NAMAN SINGH ALIAS NAMAN PRATAP SINGH vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 13-12-2018

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NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL   NO. 1620 OF 2018 (arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No.3383 of 2018) NAMAN SINGH ALIAS NAMAN PRATAP SINGH AND ANOTHER ....APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH  AND OTHERS       ...RESPONDENT(S) O R D E R NAVIN SINHA, J. Leave granted. 2. The appellants are aggrieved by the denial to quash the criminal prosecution against them under Sections 420, 406, 467, 468,   471,   504,   506,   34   IPC   in   F.I.R.   No.22/2018   dated 31.01.2018. 3. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   submits   that   no objection   certificate   has   been   obtained   from   the   Chatrapati Signature Not Verified Sahuji   Maharaj   University,   Kanpur   for   establishment   of   the Digitally signed by R NATARAJAN Date: 2018.12.13 16:47:08 IST Reason: three­year Law course.  Affiliation has also been granted by the 1 University.     The   appellants   have   also   deposited   a   sum   of Rs.3,50,000/­   with   the   Bar   Council   of   India   and   await permission from it for starting the law course.  The question of any fraudulent misrepresentation by the appellants, persuading students to take admission in an unauthorised institution simply does not arise.   Several students have taken admission in full awareness   of   the   existent   facts   with   no   grievances   and   have sworn affidavits to that effect. 4. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   submits   that   the appellants   by   misrepresentation and  cheating  have   persuaded respondent   no.4   and   others   to   take   admission   in   an unrecognised   institution.   There   are   several   students   who   are aggrieved.   In any event, such enquiries cannot be held in a quashing application by examining the defence of the appellants. The impugned order merits no interference. 5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties and are  satisfied   that  the   application  deserves   to  be   allowed, though   on   different   grounds.     Respondent   no.4   lodged   a complaint   with   the   Sub­Divisional   Magistrate,   Unnao   on 31.01.2018 that she had been duped into taking admission in an 2 unrecognised   institution.     The   Sub­Divisional   Magistrate,   the very   same   day,   without   furthermore,   directed   the   police   to register a first information report.   The only question for our consideration   is   whether   the   Sub­Divisional   Magistrate   was competent to do so, and whether such an F.I.R. can be said to have been registered in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’).  6. Section 154 of the Code provides for registration of a first information report at the instance of an informant, reduced into writing   and   signed   by   the   person   giving   it.     Section   154(3) stipulates that in the event of a refusal on part of   an officer in charge of a police station to record such information, it may be sent in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police who will direct investigation into the same.
7.Section 190 of the Code provides for taking of cognizance by
a   Magistrate   either   on   a   complaint   or   upon   a   police   report. Similarly, Section 156(3) provides that any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation, and which also includes the power to direct the lodgement of an F.I.R.  The Code in Section 200 provides for lodging of a complaint before the 3 Magistrate,   who   after   examination   of   the   complainant   and witnesses, if any, can take cognizance.
8.It is therefore apparent that in the scheme of the Code, an
Executive Magistrate has no role to play in directing the police to register an F.I.R. on basis of a private complaint lodged before him. If a complaint is  lodged before  the  Executive  Magistrate regarding an issue over which he has administrative jurisdiction, and the Magistrate proceeds to hold an administrative inquiry, it may be possible for him to lodge an F.I.R. himself in the matter. In such a case, entirely different considerations would arise.  A reading of the F.I.R. reveals that the police has registered the F.I.R on directions of the Sub­Divisional Magistrate which was clearly impermissible in the law.  The Sub­Divisional Magistrate does not exercise powers under Section 156(3) of the Code. The very institution of the F.I.R. in the manner done is contrary to the law and without jurisdiction.
9.Nothing prevented respondent no.4 from lodging an F.I.R.
herself   before   the   police   under   Section   154   of   the   Code   or proceeding under Section 154(3) if circumstances so warranted. Alternately   the   respondent   could   have   moved   the   Magistrate 4 concerned under Section 156(3) of the Code in the event of the refusal of the police to act.   Remedy was also available to the respondent by filing a complaint under Section 200 of the Code before the jurisdictional Magistrate.
10.In view of the scheme of the Code as discussed, we have
purposely refrained from going into the merits of the case so as
not to prejudiceeither parties and also keeping in mind the
nature of the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code.   Any application   by   respondent   no.4   hitherto   under   the   Code   will therefore have to be considered by the appropriate authority or forum in accordance with law.   For the reasons discussed, the impugned order is held to be unsustainable and is set aside.  The First Information Report therefore also stands quashed for the reasons discussed, but with liberty as aforesaid.
11.The appeal is allowed.
…………...................J. [R.F. NARIMAN] …………...................J. [NAVIN SINHA] NEW DELHI DECEMBER 13, 2018 5