Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 1460
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 914 OF 2025
RANJEET BABURAO NIMBALKAR ….PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution assails an
administrative notification issued by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay appointing Kolhapur as a place at which the Judges and Division
Courts of the said High Court may sit. The impugned notification, bearing
No. P.0108/2025 dated 01.08.2025, has been issued on the administrative
side of the High Court in exercise of the power conferred by Section 51(3)
of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, with the approval of the Governor
of the State of Maharashtra. It is the case of the respondents, as borne out
from the material placed on record, that the said arrangement was made
operational with effect from 18.08.2025.
2. The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, established in 1862, has
Signature Not Verified
historically exercised jurisdiction over an extensive and geographically
Digitally signed by
RASHI GUPTA
Date: 2025.12.18
18:04:44 IST
Reason:
diverse region. Following the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and the
reorganisation of States in 1960, the statute provided a framework enabling
Page 1 of 25
High Courts to hold sittings away from the principal seat where
considerations of convenience and effective administration so warranted. In
that backdrop, the Bench at Nagpur continued as a permanent Bench upon
the formation of the State of Maharashtra. Thereafter, by notification dated
27.08.1981, the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court appointed
Aurangabad as an additional place of sitting under Section 51(3), which
arrangement was later converted into a permanent Bench by a Presidential
Order under Section 51(2) with effect from 27.08.1984. A permanent Bench
at Panaji was also established in 1981 following the extension of the High
Court’s jurisdiction to the State of Goa. These arrangements demonstrate
that the statutory scheme has, in the past, been utilised to respond to distance,
volume of litigation, and the demands of access to justice.
3. Prior to its merger with the then Province of Bombay in 01.03.1949,
Kolhapur is stated to have functioned as the seat of the High Court and the
Supreme Court of the former Kolhapur State. After integration, the districts
forming the southern and south-western region of the present State of
Maharashtra came within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. Over
the decades, representations were made by the Bar and litigant bodies from
Kolhapur, Sangli, Satara, Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg seeking a High Court
sitting in this region, pointing to distance from the principal seat and the
absence of a proximate forum for adjudication of disputes to be resolved by
High Court, despite a steady inflow of cases from these districts.
4. The record placed before this Court indicates that, after administrative
consideration on feasibility and availability of infrastructure, a proposal was
formulated by the High Court for appointing Kolhapur as an additional place
of sitting. The proposal contemplated that cases arising from the districts of
Kolhapur, Sangli, Satara, Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg would be assigned to
the Kolhapur sitting in accordance with administrative directions of the
Chief Justice. It is the case of the respondents that the proposal received the
Page 2 of 25
approval of the Governor of Maharashtra on 30.07.2025, following which
Notification No. P.0108/2025 dated 01.08.2025 was issued. The present writ
petition questions the legality and constitutional validity of this
administrative decision and prays for quashing of the notification and for a
restraint on the High Court from holding sittings at Kolhapur.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
5. Learned Senior counsel, Shri Balbir Singh, appearing for the petitioner has
assailed the impugned notification and has sought to demonstrate that the
decision to designate Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting of the
Bombay High Court suffers from fundamental legal infirmities. The
principal submission advanced is that Section 51(3) of the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 was never intended to be utilised as a vehicle for
establishing what is, in effect, a permanent additional Bench of a High
Court. According to the petitioner, Parliament has consciously drawn a
distinction between sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 51. While
sub-section (2) contemplates the establishment of permanent Benches
through a Presidential order after due consultation with constitutional
authorities, sub-section (3) is urged to be a limited provision meant to
address temporary or exceptional exigencies. The petitioner contends that
the use of Section 51(3) to create an enduring institutional arrangement
amounts to doing indirectly what the statute requires to be done directly
under sub-section (2), thereby defeating the legislative intent.
6. The learned Senior counsel further contended that the decision-making
process is vitiated by lack of adequate consultation. The Senior counsel
submits that the establishment of an additional place of sitting of a High
Court has long-term institutional consequences and therefore cannot be
reduced to a unilateral administrative act of the Chief Justice. Emphasis is
Page 3 of 25
placed on the absence of Full Court deliberation, and it is urged that the
consultative role of judges, recognised in judicial precedents, has been
ignored. Reliance is placed on Federation of Bar Associations in
1
Karnataka v. Union of India , to contend that consultation is not merely a
matter of prudence but an institutional necessity.
7. The Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner further draws our attention to
the administrative history of similar proposals in the State of Maharashtra.
It is submitted that proposals for establishing additional Benches were
considered and rejected by committees of judges in the past, notably in the
years 1996, 1997, 2006 and 2018, and that these views were accepted by the
Full Court. According to the learned counsel, in the absence of any
demonstrated change in the circumstances or reconsideration by the Full
Court, the abrupt reversal of position in 2025 renders the decision arbitrary
and unexplained.
8.
The learned Senior Counsel on the aspect of Article 14 submits that the
selection of Kolhapur, to the exclusion of other regions such as Pune or
Solapur which have also articulated demands for High Court sittings,
amounts to discriminatory treatment without a rational basis. It is argued that
no comparative study or objective criteria have been disclosed, giving rise
to a legitimate apprehension that the decision is driven by local pressures
rather than neutral considerations.
9. Further invoking Article 21, the Senior Counsel petitioner argues that
judicial resources are finite and that the establishment of an additional High
Court sitting diverts judges and infrastructure away from the already
overburdened District judiciary. It is contended that access to justice is not
advanced merely by proximity to a High Court, and that strengthening trial
courts would better serve the constitutional mandate.
1
(2000) 6 SCC 715
Page 4 of 25
10. Finally, the Learned Senior counsel places reliance on developments in the
State of Karnataka, particularly the process preceding the establishment of
Benches at Dharwad and Kalaburagi, where committees were constituted,
data was gathered, and extensive consultations were undertaken. The
petitioner submits that the absence of a similarly elaborate and transparent
process in the present case renders the impugned decision procedurally
deficient.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
11. Learned Solicitor General of India, Shri Tushar Mehta, along with Advocate
– on – record, Shri Sandeep Deshmukh, appearing for the second
respondent, namely the High Court administration and Learned Counsel Shri
Shrirang Varma for the State of Maharashtra, have vehemently defended the
impugned notification and have urged that the challenge proceeds on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the statutory and constitutional
framework.
12. Learned Solicitor General further submitted that Section 51(3) of the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 is an independent and continuing source of power,
deliberately vested by Parliament in the Chief Justice of the High Court to
appoint additional places of sitting for the more convenient transaction of
judicial business. Reliance is placed on the authoritative pronouncement of
2
this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik , which
upheld the establishment of the Aurangabad Bench under the very same
provision.
13.
Learned Solicitor General emphasised that the Chief Justice occupies a
unique constitutional position as the head of the High Court and the
custodian of its administration. Decisions relating to sittings of the Court fall
2
(1982) 3 SCC 519
Page 5 of 25
squarely within this administrative domain. Citing Federation of Bar
3
Associations in Karnataka and State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand , it
is submitted that the Chief Justice’s opinion is, in law, the opinion of the
High Court, and that courts must be slow to interfere with such decisions
absent mala fides or statutory violation.
14. As regards consultation, the Learned Solicitor General submitted that
Section 51(3) expressly requires only the approval of the Governor and does
not mandate any particular form of internal consultation or Full Court
approval. While internal deliberation is a matter of sound institutional
practice, its absence, even if assumed, cannot vitiate the exercise of a
statutory power. Learned Solicitor General submitted that, in fact, the
decision was preceded by representations, administrative consideration,
committee deliberation, and verification of feasibility, as borne out by the
record.
15.
Learned Solicitor General also contended that past administrative views do
not create an estoppel. Administrative and policy decisions are necessarily
contextual and may be revisited in the light of changed circumstances,
accumulated demand, and improved infrastructure. The delay in acceding to
the demand for an additional sitting, far from suggesting arbitrariness,
demonstrates institutional caution.
16. On the constitutional challenge under Article 14, Learned Solicitor General
submitted that the establishment of an additional place of sitting of a High
Court is not a matter of conferring any benefit or favour. Article 14 does not
compel the State or the High Court to address all regional demands
simultaneously. So long as there exists a rational basis for the choice of
location, the decision cannot be invalidated merely because another location
could also have been chosen.
3
(1998) 1 SCC 1
Page 6 of 25
17. With regard to Article 21, the Learned Solicitor General submitted that
access to justice encompasses physical accessibility and that
decentralisation of High Court sittings furthers, rather than frustrates, this
constitutional guarantee. Questions of resource allocation, it is urged, lie in
the realm of policy and are beyond the scope of judicial review.
IV. ANALYSIS
18. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced
before us. At the threshold, it must be noted that, on a plain reading of the
pleadings, this writ petition could well have been dismissed in limine , as it
does not disclose any clear infringement of a fundamental right warranting
interference under Article 32 of the Constitution. Even assuming the petition
is framed as one under Articles 14 and 21, the challenge is essentially to an
administrative arrangement within statutory bounds, and does not disclose
any enforceable fundamental right to prevent an additional place of sitting.
However, having regard to the nature of the issues raised, which touch upon
the scope of Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and the
broader contours of judicial administration, we have considered it
appropriate to examine the challenge on merits and to record our reasons in
some detail, so that the position in law stands clarified and future
controversy on the subject is set at rest. Before we proceed to analyse the
rival contentions, it would therefore be appropriate to indicate the broad
heads under which the issues arising in the present writ petition fall for
consideration and under which we propose to deal with them. The heads that
we propose to examine the controversy before us are:
I. CONSTRUCTION AND SCOPE OF SECTION 51(3) OF THE
STATES REORGANISATION ACT, 1956
Page 7 of 25
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND THE QUESTION OF CONSULTATION
III. EFFECT OF PAST ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS AND
SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN APPROACH
IV. LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MATTERS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
V. CHALLENGE UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND 21:
ARBITRARINESS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
RE: ISSUE I - CONSTRUCTION AND SCOPE OF SECTION 51(3) OF
THE STATES REORGANISATION ACT, 1956
19. The controversy before us turns fundamentally on the true construction of
Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, and, more particularly,
on the nature and amplitude of the power conferred upon the Chief Justice
under sub-section (3) thereof. Any meaningful adjudication of the
petitioner’s challenge must therefore commence with a careful examination
of the statutory scheme, read not in isolation, but in the context of the object
sought to be achieved by Parliament while reorganising States and
restructuring High Courts.
20. The States Reorganisation Act, 1956 was enacted in exercise of the
constituent power of Parliament under Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution.
It was not a temporary or transitory enactment designed merely to facilitate
the immediate aftermath of reorganisation, but a permanent legislative
framework intended to govern the institutional functioning of High Courts
in newly constituted States over time. The provisions of Part V of the Act,
dealing with High Courts, were crafted with a clear appreciation of the fact
that judicial administration is a dynamic process, responsive to demographic
shifts, regional needs and evolving patterns of litigation. Section 51
Page 8 of 25
embodies this legislative design. For context, we have reproduced Section
51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 below:
“Section 51. Principal seat and other places of sitting of High
Courts for new States.
(1) The principal seat of the High Court for a new State shall be at
such place as the President may, by notified order, appoint.
(2) The President may, after consultation with the Governor of a new
State and the Chief Justice of the High Court for that State, by
notified order, provide for the establishment of a permanent bench
or benches of that High Court at one or more places within the State
other than the principal seat of the High Court and for any matters
connected therewith.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2), the Judges and division courts of the High Court for a
new State may also sit at such other place or places in that State as
the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor, appoint .”
21. Sub-section (1) of Section 51 of the Act empowers the President to appoint
the principal seat of the High Court for a new State. Sub-section (2)
contemplates the establishment of permanent Benches by Presidential order
after consultation with constitutional authorities, a process that necessarily
entails a formal allocation of territorial jurisdiction. Sub-section (3),
however, stands on a distinct footing. It opens with a non obstante clause
and authorises the Chief Justice, with the approval of the Governor, to
appoint “such other place or places” at which the Judges and Division
Courts of the High Court may also sit.
22.
The presence of the non obstante clause is not accidental. It reflects a
conscious legislative choice to preserve, in the Chief Justice, a residuary and
overriding authority to organise the sittings of the High Court in a manner
that best subserves the “more convenient transaction of judicial business” .
Parliament evidently recognised that the needs of access to justice may arise
incrementally and unpredictably, and that the judicial institution must
Page 9 of 25
possess the flexibility to respond without being encumbered by rigid
procedural formalities.
23. It would therefore be inconsistent with the text and purpose of Section 51(3)
to read into it any temporary limitation or to construe it as a provision meant
only for exceptional or short-term exigencies. The statute does not speak in
such restricted terms. On the contrary, read with Section 14 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897, which embodies the principle that a statutory power may
be exercised from time to time unless a contrary intention appears, Section
51(3) clearly admits of repeated and continuing exercise as circumstances
so demand. This interpretation is not res integra. In State of Maharashtra v.
4
Narayan Shamrao Puranik , this Court was confronted with a challenge
strikingly similar to the one before us, arising out of the establishment of the
Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court under Section 51(3).
Repelling the argument that Section 51 was a spent provision or that the
power under sub-section (3) had exhausted itself, the Court held in clear
terms that the Act of 1956 is a permanent statute and that the powers
conferred by it are capable of being exercised as and when the exigencies of
judicial administration so require. Since the ratio of that decision rests
substantially on the reasoning contained in paragraph 25 of the judgment,
we consider it proper to reproduce the same in extenso:
“25. It is clear upon the terms of Section 51 of the Act that
undoubtedly the President has the power under sub-section (1) to
appoint the principal seat of the High Court for a new State.
Likewise, the power of the President under sub-section (2) thereof,
“after consultation with the Governor of a new State and the Chief
Justice of the High Court for that State, pertains to the establishment
of a permanent Bench or Benches of that High Court of a new State
at one or more places within the State other than the place where the
principal seat of the High Court is located and for any matters
connected therewith” clearly confer power on the President to
define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation
to the principal seat as also for the conferment of exclusive
4
(1982) 3 SCC 519
Page 10 of 25
jurisdiction to such permanent Bench to hear cases arising in
districts falling within its jurisdiction. The creation of a permanent
Bench under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act must therefore
bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court. Under sub-
section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act the President
has to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers as ordained by
Article 74(1) of the Constitution. In both the matters the decision lies
with the Central Government. In contrast, the power of the Chief
Justice to appoint under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act the
sittings of the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court for a
new State at places other than the place of the principal seat or the
permanent Bench is in the unquestioned domain of the Chief Justice,
the only condition being that he must act with the approval of the
Governor. It is basically an internal matter pertaining to the High
Court. He has full-power, authority and jurisdiction in the matter of
allocation of business of the High Court which flows not only from
the provision contained in sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act
but inheres in him in the very nature of things. The opinion of the
Chief Justice to appoint the seat of the High Court for a new State at
a place other than the principal seat under sub-section (3) of Section
51 of the Act must therefore normally prevail because it is for the
more convenient transaction of judicial business. The non obstante
clause contained in sub-section (3) of Section 51 gives an overriding
effect to the power of the Chief Justice. There is no territorial
bifurcation of the High Court merely because the Chief Justice
directs under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act that the Judges
and Division Courts shall also sit at such other places as he may,
with the approval of the Governor, appoint. It must accordingly be
held that there was no territorial bifurcation of the Bombay High
Court merely because the Chief Justice by the impugned notification
issued under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act directed that the
Judges and Division Courts shall also sit at Aurangabad. The Judges
and Division Courts at Aurangabad are part of the same High Court
as those at the principal seat at Bombay and they exercise
jurisdiction as Judges of the High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad.
The Chief Justice acted within the scope of his powers. We see no
substance in the charge that the impugned notification issued by the
Chief Justice under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act was a
colourable exercise of power.”
24. More importantly, Puranik (supra) undertook a careful doctrinal distinction
between the powers under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 51. The Court
explained that the establishment of a permanent Bench under sub-section (2)
necessarily brings about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court,
accompanied by a formal conferment of exclusive jurisdiction. By contrast,
Page 11 of 25
an appointment under sub-section (3) does not effect any such bifurcation.
Judges sitting at an additional place under Section 51(3) continue to function
as Judges of the same High Court, exercising its jurisdiction as allocated by
the Chief Justice.
25. The significance of this distinction lies in understanding the true character
of the petitioner’s grievance. The longevity or continuity of a place of sitting
appointed under Section 51(3) does not, by itself, convert the exercise of
power into one under Section 51(2). Permanence, in the sense urged by the
petitioner, is not a statutory criterion under sub-section (3). What is
determinative is not the duration of the sitting, but the absence of territorial
bifurcation and the retention of administrative control with the Chief Justice.
26. This Court in Puranik was categorical in rejecting the allegation that the
exercise of power under Section 51(3) amounted to a colourable device to
circumvent the procedure prescribed under sub-section (2). The Court
emphasised that the Chief Justice’s decision to appoint Aurangabad as a
place of sitting was an internal matter pertaining to the High Court, taken
for the convenience of litigants and the efficient transaction of judicial
business. That reasoning applies with equal force to the present case.
27. Once it is accepted, as it must be, that Section 51(3) confers an independent
and continuing power on the Chief Justice, the petitioner’s argument of
indirect permanence loses much of its force. Courts cannot import into the
statute a limitation which the legislature has consciously chosen not to enact.
To do so would be to substitute judicial apprehension for legislative
judgment, a course impermissible in constitutional adjudication.
28. It becomes necessary, at this stage, to advert to the role of the Union
Government within the statutory framework of Section 51 of the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956. The petitioner’s challenge appears to be that the
decision to designate Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting of the High
Page 12 of 25
Court ought to have engaged the Central Government in a more direct or
determinative manner. Such an assumption, however, does not accord with
the scheme of the statute. Section 51 itself draws a clear and deliberate
distinction between different categories of decisions concerning the location
and sittings of High Courts. Where Parliament contemplated the
establishment of a permanent Bench involving territorial bifurcation and
enduring structural consequences, it expressly vested the power in the
President under sub-section (2), to be exercised after consultation with the
Governor and the Chief Justice, thereby ensuring Central Government
participation. In contradistinction, sub-section (3) consciously excludes any
role for the Union executive and vests the power in the Chief Justice of the
High Court, subject only to the approval of the Governor. This
differentiation is deliberate. It reflects a legislative judgment that matters
relating to internal judicial administration and the convenient transaction of
judicial business, which do not alter the constitutional identity or territorial
structure of the High Court, should be entrusted to judicial leadership at the
State level and insulated from unnecessary executive involvement. Once
Parliament has thus demarcated the field, it is not open to the Court, under
the guise of interpretation, to reintroduce Central Government participation
where the statute has deliberately chosen not to provide for it.
29. An argument may nonetheless be advanced that recognising the Chief
Justice’s authority under Section 51(3) would render sub-sections (1) and
(2) redundant.. Such an apprehension, though understandable at first blush,
rests upon a misapprehension of the legislative architecture. Section 51 does
not create overlapping or competing reservoirs of power; rather, it embodies
a graded and carefully calibrated distribution of authority, each sub-section
operating in its own sphere and addressing a distinct institutional
requirement. Sub-section (1) performs a constitutional function by fixing the
principal seat of the High Court, a determination that bears upon the very
Page 13 of 25
identity of the Court and therefore lies within the exclusive domain of the
Union Government acting through the President. Sub-section (2) operates at
a structural level, enabling the establishment of permanent Benches with
defined territorial jurisdiction, a step that entails enduring reconfiguration of
judicial geography and necessarily warrants involvement of Central
Government after consultation of constitutional authorities. These
provisions remain vital and continue to govern decisions of foundational and
structural significance.
30. Sub-section (3), by contrast, operates in a different sphere. It is designed to
confer functional and administrative flexibility upon the High Court, acting
through its Chief Justice, to organise the sittings of Judges for the more
convenient transaction of judicial business, without effecting any territorial
bifurcation or altering the constitutional character of the Court. The power
under Section 51(3) neither supplants nor dilutes the roles envisaged under
sub-sections (1) and (2); it complements them by addressing a separate
category of decisions rooted in considerations of access, convenience and
institutional responsiveness. Even where a place of sitting appointed under
sub-section (3) continues over a long period, it does not, by that fact alone,
acquire the attributes of a permanent Bench under sub-section (2), for it
remains subject to administrative control, does not confer exclusive
territorial jurisdiction, and does not alter the High Court’s jurisdictional
identity. Read as a whole, Section 51 represents a coherent statutory scheme
in which constitutional authority, structural oversight and administrative
discretion are deliberately distributed across different constitutional actors.
The recognition of the Chief Justice’s power under Section 51(3) thus
preserves, rather than undermines, the relevance and purpose of sub-sections
(1) and (2).
Page 14 of 25
RE: ISSUE II - ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICE AND THE QUESTION OF CONSULTATION
31. Having considered the statutory source of the power under Section 51(3), it
becomes necessary to state that power within the broader constitutional
framework governing the administration of High Courts. The statute vests
the authority to appoint additional places of sitting with the Chief Justice
not by accident, but by design. The Chief Justice is the head of the High
Court, entrusted not merely with adjudicatory functions, but with the
responsibility of ensuring that the institution functions efficiently,
coherently and in a manner that best serves the ends of justice.
32. The administration of a High Court is an essential part of its constitutional
functioning. Decisions concerning where the Court sits, how work is
distributed, and how litigants access the Court are not merely matters of
convenience, but matters of institutional responsibility. Such decisions can
only be taken by one who is closely acquainted with the Court’s docket, the
nature and volume of litigation, the strength of the Bar, and the practical
difficulties faced by litigants across regions. It is for this reason that
Parliament has entrusted this authority to the Chief Justice of the High Court,
who, as the head of the institution, bears responsibility both for preserving
judicial independence and for ensuring the effective administration of
justice. This understanding finds consistent affirmation in the jurisprudence
of this Court. In Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka v. Union of
5
India , the Court underscored that the Chief Justice is the “important
consultee” in matters relating to the establishment of Benches, and when he
expresses an opinion, it is not his personal view but the institutional opinion
of the High Court. The Court cautioned against dissecting a High Court on
5
(2000) 6 SCC 715
Page 15 of 25
emotional, sentimental or parochial considerations, and emphasised that no
Bench should be established contrary to the opinion of the Chief Justice.
33. A similar view has been taken by the Madras High Court in R. Suresh
6
Kumar v. Union of India , which arose in the context of the establishment
of the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court. The challenge before the
Court was that the High Court could not sit at a place other than its principal
seat without a fresh constitutional or legislative mandate. The Madras High
Court rejected this contention, holding that Section 51 of the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 provides a complete statutory framework for High
Courts to function at places other than their principal seat. The Court
observed that such arrangements do not fragment the High Court or dilute
its jurisdiction, but are intended to reduce hardship to litigants and facilitate
the administration of justice. It was emphasised that access to justice is a
relevant consideration in organising the sittings of the Court. It is also
relevant to note that the Special Leave Petition filed against the said
judgment was dismissed by this Court. While such dismissal does not
amount to a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, it lends
finality to the judgment and adds weight to the view that Section 51 validly
enables High Courts to sit at additional places in appropriate cases.
34. This Court has consistently recognised that the internal administration of a
High Court must be guided by a single point of authority. Subjecting such
decisions to multiple or parallel influences would inevitably lead to
uncertainty and inefficiency. The Chief Justice’s primacy in administrative
matters is thus a function of his position as the head of the High Court and
the responsibility is entrusted to him under the constitutional and statutory
scheme.
6
2004 SCC OnLine Mad 212
Page 16 of 25
35. It is in this context that the petitioner’s argument regarding lack of
consultation must be examined. There can be no quarrel with the proposition
that consultation within the High Court is a matter of sound institutional
practice. Indeed, it is only natural that a Chief Justice, while exercising
administrative powers of this nature, would take into account the views of
his puisne judges, the needs of the Bar, and the logistical realities of the
institution. Such deliberation enriches decision-making and reflects
collective wisdom. However, the crucial distinction that must be borne in
mind is between what is desirable as a matter of prudence and what is
mandated as a matter of law. Section 51(3) expressly requires only the
approval of the Governor. It does not stipulate consultation with the Full
Court, nor does it prescribe any particular consultative mechanism. Where
Parliament has intended consultation to be mandatory, as in Section 51(2),
it has said so in explicit terms. The deliberate absence of such a requirement
in sub-section (3) cannot be supplied by judicial interpretation. To judicially
impose a requirement of Full Court approval or to insist upon a particular
form of internal consultation would be to transgress the limits of
interpretation and to trench upon legislative prerogative. Courts must be
cautious not to elevate norms of good governance into inflexible legal
commands, lest the flexibility essential to effective judicial administration
be unduly constrained.
36. This Court has, in other contexts as well, drawn a clear distinction between
consultation as a constitutional or statutory mandate and consultation as an
7
administrative convention. In State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand , it was
reiterated that the Chief Justice is the master of the roster and that the
allocation of judicial work is an exclusive prerogative of the Chief Justice.
That principle extends, in substance, to decisions concerning the sittings of
7
(1998) 1 SCC 1
Page 17 of 25
the Court, which are intimately connected with the distribution and
management of judicial work.
37. In the present case, there is no material to suggest that the Chief Justice acted
unilaterally in disregard of institutional inputs or relevant considerations.
Even assuming that the consultative process did not conform to the
petitioner’s expectations, that circumstance by itself would not vitiate the
exercise of power under Section 51(3). Ultimately, the statute entrusts the
decision to the Chief Justice, subject to the approval of the Governor, and
once those requirements are satisfied, the Court would be slow to interfere
in the absence of mala fides or manifest illegality.
RE: ISSUE III - EFFECT OF PAST ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
AND SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN APPROACH
38. Considerable emphasis was placed by the petitioner on the circumstance
that, on earlier occasions, proposals for establishing additional Benches or
places of sitting of the High Court in the State of Maharashtra were
examined and not accepted. Reference was made to committee reports and
administrative deliberations undertaken in the years 1996, 1997, 2006 and
2018, and it was urged that these earlier views, having been accepted at the
relevant point of time, ought to operate as a restraint on the present exercise
of power. According to the petitioner, in the absence of a formal
reconsideration by the Full Court, any departure from those earlier decisions
renders the impugned notification arbitrary.
39. The submission proceeds on an incorrect premise. Administrative decisions
of this nature do not stand on the same footing as judicial determinations.
They are taken having regard to the circumstances prevailing at a given point
of time, including the volume and distribution of litigation, availability of
infrastructure, logistical feasibility, and the broader needs of the justice
Page 18 of 25
delivery system. Such decisions are necessarily contextual and are not
intended to operate as permanent or inflexible conclusions.
40. It is well settled that administrative and policy decisions do not attain finality
for all time to come. They remain open to reconsideration as circumstances
evolve. The passage of time, the accumulation of demand, improvement in
infrastructure, changes in connectivity, and shifts in litigation patterns may
legitimately warrant a fresh assessment. A subsequent decision taking a
different view, when informed by changed conditions, does not, by itself,
render the exercise arbitrary or unreasonable.
41. This principle assumes particular relevance in matters of judicial
administration. Each Chief Justice exercises administrative authority in trust
for the institution, guided by the conditions prevailing during his or her
tenure. While past decisions and reports may constitute valuable inputs, they
do not operate as a legal bar or create an estoppel against the exercise of
statutory power by a successor. What the law requires is that the decision be
taken bona fide, within the scope of authority conferred by statute, and for
legitimate institutional reasons. Once these requirements are satisfied, the
mere fact that a different view had been taken in the past cannot invalidate
the present decision.
RE: ISSUE IV - LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MATTERS OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
42. At this stage, it is necessary to recall the settled limits of judicial review in
matters involving administrative and policy decisions. Judicial review is
concerned with the legality of the decision-making process, not with the
merits of the decision itself. Courts do not sit in appeal over administrative
choices, nor do they substitute their own views for those of the authority
entrusted with the discretion by law.
Page 19 of 25
43. This restraint assumes particular importance in matters concerning the
internal administration of a constitutional court. Decisions relating to the
sittings of the High Court, allocation of judicial work, or the organisation of
judicial access are integral to the Chief Justice’s administrative
responsibilities. Such decisions are taken having regard to ground realities,
institutional capacity, and the effective utilisation of available judicial
resources. The constitutional scheme therefore accords a measure of latitude
to the Chief Justice in these matters, subject to compliance with statutory
requirements.
44. Interference by this Court is warranted only in limited situations, such as
where the action is shown to be beyond statutory authority, tainted by mala
fides, influenced by extraneous considerations, or so unreasonable as to
warrant judicial correction. In the absence of such circumstances prevalent,
the Court would exercise restraint. Any other approach would risk trenching
upon the autonomy necessary for the effective functioning of the High
Court. In the present case, no such infirmity has been demonstrated.
RE: ISSUE V- CHALLENGE UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND 21:
ARBITRARINESS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
45. The petitioner has invoked Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that
the decision to designate Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting of the
High Court is arbitrary and discriminatory, since other regions of the State,
such as Pune or Solapur, which have also raised demands for High Court
sittings, have not been similarly accommodated. The submission proceeds
on the premise that the State or the High Court is constitutionally required
to address all regional demands in an identical or simultaneous manner.
46. The premise is flawed. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and
equal protection of the laws. It does not require absolute uniformity in
Page 20 of 25
administrative decision-making, nor does it prohibit reasonable
differentiation based on relevant considerations. The decision to locate a
place of sitting of a High Court is an exercise in judicial administration,
undertaken to improve access to justice. Such decisions inevitably involve
choices based on distance, volume of litigation, feasibility and institutional
capacity. Differential treatment, when founded on such objective
considerations, does not offend Article 14.
47. The petitioner’s argument proceeds on an assumption that the existence of
similar demands elsewhere creates a constitutional entitlement to identical
treatment. Article 14 does not operate in that manner. The mere fact that
another region may also have a legitimate demand for a High Court sitting
does not render the present decision arbitrary. The Constitution does not
require the State or the High Court to address all such demands at once, nor
does it compel inaction in one case until all comparable claims can be
satisfied. What Article 14 requires is that the decision under challenge bears
a rational connection to a legitimate objective.
48. In the present case, the material on record shows that the districts proposed
to be served by the Kolhapur sitting constitute a contiguous region, with
Kolhapur emerging as a central and convenient location for that cluster of
districts. These districts are situated at a substantial distance from the
principal seat of the High Court. The decision to appoint Kolhapur as an
additional place of sitting thus bears a clear and reasonable nexus with the
object of facilitating access to justice for litigants from that region. Once
such a rational basis is evident, the Court would be slow to characterise the
decision as arbitrary or discriminatory merely because other regions may
also aspire to similar arrangements. On this touchstone, the challenge under
Article 14 cannot be sustained.
Page 21 of 25
49. The petitioner has also sought to invoke Article 21 of the Constitution,
contending that the establishment of an additional place of sitting of the High
Court at Kolhapur undermines, rather than advancing, the right of access to
justice. It is urged that judicial resources are finite, and that the diversion of
judges, infrastructure and administrative support towards a new Bench may
weaken the District judiciary, thereby impairing the overall justice delivery
system. The submission, though framed in constitutional terms, essentially
invites the Court to adjudicate upon questions of policy prioritisation.
50. The right of access to justice is undoubtedly an integral facet of the right to
life under Article 21, as authoritatively recognised by this Court in Anita
8
Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan . Access to justice is not a narrow or abstract
idea. It is concerned not merely with the existence of courts, but with
whether litigants can realistically approach them without undue hardship.
Distance, cost and delay are all relevant considerations. Viewed thus, the
holding of High Court sittings at places closer to litigants, where justified by
geography and volume of cases, furthers access to justice. Decentralisation
in such circumstances does not weaken the justice delivery system; it brings
the Court closer to those whom it exists to serve and thereby advances the
constitutional guarantee.
51. The same approach is reflected in the decision of the Karnataka High Court
in E. Ram Mohan Chowdry v. Registrar General, High Court of
9
Karnataka , where the establishment of benches at Dharwad and Kalaburagi
under Section 51(3) was challenged. The principal contention was that the
assignment of cases to those places amounted to an impermissible territorial
division of the High Court. The Court rejected the challenge, holding that
the power of the Chief Justice under Section 51(3) to determine the sittings
8
(2016) 8 SCC 509
9
2008 SCC OnLine Kar 288
Page 22 of 25
of the Court is an administrative power exercised for the convenience of
litigants and the effective functioning of the institution. It was held that
Judges sitting at such places continue to exercise the jurisdiction of the High
Court itself and that no territorial bifurcation results merely because the
Court sits at different locations. The Court observed that the convenience of
the litigant public must be the paramount consideration in such matters, and
that the establishment of circuit benches advances access to justice. The
Special Leave Petition filed against the said judgment was dismissed by this
Court.
52. The apprehension that resources might have been better deployed elsewhere
reflects a difference of opinion on administrative strategy, not a
constitutional infirmity. The Constitution does not mandate a singular model
for strengthening access to justice, nor does it privilege one level of the
judiciary over another. Decisions as to whether resources should be
channelled towards district judiciary, additional High Court sittings, or other
institutional reforms fall within the domain of the executive and the judiciary
acting in their administrative capacities. So long as the impugned decision
is taken within the bounds of statutory authority and bears a rational
connection to the objective of enhancing access to justice, it cannot be
invalidated on the ground that an alternative policy choice might have been
preferable. In the present case, the establishment of the Kolhapur Bench is
consonance with the constitutional vision of bringing justice closer to the
people, and it does not infringe Article 21 in any manner.
CONCLUSION
53. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, we find no
legal infirmity in the impugned notification appointing Kolhapur as a place
at which the Judges and Division Courts of the Bombay High Court may sit.
Page 23 of 25
The notification has been issued in exercise of the statutory power expressly
conferred by Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. The
authority competent to exercise such power, namely the Chief Justice of the
High Court, has acted within the bounds of the statute and has obtained the
approval of the Governor, as required by law. The material placed on record
indicates that the decision was taken after due consideration of factors
relating to accessibility, feasibility and institutional capacity. No material
has been placed before us to suggest that the decision is vitiated by mala
fides or influenced by any extraneous consideration.
54. On a closer examination, the objections raised by the petitioner do not
disclose any breach of a constitutional or statutory mandate. At their highest,
they reflect a disagreement with the administrative assessment underlying
the decision. Such divergence of views on matters of institutional
administration or policy prioritisation, however earnestly advanced, cannot
constitute a ground for judicial interference. Judicial review is concerned
with the legality of the decision-making process, not with the merits of the
decision itself, nor with substituting the Court’s view for that of the authority
entrusted by law with the responsibility of administering the institution.
55. It is therefore appropriate to restate the legal position that emerges from the
foregoing discussion. The power under Section 51(3) of the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 is an independent and continuing power vested in
the Chief Justice of a High Court to appoint additional places of sitting for
the more convenient transaction of judicial business, subject to the approval
of the Governor. The exercise of this power is not dependent upon the
establishment of a permanent Bench under Section 51(2), nor is it
constrained by administrative decisions taken in the past under different
circumstances. Judicial review of such decisions is correspondingly limited
and extends only to examining whether the action is within jurisdiction, bona
fide, and consistent with constitutional requirements. However we reiterate
Page 24 of 25
the power of the Union Government under Section 51 (2) would be available
at all times, and we expressly make it clear that exercise of power under
Section 51 (3) would not denude or dilute such power of the Union
Government under Section 51(2) of the Act in the facts of the case. In other
words, the Union Government would be at liberty to exercise such power if
it deems fit, notwithstanding the power exercised by the Chief Justice of the
High Court under Section 51 (3) of the Act.
56. In the present case, we are satisfied that the impugned notification satisfies
all these parameters. The decision facilitates access to justice for litigants
from a region which is geographically distant from the principal seat of the
High Court. The Constitution does not prescribe a single model for judicial
administration; it permits institutional discretion to be exercised, within the
framework of law, to meet practical and regional needs.
57. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the challenge to the notification
dated 01.08.2025 is without merit. The writ petition is accordingly
dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
.……………………………., J.
[ARAVIND KUMAR]
.……………………………., J.
[N.V. ANJARIA]
New Delhi;
th
December 18 , 2025.
Page 25 of 25
2025 INSC 1460
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 914 OF 2025
RANJEET BABURAO NIMBALKAR ….PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution assails an
administrative notification issued by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay appointing Kolhapur as a place at which the Judges and Division
Courts of the said High Court may sit. The impugned notification, bearing
No. P.0108/2025 dated 01.08.2025, has been issued on the administrative
side of the High Court in exercise of the power conferred by Section 51(3)
of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, with the approval of the Governor
of the State of Maharashtra. It is the case of the respondents, as borne out
from the material placed on record, that the said arrangement was made
operational with effect from 18.08.2025.
2. The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, established in 1862, has
Signature Not Verified
historically exercised jurisdiction over an extensive and geographically
Digitally signed by
RASHI GUPTA
Date: 2025.12.18
18:04:44 IST
Reason:
diverse region. Following the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and the
reorganisation of States in 1960, the statute provided a framework enabling
Page 1 of 25
High Courts to hold sittings away from the principal seat where
considerations of convenience and effective administration so warranted. In
that backdrop, the Bench at Nagpur continued as a permanent Bench upon
the formation of the State of Maharashtra. Thereafter, by notification dated
27.08.1981, the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court appointed
Aurangabad as an additional place of sitting under Section 51(3), which
arrangement was later converted into a permanent Bench by a Presidential
Order under Section 51(2) with effect from 27.08.1984. A permanent Bench
at Panaji was also established in 1981 following the extension of the High
Court’s jurisdiction to the State of Goa. These arrangements demonstrate
that the statutory scheme has, in the past, been utilised to respond to distance,
volume of litigation, and the demands of access to justice.
3. Prior to its merger with the then Province of Bombay in 01.03.1949,
Kolhapur is stated to have functioned as the seat of the High Court and the
Supreme Court of the former Kolhapur State. After integration, the districts
forming the southern and south-western region of the present State of
Maharashtra came within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. Over
the decades, representations were made by the Bar and litigant bodies from
Kolhapur, Sangli, Satara, Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg seeking a High Court
sitting in this region, pointing to distance from the principal seat and the
absence of a proximate forum for adjudication of disputes to be resolved by
High Court, despite a steady inflow of cases from these districts.
4. The record placed before this Court indicates that, after administrative
consideration on feasibility and availability of infrastructure, a proposal was
formulated by the High Court for appointing Kolhapur as an additional place
of sitting. The proposal contemplated that cases arising from the districts of
Kolhapur, Sangli, Satara, Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg would be assigned to
the Kolhapur sitting in accordance with administrative directions of the
Chief Justice. It is the case of the respondents that the proposal received the
Page 2 of 25
approval of the Governor of Maharashtra on 30.07.2025, following which
Notification No. P.0108/2025 dated 01.08.2025 was issued. The present writ
petition questions the legality and constitutional validity of this
administrative decision and prays for quashing of the notification and for a
restraint on the High Court from holding sittings at Kolhapur.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
5. Learned Senior counsel, Shri Balbir Singh, appearing for the petitioner has
assailed the impugned notification and has sought to demonstrate that the
decision to designate Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting of the
Bombay High Court suffers from fundamental legal infirmities. The
principal submission advanced is that Section 51(3) of the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 was never intended to be utilised as a vehicle for
establishing what is, in effect, a permanent additional Bench of a High
Court. According to the petitioner, Parliament has consciously drawn a
distinction between sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 51. While
sub-section (2) contemplates the establishment of permanent Benches
through a Presidential order after due consultation with constitutional
authorities, sub-section (3) is urged to be a limited provision meant to
address temporary or exceptional exigencies. The petitioner contends that
the use of Section 51(3) to create an enduring institutional arrangement
amounts to doing indirectly what the statute requires to be done directly
under sub-section (2), thereby defeating the legislative intent.
6. The learned Senior counsel further contended that the decision-making
process is vitiated by lack of adequate consultation. The Senior counsel
submits that the establishment of an additional place of sitting of a High
Court has long-term institutional consequences and therefore cannot be
reduced to a unilateral administrative act of the Chief Justice. Emphasis is
Page 3 of 25
placed on the absence of Full Court deliberation, and it is urged that the
consultative role of judges, recognised in judicial precedents, has been
ignored. Reliance is placed on Federation of Bar Associations in
1
Karnataka v. Union of India , to contend that consultation is not merely a
matter of prudence but an institutional necessity.
7. The Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner further draws our attention to
the administrative history of similar proposals in the State of Maharashtra.
It is submitted that proposals for establishing additional Benches were
considered and rejected by committees of judges in the past, notably in the
years 1996, 1997, 2006 and 2018, and that these views were accepted by the
Full Court. According to the learned counsel, in the absence of any
demonstrated change in the circumstances or reconsideration by the Full
Court, the abrupt reversal of position in 2025 renders the decision arbitrary
and unexplained.
8.
The learned Senior Counsel on the aspect of Article 14 submits that the
selection of Kolhapur, to the exclusion of other regions such as Pune or
Solapur which have also articulated demands for High Court sittings,
amounts to discriminatory treatment without a rational basis. It is argued that
no comparative study or objective criteria have been disclosed, giving rise
to a legitimate apprehension that the decision is driven by local pressures
rather than neutral considerations.
9. Further invoking Article 21, the Senior Counsel petitioner argues that
judicial resources are finite and that the establishment of an additional High
Court sitting diverts judges and infrastructure away from the already
overburdened District judiciary. It is contended that access to justice is not
advanced merely by proximity to a High Court, and that strengthening trial
courts would better serve the constitutional mandate.
1
(2000) 6 SCC 715
Page 4 of 25
10. Finally, the Learned Senior counsel places reliance on developments in the
State of Karnataka, particularly the process preceding the establishment of
Benches at Dharwad and Kalaburagi, where committees were constituted,
data was gathered, and extensive consultations were undertaken. The
petitioner submits that the absence of a similarly elaborate and transparent
process in the present case renders the impugned decision procedurally
deficient.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
11. Learned Solicitor General of India, Shri Tushar Mehta, along with Advocate
– on – record, Shri Sandeep Deshmukh, appearing for the second
respondent, namely the High Court administration and Learned Counsel Shri
Shrirang Varma for the State of Maharashtra, have vehemently defended the
impugned notification and have urged that the challenge proceeds on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the statutory and constitutional
framework.
12. Learned Solicitor General further submitted that Section 51(3) of the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 is an independent and continuing source of power,
deliberately vested by Parliament in the Chief Justice of the High Court to
appoint additional places of sitting for the more convenient transaction of
judicial business. Reliance is placed on the authoritative pronouncement of
2
this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik , which
upheld the establishment of the Aurangabad Bench under the very same
provision.
13.
Learned Solicitor General emphasised that the Chief Justice occupies a
unique constitutional position as the head of the High Court and the
custodian of its administration. Decisions relating to sittings of the Court fall
2
(1982) 3 SCC 519
Page 5 of 25
squarely within this administrative domain. Citing Federation of Bar
3
Associations in Karnataka and State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand , it
is submitted that the Chief Justice’s opinion is, in law, the opinion of the
High Court, and that courts must be slow to interfere with such decisions
absent mala fides or statutory violation.
14. As regards consultation, the Learned Solicitor General submitted that
Section 51(3) expressly requires only the approval of the Governor and does
not mandate any particular form of internal consultation or Full Court
approval. While internal deliberation is a matter of sound institutional
practice, its absence, even if assumed, cannot vitiate the exercise of a
statutory power. Learned Solicitor General submitted that, in fact, the
decision was preceded by representations, administrative consideration,
committee deliberation, and verification of feasibility, as borne out by the
record.
15.
Learned Solicitor General also contended that past administrative views do
not create an estoppel. Administrative and policy decisions are necessarily
contextual and may be revisited in the light of changed circumstances,
accumulated demand, and improved infrastructure. The delay in acceding to
the demand for an additional sitting, far from suggesting arbitrariness,
demonstrates institutional caution.
16. On the constitutional challenge under Article 14, Learned Solicitor General
submitted that the establishment of an additional place of sitting of a High
Court is not a matter of conferring any benefit or favour. Article 14 does not
compel the State or the High Court to address all regional demands
simultaneously. So long as there exists a rational basis for the choice of
location, the decision cannot be invalidated merely because another location
could also have been chosen.
3
(1998) 1 SCC 1
Page 6 of 25
17. With regard to Article 21, the Learned Solicitor General submitted that
access to justice encompasses physical accessibility and that
decentralisation of High Court sittings furthers, rather than frustrates, this
constitutional guarantee. Questions of resource allocation, it is urged, lie in
the realm of policy and are beyond the scope of judicial review.
IV. ANALYSIS
18. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced
before us. At the threshold, it must be noted that, on a plain reading of the
pleadings, this writ petition could well have been dismissed in limine , as it
does not disclose any clear infringement of a fundamental right warranting
interference under Article 32 of the Constitution. Even assuming the petition
is framed as one under Articles 14 and 21, the challenge is essentially to an
administrative arrangement within statutory bounds, and does not disclose
any enforceable fundamental right to prevent an additional place of sitting.
However, having regard to the nature of the issues raised, which touch upon
the scope of Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and the
broader contours of judicial administration, we have considered it
appropriate to examine the challenge on merits and to record our reasons in
some detail, so that the position in law stands clarified and future
controversy on the subject is set at rest. Before we proceed to analyse the
rival contentions, it would therefore be appropriate to indicate the broad
heads under which the issues arising in the present writ petition fall for
consideration and under which we propose to deal with them. The heads that
we propose to examine the controversy before us are:
I. CONSTRUCTION AND SCOPE OF SECTION 51(3) OF THE
STATES REORGANISATION ACT, 1956
Page 7 of 25
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND THE QUESTION OF CONSULTATION
III. EFFECT OF PAST ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS AND
SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN APPROACH
IV. LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MATTERS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
V. CHALLENGE UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND 21:
ARBITRARINESS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
RE: ISSUE I - CONSTRUCTION AND SCOPE OF SECTION 51(3) OF
THE STATES REORGANISATION ACT, 1956
19. The controversy before us turns fundamentally on the true construction of
Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, and, more particularly,
on the nature and amplitude of the power conferred upon the Chief Justice
under sub-section (3) thereof. Any meaningful adjudication of the
petitioner’s challenge must therefore commence with a careful examination
of the statutory scheme, read not in isolation, but in the context of the object
sought to be achieved by Parliament while reorganising States and
restructuring High Courts.
20. The States Reorganisation Act, 1956 was enacted in exercise of the
constituent power of Parliament under Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution.
It was not a temporary or transitory enactment designed merely to facilitate
the immediate aftermath of reorganisation, but a permanent legislative
framework intended to govern the institutional functioning of High Courts
in newly constituted States over time. The provisions of Part V of the Act,
dealing with High Courts, were crafted with a clear appreciation of the fact
that judicial administration is a dynamic process, responsive to demographic
shifts, regional needs and evolving patterns of litigation. Section 51
Page 8 of 25
embodies this legislative design. For context, we have reproduced Section
51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 below:
“Section 51. Principal seat and other places of sitting of High
Courts for new States.
(1) The principal seat of the High Court for a new State shall be at
such place as the President may, by notified order, appoint.
(2) The President may, after consultation with the Governor of a new
State and the Chief Justice of the High Court for that State, by
notified order, provide for the establishment of a permanent bench
or benches of that High Court at one or more places within the State
other than the principal seat of the High Court and for any matters
connected therewith.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2), the Judges and division courts of the High Court for a
new State may also sit at such other place or places in that State as
the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor, appoint .”
21. Sub-section (1) of Section 51 of the Act empowers the President to appoint
the principal seat of the High Court for a new State. Sub-section (2)
contemplates the establishment of permanent Benches by Presidential order
after consultation with constitutional authorities, a process that necessarily
entails a formal allocation of territorial jurisdiction. Sub-section (3),
however, stands on a distinct footing. It opens with a non obstante clause
and authorises the Chief Justice, with the approval of the Governor, to
appoint “such other place or places” at which the Judges and Division
Courts of the High Court may also sit.
22.
The presence of the non obstante clause is not accidental. It reflects a
conscious legislative choice to preserve, in the Chief Justice, a residuary and
overriding authority to organise the sittings of the High Court in a manner
that best subserves the “more convenient transaction of judicial business” .
Parliament evidently recognised that the needs of access to justice may arise
incrementally and unpredictably, and that the judicial institution must
Page 9 of 25
possess the flexibility to respond without being encumbered by rigid
procedural formalities.
23. It would therefore be inconsistent with the text and purpose of Section 51(3)
to read into it any temporary limitation or to construe it as a provision meant
only for exceptional or short-term exigencies. The statute does not speak in
such restricted terms. On the contrary, read with Section 14 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897, which embodies the principle that a statutory power may
be exercised from time to time unless a contrary intention appears, Section
51(3) clearly admits of repeated and continuing exercise as circumstances
so demand. This interpretation is not res integra. In State of Maharashtra v.
4
Narayan Shamrao Puranik , this Court was confronted with a challenge
strikingly similar to the one before us, arising out of the establishment of the
Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court under Section 51(3).
Repelling the argument that Section 51 was a spent provision or that the
power under sub-section (3) had exhausted itself, the Court held in clear
terms that the Act of 1956 is a permanent statute and that the powers
conferred by it are capable of being exercised as and when the exigencies of
judicial administration so require. Since the ratio of that decision rests
substantially on the reasoning contained in paragraph 25 of the judgment,
we consider it proper to reproduce the same in extenso:
“25. It is clear upon the terms of Section 51 of the Act that
undoubtedly the President has the power under sub-section (1) to
appoint the principal seat of the High Court for a new State.
Likewise, the power of the President under sub-section (2) thereof,
“after consultation with the Governor of a new State and the Chief
Justice of the High Court for that State, pertains to the establishment
of a permanent Bench or Benches of that High Court of a new State
at one or more places within the State other than the place where the
principal seat of the High Court is located and for any matters
connected therewith” clearly confer power on the President to
define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation
to the principal seat as also for the conferment of exclusive
4
(1982) 3 SCC 519
Page 10 of 25
jurisdiction to such permanent Bench to hear cases arising in
districts falling within its jurisdiction. The creation of a permanent
Bench under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act must therefore
bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court. Under sub-
section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act the President
has to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers as ordained by
Article 74(1) of the Constitution. In both the matters the decision lies
with the Central Government. In contrast, the power of the Chief
Justice to appoint under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act the
sittings of the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court for a
new State at places other than the place of the principal seat or the
permanent Bench is in the unquestioned domain of the Chief Justice,
the only condition being that he must act with the approval of the
Governor. It is basically an internal matter pertaining to the High
Court. He has full-power, authority and jurisdiction in the matter of
allocation of business of the High Court which flows not only from
the provision contained in sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act
but inheres in him in the very nature of things. The opinion of the
Chief Justice to appoint the seat of the High Court for a new State at
a place other than the principal seat under sub-section (3) of Section
51 of the Act must therefore normally prevail because it is for the
more convenient transaction of judicial business. The non obstante
clause contained in sub-section (3) of Section 51 gives an overriding
effect to the power of the Chief Justice. There is no territorial
bifurcation of the High Court merely because the Chief Justice
directs under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act that the Judges
and Division Courts shall also sit at such other places as he may,
with the approval of the Governor, appoint. It must accordingly be
held that there was no territorial bifurcation of the Bombay High
Court merely because the Chief Justice by the impugned notification
issued under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act directed that the
Judges and Division Courts shall also sit at Aurangabad. The Judges
and Division Courts at Aurangabad are part of the same High Court
as those at the principal seat at Bombay and they exercise
jurisdiction as Judges of the High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad.
The Chief Justice acted within the scope of his powers. We see no
substance in the charge that the impugned notification issued by the
Chief Justice under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act was a
colourable exercise of power.”
24. More importantly, Puranik (supra) undertook a careful doctrinal distinction
between the powers under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 51. The Court
explained that the establishment of a permanent Bench under sub-section (2)
necessarily brings about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court,
accompanied by a formal conferment of exclusive jurisdiction. By contrast,
Page 11 of 25
an appointment under sub-section (3) does not effect any such bifurcation.
Judges sitting at an additional place under Section 51(3) continue to function
as Judges of the same High Court, exercising its jurisdiction as allocated by
the Chief Justice.
25. The significance of this distinction lies in understanding the true character
of the petitioner’s grievance. The longevity or continuity of a place of sitting
appointed under Section 51(3) does not, by itself, convert the exercise of
power into one under Section 51(2). Permanence, in the sense urged by the
petitioner, is not a statutory criterion under sub-section (3). What is
determinative is not the duration of the sitting, but the absence of territorial
bifurcation and the retention of administrative control with the Chief Justice.
26. This Court in Puranik was categorical in rejecting the allegation that the
exercise of power under Section 51(3) amounted to a colourable device to
circumvent the procedure prescribed under sub-section (2). The Court
emphasised that the Chief Justice’s decision to appoint Aurangabad as a
place of sitting was an internal matter pertaining to the High Court, taken
for the convenience of litigants and the efficient transaction of judicial
business. That reasoning applies with equal force to the present case.
27. Once it is accepted, as it must be, that Section 51(3) confers an independent
and continuing power on the Chief Justice, the petitioner’s argument of
indirect permanence loses much of its force. Courts cannot import into the
statute a limitation which the legislature has consciously chosen not to enact.
To do so would be to substitute judicial apprehension for legislative
judgment, a course impermissible in constitutional adjudication.
28. It becomes necessary, at this stage, to advert to the role of the Union
Government within the statutory framework of Section 51 of the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956. The petitioner’s challenge appears to be that the
decision to designate Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting of the High
Page 12 of 25
Court ought to have engaged the Central Government in a more direct or
determinative manner. Such an assumption, however, does not accord with
the scheme of the statute. Section 51 itself draws a clear and deliberate
distinction between different categories of decisions concerning the location
and sittings of High Courts. Where Parliament contemplated the
establishment of a permanent Bench involving territorial bifurcation and
enduring structural consequences, it expressly vested the power in the
President under sub-section (2), to be exercised after consultation with the
Governor and the Chief Justice, thereby ensuring Central Government
participation. In contradistinction, sub-section (3) consciously excludes any
role for the Union executive and vests the power in the Chief Justice of the
High Court, subject only to the approval of the Governor. This
differentiation is deliberate. It reflects a legislative judgment that matters
relating to internal judicial administration and the convenient transaction of
judicial business, which do not alter the constitutional identity or territorial
structure of the High Court, should be entrusted to judicial leadership at the
State level and insulated from unnecessary executive involvement. Once
Parliament has thus demarcated the field, it is not open to the Court, under
the guise of interpretation, to reintroduce Central Government participation
where the statute has deliberately chosen not to provide for it.
29. An argument may nonetheless be advanced that recognising the Chief
Justice’s authority under Section 51(3) would render sub-sections (1) and
(2) redundant.. Such an apprehension, though understandable at first blush,
rests upon a misapprehension of the legislative architecture. Section 51 does
not create overlapping or competing reservoirs of power; rather, it embodies
a graded and carefully calibrated distribution of authority, each sub-section
operating in its own sphere and addressing a distinct institutional
requirement. Sub-section (1) performs a constitutional function by fixing the
principal seat of the High Court, a determination that bears upon the very
Page 13 of 25
identity of the Court and therefore lies within the exclusive domain of the
Union Government acting through the President. Sub-section (2) operates at
a structural level, enabling the establishment of permanent Benches with
defined territorial jurisdiction, a step that entails enduring reconfiguration of
judicial geography and necessarily warrants involvement of Central
Government after consultation of constitutional authorities. These
provisions remain vital and continue to govern decisions of foundational and
structural significance.
30. Sub-section (3), by contrast, operates in a different sphere. It is designed to
confer functional and administrative flexibility upon the High Court, acting
through its Chief Justice, to organise the sittings of Judges for the more
convenient transaction of judicial business, without effecting any territorial
bifurcation or altering the constitutional character of the Court. The power
under Section 51(3) neither supplants nor dilutes the roles envisaged under
sub-sections (1) and (2); it complements them by addressing a separate
category of decisions rooted in considerations of access, convenience and
institutional responsiveness. Even where a place of sitting appointed under
sub-section (3) continues over a long period, it does not, by that fact alone,
acquire the attributes of a permanent Bench under sub-section (2), for it
remains subject to administrative control, does not confer exclusive
territorial jurisdiction, and does not alter the High Court’s jurisdictional
identity. Read as a whole, Section 51 represents a coherent statutory scheme
in which constitutional authority, structural oversight and administrative
discretion are deliberately distributed across different constitutional actors.
The recognition of the Chief Justice’s power under Section 51(3) thus
preserves, rather than undermines, the relevance and purpose of sub-sections
(1) and (2).
Page 14 of 25
RE: ISSUE II - ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICE AND THE QUESTION OF CONSULTATION
31. Having considered the statutory source of the power under Section 51(3), it
becomes necessary to state that power within the broader constitutional
framework governing the administration of High Courts. The statute vests
the authority to appoint additional places of sitting with the Chief Justice
not by accident, but by design. The Chief Justice is the head of the High
Court, entrusted not merely with adjudicatory functions, but with the
responsibility of ensuring that the institution functions efficiently,
coherently and in a manner that best serves the ends of justice.
32. The administration of a High Court is an essential part of its constitutional
functioning. Decisions concerning where the Court sits, how work is
distributed, and how litigants access the Court are not merely matters of
convenience, but matters of institutional responsibility. Such decisions can
only be taken by one who is closely acquainted with the Court’s docket, the
nature and volume of litigation, the strength of the Bar, and the practical
difficulties faced by litigants across regions. It is for this reason that
Parliament has entrusted this authority to the Chief Justice of the High Court,
who, as the head of the institution, bears responsibility both for preserving
judicial independence and for ensuring the effective administration of
justice. This understanding finds consistent affirmation in the jurisprudence
of this Court. In Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka v. Union of
5
India , the Court underscored that the Chief Justice is the “important
consultee” in matters relating to the establishment of Benches, and when he
expresses an opinion, it is not his personal view but the institutional opinion
of the High Court. The Court cautioned against dissecting a High Court on
5
(2000) 6 SCC 715
Page 15 of 25
emotional, sentimental or parochial considerations, and emphasised that no
Bench should be established contrary to the opinion of the Chief Justice.
33. A similar view has been taken by the Madras High Court in R. Suresh
6
Kumar v. Union of India , which arose in the context of the establishment
of the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court. The challenge before the
Court was that the High Court could not sit at a place other than its principal
seat without a fresh constitutional or legislative mandate. The Madras High
Court rejected this contention, holding that Section 51 of the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 provides a complete statutory framework for High
Courts to function at places other than their principal seat. The Court
observed that such arrangements do not fragment the High Court or dilute
its jurisdiction, but are intended to reduce hardship to litigants and facilitate
the administration of justice. It was emphasised that access to justice is a
relevant consideration in organising the sittings of the Court. It is also
relevant to note that the Special Leave Petition filed against the said
judgment was dismissed by this Court. While such dismissal does not
amount to a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, it lends
finality to the judgment and adds weight to the view that Section 51 validly
enables High Courts to sit at additional places in appropriate cases.
34. This Court has consistently recognised that the internal administration of a
High Court must be guided by a single point of authority. Subjecting such
decisions to multiple or parallel influences would inevitably lead to
uncertainty and inefficiency. The Chief Justice’s primacy in administrative
matters is thus a function of his position as the head of the High Court and
the responsibility is entrusted to him under the constitutional and statutory
scheme.
6
2004 SCC OnLine Mad 212
Page 16 of 25
35. It is in this context that the petitioner’s argument regarding lack of
consultation must be examined. There can be no quarrel with the proposition
that consultation within the High Court is a matter of sound institutional
practice. Indeed, it is only natural that a Chief Justice, while exercising
administrative powers of this nature, would take into account the views of
his puisne judges, the needs of the Bar, and the logistical realities of the
institution. Such deliberation enriches decision-making and reflects
collective wisdom. However, the crucial distinction that must be borne in
mind is between what is desirable as a matter of prudence and what is
mandated as a matter of law. Section 51(3) expressly requires only the
approval of the Governor. It does not stipulate consultation with the Full
Court, nor does it prescribe any particular consultative mechanism. Where
Parliament has intended consultation to be mandatory, as in Section 51(2),
it has said so in explicit terms. The deliberate absence of such a requirement
in sub-section (3) cannot be supplied by judicial interpretation. To judicially
impose a requirement of Full Court approval or to insist upon a particular
form of internal consultation would be to transgress the limits of
interpretation and to trench upon legislative prerogative. Courts must be
cautious not to elevate norms of good governance into inflexible legal
commands, lest the flexibility essential to effective judicial administration
be unduly constrained.
36. This Court has, in other contexts as well, drawn a clear distinction between
consultation as a constitutional or statutory mandate and consultation as an
7
administrative convention. In State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand , it was
reiterated that the Chief Justice is the master of the roster and that the
allocation of judicial work is an exclusive prerogative of the Chief Justice.
That principle extends, in substance, to decisions concerning the sittings of
7
(1998) 1 SCC 1
Page 17 of 25
the Court, which are intimately connected with the distribution and
management of judicial work.
37. In the present case, there is no material to suggest that the Chief Justice acted
unilaterally in disregard of institutional inputs or relevant considerations.
Even assuming that the consultative process did not conform to the
petitioner’s expectations, that circumstance by itself would not vitiate the
exercise of power under Section 51(3). Ultimately, the statute entrusts the
decision to the Chief Justice, subject to the approval of the Governor, and
once those requirements are satisfied, the Court would be slow to interfere
in the absence of mala fides or manifest illegality.
RE: ISSUE III - EFFECT OF PAST ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
AND SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN APPROACH
38. Considerable emphasis was placed by the petitioner on the circumstance
that, on earlier occasions, proposals for establishing additional Benches or
places of sitting of the High Court in the State of Maharashtra were
examined and not accepted. Reference was made to committee reports and
administrative deliberations undertaken in the years 1996, 1997, 2006 and
2018, and it was urged that these earlier views, having been accepted at the
relevant point of time, ought to operate as a restraint on the present exercise
of power. According to the petitioner, in the absence of a formal
reconsideration by the Full Court, any departure from those earlier decisions
renders the impugned notification arbitrary.
39. The submission proceeds on an incorrect premise. Administrative decisions
of this nature do not stand on the same footing as judicial determinations.
They are taken having regard to the circumstances prevailing at a given point
of time, including the volume and distribution of litigation, availability of
infrastructure, logistical feasibility, and the broader needs of the justice
Page 18 of 25
delivery system. Such decisions are necessarily contextual and are not
intended to operate as permanent or inflexible conclusions.
40. It is well settled that administrative and policy decisions do not attain finality
for all time to come. They remain open to reconsideration as circumstances
evolve. The passage of time, the accumulation of demand, improvement in
infrastructure, changes in connectivity, and shifts in litigation patterns may
legitimately warrant a fresh assessment. A subsequent decision taking a
different view, when informed by changed conditions, does not, by itself,
render the exercise arbitrary or unreasonable.
41. This principle assumes particular relevance in matters of judicial
administration. Each Chief Justice exercises administrative authority in trust
for the institution, guided by the conditions prevailing during his or her
tenure. While past decisions and reports may constitute valuable inputs, they
do not operate as a legal bar or create an estoppel against the exercise of
statutory power by a successor. What the law requires is that the decision be
taken bona fide, within the scope of authority conferred by statute, and for
legitimate institutional reasons. Once these requirements are satisfied, the
mere fact that a different view had been taken in the past cannot invalidate
the present decision.
RE: ISSUE IV - LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MATTERS OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
42. At this stage, it is necessary to recall the settled limits of judicial review in
matters involving administrative and policy decisions. Judicial review is
concerned with the legality of the decision-making process, not with the
merits of the decision itself. Courts do not sit in appeal over administrative
choices, nor do they substitute their own views for those of the authority
entrusted with the discretion by law.
Page 19 of 25
43. This restraint assumes particular importance in matters concerning the
internal administration of a constitutional court. Decisions relating to the
sittings of the High Court, allocation of judicial work, or the organisation of
judicial access are integral to the Chief Justice’s administrative
responsibilities. Such decisions are taken having regard to ground realities,
institutional capacity, and the effective utilisation of available judicial
resources. The constitutional scheme therefore accords a measure of latitude
to the Chief Justice in these matters, subject to compliance with statutory
requirements.
44. Interference by this Court is warranted only in limited situations, such as
where the action is shown to be beyond statutory authority, tainted by mala
fides, influenced by extraneous considerations, or so unreasonable as to
warrant judicial correction. In the absence of such circumstances prevalent,
the Court would exercise restraint. Any other approach would risk trenching
upon the autonomy necessary for the effective functioning of the High
Court. In the present case, no such infirmity has been demonstrated.
RE: ISSUE V- CHALLENGE UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND 21:
ARBITRARINESS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
45. The petitioner has invoked Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that
the decision to designate Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting of the
High Court is arbitrary and discriminatory, since other regions of the State,
such as Pune or Solapur, which have also raised demands for High Court
sittings, have not been similarly accommodated. The submission proceeds
on the premise that the State or the High Court is constitutionally required
to address all regional demands in an identical or simultaneous manner.
46. The premise is flawed. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and
equal protection of the laws. It does not require absolute uniformity in
Page 20 of 25
administrative decision-making, nor does it prohibit reasonable
differentiation based on relevant considerations. The decision to locate a
place of sitting of a High Court is an exercise in judicial administration,
undertaken to improve access to justice. Such decisions inevitably involve
choices based on distance, volume of litigation, feasibility and institutional
capacity. Differential treatment, when founded on such objective
considerations, does not offend Article 14.
47. The petitioner’s argument proceeds on an assumption that the existence of
similar demands elsewhere creates a constitutional entitlement to identical
treatment. Article 14 does not operate in that manner. The mere fact that
another region may also have a legitimate demand for a High Court sitting
does not render the present decision arbitrary. The Constitution does not
require the State or the High Court to address all such demands at once, nor
does it compel inaction in one case until all comparable claims can be
satisfied. What Article 14 requires is that the decision under challenge bears
a rational connection to a legitimate objective.
48. In the present case, the material on record shows that the districts proposed
to be served by the Kolhapur sitting constitute a contiguous region, with
Kolhapur emerging as a central and convenient location for that cluster of
districts. These districts are situated at a substantial distance from the
principal seat of the High Court. The decision to appoint Kolhapur as an
additional place of sitting thus bears a clear and reasonable nexus with the
object of facilitating access to justice for litigants from that region. Once
such a rational basis is evident, the Court would be slow to characterise the
decision as arbitrary or discriminatory merely because other regions may
also aspire to similar arrangements. On this touchstone, the challenge under
Article 14 cannot be sustained.
Page 21 of 25
49. The petitioner has also sought to invoke Article 21 of the Constitution,
contending that the establishment of an additional place of sitting of the High
Court at Kolhapur undermines, rather than advancing, the right of access to
justice. It is urged that judicial resources are finite, and that the diversion of
judges, infrastructure and administrative support towards a new Bench may
weaken the District judiciary, thereby impairing the overall justice delivery
system. The submission, though framed in constitutional terms, essentially
invites the Court to adjudicate upon questions of policy prioritisation.
50. The right of access to justice is undoubtedly an integral facet of the right to
life under Article 21, as authoritatively recognised by this Court in Anita
8
Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan . Access to justice is not a narrow or abstract
idea. It is concerned not merely with the existence of courts, but with
whether litigants can realistically approach them without undue hardship.
Distance, cost and delay are all relevant considerations. Viewed thus, the
holding of High Court sittings at places closer to litigants, where justified by
geography and volume of cases, furthers access to justice. Decentralisation
in such circumstances does not weaken the justice delivery system; it brings
the Court closer to those whom it exists to serve and thereby advances the
constitutional guarantee.
51. The same approach is reflected in the decision of the Karnataka High Court
in E. Ram Mohan Chowdry v. Registrar General, High Court of
9
Karnataka , where the establishment of benches at Dharwad and Kalaburagi
under Section 51(3) was challenged. The principal contention was that the
assignment of cases to those places amounted to an impermissible territorial
division of the High Court. The Court rejected the challenge, holding that
the power of the Chief Justice under Section 51(3) to determine the sittings
8
(2016) 8 SCC 509
9
2008 SCC OnLine Kar 288
Page 22 of 25
of the Court is an administrative power exercised for the convenience of
litigants and the effective functioning of the institution. It was held that
Judges sitting at such places continue to exercise the jurisdiction of the High
Court itself and that no territorial bifurcation results merely because the
Court sits at different locations. The Court observed that the convenience of
the litigant public must be the paramount consideration in such matters, and
that the establishment of circuit benches advances access to justice. The
Special Leave Petition filed against the said judgment was dismissed by this
Court.
52. The apprehension that resources might have been better deployed elsewhere
reflects a difference of opinion on administrative strategy, not a
constitutional infirmity. The Constitution does not mandate a singular model
for strengthening access to justice, nor does it privilege one level of the
judiciary over another. Decisions as to whether resources should be
channelled towards district judiciary, additional High Court sittings, or other
institutional reforms fall within the domain of the executive and the judiciary
acting in their administrative capacities. So long as the impugned decision
is taken within the bounds of statutory authority and bears a rational
connection to the objective of enhancing access to justice, it cannot be
invalidated on the ground that an alternative policy choice might have been
preferable. In the present case, the establishment of the Kolhapur Bench is
consonance with the constitutional vision of bringing justice closer to the
people, and it does not infringe Article 21 in any manner.
CONCLUSION
53. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, we find no
legal infirmity in the impugned notification appointing Kolhapur as a place
at which the Judges and Division Courts of the Bombay High Court may sit.
Page 23 of 25
The notification has been issued in exercise of the statutory power expressly
conferred by Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. The
authority competent to exercise such power, namely the Chief Justice of the
High Court, has acted within the bounds of the statute and has obtained the
approval of the Governor, as required by law. The material placed on record
indicates that the decision was taken after due consideration of factors
relating to accessibility, feasibility and institutional capacity. No material
has been placed before us to suggest that the decision is vitiated by mala
fides or influenced by any extraneous consideration.
54. On a closer examination, the objections raised by the petitioner do not
disclose any breach of a constitutional or statutory mandate. At their highest,
they reflect a disagreement with the administrative assessment underlying
the decision. Such divergence of views on matters of institutional
administration or policy prioritisation, however earnestly advanced, cannot
constitute a ground for judicial interference. Judicial review is concerned
with the legality of the decision-making process, not with the merits of the
decision itself, nor with substituting the Court’s view for that of the authority
entrusted by law with the responsibility of administering the institution.
55. It is therefore appropriate to restate the legal position that emerges from the
foregoing discussion. The power under Section 51(3) of the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 is an independent and continuing power vested in
the Chief Justice of a High Court to appoint additional places of sitting for
the more convenient transaction of judicial business, subject to the approval
of the Governor. The exercise of this power is not dependent upon the
establishment of a permanent Bench under Section 51(2), nor is it
constrained by administrative decisions taken in the past under different
circumstances. Judicial review of such decisions is correspondingly limited
and extends only to examining whether the action is within jurisdiction, bona
fide, and consistent with constitutional requirements. However we reiterate
Page 24 of 25
the power of the Union Government under Section 51 (2) would be available
at all times, and we expressly make it clear that exercise of power under
Section 51 (3) would not denude or dilute such power of the Union
Government under Section 51(2) of the Act in the facts of the case. In other
words, the Union Government would be at liberty to exercise such power if
it deems fit, notwithstanding the power exercised by the Chief Justice of the
High Court under Section 51 (3) of the Act.
56. In the present case, we are satisfied that the impugned notification satisfies
all these parameters. The decision facilitates access to justice for litigants
from a region which is geographically distant from the principal seat of the
High Court. The Constitution does not prescribe a single model for judicial
administration; it permits institutional discretion to be exercised, within the
framework of law, to meet practical and regional needs.
57. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the challenge to the notification
dated 01.08.2025 is without merit. The writ petition is accordingly
dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
.……………………………., J.
[ARAVIND KUMAR]
.……………………………., J.
[N.V. ANJARIA]
New Delhi;
th
December 18 , 2025.
Page 25 of 25