Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF MADRAS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
C. P. SARATHY AND ANOTHER.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
05/12/1952
BENCH:
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), ss. 10 (1) (c), 29-
Reference to Industrial Tribunal-Nature of dispute or
parties to it not specified-Validity of reference and award-
Demands by Union of employees of several concerns-Employers
of some concerns accepting terms of their employees-
Reference as to all concerns Validity.
HEADNOTE:
The South Indian Cinema Employees’ Association, a regis-
tered trade union whose members were the employees of the 24
cinema houses operating in the Madras City including some of
the employees of the Prabhat Talkies, submitted to the
Labour Commissioner a memorandum setting forth certain
demands against their employers for increased wages etc. and
requesting him to settle the disputes. The Labour
Commissioner suggested certain, " minimum terms " which were
accepted by some of the companies including the Prabhat
Talkies and at a meeting of the employees of the Prabhat
Talkies a resolution was passed to the effect that no action
be taken about the demands of the Association. The
Association decided to go on strike. The Labour Com-
missioner reported to the Government, and the Government
made a reference to an Industrial Tribunal, the material
portion of which "’Whereas an industrial dispute has arisen
between the workers was: and management of the Cinema
Talkies in the Madras City in respect of certain matters and
whereas in the opinion of His Excellency the Governor of
Madras it is necessary, to refer the said industrial dispute
for adjudication: now therefore etc." The Prabhat
335
Talkies contended before the tribunal that as there was no
dispute between them and their employees they should not be
included in the reference or award, but the Tribunal did not
exclude them and an award was passed, and the managing
director of the Prabhat Talkies was prosecuted for non-
compliance with the award:
Held by the Full Court, (i) that the Labour
Commissioner’s report clearly showed that an industrial
dispute existed between the management and the employees of
the cinema houses; (ii) that as some of the workers of the
Prabhat Talkies were members of the Union, and a reference
could be made even when a dispute was apprehended, the
Government had jurisdiction to make a reference even in
respect of the Prabhat Talkies and the reference and the
award were binding on the Prabhat Talkies.
Held Per PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA, CHANDRA-
SEKHARA AIYAR and GHULAM HASAN JJ. (BosE J. dubitante) that
the reference to the Tribunal under s. 10 (1) of the
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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, cannot be held to be invalid
merely because it did not specify the disputes or the
parties between whom the disputes arose. Per BOSE J.-The
order of reference must be read with the documents which
accompanied it and there was sufficient compliance with s.
10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act even if the words
" the dispute " in the said clause require the Government to
indicate the nature of the dispute which the Tribunal is
required to settle. Even if it is not legally necessary to
indicate the nature of the dispute in a reference, it is
desirable that that should be done.
Per PATANJALI SASTRI C. T., MUKHERJEA, CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR and GHULAM HASAN JJ.-Though the Government will not be
justified in making a reference under s. 10 (1) without
satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to
its notice that an industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended in relation to an establishment or a definite
group of establishments engaged in a particular industry and
it is also desirable that the Government should, wherever
possible, indicate the nature of the dispute in the order of
reference, it must be remembered that in making a reference
under s. 10 (1) the Government is doing an administrative
act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the
factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary
step to the discharge of its function does not make it any
the less administrative in character. The Court cannot,
therefore, canvass the order of reference closely to see if
there was any material before the Government to support its
conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial
determination. No doubt, it will be open to a party seeking
to impugn the resulting award to show that what, was
referred by the Government, was not an industrial dispute
within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the Tri-
bunal had no jurisdiction to make the award But, if the
dispute
336
was an industrial dispute as defined in the -Act, its
factual existence and the expediency of making a reference
in the circumstances of a particular case are matters
entirely for the Government to decide upon, and it will not
be competent for the Court to hold the reference bad and
quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely
because there was, in its opinion, no material before the
Government on which it could have come to an affirmative
conclusion on those matters. The Government must have
sufficient knowledge of the nature of the dispute to be
satisfied that it is an industrial dispute within the
meaning of the Act, as, for instance, that it relates to
retrenchment or reinstatement. But, beyond this no
obligation can be held to lie on the Government to ascertain
particulars of the disputes before making a reference under
S. 10 (1) or to specify them in the order.
The adjudication by the Tribunal is only an alternative
form of settlement of the disputes on a fair and just basis
having regard to the prevailing conditions in the industry
and is by no means analogous to what an arbitrator has to do
in determining ordinary civil disputes according to the
legal rights of the parties.
Ramayya Pantulu v. Kuttti and Rao (Engineers) Ltd.
[(1949) 1 M.L.J. 2311, India Paper Pulp Co. Ltd. v. India
Paper Pulp Workers’ Union ([1949-50] F.C.R. 348), Kandan
Textiles Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras [(1949) 2
M.L.J. 789] and Western India Automobile Association’s case
([1949-50] 1 F.C.R. 321) referred to.
Judgment of the High Court of Madras reversed.
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JUDGMENT:
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Case No. 86 of 1951. Appeal under
article 132 (1) of the Constitution of India from the
Judgment and Order dated November 15, 1950, of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras (Menon and Sayeed JJ.) in
Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1278 of 1950.
V. K. T. Chari (Advocate-General of Madras)
(Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the appellant.
K. S. Krishnaswamy Iyengar (K. Venkataramani, with
him) for respondent No. 1.
1952. December 5. The-Judgment of Patanjali Sastri C.J.,
Mukherjea, Chandrasekhara Aiyar and Ghulam Hagan JJ. was
delivered by Patanjali Sastri C.J. Vivian Bose J. delivered
a separate judgment.
PATANJALI SASTRI C. J.-This is an appeal from an order
of the High Court of Judicature at Madras quashing certain
criminal proceedings instituted in
337
the Court of the Third Presidency Magistrate, Madras,
against the first respondent who is the managing director of
a cinema company carrying on business in Madras under the
name of "Prabhat Talkies."
The proceeding arose out of a charge-sheet filed by the
police against the first respondent for an offence under
section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act). The charge was that the first
respondent failed to implement certain terms of an award
dated 15th December, 1947, made by the Industrial Tribunal,
Madras, appointed under the Act and thereby committed a
breach of those terms which were binding on him.
The first respondent raised a preliminary objection
before the Magistrate that the latter had no jurisdiction to
proceed with the enquiry because the award on which the
prosecution was based was ultra vires and void on the ground
that the reference to the Industral Tribunal which resulted
in the award was not made by the Government in accordance
with the requirements of section 10 ’of the Act. As the
Magistrate refused to deal with the abjection as a
preliminary point, the first respondent applied to the High
Court under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of
certiorari to quash the proceeding pending before the
Magistrate. The application was heard in the first instance
by a single Judge who referred the matter to a Division
Bench in view of the important questions involved, and it
was accordingly heard and decided by Govinda Menon and
Basheer Ahmed Sayeed JJ. who upheld the objection and
quashed the proceeding by their order dated 15th November,
1950. From that order the State of Madras has preferred
this appeal.
The second respondent, the South Indian Cinema Employees’
Association (hereinafter referred to as the Association) is
a registered trade union whose members are employees of
various cinema companies carrying on business in the State
of Madras. Among these are the 24 cinema houses operating
in the City of Madras, including the " Prabhat Talkies". On
8th
338
November, 1946, the Association submitted to the Labour
Commissioner of Madras, who had also been appointed as the
Conciliation ’Officer under the Act a memorandum setting
forth certain demands against the employers for increased
wages and dearness allowance, annual bonus of three months’
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wages, increased leave facilities, provident fund, and
adoption of proper procedure in imposing punishment and
requesting the Officer to settle the disputes as the
employers were unwilling to concede the demands. After
meeting the representatives of the employees and the
employers, the Labour Commissioner suggested on 28th April,
1947, certain " minimum terms " which he invited the
employers and the union officials to accept. The managers
of six cinema companies in the City including " Prabhat
Talkies " agreed to accept the terms but the managements of
other companies did not intimate acceptance or non-
acceptance. It would appear that, in the meantime, a
meeting was convened on 22nd February, 1947, of the
employees of four cinema companies including "Prabhat
Talkies." Ninety-four out of 139 workers attended the
meeting and resolutions were passed to the effect that no
action need be taken about the demands of the Association as
the managements of those companies agreed to some
improvement in the matter of wages and leave facilities and
promised to look into the workers’ grievances if they were
real. But as the terms suggested by the Labour Commissioner
were not accepted by all the employers, the representatives
of the Association met that Officer on 13th May, 1947, and
reported that the Association had decided to go on strike on
any day after 20th May, 1947, if their demands were not
conceded. As the conciliation proceedings of the Labour
Commissioner thus failed to bring about a settlement of the
dispute, he made a report on 13th May, 1947, to the State
Government as requited by section 12 (4) of the Act stating
the steps taken by him to effect a settlement and why they
proved unsuccessful. In that report, after mentioning the
minimum terms suggested by him and
339
enumerating the ten demands put forward by the employee,;,
the Labour Commissioner stated as follows:-
"As the employers have not accepted even the minimum
terms suggested by me and as the employees are restive, I
apprehend that they may strike work at’ anytime. I
therefore suggest that the above demands made by the workers
may be referred to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication.
I have advised the workers to defer further action on their
notice pending the orders of Government,"
and he concluded by suggesting the appointment of a
retired District and Sessions Judge as the sole member of
the Special Industrial Tribunal " to adjudicate on this
dispute."
Thereupon the Government issued the G. O. M. S. No. 2227
dated 20th May, 1947, in the following terms:
" Whereas an industrial dispute has arisen between the
workers and managements of the cinema talkies in, the Madras
City in respect of certain matters ;
And whereas in the opinion of His Excellency the Governor
of Madras, it is necessary to refer the said industrial
dispute for adjudication;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
section 7 (1) and (2) read with section 10 (1) (c) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 " His Excellency the Governor
of Madras hereby constitutes an Industrial Tribunal
consisting of one person, namely, Sri Diwan Bahadur K. - S.
Ramaswami Sastri, Retired District and, Sessions Judge, and
directs that the said industrial dispute be referred to that
tribunal for adjudication.
The Industrial Tribunal may, in its discretion, settle the
issues in the light of a preliminary enquiry which it may
hold for the purpose and thereafter adjudicate on the said
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industrial dispute.
The Commissioner of Labour is requested to send copies of
the order to the managements of cinema talkies concerned,"
44
340
The Tribunal sent notices to all the cinema companies in
the City and to the Association calling upon them to file
statements of their respective cases and to appear before it
on 7th July, 1947.- Pleadings were accordingly filed on both
sides and the Tribunal -framed as many as 22 issues of which
issue (3) is ,material here and runs thus:
" Is there a dispute between the managements of the City
theatres and their respective employees justifying the
reference by the Government to- the Industrial Tribunal for
adjudication ? Whether such an objection is tenable in law
?"
It appears to have been claimed on behalf of some of these
companies including " Prabhat Talkies " that so far as they
ware concerned there was no dispute between the, management
and their employees and therefore they should not be
included in the reference or the award. The Tribunal
repelled this argument observing:
"That even if some of the theatres have got a staff
contented with their lot there is a substantial dispute in
the industry taken as a whole. After I arrive at my
decision about the basic wages, increments, dearness
allowance, etc. the same will bind the industry as a whole
in the City of Madras if the Government accepts and
implements my award."
The Tribunal accordingly held that none of the cinema
companies should be "removed from the ambit of this
industrial dispute and adjudication ". It also found as a
matter of fact that " the idyllic picture of industrial
peace and contentment " put forward by the first respondent
company was not justified by the evidence. ’Issue No. 3 was
thus found for the Association. The Tribunal finally passed
its award on 15th December, 1947, which was confirmed by the
Government on 13th February, 1948, and was declared binding
on the workers and the managements with effect from 25th
February, 1948, the date of its publication in the Fort St.
George Gazette, for a period of one year from that date.
It is alleged that
341
the first respondent failed to implement certain provisions
of the award when their implementation was due and thereby
committed an offence punishable under section 29 of the Act.
No prosecution, however, was instituted till 24th April,
1950, as, in the meanwhile, certain decisions of the Madras
High Court tended to throw doubt on the validity of
references made in general terms without specifying the
particular disputes or the groups of workers and managements
between whom such disputes existed, and legislation was
considered necessary to validate awards passed on such
references. Accordingly the Industrial Disputes (Madras
Amendment) Act, 1949, was passed on 10th April, 1949,
purporting to provide, inter alia, that all awards made by
any Industrial Tribunal constituted before the commencement
of that Act shall be deemed to be valid and shall not be
called in question in, any court of law on the ground that
the dispute to which the award relates was not referred to
the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (section 5). . It also
purported to validate certain specified awards including "
the award in the disputes between the managements of cinema
theatres and workers " (section 6), which obviously refers
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to the award under consideration in these proceedings.
In support of his application to the High Court the
first respondent herein raised three contentions. First,
the Government had no jurisdiction to make the reference in
question as there was no dispute between the management and
workers of " Prabhat Talkies " and, therefore, the reference
and the award in so far as they related to the first
respondent were ultra vires and void; secondly, in any case
the notification by the Government purporting to refer an
industrial dispute to the Tribunal was not competent under
the Act, inasmuch as it did not refer to any specific
disputes as &rising for adjudication and did not mention the
companies or firms in which the disputes are said to have
existed or were apprehended; and- thirdly, the Madras
Amendment Act was
342
unconstitutional and void under section, 107 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, being repugnant 10the
provisions of, the Central Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
and also void under article 13 (1) read with article 14 of
the Constitution as being discriminatory in character. The
learned Judges, by separate but concurring judgments, upheld
these contentions and issued a certificate under article 132
(1) of the Constitution as the case raised substantial
questions of law regarding the interpretation of the
Constitution. As we considered that the contentions of, the
appellant on the first two points must prevail, we did not
hear arguments on the constitutional issue.
Before dealing with the main contentions of the parties,
we may dispose of a minor point raised by Mr. Krishnaswami
Aiyangar, for the first time before us, namely, that the
prosecution of the first respondent for the alleged breach
of some of the terms of the Tribunal’s award is
unsustainable inasmuch as it was instituted after the expiry
of the award. In support of this argument learned counsel
invoked the analogy of the cases where it has been held that
a prosecution for an offence under a temporary statute could
not be commenced, or having been commenced when the statute
was in force, could not be continued after its expiry.
Those decisions have no application here. The first
respondent is prosecuted for an offence made punishable
under section 29 of the Act which is a permanent statute and
when he committed the alleged breach of some, of the terms
of the award, which was in force at the time, he incurred
the liability to be prosecuted under the Act. The fact that
the award subsequently expired cannot affect that liability.
On behalf of the appellant, the Advocate- General of
Madras urged that the question whether there existed an
industrial dispute when the Government made the reference
now under consideration was an issue of fact which the High
Court ought not to have found in the negative at this
preliminary stage
343
before evidence was recorded by the trial court. He
submitted, however, that, on the facts already appearing on
the record, there could be no reasonable doubt that an
industrial dispute did exist at the relevant time. We are.
inclined to agree. The ten demands set forth in the Labour
Commissioner’s letter of the 13th May, 1947, which were not
agreed to by the managements of the 24 cinema theatres in
Madras clearly constituted industrial disputes within the
meaning of the Act. Basheer Ahmed Sayeed J., with whom the,
other’ learned Judge concurred, says:
"There is nothing in the letter of the Commissioner which
would indicate that these demands made by the South Indian
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Cinema Employees’ Association were referred to the
respective owners of the cinema houses in the City of Madras
as a body or to any of them individually."
This, we think is based on a misapprehension of the true
facts. Thedemandswereidenticalwiththose mentioned in the
Association’s memorandum originally submitted on the 8th
November, 1946, and they formed the subject of discussion
with the representatives of the cinema companies in the City
in the course of the conciliation proceedings. That
memorandum, which was not made part of the I record in the
court below, was produced here, and Mr. Krishnaswami
Aiyangar was satisfied that the demands referred to in that
memorandum were the same as those mentioned - in the Labour
Commissioner’s letter of 13th May, 1947, of which all the
employers were thus fully aware. Nor is it correct to say "
that the disputes, if any,’ which might have existed between
the workmen of the petitioner’s cinema and the petitioner
him-self had been settled by the petitioner’s ready and
willing acceptance of the terms suggested. by the
Commissioner ". The terms accepted by the first respondent
were what the Commissioner called "the minimum terms " and
were by no means the same as the demands put for-ward by the
Association, which were never accepted
344
by the Association. The Commissioner’s letter of the 13th
May, 1947, made this clear.
But, in truth, it was not material to consider whether
there was any dispute outstanding between the first
respondent and his employees when the Government made the
reference on 20th May, 1947. The learned Judges appear to
have assumed that the disputes reference to a Tribunal under
section 10 (1) (c) of the Act must, in order that the
resulting award may be binding on any particular industrial
establishment and its. employees, have actually arisen
between them. " Analysing the order of reference of the
Madras Government now under consideration," the learned
Judges observe, " it is obvious that there is no mention of
the existence of any dispute between the petitioner (the
first respondent herein) and his workmen ............... In
fact there was no dispute to be referred to a Tribunal so
far as this petitioner is concerned. If, therefore, there
was no jurisdiction to make any reference, it follows that
the whole reference and the award are both invalid and not
binding on the petitioner." This view gives no effect to the
words "or is apprehended " in section 10 (1). In the
present case, the Government referred " and industrial
dispute between the workers and managements of cinema
talkies in Madras City in respect of certain matters." As
pointed out in the Labour Commissioner’s letter to the
Government, there were 24 cinema companies in Madras, and
the Association, which, as a duly registered trade union,
represented their employees, put forward the demands on
behalf of the employees of all the cinema houses in the
City. Fifteen out of 43 workers of the " Prabhat Talkies "
were admittedly members of the Association which thus
figured as one of the parties to the dispute. In that
situation, the Government may have thought, without a close
examination of the conditions in each individual
establishment, that disputes which affected the workmen
collectively existed in the cinema industry in the City and
that, even if such disputes had not actually arisen in any
particular establishment, they could,
345
having regard to their collective nature, well be appre-
hended as imminent in respect of- that establishment also.
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It is not denied that notices were sent by the Tribunal to
all the 24 companies and they all filed written statements
of their case in answer to the demands made by the
-Association on behalf of the employees. In these
circumstances, it is idle to claim that the Government had
no jurisdiction to make the reference and that the award was
not binding on the respondent’s Organisation. The latter
was clearly bound by the award under section 18 of the Act.
It was next contended that the reference was not
competent as it was too vague and general in its terms
containing no specification of the disputes or of the
-parties between whom the disputes arose. Stress was laid
on the definite article in clause (c) and it was said that
the Government should crystallise the disputes ,before
referring them to a Tribunal under section 1 0 (1) of the -
Act. Failure to do so vitiated the proceedings and the
resulting award. In upholding this objection, Govinda Menon
J., who dealt with it in greater detail in his judgment,
said, " Secondly, it is contended that the reference does
not specify the dispute at all. What is stated in the
reference is that an industrial dispute has arisen between
the workers and the management of the cinema talkies in the
City of Madras in respect of certain matters. Awards based
on similar references have been the subject of consideration
in this Court recently. In-Bamayya Pantulu v. Kutty and Rao
(Engineers) Ltd.(1) Horwill and Rajagopalan JJ. had to
consider an award based on similar references without
specifying what the dispute was." After referring to the
decision of the Federal Court in India Paper Pulp Co. Ltd.
v. India ’Paper Pulp Workers’ Union(2), and pointing out
that though the judgment of the Federal Court was delivered
on 30th March, 1949, it was not referred to by the High
Court in Kandan Textile Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Mad-
ras(3), which was decided on 26th August, 1949, the learned
Judge expressed the view that the trend of
(1) (1949) 1 M.L.J. 231 (3) (1949) 2 M.L.J. 789.
(2) [1949-50] F. C.R. 348.
346
decisions of this Court exemplified in the cases referred to
by me above has not been overruled by their Lordships of the
Federal Court." Basheer Ahmed Sayeed J. I however, sought to
distinguish the decision of the Federal Court on the facts
of that case, remarking "that a reading of the order of
reference that was the subject-matter of the Federal Court
decision conveys a clear idea as to a definite dispute, its
nature and existence and the parties between whom the
dispute existed." It is, however,, clear from the order of
reference which is fully extracted in the judgment that it
did not mention what the particular dispute was, and it was
in repelling the objection based on that omission that Kania
C.J. said:
"The section does not require that the particular dispute
should be mentioned in the order; it is sufficient if the
existence of a dispute and the fact that the dispute is
referred to the Tribunal are clear from the order. To that
extent the order does not appear to be defective. Section
10 of the Act, however, requires a reference of the dispute
to the Tribunal. The Court has to read the -order as a
whole and determine whether in effect the order makes such a
reference."
This is, however, not to say that the Government ’will be
justified in making a reference under section 10 (1) without
satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to
its notice that an industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended in relation to an establishment or a definite
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group of establishments engaged in a particular industry,
and it is also desirable that the Government should,
wherever possible, indicate the nature of the dispute in the
order of reference. But, it must be remembered that in
making a reference under section 10(1) the Government is
doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form
an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial
dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its
function does not make it any the less administrative in
character.’ The Court cannot, therefore, canvass the order
of reference closely to see if there was any
347
material before the Government to support its conclusion, as
if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. No
doubt, it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the
resulting award to show that what was referred by the
Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning
of the Act,, and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction to make the award. But if the dispute was an
industrial dispute as defined in the Act, its factual
existence and the expediency of making a reference in the
circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for
the Government to decide upon, and it will not be competent
for the Court to hold the reference bad and quash the
proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because there
was, in its opinion, no material before the Government on
which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on
those matters. The observations in some of the decisions in
Madras do not appear to have kept this distinction in view.
Moreover, it may not always be possible for the
Government, on the material placed before it, to
particularise the dispute in its order-of reference, for
situations might conceivably arise where public interest
requires that a strike or a look-out either existing or
imminent should be ended or averted without delay, which,
under the scheme of the Act, could be done only after the
dispute giving rise to it has been referred to a Board or a
Tribunal (vide sections 10(3) and 23). In such cases the
Government must have the power, in order to maintain
industrial peace and production, to set in motion the
machinery of settlement with its sanctions and prohibitions
without stopping to enquire what specific points the
contending parties are quarrelling about, and it would
seriously, detract from the usefulness of the statutory
machinery to construe section 10 (1) as denying such power
to the Government. We find nothing in the language of that
provision to compel such construction. The Government must,
of course, have sufficient knowledge of the nature of the
dispute to be
45
348
satisfied that it is an industrial dispute within the
meaning of the Act, as, for instance, that it relates to
retrenchment or reinstatement. But, beyond this no
obligation can be held to lie on the Government to ascertain
particulars of the disputes before making a reference under
section 10 (1) or to specify them in the order.
This conclusion derives further support from clause (a)
of section 10 (1) which provides in the same language for a
reference of the dispute to a Board for promoting a
settlement. A Board is part of the conciliation machinery
provided by the Act, and it cannot be said that it is
necessary to specify the dispute in referring it to such a
body which only mediates between the parties who must, of
course, know what they are disputing about. If a reference
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without particularising the disputes is beyond cavil under
clause (a), why should it be incompetent under clause (c) ?
No doubt, the Tribunal adjudicates; whereas the Board only
mediates. But the adjudication by the Tribunal is only an
alternative form of settlement of the disputes on a fair and
just basis having regard to the prevailing conditions in the
industry and is by no means analogous to what an arbitrator
has; to do in determining ordinary civil disputes according
to the legal rights of the parties. Indeed, this notion
that a reference to a Tribunal under the Act must specify
the particular disputes appears appears to have been derived
from the analogy of an ordinary arbitration. For instance
in Ramayya Pantulu v. Kutty & Rao (Engineers) Ltd.(1) it is
observed "that if a dispute is to be referred to: a Tribunal
the nature of the dispute must be set out just as it Would
if a reference were made to an arbitrator in a civil
dispute. The Tribunal like any other arbitrator can give an
award on a reference only if the points of reference are
clearly placed before it." The analogy is somewhat
misleading. The scope of adjudication by a Tribunal under
the Act is much wider as pointed out in the Western India
(1) (1949) 1 M. L. J. 231.
349
Automobile Association’s case (1), and it would involve no
hardship if the reference also is made in wider terms
provided, of course the dispute is one of the kind described
in section 2(k) and the parties between whom such dispute
has actually arisen or is apprehended in the view of the
Government are indicated either individually or collectively
with reasonable clearness. The rules framed under the Act
provide for the Tribunal calling for statements of their
respective cases from the parties and, the disputes would
thus get crystallised before the Tribunal proceeds to make
its award. On the other hand, it is significant that there
is no procedure provided in the Act or in the rules for the
Government ascertaining the particulars of the disputes from
the parties before referring them to a Tribunal under
section 10(1).
In view of the increasing complexity of modern life and
the interdependence of the various sectors of a planned
national economy, it is obviously in the interest of the
public that labour disputes should be peacefully and quickly
settled within the frame-work of the Act rather than by
resort to methods of direct action which are only too well
calculated to disturb the public peace and order and
diminish production in the country, and courts should not be
astute to discover formal defects and technical flaws to
overthrow such settlements.
In the result we set aside the order of the High Court and
dismiss the first respondent’s petition.
BOSE J.- I agree but would have preferred to rest my
decision on the ground that in this case there was
sufficient compliance with the terms of section 10(1) (C) of
the Act even on the first respondent’s interpretation of it,
namely that the words, " the dispute " require Government to
indicate the nature of the dispute which the Tribunal is
required to settle. I say this because, in my judgment, we
must read the order of the 20th May, 1947, along with the
documentS which accompanied it. I also agree that one
(1) [1949-50] F.C.R. 321.
350
must not be over-technical, but had it not been for the /of
act that the point is now settled by the decision in the
India Paper’ Pulp Company’s case(1) I would have been
inclined to consider that an indication of the nature of the
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dispute, either in the order itself or in the papers
accompanying it, was necessary. However, that is now
settled and I have no desire to go behind the decision but I
would like to say that even if it is not legally necessary
to indicate the nature of the dispute, it is, in my opinion,
desirable that that should be done.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
Agent for respondent No. 1: S. Subramanian.
(1) [1949-50] F.C.R. 348.
351