Dorairaj vs. Doraisamy (Dead) And Ors.

2026 INSC 126
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 2129-2130 OF 2012

J U D G M E N T
SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.
FACTUAL MATRIX
1. The present Civil Appeals arise out of a long-drawn
family dispute concerning partition, and alienation of
agricultural properties situated primarily in and around
Perambalur Taluk, Tiruchirappalli District. The dispute pertain
to 79 items of immovable properties, all of which are set out
with survey numbers, extents, and boundaries in the plaint
schedule consisting mainly of agricultural lands. At each stage
of adjudication, the concerns have primarily pertained to the
nature and character of the suit properties; the extent to which
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2026.02.05
16:45:21 IST
Reason:
certain alienations are binding on the coparcenary; and the legal
C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 1 of 18

effect of an alleged testamentary disposition purported to have
been executed shortly before the demise of the family patriarch.
The litigation has resulted in concurrent findings of fact, subject
to limited and item-specific modifications at the appellate
stages.
2. The genealogy of the parties is admitted and forms the
foundational backdrop of the lis. One Pallikoodathan was the
common ancestor. He had three sons, namely Chidambaram,
Sengan, and Natesan.
 Chidambaram predeceased the institution of the suit.
Upon his death, his minor children pursuant to the orders
passed by the competent court were represented through
their natural guardian, Sengan, and subsequently through
other legal representatives as brought on record.
 Natesan’s branch is represented through his legal heirs.
 Sengan, the central figure in the dispute, was the father of
the Plaintiff Duraisamy and the second Defendant
Dorairaj.
During his lifetime, Sengan resided with his sons and managed
the agricultural affairs of the family. Several suit properties
stood in his name, while others were acquired in the names of
his sons or through transactions involving the heirs of his
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deceased brother Chidambaram. Sengan died during the
pendency of the suit on 27.11.1989.
3. The suit for partition being O.S. No. 99 of 1987 was
instituted by Duraisamy, seeking partition and possession of his
one-fourth share in the suit schedule properties. The case was
founded on the premise that the suit properties constituted joint
Hindu family properties, either by reason of being ancestral in
origin or by reason of having been acquired from the income
derived from ancestral properties during the subsistence of the
joint family. It was pleaded that the family remained joint in
residence, cultivation, enjoyment, and management, and that
there had never been any partition, either oral or written. As per
the plaint, Sengan, being the senior-most male member, acted as
the Karta of the Hindu joint family, and properties purchased in
his name or in the names of other family members were, in
substance, acquisitions made for and on behalf of the family.
4. Primary contention was that the said acquisitions were
made at a time when the family lived and functioned jointly,
pooling its resources, and that Appellant (D2) herein did not
possess independent income at the relevant point of time,
particularly during the late 1960s and early 1970s to justify
exclusive ownership of the properties standing in his name.
However, the Appellant (D2) provided that substantial number
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of suit items were the self-acquisitions of Sengan, purchased
from his own income generated through diverse sources
including agricultural affairs, money-lending, panchayat-related
works, and other sources. Further, it was pleaded that several
properties were purchased by Dorairaj himself from his
independent income earned as a contractor and businessman,
particularly after the mid-1960s.
5. A central factual assertion in the plaint related to Item
No(s). 14 and 15 of the suit schedule properties, described as
ancestral agricultural lands situated in Thoramangalam Village.
These lands were stated to have devolved from Pallikoodathan
and were pleaded to constitute the principal source of income
for the family. Reliance was placed upon revenue records,
including Adangal extracts for Fasli years 1390 to 1395 (1980-
1985), to demonstrate continuous cultivation. It was specifically
pleaded that these lands were supported by wells and oil motor
pumps, and that agricultural operations over several years
yielded income sufficient to sustain the family and facilitate
acquisition of other properties.
6. A substantial portion of the factual controversy also
relates to a series of registered sale deeds executed by Sengan
in favour of Dorairaj, covering multiple suit items. These
alienations were effected under various sale deeds dated
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16.12.1968, 05.07.1985, 01.08.1986, and 08.05.1987 pertaining
to suit items including Item No(s). 1 to 7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 18, 19,
20 to 25, 31, 33 to 41, 52, 54 to 60, and 63. These documents
referred to discharge of debts, medical expenses, and other
family needs. Dorairaj claimed that these alienations were valid
and binding, having been effected for lawful necessity, and
asserted that possession and revenue entries stood mutated in
his favour pursuant thereto. Plaintiff, however, disputed the
necessity and binding nature of these transactions, contending
that the consideration was either illusory or sourced from joint
family funds, and that alienations in favour of one coparcener
could not bind the others in absence of genuine necessity.
7. Another set of transactions involved alienations made by
Sengan in his capacity as guardian of the minor children of his
deceased brother Chidambaram, pursuant to permissions
obtained in guardianship proceedings. Certain suit items,
including Item No(s). 15, 27 to 30, 32, 44, 67, and 69, were
sold in this manner. While Dorairaj/Appellant herein contended
that these alienations were valid and binding, having been
effected in accordance with court orders, the Plaintiff pleaded
that such transactions did not divest the properties of their joint
family character and could not result in exclusive ownership in
favour of the Appellant herein.
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8. During the pendency of the suit, Sengan died on
27.11.1989. Shortly thereafter, reliance was placed by certain
defendants on an unregistered Will dated 24.11.1989, said to
have been executed three days prior to his death, purporting to
bequeath the entirety of his properties in favour of certain
grandchildren. Plaintiff disputed the genuineness and validity of
the Will, alleging suspicious circumstances relating to the age
and health of the testator, the manner of execution, the use of
thumb impression, and the exclusion of natural heirs.
9. The Trial Court framed issues relating to the nature and
character of the suit properties; the existence of joint family
properties; the validity of the alienations; the effect of the
alleged Will; and the entitlement of the parties to partition and
consequential reliefs. Vide , judgement dated 22.04.1992 in O.S.
No. 99 of 1987, the Trial Court declared that the Plaintiff was
th
entitled to 1/4 share in the suit properties excluding Item
No(s). 15, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 44, 67, 69, 26, 31, 1 to 7, 9 to 13,
18, 19, 20, 21 to 25, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41, 52, 55, 57, 60, and 63;
and certain other properties sold under documents not forming
part of the plaint schedule. The suit was decreed accordingly,
without costs.
10. Aggrieved, by the judgement of the Trial Court, the
Plaintiff preferred A.S. No. 160 of 1994, while Defendant(s) 3
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st
to 7 preferred A.S. No. 161 of 1994, before the 1 Additional
District Judge, Tiruchirappalli. Vide judgement dated
26.09.1995, the First Appellate Court modified the preliminary
th
decree and declared the Plaintiff entitled to a 5/16 share in the
suit schedule properties.
11. Second Appeals bearing S.A. No(s). 1561 and 1562 of
1995 were thereafter preferred before the High Court of
Judicature at Madras. Vide judgment dated 12.08.2009, the
High Court partly allowed the appeals and held that the Plaintiff
th
was entitled to 5/16 share, excluding:
 Item No. 74, which had been purchased by Dorairaj from
Mookayee, who was not a coparcener;
 Item No. 66 and 4 cents out of 12 cents in Item No. 36,
covered by Exhibit B75, as these did not form part of the
coparcenary.
It is against this backdrop of concurrent and modified findings
that the present Civil Appeals have been filed.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE PARTIES
12. Ld. Senior Counsel for the Appellant (D2) at the outset
submits that the Courts below have erred in holding that the suit
properties constitute joint Hindu family properties in entirety. It
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is contended that the Plaintiff failed to provide facts necessary
to establish the existence of any income-yielding joint family
property capable of supporting subsequent acquisitions. As per
the Appellant, the plaint was conspicuously silent on the
manner in which the suit properties are alleged to have been
acquired from any common family source.
13. It is contended that mere proof of ancestral origin of Item
No(s). 14 and 15 does not, by itself, justify the inference that all
subsequent acquisitions are presumed to bear the character of
joint family property. The Appellant maintains that the Plaintiff
failed to demonstrate a clear nexus between the ancestral
properties and the acquisitions standing in the name of
individual family members.
14. It is submitted that the first Defendant, Sengan, had
substantial and continuous independent sources of income over
several decades. Reliance was placed on documentary and oral
evidence to show that Sengan was engaged in government
service, panchayat administration, money-lending, temple
trusteeship, and later as a Sub-Jail contractor.
15. It is contended that the said independent earnings fully
explain the acquisitions made in his name and negate the
presumption that such properties were purchased from any
common family fund. The Appellant submits that the courts
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below failed to properly appreciate this evidence while
mechanically invoking presumptions relating to joint family
property.
16. It is further submitted that appellant himself had
independent sources of income and financial capacity to acquire
properties in his own name from as early as 1963 and
continuously thereafter till 19.04.1991. It is contended that
there was no justification for the courts below to discard or
disbelieve the purchases made by the Appellant during this
period.
17. Learned counsel emphasises that a series of registered
covenants evidencing purchases and subsequent transactions
effected, including Ex(s). B-2, B-10, B-13 to B-19, B-67, B-73,
B-75, B-76 and B-104 are to be considered. These documents,
as per the Appellant, clearly demonstrate a consistent pattern of
independent acquisition, enjoyment, and in certain cases
alienation, wholly inconsistent with the understanding of joint
family ownership.
18. Reliance is placed on Ex(s). B-121 to B-141,
including Ex(s). B-125, B-126, B-127, B-128, B-129, B-131, B-
132, B-133, B-134, B-135, B-137 and B-142, which consist of
contract orders, completion certificates, income records, and
allied documents to establish the income out of which such
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purchases are made. These, establish beyond doubt that the
Appellant was engaged in gainful commercial and contractual
activities and had sufficient independent income to fund the
acquisitions.
19. Primary concern of the Appellant is that the courts below
failed to undertake an objective evaluation of the aforesaid
documents and unjustly discarded the same without assigning
legally sustainable reasons. It is submitted that such an
approach has resulted in serious prejudice to the Appellant.
20. It is further submitted that even assuming the existence of
a joint family, the alienations effected by the first Defendant in
his favour were legally valid and binding. It is contended that
the first Defendant, being the admitted head of the family, was
indebted and medically indisposed and that the sales effected
under including Ex(s). B-17, B-18 and B-19 were necessitated
by compelling circumstances, including medical expenses and
discharge of certain debts. Reliance is placed on promissory
notes, hospital records, and other contemporaneous documents
to substantiate the plea of necessity. It is argued that alienations
effected for lawful necessity cannot be questioned by other
coparceners.
21. With regard to properties originally belonging to
Chidambaram, it is submitted that the first Defendant was
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appointed guardian of Chidambaram’s minor children by order
of the District Court, Tiruchirappalli. Pursuant to the permission
obtained, sale deeds including dated 16.12.1968 (Ex. B-2) was
executed in favour of the Appellant. It is contended that the sale
proceeds were utilised to discharge Chidambaram’s debts and
that the transactions were lawful, binding, and immune from
challenge.
22. The Appellant also assails the rejection of the Will dated
24.11.1989 (Ex. B-200), contending that it was duly executed
and proved through the scribe and attesting witnesses. It is
largely submitted that the courts below erred in treating the Will
as suspicious and in failing to appreciate the evidence in its
proper perspective.
23. Reliance is placed on admissions made by the Plaintiff
during cross-examination, including admissions relating to
independent transactions, payment of consideration under sale
deeds and existence of debts explaining the joint family
character of the suit properties. It is contended that these
admissions disentitle the Plaintiff from asserting joint family
ownership and operate as estoppel against him.
24. On the contrary, Respondent(s) submit that the existence
of a joint Hindu family and the ancestral origin of Item No(s).
14 and 15 are admitted. It is contended that once ancestral
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properties yielding income were shown to exist and acquisitions
were made during the subsistence of the joint family, the burden
shifted to the Appellant to establish self-acquisition, which he
failed to do.
25. It is further submitted that the Trial Court undertook a
meticulous item-wise scrutiny of alienations, upheld those
supported by necessity, and excluded others. The High Court,
far from acting unfairly, granted relief to the Appellant by
excluding Item No. 74, Item No. 66, and part of Item No. 36
from partition.
26. The Respondent(s) also submit that the rejection of the
Will attained finality, having not been challenged at the
appropriate stage. The Appellant cannot now seek to resurrect
the issue in second appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
27. Having given anxious consideration to the record and
contentions made by the parties; impugned judgment of the
High Court reflects a correct appreciation of the pleadings,
exhaustive analysis of the record and settled principles
governing partition of joint Hindu family properties.
28. At the outset, it must be emphasized that the High Court
correctly identified that the relationship between the principal
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parties was admitted, and that the suit was instituted by one
coparcener against the others during the subsistence of the joint
family. The genealogy traced to Pallikoodathan and his three
sons was not in dispute, nor was the fact that Sengan (D1) and
his three sons namely, Duraisamy (Plaintiff), Durairaj (D2), and
the deceased Rajakannu, constituted a coparcenary at the
relevant time. The High Court therefore approached the
controversy on a settled factual foundation, without allowing
any other dispute to cloud the core issues.
29. The principal contention by the Appellant before the
High Court, and reiterated before us, is that the First Appellate
Court erred in holding that the suit properties were joint family
properties, particularly in the absence of what was described as
an “income-bearing joint family nucleus”. The High Court
primarily placing its reliance on MLJ (II) 1976 225 (Pattusami
Padayachi v. Mullaiammal and others); 1954 1 SCC 544
Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and Ors.
noted that proof of the mere existence of a joint family does not
by itself render all properties as joint family properties, but
equally, once it is established that ancestral properties yielding
income existed and acquisitions were made during the
continuance of the joint family, the burden shifts to the person
asserting self-acquisition.
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30. In this context, the High Court undertook a detailed
examination of Item No(s). 14 and 15, which were admittedly
ancestral properties. The plea of the Appellant that these lands
were perpetually water-logged, and incapable of yielding
income was carefully examined. On the contrary, reliance was
placed on revenue records (Ex(s). B-201 to B-206), which
categorically evidenced cultivation over several fasli years and
disclosed the existence of wells and oil-engine pump sets. The
High Court further examined the Appellant’s reliance on the
alleged independent income of Sengan (D1). It accepted that
Sengan had engaged in various jobs over his lifetime, including
service and contractual work. However, it correctly rejected the
simplistic assumption that the mere existence of some
independent earnings would automatically negate the
contribution of joint family income. The High Court observed
that Hindu law does not require other coparceners to establish
with precision the exact source of funds for each acquisition
made by the Karta. Where acquisitions are made during the
subsistence of the joint family, and where ancestral properties
yielding income are shown to exist, properties acquired in the
name of the Karta are ordinarily regarded as joint family
properties unless the contrary is proved.
31. Significantly, the High Court also examined the factual
position of the Appellant (D2) during the relevant period. On
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the basis of material on record, it noted that he was pursuing his
studies till about 1966 and that his claim of having amassed
substantial savings sufficient to purchase properties while still a
student was subjected to careful scrutiny. The High Court’s
reasoning on this aspect is neither conjectural nor speculative; it
is rooted in a realistic appraisal of the evidence and the
surrounding circumstances.
32. On the plea of prior partition or division in status, the
High Court recognised that separate enjoyment of portions,
installation of irrigation facilities, or even obtaining borrowings
individually, do not by themselves establish partition in law.
What is required is a clear and unequivocal intention to sever
the joint status. The High Court correctly emphasized that all
relevant conveyances described the interests conveyed as
undivided shares, that there was no mutation evidencing
division, and that there was no separate payment towards
borrowings. In the absence of any declaration or conduct
evidencing an intention to divide, the inference of continued
joint family status was inevitable.
33. The High Court then addressed with notable clarity; the
validity of alienations effected by Sengan (D1) in favour of the
Appellant (D2) as per various sale deeds Ex(s). B-17 to B-19. It
correctly distinguished between alienations for proved legal
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necessity and those which were legally impermissible. The
Courts below undertook an item-wise scrutiny of each
transaction and upheld those alienations where legal necessity
was established, while excluding others where such necessity
was not proved. The High Court affirmed this calibrated
approach, reiterating that alienations by a Karta in favour of one
coparcener must be proved to be for legal necessity and that
vague or general recitals are insufficient to bind the interests of
other coparceners. However, it protected D2’s right to establish
actual medical expenses during final decree proceedings.
34. Of particular significance is the High Court’s approach to
Ex. B-2, qua properties sold by Sengan as guardian of the minor
sons of Chidambaram. The High Court in paragraph 82 to 89
meticulously analysed the surrounding circumstances, the court
permission obtained, the recitals in the sale deed, and the
endorsements on the promissory note. It found glaring
inconsistencies and rightly concluded that the Trial Court had
upheld Ex. B-2 without adequate reasoning. The First Appellate
Court’s correction of this error was therefore fully justified.
35. Likewise, on the issue of the Will dated 24.11.1989 (Ex.
B-200), the High Court’s reasoning is both legally and factually
compelling. It noted that the testator was habitually signing
documents but affixed only a thumb impression as far as this
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document is concerned; that the Will was allegedly executed
barely 72 hours prior to death; that it was scribed by a close
relative instead of a professional scribe; and that the scribe’s
presence itself was doubtful due to election duty. These
circumstances clearly warranted a finding of suspicion.
Importantly, the High Court also noted that the rejection of the
Will by the Trial Court had not been challenged by D2 at the
appropriate stage and had therefore attained finality. The
Appellant cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate at
different stages of litigation.
36. The High Court further dealt with the impleadment
applications filed by alleged heirs of Rajakannu. It correctly
held that there was no evidence of collusion in the suit, that the
share of Rajakannu was already represented, and that permitting
impleadment at such a belated stage would unsettle proceedings
that had otherwise attained finality. This approach reflects a
proper balance between substantive justice and procedural
discipline.
37. Finally, the High Court exercised its powers with
restraint and precision by granting limited relief to the
Appellant. Item No(s). 66 and 74, as well as a portion of Item
No. 36 were clearly shown to have been purchased from third
parties, accordingly, were excluded from partition as they were
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the exclusive properties of D2. Save and except these limited
modifications, the High Court affirmed the judgment and
decree of the First Appellate Court.
CONCLUSION
38. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we are of the
considered view that the impugned judgement is reasoned and
borne out from the material on record. Except to the limited
extent expressly modified therein, this Court finds no ground to
take a view different from that taken by the High Court.
39. Accordingly, the Civil Appeals are dismissed. No order
as to cost.
……………………………………J.
[SANJAY KAROL]
……………………………………J.
[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]
NEW DELHI
February 05, 2026.
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