Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 929
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _________OF 2025
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. __________ OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) (D) No.(s) 26453 OF 2025
DEEPAK KUMAR SAHU ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH ….Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
N.V. ANJARIA, J.
Delay condoned. Leave granted.
2. Preferred by the appellant-accused, the present appeal
nd
addresses the challenge to judgment and order 22 September,
2023 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh, at Bilaspur, in
CRA No. 34 of 2020 whereby the High Court continued the
judgement and order of the Special Judge (SC/ST Court),
Rajnandgaon, (CG) in Special Criminal (T) Case No. 10 of 2018,
convicting and sentencing the appellant.
Signature Not Verified
2.1 The appellant came to be convicted for the offence
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Date: 2025.08.05
17:24:07 IST
Reason:
punishable under Section 450 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to
1
undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years with fine of
₹
5,00/-. He was also convicted for the offence punishable under
Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012 [POCSO Act] and further came to be convicted for the
offence under Section 376 (2), IPC to be sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for ten years and with a fine of ₹ 1,000/-.
The punishment for the offence under Section 376 (2), IPC, which
was more severe to one provided for the offence under the POCSO
Act therefore the same came to be awarded.
3. As per the prosecution case, the incident occurred on
03.04.2018 at about 12:00 Noon. On the fateful day, the victim
aged about 15 years and her younger brother named Mayank,
aged about 11 years were inside their house. The parents had
gone to village Karate to attend the funeral as there was a death
in their family. Finding the victim alone in the house, the
appellant-accused entered the house. He thereafter sent the
brother of the victim to bring a pack of chewing tobacco. Once
the brother of the victim left the house, the accused forced the
victim to lie on the cot lying in the porch of the house, gagged her
mouth and then committed sexual intercourse. When the brother
of the victim came back, seeing him, the appellant-accused fled
2
away from the house, threatening the victim not to tell anything
to anyone.
3.1 Soon after the incident the victim went to her cousin sister-
Dushyantin’s house in the neighbourhood and told about the
incident. The brother of the Dushyantin named Khomendra, who
had gone to village Kareti with the parents of the victim, was also
informed through mobile phone about the incident. The parents
of the victim rushed back to home. When they reached the home,
the victim narrated the entire story of the incident to her parents.
A police complaint was lodged, and FIR (Ex. P-08) was registered.
3.2 The victim was subjected to medical examination, statement
under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1978 was
recorded and a criminal case was registered for the offences as
above, which was tried before the Special Court culminating into
conviction and sentence of the appellant upheld by the High
Court.
3.3 Amongst the witnesses examined by the prosecution in
course of the trial, included the prosecutrix herself (PW-2),
mother Alka (PW-1), father Mayaram (PW-3), brother Mayank
(PW-9), Dushyantin (PW-14), Medical Officer, Dr. R.K. Pashi (PW-
3
11), Dr. Kiran, Block Medical Officer (PW-17), Investigating Officer
(PW-18).
4. Learned advocate Mr. Manish Kumar Saran, AOR appearing
for the appellant assailed the judgment of the High Court
primarily and mainly on three grounds, as highlighted from the
memorandum of appeal and elaborated in course of submissions.
It was contended that the prosecution had failed to establish its
case beyond the reasonable doubt and that it was not possible to
rule out the theory of innocence of the appellant. In this regard, it
was submitted that the evidence of the prosecutrix could not be
relied on and needed to be analysed with caution when the
medical report was not categorical to confirm the offence of
sexual assault and rape on the victim. Secondly, it was
contended that there were contradiction between the evidence of
the victim (PW-2) and her younger brother (PW-9). Lastly it was
sought to be contended that the prosecution could not establish
that the victim was minor on the date of commission of offence so
as to attract the provisions of POCSO Act, 2012.
5. Dealing with the last contended aspect at the outset, that
the prosecutrix was not shown to be minor, this contention is
4
stated to be rejected. There was a cogent and reliable evidence in
th
the nature of 8 standard marksheet of the victim which showed
her date of birth to be 09.10.2002. The said marksheet was
obtained by the investigating officer (PW-18) from the mother of
the victim and he had testified about it in his evidence. The birth
date of 09.10.2002 was also corroborated by the evidence of the
mother of the victim (PW-1) and father of the victim (PW-3) who
stated that her daughter was less than 16 years of age. The trial
court rightly recorded that on the date of the incidence which was
03.04.2018, the age of the victim was 15 years 5 months 24 days.
5.1. Before proceeding further, the evidence brought on record
and appreciated by the court of the first instance and considered
by the High Court may be briefly visited with. The prosecutrix
herself deposed as PW-2. Her testimony weighed pivotal by the
courts below, along with the other evidence, in establishing the
commission of the offence.
5.2. Looking at the evidence of the Prosecutrix with some
elaboration, she stated that on that particular day, she and her
younger brother Mayank were at home and that she had been
serving lunch to her brother, at which time the accused whom
5
she could recognized, came inside the house, sent away her
brother to buy some chewing tobacco. She stated that thereafter
the accused forced her to lay down on the cot which was in the
porch of the house and gagged her mouth. She stated that after
disrobing her, the accused committed a misdeed and raped her.
5.2.1. The victim further stated that when her brother
returned, seeing him, the accused ran away. After the incident, it
was stated, she went to the house of her uncle in the
neighbourhood and asked her sister named Dushyantin to give
her mobile, using which she contacted cousin brother
Khomendra who had gone with her parents at Kareti village, and
informed him about what has happened. She stated that after her
parents came back, she informed the all about the incident. They
went to the police station to get the complaint registered. The
report to the police was made her own signature.
5.2.2. In her cross-examination, the victim stated that her
brother when questioned by her parents, told the parents that he
saw both of them namely herself and the accused on the cot. She
further stated that her father phoned his friend named
6
Sudarshan Manikpuri, who also had come to the police station.
She stated that at the police station, she was questioned orally.
5.3 Noticing the other evidence would not be out of place. The
brother-Mayank (PW-09) who was aged about 11 years and a
child witness, came to be examined. He was put to certain
questions to ensure that he was capable of giving evidence. He
stated that when he came back from the school on the day of
happening, except her sister nobody was at home. He stated that
accused-Deepak who saw him coming inside their house sent
him to buy chewing tobacco and when he came back with the
tobacco he saw the accused gagging his sister’s mouth with his
hand and had laid her down on the cot. It was stated that his
sister at that time was seen without clothes and that the accused
was also noticed in a similar state, off the trouser.
5.3.1. The evidence of Dusyantin (PW-10) as well as that of
Khomendra (PW-14) corroborated with what was testified by the
victim that after the incident she has gone to the house of
Dushyantin from where she using the mobile phone of
Dushyantin, contacted and informed Khomendra, who in turn
7
informed the parents of the victim about the incident and that
knowing about the incident they had returned back.
5.3.2. The mother of the victim, Alka Barsagarhe, (PW-1) and
the father Myaram Barsagarhe (PW-3) were consistent in
deposing, inter alia, that the accused-Deepak Kumar lived in their
neighbour and they knew him, that on the date of incident they
had gone to village Kareti to attend a funeral and that son of the
brother-in-law Khomendra had also accompanied them along
with other relatives. PW-1 stated that her husband informed her
about the incident, upon being informed by Khomendra who had
received the phone call from her daughter. Both in their
depositions narrated the incident which was told to them by the
victim-daughter, that the accused came inside the house and
gagged her to lay her down on the bed in the porch of the house
and raped her. PW-1 stated in terms in her cross examination
that her daughter told her that the accused had committed
misdeed with her after removing her inner clothes.
5.3.3 The record of the medical examination obtained by the
police post-complaint showed that there where no injury marks
on the private parts of the victim. It was however, mentioned that
8
the hymen was ruptured and healing up was indicated. The
accused was found to be fully capable physically, mentally and
medically of having sexual intercourse as was stated by PW – 11.
He in his cross-examination have stated that if the bath is taken
and clean, the semen can be absent. PW-17, who was the Block
Medical Officer has also stated that there where no external signs
of injury marks or scratch marks on the genitals of the victim.
5.4 The evidence of the prosecutrix is highlighted in Para 5.2 to
5.2.2 above is not is only clear and consistent in the narration of
the incident, and natural as well. The sequence of events
including her approaching the house of Dushyantin and through
her mobile contacting her parents by talking to Khomendra etc.
which facts were duly corroborated from the evidence of PW-1
and PW-3 as well as PW -10 and PW-14. The facts relating to the
actual commission of offence and attendant circumstances
thereof matched in the testimony of prosecutrix (PW-2) and her
brother, Mayank (PW-9).
5.4.1 An attentive look at the evidence of the prosecutrix
(PW-2) would reveal that her testimony in narrating the incident
and to describe what happened with her, is natural. Even when
9
read independently, excepting the oral testimonies of others
highlighted above, it inspires confidence and veracity for its
clarity and consistency. The contention that non-availability of
emphatic medical evidence about occurrence of physical
intercourse and absence of external injury marks make it
imperative to doubt and disregard the evidence of the
prosecutrix, could hardly be countenanced.
5.5 In cases of offences committed under Section 376, IPC,
when the story of the victim girl as told in the evidence is found
credit-worthy, the apparent insufficiency of medical evidence
pitted against acceptable testimony of the victim, the latter would
prevail. In State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh [(1996) 2 SCC
384] it was observed:
In the absence of injury on the private part of the
prosecutrix, it cannot be concluded that the
incident had not taken place or the sexual
intercourse was committed with the consent of the
prosecutrix. The prosecutrix being a small child of
about nine years of age, there could be no question
of her giving consent to sexual intercourse. The
absence of injuries on the private part of the
prosecutrix can be of no consequence in the facts
and circumstances of the present case.
(Para 16)
5.5.1 In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Manga Singh,
which was also a case in relation to the
[(2019) 16 SCC 759],
10
offence committed under Section 376, IPC where the prosecutrix
was minor girl aged 9 years, she was staying in her aunt’s house
pursuing her studies. When the offence of rape was committed
against her, she narrated the story to her teacher. The High Court
gave the benefit of doubt to the accused on the ground, inter alia,
that the medical evidence of the doctor was not conclusive to hold
that the prosecutrix was subjected to sexual intercourse.
5.5.2. This Court observed that if the evidence of the victim
does not suffer from any basic infirmities and the factor of
probability does not render it unworthy evidence, the conviction
could base solely on the evidence of the prosecutrix. It was
further observed that as a general rule there is no reason to
insist on the corroboration accept in certain cases, it was stated.
5.5.3 The medical evidence may not be available in which
circumstance, solitary testimony of the prosecutrix could be
sufficient to base the conviction.
“The conviction can be sustained on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires
confidence. The conviction can be based solely on
the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no
corroboration be required unless there are
compelling reasons which necessitate the courts to
insist for corroboration of her statement.
Corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is
11
not a requirement of law; but a guidance of
prudence under the given facts and circumstances.
Minor contractions or small discrepancies should
not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the
prosecutrix.”
(Para 11)
5.5.4 It may be true that in the present case the evidence of
the medical officer (PW-17) spoke about absence of external
injury marks on the genitals of the victim. However, the
proposition that the corroboration from the medical evidence is
not sine qua non when the cogent evidence of the victim is
available, was reiterated in a recent judgement of this Court in
Lok Mal alias Loku vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, [(2025) 4 SCC
470] , observed:
“Merely because in the medical evidence, there are
no major injury marks, this merely cannot a be a
reason to discard the otherwise reliable evidence of
the prosecutrix. It is not necessary that in each
and every case where rape is alleged there has to
be an injury to the private parts of the victim and it
depends on the facts and circumstances of a
particular case. We reiterate that absence of
injuries on the private parts of the victim is not
always fatal to the case of the prosecution.
(Para 4)
5.5.5 Akin to the facts of the present case, it was stated in
Lok Mal (supra) , according to the version of the prosecutrix, that
the accused overpowered her and pushed her to bed in spite of
12
her resistance and gagged her mouth using a piece of cloth. Thus,
considering this very aspect, it is possible that there were no
major injury marks. The appellant made an attempt to raise the
defence of false implication, however, he was unable to support
his defence by any cogent evidence.
5.5.6 The credible and reliable evidence of prosecutrix could
not be jettisoned for want of corroboration including the
corroboration by medical report or evidence. The Court observed
in Manga Singh (supra) that “in absence of injury on the private
part of the prosecutrix, it cannot be concluded that the incident had
not taken place or the sexual intercourse was committed with the
consent of the prosecutrix”.
It was stated that it is well settled that
in the cases of rape it is not always necessary that external injury
is to be found on the body of the victim.
5.5.7 In Wahid Khan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [(2010)
2 SCC 9] , this Court repelled the contention of the appellant that
since the hymen of the prosecutrix was found to be intact, it
cannot be said that an offence of rape has been committed. The
Court refuse to accept such contention in light of the definition of
offence of rape in Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code. It was
13
further observed that it is the consistent view of this Court that
even the slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence
of rape.
5.6 It is an opt-reiterated dictum of law that in cases of
rape, the testimony of the prosecutrix alone may be sufficient and
sole evidence of the victim, when cogent and consistent, could be
properly used to arrive at a finding of the guilt. In the State of
Himachal Pradesh vs. Manga Singh, (2019) 16 SCC 759 , this
Court in terms stated that conviction can be rested on the
testimony of the prosecutrix alone.
The conviction can be sustained on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires
confidence. The conviction can be based solely on
the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no
corroboration be required unless there are
compelling reasons which necessitate the courts to
insist for corroboration of her statement.
Corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is
not a requirement of law, but a guidance of
prudence under the given facts and circumstances.
Minor contractions or small discrepancies should
not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the
prosecutrix.”
(Para 10)
5.6.1 It was further asserted that corroboration is not an
essential requirement for conviction in the cases of rape.
14
It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the
Supreme Court that corroboration is not a sine qua
non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of
the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity
and the "probabilities factor" does not render it
unworthy of credence. As a general rule, there is no
reason to insist on corroboration except from
medical evidence. However, having regard to the
circumstances of the case, medical evidence may
not be available. In such cases, solitary testimony of
the prosecutrix would be sufficient to base the
conviction, if it inspires the confidence of the court.
(Para 11)
5.6.2 In Gurmit Singh (supra) it was observed to reiterate
that in all cases, the corroboration to the statements made by the
victim in her evidence could not be insisted upon as a rule of
thumb:
In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed
considerations which have no material effect on
the veracity of the prosecution case or even
discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix
should not, unless the discrepancies are such
which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out
an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The
inherent bashfulness of the females and the
tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression
are factors which the courts should not overlook.
(Para 8)
5.6.3 It was asserted that only compelling reasons would
justify rejection of testimony of a rape victim, and not otherwise:
15
“….the courts should find no difficulty to act on the
testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to
convict an accused where her testimony inspires
confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking
corroboration of her statement before relying upon
the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to
adding insult to injury…..”
(Para 8)
5.6.4 From a recent decision in Raju alias Umakant vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh, (2025 SCC OnLine SC 997) ,
following observations could be noticed:
“…….a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault
is not an accomplice but a victim of another
person's lust and it will be improper and
undesirable to test her evidence with suspicion. All
that the law mandates is that the Court should be
alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing
with the evidence of a person who is interested in
the outcome of charge levelled by her and if after
keeping that aspect in mind if the Court is
thereafter satisfied that the evidence is
trustworthy, there is nothing that can stop the
Court from acting on the sole testimony of the
prosecutrix. [See State of Rajasthan v. N.K. the
Accused, (2000) 5 SCC 30, Rameshwar v. State
of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213, State of
Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewal Chand
Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550, State of Punjab v.
Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384]”
(Para 18)
5.6.5 As early as in State of Maharashtra vs.
Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain , [(1990) 1 SCC 550] , this
court observed that the prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put
16
on a par with the accomplice, it was further observed that she is
a victim of crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her
evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material
particulars. It was further observed that evidence of a rape victim
must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in
cases of physical violence. It was stated that there is no rule of
law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to
illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act which may
require it to look for corroboration.
5.7 The last submission on behalf of the appellant that there
were discrepancies in the evidences of victim (PW-2) and her
brother (PW-11) has no room to stand, for, no material
discrepancy could be noticed by the Court on comparison of the
evidence of the two witnesses. Even otherwise, discrepancies in
evidence which are of minor nature not going to the root have to
be ignored. This Court observed in Lok Mal alias Loku (supra)
that in criminal jurisprudence the principle is that the evidence
of prosecutrix in case of rape is of the same value as that of an
injured witness and conviction can be made on the basis of the
sole testimony of the prosecutrix, while reiterating this.
17
5.7.1 The sensitive approach and greater inclination to rely
on the creditworthy evidence of the victim is guided by the aspect
as observed in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of
Gujarat, [(1983) 3 SCC 217] it was observed thus:
In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony
of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of
corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury.
Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman
who complains of rape or sexual molestation be
viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses
tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion?"
(Para 9)
5.7.2 Insignificance of minor discrepancies was pointed out
by this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Lekh Raj,
[(2001) 1 SCC 247] . By referring to earlier judgment in Ousu
Varghese vs. State of Kerala, [(1974) 3 SCC 767 ], it was
observed that minor variation in the accounts of the witnesses
are often the hallmark of the truth of their testimony and the
discrepancies are found to be of minor character not going to the
root of the prosecution story, they need not be given undue
importance.
5.7.3 It was observed in
Jagdish vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, [(1981) SCC (Crl.) 676], that mere congruity or
consistency is not the sole test of truth of depositions. The
18
discrepancies have to be such which could be characterized as
material, which are not normal and of the nature not expected
from the normal person.
5.8 There is no gainsaying that the Court should remain
sensitive while dealing with the charges of sexual assault on the
helpless woman. In State of Rajasthan vs. N.K. The Accused ,
this Court observed that “an unmerited
[(2000) 5 SCC 30],
acquittal encourages wolves in the society being on the prowl for
easy prey, more so when the victim of crime are helpless females.”
Similar was expressed in Gurmit Singh (supra) that the rapist
not only violates the victim’s privacy and personal integrity, but
inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm
in the process. It was stated that the rape is not merely a physical
assault and subsequently destructs the whole personality of the
victim.
6. Evaluating the total evidence in light of the principles of law,
evidentiary appreciation and application, with the evidence of the
victim at the forefront, it has to be stated that victim’s evidence
was entirely probable, natural and trustworthy who with lucidity
narrated the whole incident about commission of offence against
19
her by the accused. There exists no reason, much less compelling
reasons, to disbelieve and discard her testimony. Her brother
Mayank’s testimony as a child witness was rationally and
logically supportive of what the prosecutrix narrated. The factum
that the cot was in the porch and the victim was forced to lay
there by the accused could also be called out from the evidence.
6.1 There was a consistency lent. The conduct of the victim,
soon after the incident was quite natural, as she went to cousin
sister’s neighbouring house and through her, informed cousin
brother and her parents who were away.
6.2 The crux of the incident, of accused overpowering the victim
and committing forcible act by forcing her to the bed, could be
clearly established from the totality of evidence adduced by the
prosecution. Merely because the medical evidence was less
corroborative and less supportive or absent in details or indictive
of no external injuries. It in no way weakened the prosecution
case. Sole testimony of the victim was a strong evidence to rely on
along with available attendant evidence.
20
6.3 The High Court was wholly justified in upholding and
confirming the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant-
convict, by the trial court.
7. The Criminal Appeal is accordingly dismissed.
...……………………………….. J.
(SUDHANSHU DHULIA)
...……………………………….. J.
(N.V. ANJARIA)
NEW DELHI;
August 5, 2025
21
2025 INSC 929
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _________OF 2025
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. __________ OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) (D) No.(s) 26453 OF 2025
DEEPAK KUMAR SAHU ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH ….Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
N.V. ANJARIA, J.
Delay condoned. Leave granted.
2. Preferred by the appellant-accused, the present appeal
nd
addresses the challenge to judgment and order 22 September,
2023 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh, at Bilaspur, in
CRA No. 34 of 2020 whereby the High Court continued the
judgement and order of the Special Judge (SC/ST Court),
Rajnandgaon, (CG) in Special Criminal (T) Case No. 10 of 2018,
convicting and sentencing the appellant.
Signature Not Verified
2.1 The appellant came to be convicted for the offence
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Date: 2025.08.05
17:24:07 IST
Reason:
punishable under Section 450 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to
1
undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years with fine of
₹
5,00/-. He was also convicted for the offence punishable under
Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012 [POCSO Act] and further came to be convicted for the
offence under Section 376 (2), IPC to be sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for ten years and with a fine of ₹ 1,000/-.
The punishment for the offence under Section 376 (2), IPC, which
was more severe to one provided for the offence under the POCSO
Act therefore the same came to be awarded.
3. As per the prosecution case, the incident occurred on
03.04.2018 at about 12:00 Noon. On the fateful day, the victim
aged about 15 years and her younger brother named Mayank,
aged about 11 years were inside their house. The parents had
gone to village Karate to attend the funeral as there was a death
in their family. Finding the victim alone in the house, the
appellant-accused entered the house. He thereafter sent the
brother of the victim to bring a pack of chewing tobacco. Once
the brother of the victim left the house, the accused forced the
victim to lie on the cot lying in the porch of the house, gagged her
mouth and then committed sexual intercourse. When the brother
of the victim came back, seeing him, the appellant-accused fled
2
away from the house, threatening the victim not to tell anything
to anyone.
3.1 Soon after the incident the victim went to her cousin sister-
Dushyantin’s house in the neighbourhood and told about the
incident. The brother of the Dushyantin named Khomendra, who
had gone to village Kareti with the parents of the victim, was also
informed through mobile phone about the incident. The parents
of the victim rushed back to home. When they reached the home,
the victim narrated the entire story of the incident to her parents.
A police complaint was lodged, and FIR (Ex. P-08) was registered.
3.2 The victim was subjected to medical examination, statement
under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1978 was
recorded and a criminal case was registered for the offences as
above, which was tried before the Special Court culminating into
conviction and sentence of the appellant upheld by the High
Court.
3.3 Amongst the witnesses examined by the prosecution in
course of the trial, included the prosecutrix herself (PW-2),
mother Alka (PW-1), father Mayaram (PW-3), brother Mayank
(PW-9), Dushyantin (PW-14), Medical Officer, Dr. R.K. Pashi (PW-
3
11), Dr. Kiran, Block Medical Officer (PW-17), Investigating Officer
(PW-18).
4. Learned advocate Mr. Manish Kumar Saran, AOR appearing
for the appellant assailed the judgment of the High Court
primarily and mainly on three grounds, as highlighted from the
memorandum of appeal and elaborated in course of submissions.
It was contended that the prosecution had failed to establish its
case beyond the reasonable doubt and that it was not possible to
rule out the theory of innocence of the appellant. In this regard, it
was submitted that the evidence of the prosecutrix could not be
relied on and needed to be analysed with caution when the
medical report was not categorical to confirm the offence of
sexual assault and rape on the victim. Secondly, it was
contended that there were contradiction between the evidence of
the victim (PW-2) and her younger brother (PW-9). Lastly it was
sought to be contended that the prosecution could not establish
that the victim was minor on the date of commission of offence so
as to attract the provisions of POCSO Act, 2012.
5. Dealing with the last contended aspect at the outset, that
the prosecutrix was not shown to be minor, this contention is
4
stated to be rejected. There was a cogent and reliable evidence in
th
the nature of 8 standard marksheet of the victim which showed
her date of birth to be 09.10.2002. The said marksheet was
obtained by the investigating officer (PW-18) from the mother of
the victim and he had testified about it in his evidence. The birth
date of 09.10.2002 was also corroborated by the evidence of the
mother of the victim (PW-1) and father of the victim (PW-3) who
stated that her daughter was less than 16 years of age. The trial
court rightly recorded that on the date of the incidence which was
03.04.2018, the age of the victim was 15 years 5 months 24 days.
5.1. Before proceeding further, the evidence brought on record
and appreciated by the court of the first instance and considered
by the High Court may be briefly visited with. The prosecutrix
herself deposed as PW-2. Her testimony weighed pivotal by the
courts below, along with the other evidence, in establishing the
commission of the offence.
5.2. Looking at the evidence of the Prosecutrix with some
elaboration, she stated that on that particular day, she and her
younger brother Mayank were at home and that she had been
serving lunch to her brother, at which time the accused whom
5
she could recognized, came inside the house, sent away her
brother to buy some chewing tobacco. She stated that thereafter
the accused forced her to lay down on the cot which was in the
porch of the house and gagged her mouth. She stated that after
disrobing her, the accused committed a misdeed and raped her.
5.2.1. The victim further stated that when her brother
returned, seeing him, the accused ran away. After the incident, it
was stated, she went to the house of her uncle in the
neighbourhood and asked her sister named Dushyantin to give
her mobile, using which she contacted cousin brother
Khomendra who had gone with her parents at Kareti village, and
informed him about what has happened. She stated that after her
parents came back, she informed the all about the incident. They
went to the police station to get the complaint registered. The
report to the police was made her own signature.
5.2.2. In her cross-examination, the victim stated that her
brother when questioned by her parents, told the parents that he
saw both of them namely herself and the accused on the cot. She
further stated that her father phoned his friend named
6
Sudarshan Manikpuri, who also had come to the police station.
She stated that at the police station, she was questioned orally.
5.3 Noticing the other evidence would not be out of place. The
brother-Mayank (PW-09) who was aged about 11 years and a
child witness, came to be examined. He was put to certain
questions to ensure that he was capable of giving evidence. He
stated that when he came back from the school on the day of
happening, except her sister nobody was at home. He stated that
accused-Deepak who saw him coming inside their house sent
him to buy chewing tobacco and when he came back with the
tobacco he saw the accused gagging his sister’s mouth with his
hand and had laid her down on the cot. It was stated that his
sister at that time was seen without clothes and that the accused
was also noticed in a similar state, off the trouser.
5.3.1. The evidence of Dusyantin (PW-10) as well as that of
Khomendra (PW-14) corroborated with what was testified by the
victim that after the incident she has gone to the house of
Dushyantin from where she using the mobile phone of
Dushyantin, contacted and informed Khomendra, who in turn
7
informed the parents of the victim about the incident and that
knowing about the incident they had returned back.
5.3.2. The mother of the victim, Alka Barsagarhe, (PW-1) and
the father Myaram Barsagarhe (PW-3) were consistent in
deposing, inter alia, that the accused-Deepak Kumar lived in their
neighbour and they knew him, that on the date of incident they
had gone to village Kareti to attend a funeral and that son of the
brother-in-law Khomendra had also accompanied them along
with other relatives. PW-1 stated that her husband informed her
about the incident, upon being informed by Khomendra who had
received the phone call from her daughter. Both in their
depositions narrated the incident which was told to them by the
victim-daughter, that the accused came inside the house and
gagged her to lay her down on the bed in the porch of the house
and raped her. PW-1 stated in terms in her cross examination
that her daughter told her that the accused had committed
misdeed with her after removing her inner clothes.
5.3.3 The record of the medical examination obtained by the
police post-complaint showed that there where no injury marks
on the private parts of the victim. It was however, mentioned that
8
the hymen was ruptured and healing up was indicated. The
accused was found to be fully capable physically, mentally and
medically of having sexual intercourse as was stated by PW – 11.
He in his cross-examination have stated that if the bath is taken
and clean, the semen can be absent. PW-17, who was the Block
Medical Officer has also stated that there where no external signs
of injury marks or scratch marks on the genitals of the victim.
5.4 The evidence of the prosecutrix is highlighted in Para 5.2 to
5.2.2 above is not is only clear and consistent in the narration of
the incident, and natural as well. The sequence of events
including her approaching the house of Dushyantin and through
her mobile contacting her parents by talking to Khomendra etc.
which facts were duly corroborated from the evidence of PW-1
and PW-3 as well as PW -10 and PW-14. The facts relating to the
actual commission of offence and attendant circumstances
thereof matched in the testimony of prosecutrix (PW-2) and her
brother, Mayank (PW-9).
5.4.1 An attentive look at the evidence of the prosecutrix
(PW-2) would reveal that her testimony in narrating the incident
and to describe what happened with her, is natural. Even when
9
read independently, excepting the oral testimonies of others
highlighted above, it inspires confidence and veracity for its
clarity and consistency. The contention that non-availability of
emphatic medical evidence about occurrence of physical
intercourse and absence of external injury marks make it
imperative to doubt and disregard the evidence of the
prosecutrix, could hardly be countenanced.
5.5 In cases of offences committed under Section 376, IPC,
when the story of the victim girl as told in the evidence is found
credit-worthy, the apparent insufficiency of medical evidence
pitted against acceptable testimony of the victim, the latter would
prevail. In State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh [(1996) 2 SCC
384] it was observed:
In the absence of injury on the private part of the
prosecutrix, it cannot be concluded that the
incident had not taken place or the sexual
intercourse was committed with the consent of the
prosecutrix. The prosecutrix being a small child of
about nine years of age, there could be no question
of her giving consent to sexual intercourse. The
absence of injuries on the private part of the
prosecutrix can be of no consequence in the facts
and circumstances of the present case.
(Para 16)
5.5.1 In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Manga Singh,
which was also a case in relation to the
[(2019) 16 SCC 759],
10
offence committed under Section 376, IPC where the prosecutrix
was minor girl aged 9 years, she was staying in her aunt’s house
pursuing her studies. When the offence of rape was committed
against her, she narrated the story to her teacher. The High Court
gave the benefit of doubt to the accused on the ground, inter alia,
that the medical evidence of the doctor was not conclusive to hold
that the prosecutrix was subjected to sexual intercourse.
5.5.2. This Court observed that if the evidence of the victim
does not suffer from any basic infirmities and the factor of
probability does not render it unworthy evidence, the conviction
could base solely on the evidence of the prosecutrix. It was
further observed that as a general rule there is no reason to
insist on the corroboration accept in certain cases, it was stated.
5.5.3 The medical evidence may not be available in which
circumstance, solitary testimony of the prosecutrix could be
sufficient to base the conviction.
“The conviction can be sustained on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires
confidence. The conviction can be based solely on
the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no
corroboration be required unless there are
compelling reasons which necessitate the courts to
insist for corroboration of her statement.
Corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is
11
not a requirement of law; but a guidance of
prudence under the given facts and circumstances.
Minor contractions or small discrepancies should
not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the
prosecutrix.”
(Para 11)
5.5.4 It may be true that in the present case the evidence of
the medical officer (PW-17) spoke about absence of external
injury marks on the genitals of the victim. However, the
proposition that the corroboration from the medical evidence is
not sine qua non when the cogent evidence of the victim is
available, was reiterated in a recent judgement of this Court in
Lok Mal alias Loku vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, [(2025) 4 SCC
470] , observed:
“Merely because in the medical evidence, there are
no major injury marks, this merely cannot a be a
reason to discard the otherwise reliable evidence of
the prosecutrix. It is not necessary that in each
and every case where rape is alleged there has to
be an injury to the private parts of the victim and it
depends on the facts and circumstances of a
particular case. We reiterate that absence of
injuries on the private parts of the victim is not
always fatal to the case of the prosecution.
(Para 4)
5.5.5 Akin to the facts of the present case, it was stated in
Lok Mal (supra) , according to the version of the prosecutrix, that
the accused overpowered her and pushed her to bed in spite of
12
her resistance and gagged her mouth using a piece of cloth. Thus,
considering this very aspect, it is possible that there were no
major injury marks. The appellant made an attempt to raise the
defence of false implication, however, he was unable to support
his defence by any cogent evidence.
5.5.6 The credible and reliable evidence of prosecutrix could
not be jettisoned for want of corroboration including the
corroboration by medical report or evidence. The Court observed
in Manga Singh (supra) that “in absence of injury on the private
part of the prosecutrix, it cannot be concluded that the incident had
not taken place or the sexual intercourse was committed with the
consent of the prosecutrix”.
It was stated that it is well settled that
in the cases of rape it is not always necessary that external injury
is to be found on the body of the victim.
5.5.7 In Wahid Khan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [(2010)
2 SCC 9] , this Court repelled the contention of the appellant that
since the hymen of the prosecutrix was found to be intact, it
cannot be said that an offence of rape has been committed. The
Court refuse to accept such contention in light of the definition of
offence of rape in Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code. It was
13
further observed that it is the consistent view of this Court that
even the slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence
of rape.
5.6 It is an opt-reiterated dictum of law that in cases of
rape, the testimony of the prosecutrix alone may be sufficient and
sole evidence of the victim, when cogent and consistent, could be
properly used to arrive at a finding of the guilt. In the State of
Himachal Pradesh vs. Manga Singh, (2019) 16 SCC 759 , this
Court in terms stated that conviction can be rested on the
testimony of the prosecutrix alone.
The conviction can be sustained on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires
confidence. The conviction can be based solely on
the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no
corroboration be required unless there are
compelling reasons which necessitate the courts to
insist for corroboration of her statement.
Corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is
not a requirement of law, but a guidance of
prudence under the given facts and circumstances.
Minor contractions or small discrepancies should
not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the
prosecutrix.”
(Para 10)
5.6.1 It was further asserted that corroboration is not an
essential requirement for conviction in the cases of rape.
14
It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the
Supreme Court that corroboration is not a sine qua
non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of
the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity
and the "probabilities factor" does not render it
unworthy of credence. As a general rule, there is no
reason to insist on corroboration except from
medical evidence. However, having regard to the
circumstances of the case, medical evidence may
not be available. In such cases, solitary testimony of
the prosecutrix would be sufficient to base the
conviction, if it inspires the confidence of the court.
(Para 11)
5.6.2 In Gurmit Singh (supra) it was observed to reiterate
that in all cases, the corroboration to the statements made by the
victim in her evidence could not be insisted upon as a rule of
thumb:
In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed
considerations which have no material effect on
the veracity of the prosecution case or even
discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix
should not, unless the discrepancies are such
which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out
an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The
inherent bashfulness of the females and the
tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression
are factors which the courts should not overlook.
(Para 8)
5.6.3 It was asserted that only compelling reasons would
justify rejection of testimony of a rape victim, and not otherwise:
15
“….the courts should find no difficulty to act on the
testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to
convict an accused where her testimony inspires
confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking
corroboration of her statement before relying upon
the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to
adding insult to injury…..”
(Para 8)
5.6.4 From a recent decision in Raju alias Umakant vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh, (2025 SCC OnLine SC 997) ,
following observations could be noticed:
“…….a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault
is not an accomplice but a victim of another
person's lust and it will be improper and
undesirable to test her evidence with suspicion. All
that the law mandates is that the Court should be
alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing
with the evidence of a person who is interested in
the outcome of charge levelled by her and if after
keeping that aspect in mind if the Court is
thereafter satisfied that the evidence is
trustworthy, there is nothing that can stop the
Court from acting on the sole testimony of the
prosecutrix. [See State of Rajasthan v. N.K. the
Accused, (2000) 5 SCC 30, Rameshwar v. State
of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213, State of
Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewal Chand
Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550, State of Punjab v.
Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384]”
(Para 18)
5.6.5 As early as in State of Maharashtra vs.
Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain , [(1990) 1 SCC 550] , this
court observed that the prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put
16
on a par with the accomplice, it was further observed that she is
a victim of crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her
evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material
particulars. It was further observed that evidence of a rape victim
must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in
cases of physical violence. It was stated that there is no rule of
law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to
illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act which may
require it to look for corroboration.
5.7 The last submission on behalf of the appellant that there
were discrepancies in the evidences of victim (PW-2) and her
brother (PW-11) has no room to stand, for, no material
discrepancy could be noticed by the Court on comparison of the
evidence of the two witnesses. Even otherwise, discrepancies in
evidence which are of minor nature not going to the root have to
be ignored. This Court observed in Lok Mal alias Loku (supra)
that in criminal jurisprudence the principle is that the evidence
of prosecutrix in case of rape is of the same value as that of an
injured witness and conviction can be made on the basis of the
sole testimony of the prosecutrix, while reiterating this.
17
5.7.1 The sensitive approach and greater inclination to rely
on the creditworthy evidence of the victim is guided by the aspect
as observed in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of
Gujarat, [(1983) 3 SCC 217] it was observed thus:
In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony
of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of
corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury.
Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman
who complains of rape or sexual molestation be
viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses
tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion?"
(Para 9)
5.7.2 Insignificance of minor discrepancies was pointed out
by this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Lekh Raj,
[(2001) 1 SCC 247] . By referring to earlier judgment in Ousu
Varghese vs. State of Kerala, [(1974) 3 SCC 767 ], it was
observed that minor variation in the accounts of the witnesses
are often the hallmark of the truth of their testimony and the
discrepancies are found to be of minor character not going to the
root of the prosecution story, they need not be given undue
importance.
5.7.3 It was observed in
Jagdish vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, [(1981) SCC (Crl.) 676], that mere congruity or
consistency is not the sole test of truth of depositions. The
18
discrepancies have to be such which could be characterized as
material, which are not normal and of the nature not expected
from the normal person.
5.8 There is no gainsaying that the Court should remain
sensitive while dealing with the charges of sexual assault on the
helpless woman. In State of Rajasthan vs. N.K. The Accused ,
this Court observed that “an unmerited
[(2000) 5 SCC 30],
acquittal encourages wolves in the society being on the prowl for
easy prey, more so when the victim of crime are helpless females.”
Similar was expressed in Gurmit Singh (supra) that the rapist
not only violates the victim’s privacy and personal integrity, but
inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm
in the process. It was stated that the rape is not merely a physical
assault and subsequently destructs the whole personality of the
victim.
6. Evaluating the total evidence in light of the principles of law,
evidentiary appreciation and application, with the evidence of the
victim at the forefront, it has to be stated that victim’s evidence
was entirely probable, natural and trustworthy who with lucidity
narrated the whole incident about commission of offence against
19
her by the accused. There exists no reason, much less compelling
reasons, to disbelieve and discard her testimony. Her brother
Mayank’s testimony as a child witness was rationally and
logically supportive of what the prosecutrix narrated. The factum
that the cot was in the porch and the victim was forced to lay
there by the accused could also be called out from the evidence.
6.1 There was a consistency lent. The conduct of the victim,
soon after the incident was quite natural, as she went to cousin
sister’s neighbouring house and through her, informed cousin
brother and her parents who were away.
6.2 The crux of the incident, of accused overpowering the victim
and committing forcible act by forcing her to the bed, could be
clearly established from the totality of evidence adduced by the
prosecution. Merely because the medical evidence was less
corroborative and less supportive or absent in details or indictive
of no external injuries. It in no way weakened the prosecution
case. Sole testimony of the victim was a strong evidence to rely on
along with available attendant evidence.
20
6.3 The High Court was wholly justified in upholding and
confirming the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant-
convict, by the trial court.
7. The Criminal Appeal is accordingly dismissed.
...……………………………….. J.
(SUDHANSHU DHULIA)
...……………………………….. J.
(N.V. ANJARIA)
NEW DELHI;
August 5, 2025
21