Wikimedia Foundation Inc. vs. Ani Media Private Limited

2025 INSC 656

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5391 OF 2025


WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION INC. APPELLANT(S)


VERSUS

ANI MEDIA PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)


J U D G M E N T

UJJAL BHUYAN, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the
order dated 16.10.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court of Delhi (‘High Court’ hereinafter) in FAO (OS)
No.146 of 2024 ( Wikimedia Foundation Inc. Vs. ANI Media
Private Limited and Ors.).
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ASHISH KONDLE
Date: 2025.05.09
14:29:13 IST
Reason:
1




2. Order dated 16.10.2024 of the Division Bench of the
High Court reads as under:
1. On the last date of hearing, learned counsel for
respondent No. l had drawn this Court's attention to a
page published on the website 'Wikipedia 'wherein the
impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge in
CS(OS)524/2024 was adversely commented upon. It
was stated in the said publication that the impugned
order passed by the learned Single Judge to release
the identities of the editors who made the edits
amounted to 'censorship and a threat to the flow of
information’.
2. This Court is of the prima facie view that the
aforesaid comment on the impugned order passed by
the learned Single Judge amounts to interference in
Court proceedings, and that too, on a website
managed by Wikimedia Foundation Inc. who is a
defendant in the suit. The subjudice principle, prima
facie , seems to have been 'violated with impunity' by
Wikimedia Foundation Inc. - the appellant herein.
3. This Court is also informed by the learned counsel
for respondent No. l that after the last hearing, the
observations made by this Bench have been 'opened
up for discussion' on Wikimedia Foundation Inc.
website which, according to us, complicates and
compounds the issue at hand.
2




4. At this stage, Mr. Akhil Sibal, learned senior
counsel for the appellant, on instructions, states that
neither the pages wherein the impugned order passed
by the learned Single Judge have been commented
upon nor the pages on which the discussion qua the
observations made by the Division Bench have been
created by the Wikimedia Foundation Inc. He further
states that, in the event this Court were to direct to
take down of the offending pages and discussions, the
said order would be complied with.
5. Since this Court is of the prima facie view that the
aforesaid comments on the impugned order passed by
the learned Single Judge and the discussion on the
observations made by this Bench amount to
interference in court proceedings and violation of the
subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and
borders on contempt, this Court directs Wikimedia
Foundation Inc.- the appellant herein to take
down/delete the said pages and discussion with
regard to the observations made by this Court within
st
thirty six (36) hours. List on 21 October, 2024.
3. When the related special leave petition was moved
on 17.03.2025, this Court while issuing notice to the first
respondent (ANI Media Private Limited) observed as follows:
3




We are concerned with the legality and

validity of the directions issued by the High Court in
paragraph 5 of the impugned order.
4. Therefore, in this appeal we are not concerned with
the inter se merit of the case between the parties. We are
primarily concerned with the legality and propriety of the
direction of the High Court to the appellant to take
down/delete the pages and discussion with regard to the
observations made by the High Court. That is the width and
scope of this appeal.
5. However to put the matter in proper perspective,
background facts may be briefly noted.
6. Respondent has instituted a suit before the High
Court against the appellant and others being CS (OS) No.
524/2024 (appellant is defendant No. 1 in the suit). Following
are the reliefs claimed in the suit:
In view of the above, it is prayed that this Hon'ble
Court may be pleased to:
a. Pass an order against the defendants,

restraining them from posting, publishing, uploading,
writing, speaking, distributing and/ or republishing
4




any false, misleading and defamatory content against
the plaintiff on any platform, including the platform
maintained by defendant No. 1;
b. Pass an injunction against the defendant No.
1 or its agents or any person acting on its behalf or
under its authority, directing it to remove all false,
misleading and defamatory content against the
plaintiff available on its platform, which can tarnish
the reputation of the plaintiff and further restrain its
users and administrators from publishing anything
defamatory against the plaintiff on its platform;
7. On 20.08.2024, a learned Single Judge of the High
Court passed the following order:
10. The learned counsel for the plaintiff submits
that defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are claimed to be the
‘Administrators' of defendant No. l.
11. Learned senior counsel for defendant No. l
submits that they have no connection with
defendant Nos. 2 to 4.
12. Keeping in view the above submissions,
defendant No. l is directed to disclose the
subscriber details of defendant Nos.2 to 4 to the
plaintiff, through its counsel, within a period of two
weeks from today. On receipt of the said
information, the plaintiff shall take steps for
5




ensuring service of summons and notice on the
application on the said defendants.

8. Respondent filed an application under Order XXXIX
Rule 2A, Order X Rule 2 and Order XI read with Section 151 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘Civil Procedure Code’
hereinafter) in the suit seeking initiation of contempt
proceedings against the appellant for alleged willful
disobedience to the aforesaid order dated 20.08.2024. The
same has been registered as I.A. No. 38498 of 2024.
9. On 17.09.2024, an opinion piece was published in
the Indian Express (E-edition) titled why the case against
Wikipedia in India is a challenge to freedom of speech and
It was also hosted in the platform of the appellant.
information.
10. In the piece it was mentioned that while issuing
contempt notice, the learned Single Judge had reportedly said:
If you don’t like India, please don’t work in India: we will ask
the Government to block your site. Observing that there could
be a failure to understand the nature of the medium i.e.
Wikipedia, it was commented upon that the court’s decision to
6




hold some members accountable and punish a community of
volunteers by disclosing their private information seems to be
a challenge to freedom of speech and information. The effect
this would produce is that any form of critical information that
a powerful organization does not like can be censored or
become grounds for punishment which would set a wrong
precedent.
11. Be that as it may, aggrieved by the order dated
20.08.2024 of the learned Single Judge, appellant preferred an
appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court under
Section 104 of the Civil Procedure Code read with Order XLIII
Rule 1(r) of the said Code for setting aside of the aforesaid
order.
12. On 10.10.2024 a video was posted by news agency
Medianama about the case. In this video again reference was
made to the learned Judge’s warning to the appellant and
discussed as to how the court’s decision can impact safe
harbor protection and information flow in India; it can stifle
the flow of information and knowledge, it being a form of
7




censorship. In the ultimate analysis, it is the people who
would suffer because of restrictions on knowledge and
information flow.
13. It appears that when the appeal was listed before
the Division Bench on 14.10.2024, respondent complained
that publishing of such a page on the platform of the appellant
was intended to pressurize the learned Single Judge. When
appellant sought for time to seek instructions the court
directed the matter to be listed for hearing on 16.10.2024.
14. On 14.10.2024, a talk page was hosted on the
appellant’s platform opening up discussions on the ongoing
proceedings between the parties before the High Court. Be that
as it may, on 16.10.2024, the impugned order was passed
which we have extracted above. In the impugned order
reference has also been made to the discussion page at
paragraph 3.
15. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits
that the Division Bench is palpably in error in holding that a
prima facie case of interference in court proceeding, violation
8




of the subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and
bordering on contempt was made out. He submits that High
Court failed to consider that appellant is merely an
intermediary having the limited role of providing technical
infrastructure to host the platform and does not edit, update,
maintain or monitor the contents on the platform. This was
applicable to the talk page as well as to the video. Appellant,
not being the author, cannot be said to have violated the sub
judice principle merely because the two pages were hosted on
its platform. In any case, what were being hosted were
secondary source material.
15.1. Insofar the subjudice principle is concerned,
learned senior counsel has referred to a Constitution Bench
decision of this Court in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation
1
Limited Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India and
submits that the aforesaid decision provides for an order for
postponement of publication in the event of violation of the

1
(2012) 10 SCC 603
9




subjudice principle but for determining such violation, the
Constitution Bench set out the following criteria:
1. There is a real and substantial risk of
prejudice to fairness of the trial or to the proper
administration of justice;
2. Reasonable alternative methods will not
prevent the risk to fairness of the trial.

15.2. He submits that there is no discussion at all by the
Division Bench as to how the pages hosted on the platform of
the appellant constitute a real and substantial risk of
prejudice to the pending proceedings before the learned Single
Judge. The impugned order is devoid of any reason.
15.3. He further submits that the direction to take down
the said pages is an unreasoned, unwarranted one and in
violation of the right to open justice guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of India. Further, it impinges upon the
freedom of speech and expression, a guaranteed right under
Article 19(1)(a).
15.4. Learned senior counsel submits that the view taken
by the Division Bench that the contents of the pages hosted on
10




the appellant’s platform borders on contempt is wholly
unjustified. While observing so, the Division Bench failed to
consider that the said pages were derived from other published
secondary sources. Those were publicly available.
15.5. Finally, learned senior counsel submits that passing
of orders like the impugned one would have a chilling effect
not only on free speech but also on the right to know. It would
impinge upon the right to freely access and use the medium of
internet.
15.6. He, therefore, submits that in any view of the matter
the impugned order cannot be sustained and is liable to be set
aside.
16. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent
vehemently argued that the impugned order is only in the
nature of an interim order. Appeal is pending as well as the
suit. Therefore, this Court should not entertain the appeal.
16.1. He further submits that such airing of adverse
comments, that too on the platform of a party to the suit,
11




certainly amounts to interference in court proceedings.
Therefore, the Division Bench was justified in directing the
appellant to take down/delete the offending pages. No
interference is called for.
17. Submissions made by learned counsel for the
parties have received the due consideration of the Court.
18. At the outset, it would be appropriate to advert to
the two pages which are the subject matter of the present
proceeding. The page hosted on the platform of the appellant
titled “Asian News International vs. Wikimedia Foundation
(article page) along with the discussions concerning the article
page hosted on its corresponding "talk page" (talk page)
(collectively hereinafter referred to as ‘impugned page’) contain
the details regarding the defamation case filed by respondent
No. 1 against the appellant and some comments allegedly
made by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in the
case.
19. There was also a talk page hosted on the appellant’s

platform on 14.10.2024, where discussions were held on the
12




ongoing proceedings between the parties before the High Court
which was noticed by the Division Bench in paragraph 3 of the
impugned order. Division Bench of the High Court in
paragraph 5 of the impugned order opined that the comments
and discussion on the observations made by the Bench
amounts to interference in court proceedings and violation of
the subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and
borders on contempt. It therefore directed the appellant to
take down/delete the said pages and discussion within thirty-
six (36) hours.
20. As noticed above, while directing the appellant to
take down/delete the concerned pages and discussion, the
Division Bench was of the prima facie view that those
amounted to interference in court proceedings, violation of the
subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and borders
on contempt.
21. Let us deal with the above grounds.
13




22. In Reliance Petrochemicals Limited Vs. Proprietors of
2
Indian Express Newspapers , respondent had published
articles containing adverse remarks on the issue of debentures
by the appellant while the matter was subjudiced before this
Court. When this was complained of by the appellant who
sought initiation of contempt proceedings against the
respondent, this Court granted an injunction against the said
publication. At a later stage, this Court considered the
question as to whether there was need for continuance of the
order of injunction. It was in that backdrop that this Court
formulated the principle of preventive injunction. It has been
held that preventive injunction against the press can be
granted only if reasonable grounds for keeping the
administration of justice unimpaired necessitate so. This
Court accepted the test of present and imminent danger on
the basis of balance of convenience and clarified that it would
be justified to grant preventive injunction against the press
only if the danger apprehended is real and imminent.

2
(1988) 4 SCC 592
14




22.1. In the facts of that case, this Court reiterated that
continuance of the injunction would amount to interference
with the freedom of press in the form of preventive injunction.
People at large have a right to know in order to be able to take
part in a participatory development in the industrial life and
democracy. Right to know is a basic right which citizens of a
free country like ours aspire in the broader horizon of the right
to live in this age under Article 21 of our Constitution. This
right has reached new dimension and urgency.
23. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Sahara India
Real Estate Corporation Limited (supra) considered a gamut of
issues to find an acceptable constitutional balance between
freedom of the press and administration of justice; as to when
publishing matters relating to cases which are sub-judice
interferes with or obstructs or tends to obstruct with the due
course of justice. In that case, appellant was directed by the
respondent to refund amounts invested with the appellant in
certain optionally fully convertible bonds with interest. This
came to be challenged by the appellant. This Court had issued
15




notice to the respondent. While putting the appellant to notice
as to how it intended to secure the liabilities incurred by them
to the optionally fully convertible bond holders during the
pendency of the civil appeals, it was directed to file an affidavit
together with a valuation certificate indicating fair market
value of the assets proposed to be offered as security.
Pursuant thereto, appellant filed an affidavit before this Court
explaining the manner in which it proposed to secure its
liability. While the matter was subjudiced, this Court
communicated to the parties that they should try to reach a
consensus with respect to an acceptable security in the form
of an unencumbered asset. Learned counsel for the appellant
addressed a letter to the learned counsel for the respondent
enclosing the proposal with details of security to secure
repayment to the bond holders as a pre-condition for stay
during the pendency of the appeals. There were also
correspondences between the respective Advocates-on-Record.
A day prior to the hearing, one of the news channel flashed on
television the details of the said proposal which was a
16




confidential communication, obviously not meant for public
circulation. The television channel concerned also named the
valuer who had done the valuation of assets proposed to be
offered as security. There was no information forthcoming
from the respondent either of acceptance or rejection of the
proposal. In the hearing it was complained on behalf of the
appellant that disclosure of such details to the media by the
respondent was in breach of confidentiality which was of
course denied by the learned counsel for the respondent. It
was in that context that this Court rendered its decision in
Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited (supra).
23.1. This Court examined the interplay between the
constitutional safeguard of free speech on the one hand and
the doctrine of prior restraint on the other hand. It was
observed that Supreme Court is not only the sentinel of the
fundamental rights but is also a balancing wheel between the
rights, subject to social control. Freedom of expression is one
of the most cherished values of a free democratic society.
Freedom of the press which is a facet of freedom of expression
17




includes the right to receive information and ideas of all kinds
from different sources. In essence, freedom of expression
embodies the right to know. After noticing the development of
law on the issue of prior restraint, this Court observed that
while open justice is the corner stone of our judicial system as
it instills faith in the judicial and legal system, it is not
absolute. It can be restricted by the court in its inherent
jurisdiction as done in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vs.
3
wherein this Court upheld the decision of
State of Mahrashtra
the High Court directing that deposition of the defence
witnesses should not be reported in the newspapers. An order
of a court passed to protect the interest and administration of
justice cannot be treated as violative of Article 19(1)(a). This
Court held that there is power in the courts to postpone
reporting of judicial proceedings in the interest of
administration of justice but burden lies on the applicant to
demonstrate substantial risk of prejudice to the pending trial
which would therefore justify postponement of offending
publication.

3
AIR 1967 SC 1
18




23.2. This Court posed the question as to whether a
postponement order constitutes a restriction on Article 19(1)(a)
and whether such restriction is saved under Article 19(2).
Answering the above question, this Court observed that a
postponement order is actually a balancing measure. It seeks
to balance the right to free speech as well as the right to
information on the one hand and the presumption of
innocence of the accused on the other hand. However, this
Court cautioned that given that postponement orders curtail
the freedom of expression of third parties, such orders
have to be passed only in cases in which there is real and
substantial risk of prejudice to fairness of the trial or to the
proper administration of justice. Therefore, such orders of
postponement should be ordered for a limited duration and
without disturbing the content of the publication. It should be
passed only when necessary to prevent real and substantial
risk to the fairness of the court proceedings. The order of
postponement will only be appropriate in cases where the
balancing test otherwise favours non-publication for a limited
19




period. If a High Court or the Supreme Court, being courts of
record, pass postponement orders under their inherent
jurisdiction, such orders would fall within ‘reasonable
restrictions’ under Article 19(2).
23.3. This Court concluded that a postponement order is
a neutralizing device evolved by the courts to balance interests
of equal weightage viz freedom of expression vis-a-vis freedom
of trial. However, this Court observed that keeping in mind the
important role of the media, such a postponement order
should be subject to the twin tests of necessity and
proportionality to be applied only in cases where there is real
and substantial risk of prejudice to the proper administration
of justice or to the fairness of the trial. However, it would be
open to the media to challenge such an order in appropriate
proceedings. A postponement order is not a punitive measure
but is a preventive measure.
24. A three-Judge Bench of this Court was considering
the issue of live streaming of court proceedings in Swapnil
20




4
Tripathi Vs. Supreme Court of India . The Bench observed that
our legal system subscribes to the principle of open justice
and highlighted that right to access justice flowing from Article
21 of the Constitution would be meaningful only if the public
gets access to the proceedings unfolding before the courts.
Right to know and receive information is a facet of Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Therefore, the public is entitled to
witness court proceedings involving issues having an impact
on the public at large or even on a section of the public.
24.1. In his concurring opinion Justice Dr. D.Y.
Chandrachud (as His Lordship then was) referred to the
observations of Lord Diplock in the following manner:
69. Lord Diplock, speaking for the House of Lords
in Attorney General v. Leveller Magazine Ltd. ,
remarked that open courts are a safeguard
against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy.
Open courts, in his view, help build public
confidence in the administration of justice. The
public's trust in the judicial system depends on
their perception of how courts function. Open
courts make it possible for the public to develop

4
(2018) 10 SCC 639
21




reasonable perceptions about the judiciary, by
enabling them to directly observe judicial
behaviour, and the processes and outcomes of a
case.
24.2. He also referred to what Jeremy Bentham had said
regarding publicity about courtroom proceedings as a
mechanism to prevent improbity of Judges: it is the surest of
all guards against improbity. It keeps the Judge himself, while
trying, under trial.
24.3. Referring to Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra), it was
observed that various judgments of this Court have reinforced
the importance of open courts. Public trial in open court is
undoubtedly essential for the healthy, objective and fair
administration of justice. Trial held subject to the public
scrutiny and gaze naturally acts as a check against judicial
caprice or vagaries and serves as a powerful instrument for
creating confidence of the public in the fairness, objectivity
and impartiality of the administration of justice. Public
confidence in the administration of justice is of such great
significance that there can be no two opinions on the broad
22




proposition that in discharging functions as judicial tribunals,
courts must generally hear causes in open and must permit
the public admission to the court-room. Publicity is the very
soul of justice.
24.4. Justice Chandrachud concluded that live streaming
of court proceedings is a significant instrument for enhancing
the accountability of judicial institutions and of all those who
participate in the judicial process. It will result in the
dissemination of information in the widest possible sense,
imparting transparency and accountability to the judicial
process. Above all, sunlight is the best disinfectant.
25. In a recent decision, this Court in Imran
5
Pratapgadhi Vs. State of Gujarat highlighted the importance of
freedom of expression and the duty of the courts to uphold
such freedom. This Court observed that sometimes Judges
may not like spoken or written words but still it is the duty of
the courts to uphold the fundamental right under Article
19(1)(a). Except the courts there is no other institution which

5
2025 SCC OnLine SC 678
23




can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens. The courts
must not be seen to regulate or stifle the freedom of speech
and expression. This Court held thus:
38. Free expression of thoughts and views by
individuals or groups of individuals is an integral
part of a healthy, civilised society. Without freedom
of expression of thoughts and views, it is
impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by
Article 21 of the Constitution. In a healthy democracy,
the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an
individual or group of individuals must be countered
by expressing another point of view. Even if a large
number of persons dislike the views expressed by
another, the right of the person to express the
views must be respected and protected. Literature
including poetry, dramas, films, stage shows, satire
and art, make the life of human beings more
meaningful. The Courts are duty-bound to uphold
and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under
the Constitution of India. Sometimes, we, the
Judges, may not like spoken or written words. But,
still, it is our duty to uphold the fundamental right
under Article 19 (1)(a). We Judges are also under
an obligation to uphold the Constitution and
respect its ideals. If the police or executive fail to
honour and protect the fundamental rights
24




guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution,
it is the duty of the Courts to step in and protect the
fundamental rights. There is no other institution
which can uphold the fundamental rights of the
citizens.
39. Courts, particularly the constitutional Courts,
must be at the forefront to zealously protect the
fundamental rights of the citizens. It is the
bounden duty of the Courts to ensure that the
Constitution and the ideals of the Constitution are
not trampled upon. Endeavour of the courts should
always be to protect and promote the fundamental
rights, including the freedom of speech and
expression, which is one of the most cherished
rights a citizen can have in a liberal constitutional
democracy. The Courts must not be seen to
regulate or stifle the freedom of speech and
expression. As a matter of fact, the Courts must
remain ever vigilant to thwart any attempt to
undermine the Constitution and the constitutional
values, including the freedom of speech and
expression.
6
26. Ramesh Kumaran Vs. State is a case which arose
out of a dispute between two lawyers of the same Bar leading
to lodging of first information reports (FIRs) by both the sides.

6
2025 SCC OnLine 667
25




While hearing the matter, this Court impressed upon the
parties to put an end to the entire controversy. It was observed
that the second respondent had tendered an apology to the
first appellant. Thereafter, he tendered a sincere and
unconditional apology not only to this Court but also to the
first appellant, Bar Council and to the Bar Association. This
Court therefore suggested an amicable settlement. However,
the first appellant was unwilling to accept such apology and
thereby compromise the proceedings. Not only that, he even
went to the extent of threatening the court that if the FIR filed
by him against the second respondent was quashed, he would
commit suicide. It was in that context the Bench observed as
under:
13. …………….In normal course, such threats
must be taken very seriously by the Courts.
Action for criminal contempt against the person
giving such a threat must be initiated, which
should be taken to its logical end, especially when
the first appellant is a member of the Bar.
14. However, we believe that if magnanimity is to
be shown by someone, the same should be done
by the persons holding the highest constitutional
26




office. Moreover, the first appellant has shown
some repentance by tendering an unconditional
apology and by giving an undertaking not to
repeat such misconduct. In view of this apology
and in the peculiar facts of this case, we deem it
proper not to initiate any action against the first
appellant.
27. The contours of criminal contempt are well
delineated. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
defines criminal contempt as under:
(c) “criminal contempt” means the publication
(whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs,
or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any
matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever
which— (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or
lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any
court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to
interfere with, the due course of any judicial
proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with,
or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration
of justice in any other manner;

28. Definitely, if a member of the public or a litigant or
for that matter even the media tries to scandalize the court by
making sweeping unfounded allegations against the court or
27




the Judge(s) or by imputing motives against the Judge or
Judges who had passed a judicial order or had conducted the
court proceedings, certainly the courts would be justified to
initiate criminal contempt proceedings against such
contemnors. This would also be a ground to direct
postponement of publication as contempt of court is a
reasonable restriction enumerated under Article 19(2) on the

freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
7
29. In Re S. Mulgaokar is a classic case qua attitude of
Judges towards contempt of court. Speaking for the Bench,
Chief Justice Beg in his opening remarks said that if criticism
of court proceedings or court orders is done in a reasonable
manner, which pre-supposes accuracy of information about a
matter on which any criticism is offered, and arguments are
directed fairly against any reasoning adopted, I would,
speaking for myself, be the last person to consider it
objectionable even if some criticism offered is erroneous. In the
ultimate analysis, the Bench while dropping the proceedings

7
(1978) 3 SCC 339
28




observed that the need for appropriate norms of conduct exist
in practically every sphere of life in which enlightened people
strive to attain exalted ends irrespective of consequences.
29.1. In his concurring opinion Justice Krishna Iyer culled
out several principles. Relevant portion of his opinion reads
thus:
27. The first rule in this branch of contempt
power is a wise economy of use by the court of
this branch of its jurisdiction. The court will act
with seriousness and severity where justice is
jeopardised by a gross and/or unfounded
attack on the Judges, where the attack is
calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial
process. The court is willing to ignore, by a
majestic liberalism, trifling and venial offences
— the dogs may bark, the caravan will pass.
The court will not be prompted to act as a
result of an easy irritability. Much rather, it
shall take a noetic look at the conspectus of
features and be guided by a constellation of
constitutional and other considerations when it
chooses to use, or desist from using, its power
of contempt.
28. The second principle must be to harmonise
the constitutional values of free criticism, the
29




Fourth Estate included, and the need for a fearless
curial process and its presiding functionary, the
Judge. A happy balance has to be struck, the
benefit of the doubt being given generously
against the Judge, slurring over marginal
deviations but severely proving the supremacy
of the law over pugnacious, vicious, unrepentant
and malignant contemners, be they the powerful
press, gang-up of vested interests, veteran
columnists of olympian establishmentarians. Not
because the Judge, the human symbol of a high
value, is personally armoured by a regal privilege
but because “be you — the contemner — ever so
high, the law — the people's expression of justice —
is above you”. Curial courage overpowers arrogant
might even as judicial benignity forgives errant or
exaggerated critics. Indeed, to criticise the
Judge fairly, albeit fiercely, is no crime but a
necessary right, twice blessed in a democracy
For, it blesseth him that gives and him that
takes. Where freedom of expression, fairly
exercised, subserves public interest in
reasonable measure, public justice cannot gag
it or manacle it, constitutionally speaking. A
free people are the ultimate guarantors of
fearless justice…………..
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29.2. Justice Iyer culled out four more principles. The
third principle is to avoid confusion between personal
protection of a libeled Judge and prevention of obstruction of
public justice (and the community’s confidence in that great
process). While the former is not contempt, the latter is
although there can be an overlapping between the two
situations. According to him, the fourth functional canon
which controls discretionary exercise of the contempt power by
the court is that the media which is an indispensable
intermediary between the state and the people and a
necessary instrumentality in strengthening the forces of
democracy, should be given free play within responsible limits
even when the focus of its critical attention is the court,
including the highest court. The next normative guideline
i.e. the fifth is that Judges should not be hypersensitive even
when distortions and criticisms overstep the limits;
Judges should deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified
bearing, condescending indifference and repudiation by
judicial rectitude. Finally, and that is the sixth principle, after
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evaluating the totality of factors, if the court considers the
attack on the Judge or Judges scurrilous, offensive,
intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits, the strong
arm of the law must strike a blow. This is to uphold public
interest and public justice.
29.3. Justice Krishna Iyer referred to a judgment of Lord
Denning and observed that it was a very valuable and
remarkably fresh approach to the question of criticism of
courts in intemperate language and invocation of contempt of
court against the contemnor. Justice Krishna Iyer highlighted
a few observations of Lord Denning as under:
40. A very valuable and remarkably fresh
approach to this question of criticism of
courts in intemperate language and invocation
of contempt of court against the contemner,
a person of high position, is found
in Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner,
ex. p. Blackburn . Lord Denning's judgment is
particularly instructive in the context of the
obnoxious comments made by Quintin Hogg in
an article in the “ Punch ” about the members of
the Court of Appeal. The remarks about the
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Court of Appeal were highly obnoxious and the
barbed words thrown at the Judges obviously
were provocative. Even so, in a brief but telling
judgment, Lord Denning held this not to be
contempt of court. It is illuminating to excerpt
a few observations of the learned Judge:
This is the first case, so far
as I know, where this Court has been
called on to consider an allegation of
contempt against itself. It is a jurisdiction
which undoubtedly belongs to us but
which we will most sparingly exercise:
more particularly as we ourselves have an
interest in the matter.
Let me say at once that we will never
use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold
our own dignity. That must rest on surer
foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress
those who speak against us. We do not fear
criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is
something far more important at stake. It
is no less than freedom of speech itself.
It is the right of every man, in
Parliament or out of it, in the press or over
the broadcast, to make fair comment, even
outspoken comment, on matters of public
interest. Those who comment can deal
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faithfully with all that is done in a court of
justice. They can say that we are mistaken,
and our decisions erroneous, whether they
are subject to appeal or not. All we would
ask is that those who criticise us will
remember that, from the nature of our
office, we cannot reply to their criticisms.
We cannot enter into public controversy.
Still less into political. We must rely on our
conduct itself to be its own vindication.
Exposed as we are to the winds of
criticism, nothing which is said by this
person or that, will deter us from doing
what we believe is right; nor, I would add,
from saying what the occasion requires,
provided that it is pertinent to the matter
in hand. Silence is not an option when
things are ill done.”
30. Thus, the judicial attitude to the subjudice principle
or interference in court proceedings or contempt of court have
been clearly spelt out by this Court which we have noted.
Further accretion to the analysis would only be repetitive
which we should avoid. However, before moving on, we may
once again remind ourselves of the profound words of this
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Court expressed through the nine-Judge Bench decision in
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra): trial held subject to the
public scrutiny and gaze naturally acts as a check against
judicial caprice or vagaries and serves as a powerful
instrument for creating confidence of the public in the fairness,
objectivity and impartiality of the administration of justice.
Courts, as a public and open institution, must always remain
open to public observations, debates and criticisms. Infact,
courts should welcome debates and constructive criticism.
Every important issue needs to be vigorously debated by the
people and the press, even if the issue of debate is subjudice
before a court. However, those who offer criticism should
remember that Judges cannot respond to such criticism but if
a publication scandalizes the court or a Judge or Judges and if
a case of contempt is made out, as highlighted by Justice Iyer
in the sixth principle, certainly courts should take action. But
it is not the duty of the court to tell the media: delete this, take
that down.
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31. For the improvement of any system and that
includes the judiciary, introspection is the key. That can
happen only if there is a robust debate even on issues which
are before the court. Both the judiciary and the media are the
foundational pillars of democracy which is a basic feature of
our Constitution. For a liberal democracy to thrive, both must
supplement each other.
32. The above position has become more nuanced in
the digital age. Though the contention of the appellant is that
it is an intermediary in terms of Section 2(1)(w) read with
Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 providing
only technical infrastructure that host the platform and does
not (a) publish, add or remove content on the platform, (b)
decide which users are vested with certain technical privileges
or (c) continually judge and censor the content posted on the
platform, thereby not liable for any third party information,
data, or communication link made available or hosted by it, we
are not inclined to examine this aspect of the matter since it
may have a bearing on the proceedings of the pending suit.
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Nonetheless, we are of the firm view that the Division Bench
had reacted disproportionately while issuing the impugned
directions.
33. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above,
we have no hesitation in our mind that such directions could
not have issued. Accordingly, the impugned directions
contained in para 5 of the impugned order dated 16.10.2024
are hereby set aside.
34. Appeal is allowed. However, there shall be no order
as to costs.

………………………………J.
[ABHAY S. OKA]



.……………………………J.
[UJJAL BHUYAN]
NEW DELHI;
MAY 09, 2025.
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