V. Pathmavathi vs. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd.

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 131
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ______ OF 2026
[arising out of SLP (C.) NO. 23880 OF 2022]


V. PATHMAVATHI & ORS. … APPELLANTS


VERSUS


BHARTHI AXA GENERAL INSURANCE
CO. LTD & ANR. … RESPONDENTS



J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
T HE A PPEAL
2. The present appeal assails the judgment and order dated
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31.01.2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras
in C.M.A. No. 2806 of 2013, whereby the High Court partly allowed
the appeal filed by the claimants (heirs of the deceased) and
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modified the award dated 08.11.2012 , passed by the Motor
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2026.02.06
17:03:39 IST
Reason:

1
impugned order
2
High Court
3
award
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4
Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chennai while deciding a claim petition
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under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 . It is at the
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instance of the claimants/appellants before the High Court .
F ACTUAL B ACKGROUND
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3. Facts, in brief, are that on 09.06.2011, D. Velu , aged about 37
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years as noted by the High Court, was riding a two-wheeler. A
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tanker lorry insured with the respondent–insurance company ,
which was driven in a rash and negligent manner, hit the two-
wheeler and as a result thereof the victim died instantly.
4. The claimants, viz. the widow of the victim, their two minor children
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and the victim’s parents lodged a claim petition before the MACT,
claiming compensation of Rs. 20,00,000/- on account of loss of
dependency and other conventional heads. It was claimed that the
victim, employed as a driver at the material time, was earning a
regular monthly income of Rs.10,000/- and since the accident
occurred solely due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending
vehicle, they were entitled to “just compensation”. Before the MACT,

4
MACT
5
Act
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claimants
7
victim
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MACT recorded the age of the victim as 36 years. As the marginal variation in age does
not materially affect the computation of compensation payable to the claimants, we deem
it appropriate to consider the age of the victim as 37 years, as recorded by the High Court,
for the limited purpose of determining the quantum of compensation.
9
offending vehicle
10
insurer
11
M.C.O.P. No. 4026 of 2011
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the insurer contested the claim, inter alia, disputing negligence, the
income of the victim, and the quantum of compensation claimed.
5. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record,
the MACT, by its award, held that the accident occurred due to the
negligence of the offending vehicle; however, in view of lack of
supporting documentary evidence, the victim’s monthly salary was
reckoned as Rs. 6,000/-. Accordingly, the compensation payable
was assessed as follows: the victim’s monthly income was taken at
Rs. 6,000/-; and, after deducting one-fourth towards personal
expenses, i.e., Rs. 1,500/-, the notional monthly contribution to the
family was calculated at Rs. 4,500/-; then, applying the multiplier
of 16, the loss of income was computed at Rs. 8,64,000/- (Rs. 4,500
× 12 × 16). In addition, a sum of Rs. 2,000/- was awarded towards
transport charges; Rs. 25,000/- towards loss of consortium to the
widow of the victim; Rs. 5,000/- towards funeral expenses; Rs.
40,000/- towards loss of love and affection to the parents and
children at Rs. 10,000/- each; and Rs. 1,000/- towards damages.
No amount was awarded under the head of loss of estate. Thus, the
total compensation payable was determined at Rs. 9,37,000/- with
interest @7.5%.
6. Aggrieved by the quantum of compensation awarded, the claimants
preferred an appeal before the High Court under Section 173 of the
Act.
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7. The High Court, by the impugned order, affirmed the finding on
negligence; however, it modified the award by enhancing the
quantum of compensation payable by the insurer from Rs.
9,37,000/- to Rs. 10,51,000/-. In computing the quantum of
compensation payable, the High Court reckoned the monthly salary
of the victim as Rs. 7,000/-. The insurer was directed to deposit the
enhanced compensation with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the
date of the claim petition till the date of payment and with
proportionate cost. The following is the break-up of compensation
granted by the High Court:

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8. Dissatisfied with the minor modification of compensation and, in
particular, the denial of future prospects despite the settled law laid
down by this Court, the claimants are now before us seeking further
enhancement.
I SSUES I NVOLVED
9. While the claimants contend that the High Court erred on two counts
[(i) not reckoning the victim’s monthly salary as Rs.10,000/- and
(ii) not awarding future prospects in line with the decision in
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National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi ], the insurer
claims that the High Court was right in not accepting the claim of
Rs.10,000/- being the monthly salary of the victim in the absence
of supporting evidence. However, while omission of the High Court
not to grant any amount for future prospects has not been seriously
contested, the insurer has claimed, relying on Pranay Sethi
(supra), that the High Court erred in granting Rs.60,000/- on
account of loss and affection for the parents and the children of the
victim. Pointed reference has been made to Pranay Sethi (supra)
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overruling the decision in Rajesh v. Rajbir , which had provided
compensation under such head.

12
(2017) 16 SCC 680
13
(2013) 9 SCC 54
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10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
materials on record.
11. The controversy in the present appeal lies in a narrow compass and
relates primarily to:
(i) the assessment of the income of the victim and the denial
of any amount towards future prospects; and
(ii) the grant of compensation under the head “loss of love and
affection”.
A NALYSIS
12. We ought to remind ourselves, at the outset, that when an individual
dies as a result of a fatal road accident and his distressed
dependents apply for compensation either from the owner of the
vehicle responsible for the death or the insurance company with
whom such vehicle is insured, no amount of money can truly
compensate for the loss. Compensation is nothing but a rough
estimate, being a token attempt to ease the financial burden on the
dependents. Take consortium, for example. It is impossible to put a
price on the loss of a loved one’s companionship. Spousal, filial or
parental compensation are all about acknowledging the emotional
void but the payout can never be more than a rough approximation.
It is like trying to measure the immeasurable. Considering the
income of the deceased, the needs of his dependents and the
emotional toll of the loss, the best that can be ensured is that the
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compensation is fair and reasonable, without being either arbitrary
or niggardly. This would be in accord with the foundational principle
governing the determination of “just compensation” under Section
168 of the Act.
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13. In Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan , a three-Judge Bench of
this Court held that the purpose of award of compensation under
section 166 read with section 168 of the Act is to place the distressed
dependents of the victim of a fatal road accident, if the victim had
been the sole bread earner, in almost the same position financially
if he lived his natural span of life. It is obviously not intended to put
such distressed dependents in a better financial position in which
they would otherwise have been if the accident had not occurred. At
the same time, the determination of compensation is not an exact
science and the exercise involves an assessment based on
estimation and conjectures, here and there, as many imponderable
factors and unpredictable contingences have to be taken into
consideration. Obviously, award of damages in each case would
depend on the particular facts and circumstances of the case but the
element of fairness in the amount of compensation so determined is
the ultimate guiding factor.
14. What follows is that the amount of compensation should be “just”,
i.e., it implies that the determination is fair, reasonable and
equitable by accepted legal standards and is not a bonanza. Though

14
(2013) 9 SCC 65
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“just” compensation can never be prefect or absolute compensation,
since loss of human life can never be compensated by monetary
terms, the principle of awarding “just” compensation and assessing
the extent of dependency would depend on examination of the
unique situation of each individual case.
I SSUE 1:
15. Bearing the aforesaid well-settled principles in mind, we now move
on to decide the first issue.
16. In the present case, the MACT proceeded on the premise that the
monthly income of the victim was Rs. 6,000/-. This was
subsequently enhanced by the High Court to Rs. 7,000/-, albeit
without recording any reason. However, learned counsel appearing
for the claimants has rightly drawn our attention to the salary
certificate issued by the employer of the victim, marked Exhibit P-
14, which unequivocally records that the victim was employed as a
driver on a fixed monthly salary of Rs. 10,000/-. This documentary
evidence is further corroborated by the affidavit sworn by the
victim’s employer (PW-3). On the face of such cogent and relevant
evidence, which was not impeached by the insurer, it would be
wholly impermissible to assess the income at a lower figure. The
determination of income must be founded on proof placed on record
and cannot rest on conjecture or assumptions divorced from
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evidence. Accordingly, for the purposes of re-computation, the
monthly income of the victim has to be reckoned as Rs. 10,000/-.
17. Equally significant is the High Court’s omission to consider grant of
any amount towards future prospects. Assessment of income and
the grant of future prospects are not matters of judicial discretion in
the abstract but are now firmly structured by authoritative
precedents. Having regard to the decision in Pranay Sethi (supra),
the law on this aspect is no longer res integra . The Constitution
Bench clarified therein that the concept of future prospects is an
integral component of “just compensation” and is not confined only
to those in permanent government employment. While this Court
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in Sarla Verma v. DTC adopted a structured approach, Santosh
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Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd marked a jurisprudential
shift by recognising the economic realities faced by self-employed
persons and those on fixed salaries. Although Santosh Devi
(supra) was later held not to be a binding precedent on account of
judicial discipline, the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi (supra)
itself incorporated, refined and standardised the principle of future
prospects for such categories by holding as follows:
59.1. The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi [ Santosh Devi v.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. , (2012) 6 SCC 421] should have been
well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a
different view than what has been stated in Sarla Verma [ Sarla
Verma v. DTC , (2009) 6 SCC 121], a judgment by a coordinate
Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot

15
(2009) 6 SCC 121
16
(2012) 2 SCC 421
9



take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate
Bench.
59.2. As Rajesh [ Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh , (2013) 9 SCC 54] has
not taken note of the decision in Reshma Kumari [ Reshma
Kumari v. Madan Mohan , (2013) 9 SCC 65], which was delivered at
earlier point of time, the decision in Rajesh [ Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh ,
(2013) 9 SCC 54] is not a binding precedent.
59.3. While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual
salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where
the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40
years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the
deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was
between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%.
Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax.
59.4. In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed
salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the
warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An
addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to
50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to
60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of
computation. The established income means the income minus the
tax component.
59.5. For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for
personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be
guided by paras 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma [ Sarla Verma v. DTC ,
(2009) 6 SCC 121] which we have reproduced hereinbefore.
59.6. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table
in Sarla Verma [ Sarla Verma v. DTC , (2009) 6 SCC 121] read with
para 42 of that judgment.
59.7. The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying
the multiplier.
59.8. Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of
estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs 15,000,
Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The aforesaid amounts should
be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.

18. Paragraph 59.4 of Pranay Sethi (supra) unequivocally mandates
that where the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary and
below the age of 40 years, an addition of 40% of the established
income towards future prospects is compulsory. This is not a matter
of choice, but a binding norm flowing from Article 141 of the
Constitution.
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19. In the present case, the victim was 37 years of age at the time of
the accident and was earning a fixed monthly income. Once these
foundational facts are established, the addition towards future
prospects follows as a necessary consequence. The High Court, in
declining such addition, failed to apply the binding precedent of this
Court, thereby committing a manifest error of law.
20. Accordingly, the income of the victim being fixed at Rs. 10,000/- per
month, an addition of 40% towards future prospects is warranted
which brings the monthly income to Rs. 14,000/-. After deducting
one-fourth towards personal and living expenses, the monthly
contribution to the family would be Rs. 10,500/-. Applying the
multiplier of 15, as applicable to the age group of the victim, the
total loss of dependency is computed at Rs. 18,90,000/- (Rs. 10,500
× 12 × 15).
SSUE RANT OF COMPENSATION UNDER THE HEAD LOSS OF LOVE AND
I 2: G “
AFFECTION ”
21. The second issue raises a question that lies at the intersection of
judicial discipline and substantive justice.
22. In Rajesh (supra), this Court recognised “loss of love and affection”
as a distinct head of compensation, reflecting the non-pecuniary
deprivation suffered by family members upon the untimely death of
a loved one. However, the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi
(supra) expressly disapproved this approach holding that Rajesh
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(supra) was rendered per incuriam and that compensation should
be confined to three conventional heads, i.e., loss of estate, loss of
consortium and funeral expenses in order to preserve consistency
and certainty in awards. Observing disagreement, Pranay Sethi
(supra) held thus:

23. There can be no quarrel with the binding nature of Pranay Sethi
(supra). Judicial discipline demands that a Constitution Bench
decision must prevail over a judgment of a Bench of lesser strength.
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Accordingly, this Court is constrained to follow the law declared
therein.
24. That said, it is difficult to ignore the conceptual tension that
underlies this exclusion. The head of “future prospects” itself is a
creation of judicial interpretation, evolved to respond to socio-
economic realities and the legitimate expectations of dependents. If
the law is capable of recognising anticipated economic progression
as a valid loss, it is not too clear why emotional deprivation
manifested in loss of love and affection must be viewed as an
impermissible head, especially when Chapter XII of the Act is a
beneficial piece of legislation meant to help people in distress arising
out of road accidents.
25. The concern expressed in Pranay Sethi (supra) was primarily one
of consistency and avoidance of unguided discretion. However,
consistency, though desirable, cannot be elevated to a point where
it eclipses the core objective of awarding “just compensation”. The
law must remain responsive to lived human realities, especially in
cases involving the sudden rupture of familial bonds.
26. It is in this context that the subsequent decision of this Court in
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Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram assumes
significance. This Court expanded the ambit of “consortium” to
include parental and filial consortium, implicitly acknowledging the
emotional and relational loss suffered by children and parents alike.

17
(2018) 18 SCC 130
13



This doctrinal expansion suggests that the distinction between
“consortium” and “loss of love and affection” may be one of form
rather than substance. The coordinate Bench ruled as follows:
21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi [ National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi , (2017) 16 SCC 680] dealt with
the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a
death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal
parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses
“spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium”.
The right to consortium would include the company, care, help,
comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a
loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual
relations with the deceased spouse: [ Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh , (2013)
9 SCC 54].
21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining
to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to
the surviving spouse for loss of “company, society, cooperation,
affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation”. [ Black's
Law Dictionary (5th Edn., 1979).]
21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the
premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental aid, protection,
affection, society, discipline, guidance and training”.
21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation
in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to
the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and
family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose
their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love,
affection, companionship and their role in the family unit.
22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about
the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions
world-over have recognised that the value of a child's consortium far
exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case
of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to
be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of
a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for
loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased
child.
23. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at
providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine
claims. In case where a parent has lost their minor child, or
unmarried son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded
loss of consortium under the head of filial consortium. Parental
consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor
vehicle accidents under the Act. A few High Courts have awarded
compensation on this count [Rajasthan High Court in Jagmala
Ram v. Sohi Ram , 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3848; Uttarakhand High
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Court in Rita Rana v. Pradeep Kumar , 2013 SCC OnLine Utt 2435;
Karnataka High Court in Lakshman v. Susheela Chand Choudhary ,
1996 SCC OnLine Kar 74]. However, there was no clarity with respect
to the principles on which compensation could be awarded on loss of
filial consortium.
24. The amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium
will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under
“loss of consortium” as laid down in Pranay Sethi . In the present case,
we deem it appropriate to award the father and the sister of the
deceased, an amount of Rs.40,000 each for loss of filial consortium.


27. Interestingly, we find from paragraph 25 of Magma General
Insurance (supra) that apart from Rs. 80,000/- awarded on
account of filial consortium, this Court awarded Rs. 1,00,000/- on
account of loss and affection in addition.
28. More recently, in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
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Satinder Kaur , a three-Judge Bench of this Court harmonised the
principles laid down in Pranay Sethi (supra) and Magma General
Insurance (supra) to ensure uniformity in the award of
compensation under conventional heads. Reaffirming the binding
nature of Pranay Sethi (supra), this Court held that compensation
in death cases is confined to three conventional heads, i.e., loss of
estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses. At the same time,
drawing upon Magma General Insurance (supra), this Court
clarified that consortium is a compendious concept encompassing
spousal, parental and filial consortium. It was further held that loss
of love and affection is subsumed within loss of consortium and
cannot be awarded as a separate head. This Court held as follows:


18
(2021) 11 SC 780
15



34. At this stage, we consider it necessary to provide uniformity with
respect to the grant of consortium, and loss of love and affection.
Several Tribunals and the High Courts have been awarding
compensation for both loss of consortium and loss of love and
affection. The Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi [ National Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi , (2017) 16 SCC 680], has recognised only
three conventional heads under which compensation can be awarded
viz. loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses.
In Magma General [ Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram ,
(2018) 18 SCC 130], this Court gave a comprehensive interpretation
to consortium to include spousal consortium, parental consortium, as
well as filial consortium. Loss of love and affection is comprehended
in loss of consortium.
35. The Tribunals and the High Courts are directed to award
compensation for loss of consortium, which is a legitimate
conventional head. There is no justification to award compensation
towards loss of love and affection as a separate head.


29. Consistent with the aforesaid position but notwithstanding the
reservations noted earlier, this Court is bound by the law declared
by the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi (supra), which does not
countenance “loss of love and affection” as a distinct head of
compensation. As subsequently clarified in Satinder Kaur (supra),
referring to both Pranay Sethi (supra) and Magma General
Insurance (supra), the non-pecuniary loss arising from deprivation
of love and affection is comprehended within the broader head of
“consortium”. Consequently, no separate award under the head of
loss of love and affection is warranted.
30.
In light of the aforesaid discussion, the claimants are awarded
compensation as follows:




16

31. If any amount on account of compensation as awarded by the MACT,
since enhanced by the High Court has been paid to the claimants,
the insurer is directed to pay the balance amount of compensation
within a period of twelve weeks from the date of this order.

19
since the father of the victim passed away on 12.11.2019, filial consortium is granted
only to the mother of the victim.
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32. The victim passed away on 09.07.2011. His dependants have been
pursuing legal proceedings for grant of compensation since the past
15 years. As a consequence, we deem it appropriate to direct that
interest @ 9% p.a. be paid on the total compensation awarded, from
the date of filing the claim petition, till realization.
33. The civil appeal, thus, stands disposed of on the aforesaid terms.
34. Connected applications, if any, shall stand closed.



……………………...………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)



………………………………………J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
New Delhi;
February 06, 2026.








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