Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 13451346 OF 2022
The Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee ..Appellant (S)
Bangalore
Versus
The State of Karnataka & Ors. ..Respondent (S)
With
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 13471374 OF 2022
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. As common question of law and facts arise in this group of
appeals and as such are between the same parties, all
these appeals are decided and disposed of together by this
common judgment and order.
2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by R
Natarajan
Date: 2022.03.22
17:36:59 IST
Reason:
judgment and order in respective writ appeals preferred by
1
the appellant herein – the Agricultural Produce Marketing
Committee, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the
“APMC”), by which the Division Bench of the High Court
has dismissed the said writ appeals and confirmed the
common judgment and order passed by the learned Single
Judge passed in respective writ petitions preferred by the
private respondents herein – original land owners and
declared that the acquisitions of the lands in question has
lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act, 2013”), the APMC, Bangalore has
preferred the present appeals.
3. The facts leading to the present appeals in a nutshell are
as under:
3.1 That the lands in question were acquired in three parts.
The first acquisition was in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas
of land owned by respondent No.4 – Jamanlal Bajaj Seva
Trust (for short “Trust”). Second acquisition was in respect
2
of 104 acres 5 guntas of land owned by very respondent
No.4 – Trust and the third acquisition was in respect of 3
acres 34 guntas of land (which is not the subject matter of
appeals before this Court).
3.2 The relevant facts in respect of first and second
acquisitions are as under:
In respect of 172 acres 22 guntas (First Acquisition)
3.2.1 That a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act, 1894”) on 03.09.1994 in respect of 172 acres 22
guntas of land owned by respondent No.4 herein – Trust in
Srigandadakaval Village, Yeshwanthpura Hobli, Bengaluru
for establishing a mega market by the appellant – APMC,
Bangalore.
3.2.2 One Rajajinagar House Building Cooperative Society
challenged the notification issued under Section 4(1),
before the High Court of Karnataka by way of Writ Petition
No.28988/1994. It was the case on behalf of the said
society that the land should be acquired for them and not
3
for APMC. The said writ petition came to be dismissed by
the High Court vide order dated 23.12.1995.
3.3.3 Thereafter a notification/declaration under Section 6 of the
Act, 1894 was issued on 10.10.1996 and published on
13.10.1996. A draft award was prepared in respect of 172
acres 22 guntas of land on 12.08.1998.
3.3.4 On the instructions given by the Land Acquisition Officer,
the appellant – APMC deposited Rs.9,14,14,873/ on
19.08.1998 towards approximate cost of the acquisition.
3.3.5 It appears that the aforesaid Rajajinagar House Building
Cooperative Society filed another writ petition being W.P.
No.6880/1997 before the High Court, before the
acquisition of 172.50 acres of land at Srigandadakaval
Village could be completed. The High Court granted an ex
parte order of stay of acquisition proceedings vide interim
order dated 16.09.1998. Thereafter respondent no.4 –
original land owner filed Writ Petition No.3884/1998
before the High Court, challenging the acquisition
4
proceedings. Vide interim order dated 08.02.1999, the
High Court ordered stay of dispossession.
In respect of 104 acres 5 guntas (Second Acquisition)
3.4 That a notification under Section 4(1) read with Section
17(4) of the Act, 1894, dispensing with the requirement of
hearing was issued on 13.04.1999 in respect of 104 acres
5 guntas of land owned by respondent No.4 – Trust in
Herohalli Village, Yeshwanthpura Hobli, Bangalore North
Taluk, for establishing a mega market by the appellant –
APMC. A final notification under Section 6(1) read with
Section 17(1) to 17(4) was issued in respect of 100 acres
11 guntas out of 104 acres 5 guntas which had been
notified under Section 4(1) on 13.04.1999, leaving an area
of 3 acres 34 guntas out of acquisition. An enquiry under
Section 5A was dispensed with.
3.4.1 That one Vishwaneedam Trust filed Writ Petition
No.708/2000 before the High Court challenging the said
acquisition. The High Court granted stay of dispossession
in respect of 35 acres out of the 100 acres 5 guntas
situated in Herohalli Village.
5
3.4.2 Respondent No.4 – Trust – original land owner filed Writ
Petition No.37140/2000 challenging the notifications
dated 13.04.1999 and 26.10.1999 in respect of the lands
at Herohalli Village.
3.4.3 According to the appellant, possession was taken and
handed over to the APMC by the Land Acquisition Officer
vide an Official Memorandum of Possession dated
06.10.2000 in respect of 65 acres 19 guntas of the lands at
Herohalli Village.
3.4.4 That an award was made by the State Land Acquisition
Officer (SLAO) on 22.05.2002, referring to a Government
order dated 26.03.2002, in respect of 100 acres 11 guntas
covered by Section 6 notification dated 26.10.1999. The
award provided for payment of compensation to
respondent No.4 – Trust after excluding 34 acres 14
guntas of acquired land treating the same as Phut Kharab
belonging to the Government and further excluding 35
acres in respect of the writ petition filed Vishwaneedam
6
trust in which an order of stay of dispossession had been
passed by the High Court. The said compensation was
accepted by respondent No.4 under protest. Respondent
No.4 – Trust – original land owner filed a Land Acquisition
Case No.1/2003 seeking enhancement of compensation
which seems to be pending.
3.5 Thus, Writ Petition No.3884/1998 filed by respondent No.4
– original land owner was in respect of 172 acres 22
guntas of land. Writ Petition Nos.3714037146/2000 was
in respect of 100 acres of land and Writ Petition
No.708/2000 was filed by Vishwaneedam Trust in respect
of second acquisition (part).
3.6 A common statement of objections was filed by the
appellant – APMC to all the writ petitions.
3.7 That the APMC filed IA No.01/2007 in W.P.
No.37140/2000, to permit APMC to hand over 9 acres of
land out of 65 acres 11 guntas to the Bangalore
Development Authority (BDA) and 4 acres to the Bangalore
Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB). That vide
7
order dated 21.03.2007, the learned Single Judge allowed
the said IA No.01/2007 and granted permission to the
APMC as prayed.
3.8 At this stage, it is required to be noted that in respect to
the lands in question and other lands owned by
respondent No.4 – Trust, proceedings were pending before
the Land Reforms Tribunal, Bangalore N. Taluk. At this
stage, it is required to be noted that it was the specific case
on behalf of the State and the APMC that unless the
proceedings under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (KLR
Act) are disposed of, the compensation is not required to
be deposited as, if ultimately it is held that the land
acquired is excess vacant land under the provisions of KLR
Act, in that case, the said land would vest with the State
Government and therefore, no compensation would be
payable. Therefore, since the Government was not
proceeding with making of awards or offering
compensation on the ground that proceedings were
pending before the Land Reforms Tribunal, by the same
order dated 21.03.2007 the learned Single Judge directed
8
the Tribunal to dispose of application No.LRF 2099/7475
under Section 66 of the KLR Act, within three months.
3.9 The order passed by the learned Single Judge dated
21.03.2007 granting permission to the APMC to hand over
9 acres of land to BDA and 4 acres of land to BWSSB was
challenged before the Division Bench of the High Court by
way of Writ Appeal No.1011/2007. The Division Bench of
the High Court stayed the order of the learned Single
Judge. The said appeal along with some companion
appeals came to be disposed of by the Division Bench vide
order dated 28.06.2012, directing learned Single Judge to
decide all the connected writ petitions finally and
continued the interim stay granted by the Division Bench
until the final disposal of all the petitions.
3.10 Thereafter APMC filed IA No.03/2008 seeking permission
to build a wall around 65 acres of land, which came to be
allowed vide order dated 12.02.2009. It is reported that
thereafter APMC has completed the fencing work.
Proceedings before the Land Reforms Tribunal
9
3.11 That the Land Reforms Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as
“the Tribunal”) passed an order dated 12.01.2010 in the
proceedings under the KLR Act holding that 213 acres 20
guntas of respondent No.4 – Trust’s land was excess land
under the said Act.
3.11.1 The order passed by the Tribunal was challenged before
the High Court in Writ Petition No.4311/2010. The High
Court vide order dated 24.03.2014 remitted the
proceedings to the Tribunal with directions for a fresh
consideration.
3.11.2 On remand the Tribunal passed a fresh order dated
22.09.2015 and declared that 265 acres 24 guntas of
land held by respondent No.4 – Trust was excess land.
That the order passed by the Tribunal dated 22.09.2015
was challenged before the High Court and the High Court
vide order dated 02.05.2017 set aside the order passed
by the Tribunal dated 22.09.2015 and once again
remitted the matter to the Tribunal.
10
3.11.3 That the Tribunal passed a fresh order dated 28.11.2017
and declared that 354 acres 10 guntas was excess land.
The order passed by the Tribunal dated 28.11.2017 was
again the subject matter before the High Court by way of
Writ Petition No.55344/2017. By judgment and order
dated 30.06.2021, the learned Single Judge has quashed
and set aside the Tribunal’s order dated 28.11.2017. It is
reported that against the judgment and order passed by
the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated
30.06.2021 passed in Writ Petition No.55344/2017, the
State has preferred a writ appeal being W.A. No.1089/21,
which is reported to be pending before the Division Bench
of the High Court.
3.12 That all the aforesaid writ petitions being W.P.
No.3884/1998 (in respect of 172 acres of land), W.P. Nos.
3714037146/2000 (in respect of 100 acres of land) and
others writ petitions being W.P. No.708/2000 and 19579
19585/2001, were clubbed together. During the pendency
of the aforesaid writ petitions the Act, 2013 came into
force. Therefore, the writ petitioners submitted an
11
application dated 24.02.2014 seeking to invoke the benefit
of the Act, 2013 and urged that the benefit of provisions of
the said Act would be available to it.
3.13 That the learned Single Judge framed the following points
for consideration:
a. Whether the disposal of these petitioners should
be deferred pending adjudication and
determination by the Land Tribunal, Bangalore
North Taluk of the excess holdings or otherwise
under the provisions of the Karnataka Land
Reforms Act, 1961 of the very lands which are
the subject matter herein.
b. Whether the possession of a portion of the lands
in question having said to have been given to
APMC can be said to be valid and in accordance
with law.
c. Whether the invocation of Section 17 of the LA
Act in the acquisition of a portion of the lands
for the same purpose was justified.
d. Whether the acquiring authority could keeping
abeyance the mandate to pay or deposit the
compensation amount pending disposal of the
proceedings before the Land Tribunal in respect
of the lands.
e. Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed
by virtue of the 2013 Act.
3.14 That though some observations were made on the
proceedings under the Act, 1894, thereafter, without
further finally deciding any other point framed for
12
consideration, as reproduced hereinabove, the learned
Single Judge has allowed the writ petitions by holding that
respective acquisitions have lapsed under Section 24(2) of
the Act, 2013.
3.15 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the common
judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge
dated 24.06.2014 holding that respective acquisitions have
lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, the APMC
preferred writ appeals before the High Court. By the
impugned common judgment and order, the Division
Bench of the High Court has dismissed the said appeals
confirming the judgment and order passed by the learned
Single Judge declaring that the acquisition have lapsed
under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.
3.16 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
common judgment and order passed by the Division Bench
of the High Court in respective Writ Appeal No.1732/2014
and others along with accompanied appeals, the APMC,
Bangalore, has preferred the present appeals.
13
4 Shri V. Giri, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the appellant – APMC has vehemently contended that in
the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court
has erred in holding that the acquisitions in respect of the
lands in question have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the
Act, 2013.
4.1 It is further contended that in respect of acquisition of 172
acres land no award was declared in view of the stay
granted by the High Court in various proceedings. It is
submitted that therefore subsection (2) of Section 24 of
the Act, 2013 shall not be applicable. It is submitted that
therefore the High Court has erred in declaring that the
acquisitions have lapsed under subsection (2) of Section
24 of the Act, 2013.
4.2 It is further submitted that so far as the acquisition in
respect of 100 acres of land situated at Herohalli Village is
concerned, the award in respect of 65 acres of land was
declared and the possession was also taken over. Further,
the amount of compensation was deposited and the
14
respondent – original land owner withdrew Rs.2.37 crores,
therefore it cannot be said that the acquisition has lapsed
under subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013.
4.3 It is urged that the High Court has not properly
appreciated the fact that in respect of acquisition of 172
acres and in respect of remaining 35 acres out of the 100
acres of land, the awards could not be declared in view of
the stay orders granted by the High Court in various
proceedings. Therefore, for the purpose of Section 24(1)(a)
of the Act, 2013, being made applicable, the period during
which the stay orders were in operation have to be
excluded.
4.4 Now so far as the observations made by the High Court
that the appellant was not ready to deposit the amount of
compensation, it is submitted that the High Court ought to
have appreciated that as such there was a very valid
reason and/or justification for the APMC not to deposit the
entire amount of compensation. It is submitted that with
respect to the very land in question the proceedings under
15
the KLR Act were pending before the Land Reforms
Tribunal and the Tribunal had to take a call and/or
decision that the respondentTrust is holding any excess
vacant land or not and therefore, it was thought fit to wait
till the outcome of the proceedings under the Land
Reforms Act. It is submitted that the aforesaid reason
cannot be ascribed against the appellant on the ground
that the appellant was not ready to deposit/pay the
compensation.
4.5 It is further submitted that even the High Court has
materially erred in holding that possession in respect of 65
acres of land was illegal which was taken by invoking
urgency clause and not complying with the deposit of 80%
of compensation as required under Section 17 of the Act,
1894.
4.6 It is further submitted that as such in the impugned
judgment and order the High Court has not at all quashed
and set aside the notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the
Act, 1894 in respect of 172 acres and 100 acres of lands,
16
respectively. It is submitted that after some discussion on
the proceedings under the Act, 1894, the High Court has
straightway considered the applicability of the Act, 2013
and has held that the acquisitions in respect of both the
lands have lapsed under subsection (2) of Section 24 of
the Act, 2013.
4.7 Relying upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of this
Court reported in the case of Indore Development
(2020) 8 SCC 129, it is
Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Ors.,
submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed
by the High Court holding that the acquisitions have
lapsed under subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act,
2013, is not sustainable.
4.8 A number of submissions are sought to be made by Shri V.
Giri, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
appellant – APMC on repeal of the Act, 1894 in view of the
enactment of the Act, 2013 and the effect of the Act, 2013
on the acquisitions under the Act, 1894. However, for the
reasons stated hereinbelow and as the High Court has not
17
at all considered any of the submissions/issues on the
validity of the notifications issued under Section 4 and 6
and the High Court having considered and dealt with the
applicability of subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act,
2013 and having held that the acquisitions have lapsed
under subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, we
propose to remand the matter to the High Court to decide
the other issues raised afresh, in accordance with law and
on merits. Therefore, we have not dealt with any of the
submissions made by Shri V. Giri, learned Senior Advocate
and even Shri C.U. Singh, learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the respondent – Trust on merits on
other issues. Hence, we have restricted the consideration
of the present appeals to the impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court declaring that the
acquisitions have lapsed under subsection (2) of Section
24 of the Act, 2013.
5 Shri V.N. Raghupathy, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the State has supported the appellant – APMC.
He has stated that the Writ Appeal No.1089/21
18
challenging the judgment and order passed by the learned
Single Judge quashing and setting aside the order passed
by the Tribunal, is pending before the Division Bench of
the High Court. Therefore, it is prayed that if this
honourable Court proposes, to remand the matter to the
learned Single Judge, in that case, the aforesaid appeal be
directed to be heard first by the Division Bench of the High
Court.
6 All these appeals are vehemently opposed by Shri C.U.
Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
respondent – Trust – original land owner. It is submitted
that in the present case respondent – Trust is undertaking
various activities and running the ashram in furtherance
of the object of the Trust. It is submitted that respondent –
Trust is not an ordinary individual land owner. That the
Trust was established in the year 1960. It is submitted
that the lands in question was purchased in the year 1960
and the same is being used to carry out Gandhian
activities and in furtherance of the object of the Trust.
19
6.1 It is submitted that in the present case the High Court has
rightly observed that the State Government/APMC have no
intention of paying any compensation for the acquisition of
the subject lands and accordingly, chose to abandon the
acquisition of the lands or to allow the same deliberately to
lapse.
6.2 Shri Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of
respondent – Trust has also made elaborate submissions
on the legality and validity of the notifications under
section 4 and 6 of Act, 1894 in respect of the acquisitions
of 172 acres and 100 acres lands, respectively. However,
by the impugned judgment and order the High Court has
not declared and set aside the notifications under Section
4 and 6 of the Act, 1894 and has held and declared that
the acquisitions have lapsed under subsection (2) of
Section 24 of the Act, 2013 and the High Court has not at
all decided the other issues which were placed before it.
We propose not to deal with any of the submissions on
other issues on which there is no decision by the High
Court and we confine the present appeals to the decision
20
of the High Court declaring and holding that the
acquisitions have lapsed under subsection (2) of Section
24 of the Act, 2013 and for the other issues we propose to
remand the matter to the High Court.
6.3 Now so far as the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court holding and declaring that the acquisitions
have lapsed under subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act,
2013, Shri Singh learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of respondent – Trust has fairly conceded that in
view of the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of
Indore Development Authority (supra), the view taken by
the High Court that the acquisitions have lapsed under
subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 is
unsustainable. However, he has submitted that the
learned Single Judge and even the learned Division Bench
of the High Court were right in holding so, considering the
law prevailing at that time when the learned Single Judge
decided the matters. It is submitted that the learned Single
Judge followed the law prevailing at the relevant time and
the learned Single Judge decided the matters accordingly.
21
It is submitted that therefore no fault can be found with
the view taken by the learned Single Judge.
7 We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respective parties at length.
8 At the outset it is required to be noted that the proceedings
before the learned Single Judge of the High Court by way
of writ petition No. 3884 of 1998 was with respect to 172
acres 22 guntas of land acquired. In the writ petition No.
3884 of 1998, the original land owners prayed for the
following reliefs:
(i) Declare that the entire acquisition proceedings
commencing with the issue of a preliminary
notification gazette on 3.9.1994 marked as Annexure
A in the writ petition have lapsed on account of the
award not having been made within a period of two
years in terms of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition
Act.
(ii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or
direction to quash AnnexureA, the preliminary
notification LAQ (2) SR/32/9495 DATED 2.9.1994
PUBLISHE DIN TH Karnataka Gazette dated 3.9.1994
and Annexure the final notification No. RDD 21 LAQ
96 dated 10.10.1996 published in the Karnataka
Gazette dated 31. l 0.1996.
By way of amendment the original writ petitioners – original
land owners also prayed to declare that the acquisition
22
proceedings are deemed to have lapsed in view of the
provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013.
8.1 Writ petition Nos. 3714037146 of 2000 filed by the original
writ petitioners – original land owners was with respect to
100 acres of acquired land. In the said writ petitions original
writ petitioners prayed for the following reliefs:
(i) Issue a Writ of certiorari or any other writ or order,
quashing the impugned notification at AnnexureB
dated 13.04.1999 gazetted on 17.04.1999 in LAC(2) SR
2/992000 issued by the second respondent and also
the notification at AnnexureC dated 26.10.1999
gazetted on 18.11.1999 in No. Kam.E.68.AQ899
issued by the first respondent.
OR
(ii) In the alternative direct the respondents to pay
compensation to the petitioner in terms of the
proceedings of the meeting dated 29.04.1999 Vide
AnnexureD
By way of amendment the original writ petitioners also
prayed to declare the acquisition proceedings having been
lapsed under the provisions of the Act, 2013.
8.2 That the learned Single Judge framed the following common
points for consideration:
a. Whether the disposal of these petitioners should
be deferred pending adjudication and
determination by the Land Tribunal, Bangalore
North Taluk of the excess holdings or otherwise
23
under the provisions of the Karnataka Land
Reforms Act, 1961 of the very lands which are
the subject matter herein.
b. Whether the possession of a portion of the lands
in question having said to have been given to
APMC can be said to be valid and in accordance
with law.
c. Whether the invocation of Section 17 of the LA
Act in the acquisition of a portion of the lands
for the same purpose was justified.
d. Whether the acquiring authority could keeping
abeyance the mandate to pay or deposit the
compensation amount pending disposal of the
proceedings before the Land Tribunal in respect
of the lands.
e. Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed
by virtue of the 2013 Act.
Despite the fact that a number of issues/grounds were
raised before the High Court on the legality and validity of
the acquisition proceedings, the learned Single Judge
decided only one issue, namely, whether the acquisition
proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013 Act.
Whereas a number of issues/grounds were raised and as
such the original reliefs sought (acquisition proceedings
under Act 1894) were the main reliefs which were required
to be dealt with and considered, unfortunately, the learned
Single Judge did not give findings on the other
issues/grounds and on the reliefs sought and as observed
24
hereinabove, disposed of the writ petitions considering
only one relief/ground, namely, whether the acquisition
proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013 Act. When a
number of submissions were made on the other
issues/grounds, we are of the opinion that the High Court
ought to have considered the other issues and ought to
have given the findings on other issues also. Because of
not deciding the other issues and deciding the matter only
on one issue and thereafter when the decision on such one
issue, is held to be bad in law for the reasons stated
hereinbelow, this Court has no other alternative but to
remand the matters to the learned Single Judge for
deciding the Writ Petitions afresh on all other issues.
8.3 By way of analogy we observe that while considering Order
14 Rule 2 (as amended w.e.f. 01.02.1977), this Court in
the case of
Nusli Neville Wadia Vs. Ivory Properties &
Ors , (2020) 6 SCC 557, has observed and held that after
the amendment w.e.f. 01.02.1977, though Order 14 Rule
2(2) enables the court to decide the issue of law as a
preliminary issue in case the same relates to (i) jurisdiction
of court or (ii) a bar to suit created by any law for the time
25
being in force, a departure has been made in amended
provision whereby now it mandates the court to pronounce
judgment on all issues notwithstanding that a case may be
disposed of on a preliminary issue. It is further observed
that intendment behind this departure is to avoid remand
in an appealable case for deciding other issues.
8.4 Therefore, the courts should adjudicate on all the issues
and give its findings on all the issues and not to
pronounce the judgment only on one of the issues. As
such it is the duty cast upon the courts to adjudicate on
all the issues and pronounce the judgment on all the
issues rather than adopting a shortcut approach and
pronouncing the judgment on only one issue. By such a
practice, it would increase the burden on the appellate
court and in many cases if the decision on the issue
decided is found to be erroneous and on other issues there
is no adjudication and no findings recorded by the court,
the appellate court will have no option but to remand the
matter for its fresh decision. Therefore, to avoid such an
eventuality, the courts have to adjudicate on all the issues
26
raised in a case and render findings and the judgment on
all the issues involved.
9 Now, so far as the impugned common judgment and order
passed by the High Court declaring that the acquisition
proceedings have lapsed under subsection (2) of Section
24 of the Act, 2013, is concerned, the same is
unsustainable in view of the decision of the Constitution
bench of this Court in the case of Indore Development
Authority (supra). This Court has concluded in paragraph
365 and 366 as under:
Resultantly, the decision rendered in
“365. Pune
Municipal Corpn. [ Pune Municipal
Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki , (2014) 3 SCC
183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is hereby overruled and
all other decisions in which Pune Municipal
Corpn. [ Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal
Solanki , (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274]
has been followed, are also overruled. The decision
in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. [ Sree Balaji
Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of T.N. , (2015) 3 SCC
353 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 298] cannot be said to be
laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions
following the same are also overruled. In Indore
Development Authority v. Shailendra [ Indore
Development Authority v. Shailendra , (2018) 3 SCC 412
: (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 426] , the aspect with respect to
the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether “or” has to be
read as “nor” or as “and” was not placed for
consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot
prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present
judgment.
27
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer
366.
the questions as under:
Under the provisions of Section 24(1)( a ) in case
366.1.
the award is not made as on 112014, the date of
commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of
proceedings. Compensation has to be determined
under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
366.2. In case the award has been passed within the
window period of five years excluding the period
covered by an interim order of the court, then
proceedings shall continue as provided under Section
24(1)( b ) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has
not been repealed.
366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between
possession and compensation has to be read as “nor”
or as “and”. The deemed lapse of land acquisition
proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes
place where due to inaction of authorities for five years
or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the
possession of land has not been taken nor
compensation has been paid. In other words, in case
possession has been taken, compensation has not
been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if
compensation has been paid, possession has not been
taken then there is no lapse.
366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a
deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of
nondeposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2)
in case it has not been deposited with respect to
majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries
(landowners) as on the date of notification for land
acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be
entitled to compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation
under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the
said Act can be granted. Nondeposit of compensation
(in court) does not result in the lapse of land
acquisition proceedings. In case of nondeposit with
respect to the majority of holdings for five years or
more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid
28
to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for
land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
366.5. In case a person has been tendered the
compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the
1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that
acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non
payment or nondeposit of compensation in court. The
obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount
under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused
to accept compensation or who sought reference for
higher compensation, cannot claim that the
acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act.
366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is
to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of
Section 24(1)( b ).
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894
Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by
drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award
has been passed on taking possession under Section
16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no
divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act,
as once possession has been taken there is no lapse
under Section 24(2).
366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a
deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case
authorities have failed due to their inaction to take
possession and pay compensation for five years or
more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a
proceeding for land acquisition pending with the
authority concerned as on 112014. The period of
subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to
be excluded in the computation of five years.
366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise
to new cause of action to question the legality of
concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24
applies to a proceeding pending on the date of
enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 112014. It does not
revive stale and timebarred claims and does not
reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to
question the legality of mode of taking possession to
reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of
29
compensation in the treasury instead of court to
invalidate acquisition.”
We wish to emphasise that this Court has opined that
all judgments rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal
Corporation Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [(2014)
3 SCC 183] are overruled in view of the interpretation
made to Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, in Indore
Development Authority (supra). There has been a trend
of land owners filing fresh cases seeking lapse of
acquisition on the basis of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013,
although such land owners may have earlier
unsuccessfully filed writ petitions challenging the
acquisition notifications. Such land owners may have had
the benefit of interim orders of stay of further proceedings
in the acquisition process or dispossession resulting in a
delay in the making of the award and payment/deposit of
the compensation and consequently in taking over
possession of the acquired land. There being a delay in the
passing of the award owing to interim orders granted by
the High Court or even by the civil courts, where suits may
30
have been filed against acquiring bodies, the land owners
cannot now take advantage of the same so as to contend
that no award has been made and consequently there has
been no payment or deposit of the compensation and that
possession of the acquired land continues with them. The
land owners having had the benefit of interim orders
granted in their favour in proceedings initiated by them
against the acquisition cannot take benefit under Section
24(2) of the Act, 2013. The High Court or the civil courts
which may have granted interim orders in favour of the
land owners, ought to consider the aforesaid aspect before
applying Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 in favour of the
land owners.
10 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of
Indore Development Authority (supra) to the facts of the
case on hand, the view taken by the High Court while
declaring the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under
subsection (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013, is
unsustainable and is just contrary to the law laid down by
this Court in the case Indore Development Authority
31
(supra). Even the same is also not disputed by Shri C. U.
Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
original writ petitioners – original land owners. Therefore,
the common judgment and order passed by the High Court
allowing the writ petitions and declaring that the
acquisition proceedings with respect to the lands in
question have lapsed under subsection (2) of section 24 of
the Act, 2013 cannot stand and the same deserve to be
quashed and set aside.
11 As observed hereinabove, though a number of other issues
were raised on the legality of the acquisition proceedings
under the Act, 1894 and though other points for
consideration were raised/framed by the High Court
reproduced hereinabove, since none of the issues are
adjudicated by the High Court on merits, we have no other
alternative but to remand the matter to the learned Single
Judge for deciding the writ petitions afresh and to
adjudicate on all the other issues, other than the lapse of
acquisitions under subsection (2) of section 24 of the Act,
2013. At the cost of repetition, we observe that the High
32
Court ought to have adjudicated on all the issues raised
and ought not to have decided and disposed of the writ
petitions, adjudicating only on one issue which has been
found to be erroneous. The Division Bench has also not
applied its mind to this aspect of the matter and has
simply dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant herein.
12 In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated
above, all these appeals are allowed. The impugned
common judgment and order passed by the Division Bench
of the High Court as well as the common judgment and
order passed by the High Court in writ petition(s) No.
3884/1998 and Nos. 3714037146/2000 are hereby
quashed and set aside. The matters are remitted back to
the learned Single Judge to decide and dispose of the
aforesaid writ petitions afresh and in accordance with law
and on their own merits. The learned Single Judge to
adjudicate all other issues which were framed reproduced
hereinabove and pronounce the judgment on all the points
framed for consideration. The aforesaid exercise shall be
33
completed within a period of twelve months from the date
of receipt of the present order.
It is made clear that we have not expressed anything
on the merits of these cases, in favour of either of the
parties on other issues and it is ultimately for the learned
Single Judge to deal with and consider the same in
accordance with law and on their own merits. It is also
made clear that on remand the learned Single Judge to
adjudicate and pronounce the judgment on all other issues
except the issue with respect to the lapse of the acquisition
proceedings by virtue of the Act, 2013. All the appeals are
allowed accordingly.
We also observe and direct that Writ Appeal No.1089 of
2021 be heard first and to be decided and disposed of on
or before 31.12.2022. There shall be no order as to costs.
…………………………………J.
(M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi,
March 22, 2022.
34