr. S. K. Awasthi, was the shadow witness.  When he along with the complainant as   well   as   members   of   the   raiding   party   visited   the complainant’s shop at 3:50 p.m., the appellant was not present there.  At about 4:40 p.m., a telephone call was received by the complainant   that   the   appellant   would   come   at   around 3 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 5:30/6:00 p.m.  At 5:20 p.m., the appellant came with the co­ accused   and   demanded   the   documents   and   bribe   of Rs.10,000/­, which was paid by the complainant.  The Special Court held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence on record to prove the guilt of the appellant.  In fact, a finding was recorded   on   the   basis   of   circumstantial   evidence   that   the demand and acceptance were proved.  The order of conviction of the learned Special Court as regards the appellant has been confirmed by the High Court in the impugned judgment. 4. While hearing this appeal, a bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court came to a conclusion that the decisions of this Court of the benches of three Hon’ble Judges in the cases of  B. 1 Jayaraj   v.   State   of   Andhra   Pradesh   and   P. Satyanarayana   Murthy   v.   District   Inspector   of   Police, 2 were in conflict with an State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.   earlier   three­Judge   bench’s   decision   in   the   case   of   M. 3    Accordingly, the following Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. question was referred to the larger bench: “The   question   whether   in   the   absence   of evidence   of   complainant/direct   or   primary 1   2014 (13) SCC 55 2   2015 (10) SCC 152 3   2001 (1) SCC 691 4 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 evidence of demand of illegal gratification, is it not permissible to draw inferential deduction of culpability/guilt   of   a   public   servant   under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)   of   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act,   1988 based   on   other   evidence   adduced   by   the prosecution.” 5. The above­mentioned question was referred for decision to a Constitution Bench, which disposed of the reference by the th 4 judgment   dated   15   December   2022 .     Broadly,   the Constitution Bench  held  that in  absence  of  the   complaint’s testimony   in   a   prosecution   for   offences   punishable   under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the PC Act, the prosecution can rely upon   even   circumstantial   evidence   to   prove   the   demand   of gratification.     In   paragraph   74   of   the   said   decision,   the Constitution Bench has summarized its conclusions. RIVAL SUBMISSIONS 6. Shri S. Nagamuthu, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that this is a case where there is no evidence   of   demand   of   illegal  gratification  by   the   appellant. The learned senior counsel submitted that proof of demand of gratification   by   a   public   servant   is   a   sine   qua   non   for   the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC 4   2022 SCCOnline SC 1724 5 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 Act. He submitted that the findings of the Courts are based on surmises and conjectures.  7. Ms.   Aishwarya   Bhati,   the   learned   Additional   Solicitor General appearing for the prosecution supported the impugned judgments.  She submitted that PW­5 has proved the demand. Moreover,   on   the   basis   of   the   circumstantial   evidence,   the demand and acceptance were proved. She also submitted that once the demand and acceptance are established, there is a presumption   that   the   acceptance   of   gratification   proves   the existence of motive or reward.  The learned ASG submitted that no interference is called for with the impugned judgments. LEGAL POSITION 8. Before we analyze the evidence, we must note that we are dealing with Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act as they stood prior to the amendment made by the Act 16 of 2018 with effect th from 26  July 2018.  We are referring to Sections 7 and 13 as they stood on the date of commission of the offence.  Section 7, as existed at the relevant time, reads thus: “ 7. Public servant taking gratification other than   legal   remuneration   in   respect   of   an official act.— 6 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 Whoever,   being,   or   expecting   to   be   a   public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or   attempts   to   obtain   from   any   person,   for himself   or   for   any   other   person,   any gratification   whatever,   other   than   legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or   forbearing   to   do   any   official   act   or   for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with   the   Central   Government   or   any   State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any   State   or   with   any   local   authority, corporation or Government company  referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not   less   than   three   years   but   which   may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanations. ­ (a)   "Expecting   to   be   a   public   servant"­   If   a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section. (b)"Gratification".   The   word   “gratification”   is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. (c)   "Legal   remuneration"­   The   words   "legal remuneration”   are   not   restricted   to remuneration   which   a   public   servant   can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept. 7 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 (d) "A motive or reward for doing”. A person who   receives   a   gratification   as   a   motive   or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression. (e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the   public   servant,   money   or   any   other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section.” 9. Section 13(1)(d), as existed at the relevant time, reads thus: “ 13.Criminal   misconduct   by   a   public servant.— (1)   A   public   servant   is   said   to   commit   the offence of criminal misconduct,­ (a) ……………………………… (b) ……………………………... (c) ……………………………… (d) if he,­ (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself   or   for   any   other   person   any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii)  by   abusing   his   position   as   a  public servant,   obtains   for   himself   or   for   any other   person   any   valuable   thing   or pecuniary advantage; or  (iii)   while   holding   office   as   a   public servant,   obtains   for   any   person   any valuable   thing   or   pecuniary   advantage without any public interest; or (e)  ………………………………….”   8 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 The demand for gratification and the acceptance thereof are for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the sine qua non  PC Act. 4 10. The Constitution Bench   was called upon to decide the question which we have quoted earlier. In paragraph 74, the conclusions of the Constitution have been summarised, which read thus:  “ 74.  What   emerges   from   the   aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: (a)   Proof   of   demand   and   acceptance   of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a  sine  in order to establish the guilt of qua non the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (b)  In order to bring home the guilt of the accused,   the   prosecution   has   to   first prove the demand of illegal gratification and   the   subsequent   acceptance   as   a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved   either   by   direct   evidence   which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c)  Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification   can   also   be   proved   by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d)   In   order   to   prove   the   fact   in   issue, namely,   the   demand   and   acceptance   of 9 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009

10 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009

11 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 presumption   is   also   subject   to   rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.”                    (emphasis added) The referred question was answered in paragraph 76 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus: 

11. Even the issue of presumption under Section 20 of the PC   Act   has   been   answered   by   the   Constitution   Bench   by holding that only on proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates   the   Court   to   raise   a   presumption   that   illegal gratification   was   for   the   purpose   of   motive   or   reward   as mentioned in Section 7 (as it existed prior to the amendment 12 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 of 2018).   In fact, the Constitution Bench has approved two decisions by the benches of three Hon’ble Judges in the cases 1 2 of   B.   Jayaraj   and   P.   Satyanarayana   Murthy .   There   is another decision of a three Judges’ bench in the case of   N. 5 ,   which follows the Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu 1  view taken in the cases of  B. Jayaraj and  P. Satyanarayana 2 .     In paragraph 9 of the decision in the case of   Murthy B. 1 Jayaraj , this Court has dealt with the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act.   In paragraph 9, this Court held thus:  “9.   Insofar   as   the   presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20   of   the   Act   is   concerned,   such presumption can only be in respect of the   offence   under   Section   7   and   not the offences under Sections 13(1)( d )( i )   and ( ii ) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such   gratification   was   received   for doing or forbearing to do any official Proof   of   acceptance   of   illegal act.   gratification   can   follow   only   if   there   is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.” 5   2021 (3) SCC 687 13 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009

14 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 “ 26.  It   is   equally   well   settled   that   mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of   the   prosecution   against   the   accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of   this   Court   in  C.M.   Girish  v.   [  v.  , Babu CBI C.M.   Girish   Babu CBI (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and   in  B.   Jayaraj  v.  State   of   A.P.  [ B. Jayaraj  v.  State   of   A.P. ,   (2014)   13   SCC 55   :   (2014)   5   SCC   (Cri)   543]   In   the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)( d )( i ) and ( ii ) of the Prevention of Corruption   Act,   1988   it   is   reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved   beyond   reasonable   doubt   that the   accused   voluntarily   accepted money knowing it to be bribe.  Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and   mere   possession   or   recovery   of currency   notes   is   not   sufficient   to constitute   such   offence.   In   the   said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance   of   illegal   gratification   is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial   presumption   of   innocence   in   the criminal   jurisprudence   gets   doubled   by acquittal recorded by the trial court.”                  (emphasis added) Thus, the demand for gratification and its acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  th 13. Section 7, as existed prior to 26  July 2018, was different from the present Section 7.  The unamended Section 7 which is applicable in the present case, specifically refers to “any 15 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 gratification”.     The   substituted   Section   7  does   not  use   the word   “gratification”,   but   it   uses   a   wider   term   “undue advantage”.  When the allegation is of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof by the accused, it must be as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The fact that   the   demand   and   acceptance   of   gratification   were   for motive or reward as provided in Section 7 can be proved by invoking the presumption under Section 20 provided the basic allegations of the demand and acceptance are proved. In this case, we are also concerned with the offence punishable under clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) which is punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act.   Clause (d) of sub­section (1) of Section 13, which existed on the statute book prior to the th amendment of 26  July 2018, has been quoted earlier. On a plain reading of clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d), it is apparent that proof of acceptance of illegal gratification will be necessary to prove the offences under clauses (i) and (ii) of Section   13(1)(d).   In   view   of   what   is   laid   down   by   the Constitution   Bench,   in   a   given   case,   the   demand   and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant can be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral 16 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 or   documentary   evidence.     While   answering   the   referred question,   the   Constitution   Bench   has   observed   that   it   is permissible   to   draw   an   inferential   deduction   of   culpability and/or guilt of the public servant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.  The conclusion is that in absence of direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always be proved by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence. The allegation of demand of gratification and acceptance 14. made  by   a  public   servant   has   to   be   established   beyond   a reasonable   doubt.    The  decision  of  the   Constitution  Bench does not dilute this elementary requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution Bench was dealing with the issue of the modes by which the demand can be proved. The Constitution Bench has laid down that the proof need not be only by direct oral or documentary evidence, but it can be by way of other evidence including circumstantial evidence. When reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence to prove the demand for gratification, the prosecution must establish each   and   every   circumstance   from   which   the   prosecution wants the Court to draw a conclusion of guilt. The facts so 17 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 established must be consistent with only one hypothesis that there was a demand made for gratification by the accused. Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine whether there is any direct evidence of demand.  If we come to a conclusion that there is no direct evidence of demand, this Court will have to consider whether there is any circumstantial evidence to prove the demand.   CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD 15. Now, coming to the evidence on record, according to the prosecution, the direct evidence is in the form of evidence of PW­5 – Mr. S.K. Awasthi. In this case, the complainant had died and therefore, he could not be examined.   The raiding party   consisted   of   PW­5,   Mr.   S.K.   Awasthi,   an   Officer   in Irrigation Department; PW­6, Mr. O.D. Yadav, Traffic Inspector and PW­7, Mr. Niranjan Singh, ACP.  Going by the complaint which could not be proved through the complainant, it is the case of the prosecution that the first demand was made by the appellant   to  the   complainant  in  the   morning  of  17th   April 2000 when he met her at her residence. There was no charge framed   on   the   basis   of   this   demand.   According   to   the prosecution’s case, the second demand was made during the 18 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 trap.  There is absolutely no evidence about the first demand made   in   the   house   of   the   appellant   as   no   one   except   the complainant   was   present   there.     According   to   the prosecution’s   case,   PW­5   was   the   witness   to   the   second th demand made by the appellant on 17  April 2000 at around 5:20   p.m.     PW­5   stated   in   his   evidence   that   though   the complainant had informed the trap party that the appellant will be visiting his shop at about 3:50 p.m., the appellant did not turn up.  Subsequently, a telephone call was received by the complainant informing that she would come by 5:30/6:00 p.m.  Ultimately, according to the case of PW­5, at about 5:20 p.m., the appellant along with the co­accused came to the Complainant’s shop.  The version of PW­5, which according to the prosecution constitutes demand, reads thus: “ Mrs. Neeraj Dutta asked the complainant to   give   papers   regarding   his   electricity meter and Rs.10,000/­ to her as she was    Complainant handed over the in a hurry. documents   of   his   electricity   meter   and treated   GC   Notes   of   Rs.10,000/­   to   Mrs. Neeraj Dutta in her right hand after taking the same out of left pocket of his shirt.  Mrs. Neeraj Dutta handed over said GC Notes to his   associate   Yogesh   Kumar   to   count   and she   told   the   complainant   that   his   work would be done.”                      (emphasis added) 19 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 16. Rest   of   the   examination­in­chief   deals   with   the acceptance by the appellant and recovery.  Now the question is whether,   on   the   basis   of   the   evidence   on   record,   the prosecution   has   proved   the   demand   of   gratification   by   the accused.   When   we   consider   the   issue   of   proof   of   demand within the meaning of Section 7, it cannot be a simpliciter demand for money but it has to be a demand of gratification other than legal remuneration.  All that PW­5 says is when the appellant visited the shop of the complainant, she asked the complainant to give papers regarding the electricity meter and Rs.10,000/­ to her by telling him that she was in a hurry. This is not a case where a specific demand of gratification for providing electricity meter was made by the appellant to the complainant in the presence of the shadow witness. PW­5 has not   stated   that   there   was   any   discussion   in   his   presence between the appellant and the complainant on the basis of which an inference could have been drawn that there was a demand made for gratification by the appellant. The witness had   no   knowledge   about   what   transpired   between   the complainant and the appellant earlier. PW­5 had admittedly no personal knowledge about the purpose for which the cash 20 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 was   allegedly   handed   over   by   the   complainant   to   the appellant.  17. We may note here that as per the version of the appellant in her statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal th Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), on 17  April 2000, she was working as an LDC in DVB office.  On that day, she was busy with her official duty in a collection drive organized by the department to collect dues from the consumers.   Her explanation is that the   complainant   was   her   neighbour   and   he   wanted   her assistance   to   deposit   electricity   charges.     She   stated   that earlier, she had a transaction of sale and purchase of a car through   the   complainant.     She   has   also   stated   that   the complainant was a history­sheeter and there were three First Information   Reports   (FIRs)   registered   against   him.   In   this context, PW­5 was questioned in the cross­examination.  The relevant answer given by PW­5 reads thus: “I cannot confirm or deny that accused Neeraj Dutta along with her cashier and other staff consisting of four five member had   collected   Rs.71,000/­   in   the   single delivery point camp held at Jai Vihar and she   along   with   her   staff   members   were coming in  her car  and  on  the way  she stopped at the shop of the complainant who   was   her   neighbour   to   collect   the 21 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 balance sale proceeds of Rs.1 lac of her previous car from the complainant as she had   sold   the   said   car   through   the complainant   to   M/s.   Sagar   Motors   and this payment was to be received by her through   complainant   from   M/s.   Sagar Motors.” It is pertinent to note here that PW­5 did not confirm the correctness of the suggestion but stated that he was not in a position to deny the same.   In fact, PW­7, the investigation officer, deposed that cash of Rs.71,900/­ was found in the appellant’s car.  This lends support to the defence that there was a recovery drive conducted by the appellant.  Apart from the   evidence   of   PW­5,   there   is   no   other   evidence   that   is pressed into service by the prosecution for proving the demand by the appellant.  Even taking the statements of PW­5 in the examination­in­chief as correct, it is impossible to even infer that the demand of Rs.10,000/­ was made by the appellant by way   of   gratification.     Every   demand   made   for   payment   of money   is   not   a   demand   for   gratification.     It   has   to   be something more than mere demand for money. 18. There is one more important factual aspect to be noted which creates serious doubt about the prosecution’s case. In th the complaint filed by the deceased complainant on 17  April 22 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 2000,   in   the   form   of   his   statement   recorded   by   the   Anti­ Corruption   Bureau,   he   has   stated   that   pursuant   to   the th application dated 6   May 199 6 , a meter was installed in his shop and after a few months, he found that the meter was removed.   However,   the   Special   Court   has   observed   in paragraph   19   of   the   impugned   judgment   that   a   complaint regarding   a   stolen   electricity   meter   was   registered   at   the th instance   of   the   complainant   on   25   April  2000.   Thus,   the grievance   regarding   stolen   meter   was   made   by   the complainant 8 days after the alleged demand for bribe. In fact, PW­7 admitted that the complainant did not produce a copy of the application made by him for providing electricity meter. PW­7 further stated that the complainant did not clearly tell him that he had given such application. In absence of proof of making   such   application,   the   prosecution’s   case   regarding demand of bribe for installing new electricity meter becomes th doubtful.  Moreover, till 24  April 2000, the complainant did not register a complaint regarding commission of offence.  This makes   the   prosecution’s   case   regarding   the   demand   of th gratification on 17  April 2000 for installing a new electricity meter extremely doubtful.  23 Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009 In the present case, there are no circumstances brought 19. on   record   which   will   prove   the   demand   for   gratification. Therefore, the ingredients of the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act  were  not  established   and  consequently,  the   offence under Section 13(1)(d) will not be attracted. 20. Hence,   the   appeal   must   succeed.   We   set   aside   the impugned judgment and the judgment of the Special Court and set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant. The bail bonds of the appellant stand cancelled. Appeal is allowed. ……..…………………J. (Abhay S. Oka) ……..…………………J.  (Rajesh Bindal) New Delhi; March 17, 2023.    24