Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RAKESH KUMAR & SHRI SHAKTI KUMAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
HINDUSTAN EVEREST TOOL LTD.
DATE OF JUDGMENT07/03/1988
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
RANGNATHAN, S.
CITATION:
1988 AIR 976 1988 SCR (3) 88
1988 SCC (2) 165 JT 1988 (1) 619
1988 SCALE (1)556
ACT:
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s. 14(1)(a)-Eviction-
Notice of demand by landlord for arrears of rent-Validity
of-To be construed as understood by common man.
HEADNOTE:
%
Section 14(1)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, ,958
provides for recovery of possession of the demised premises,
where the tenant has failed to pay the arrears of rent
recoverable from him within two months of the date on which
notice of demand had been served on him in the manner
provided in s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Under the lease agreement the respondent-tenant was
required to pay rent in advance by the 5th of-each calendar
month. The appellant-landlords by their notice dated 8th
March, 1982 reminded the respondent that the rent for the
months of February and March, 1982 was due as per the lease
agreement and requested for immediate payment. The
appellants again served a notice on the respondent on 19th
April,1982 that it had not paid the rent for the months of
February, March and April,1982 for the two shops and it
having committed violation of the terms of the lease
agreement they do not wish to keep it as their tenant any
longer and thereby terminated the tenancy requesting the
tenant to handover peaceful vacant possession of the
premises by 31st May, 1982. The respondent by their letter
dated 1st June, 1982 acknowledged the arrears of rent as on
that date.
On a petition filed by the appellants under s. 14(1)(a)
of the Act, the Rent Controller passed an order of eviction,
which was upheld by the Rent Control Tribunal. The High
Court, however, set aside that order on the ground that
there was no proper notice of demand to pay arrears of rent
in terms of proviso to s. 14(1)(a) of the Act.
Allowing the appeals,
^
HELD: 1. The High Court was in error in setting aside
the judgement of the Rent Control Tribunal. [96F]
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2.1 For obtaining recovery of possession under the Act
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there must be relationship of landlord and tenant between
the parties, the tenant must have been in arrears of legally
recoverable rent on the date of the notice of demand, and a
notice of demand had been served upon the tenant in the
manner provided under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, but the tenant neither pays nor tenders the rent within
two months of the notice of demand. [93E-F]
2.2 The notice of the landlord stating therein about
the arrears of rent must be read in common sense point of
view bearing in mind how such notices are understood by
ordinary people. [93G]
In the instant case if the two notices dated 8th March,
1982 and 19th April, 1982 are read alongwith the letter
dated 1st June, 1982 it is clear that the respondent was in
arrears of rent for the months mentioned therein and there
was a demand to pay rent. There were intimations that in
default of payment of rent an eviction petition as
consequence thereof would follow. That is how the appellants
understood the notices. If that was so, there was clear
notice of demand and the relevant requirement of the proviso
to s. 14(i)(a) of the Act was fulfilled. [93G; H; 94G]
Shri Ram Sarup v. Shri Sultan Singh etc., [1977] All
India Rent Control Journal, Vol. II 522, approved.
Mangoo Singh v. The Election Tribunal, Bareilly & Ors.,
[1958] SCR 418; Chimanlal v. Mishrilal, [ 1985] SCC 14 and
Mangat Ram Anr. v. Sardar Meharban Singh, A.I.R. ;987 SC
1656, distinguished.
(The decree for eviction not to be executed till 30th
September, i988 provided the respondent files the usual
undertaking in this Court within four weeks.) [96G]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTloN: Civil Appeal Nos. 933-934
of 1988
From the Judgment and order dated 8.10.1985 of the
Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 142 of 1985
Soli J. Sorabji, S. Kumar and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the
Appellants.
Shankar Ghosh, Rajiv Endlow, Sandeep Narain and Praveen
Kumar for the Respondent.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. Special leave granted in both
the matters and the appeals are disposed of hereunder.
The facts in both these cases are identical. These
appeals are directed against the judgment and orders of the
High Court of Delhi, dated. the 8th October, 1985 setting
aside the order of eviction affirmed by the Rent Control
Tribunal. In order to appreciate the controversy it may be
mentioned here briefly that the appellant is the owner of a
flat in Dohil Chambers, 46 Nehru Place, New Delhi. It is the
case of the appellant that the appellant had duly appointed
Shri Hardev Dohil as the general attorney for and on his
behalf to do all the acts and deeds including renting out
the premises in question. Shri H. Dohil entered into an
agreement of lease with respondent No. 1 Hindustan Everest
Tools Ltd., to take the premises situated at Nehru Place.
Clause 21 of the said agreement amongst others specifically
provided that the respondent herein would not be in arrears
of rent and there was a specific obligation imposed upon the
respondent by virtue of the agreement between the parties to
regularly pay the rent of the premises without default and
without notice from the appellant. The respondent started
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defaulting, according to the appellant, not only towards the
arrears of rent but also towards payment of maintenance and
other charges. It is the case of the appellant that the
respondent was occupying a number of flats in the said
building and the appellant further alleges that on one
pretext or the other, respondent had been avoiding to pay
their admitted liability under the terms of the agreement.
It is alleged by the appellants that the respondent was
using a number of air-conditioners which had put the builder
in great difficulties and it had come to a situation where
the electric supply to the building was disconnected. It was
under the orders of the High Court of Delhi and trial courts
that the electricity could be got restored and the
respondent was directed to make certain payments. It is
alleged by the appellants that the respondent had not made
payment of rent despite various notices issued.
The appellant had filed a petition under Section
14(1)(a) and (j) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, hereinafter
called as ’the Act’. The respondent filed a written
statement to the said petition and took up the stand that
rent was attached by M.C.D. and had also raised certain
frivolous objections. It is the case of the appellant that
the appellant had verified from the Corporation and found
that the respondent had been wrongfully with-holding the
payment of the rent of the appel-
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lant. The learned Additional Rent Controller during the
pendency of main petition under Section 15(c) of the Act,
had directed the respondent to deposit the arrears within
one month from the date of order and to continue depositing
the monthly rent by 15th of each succeeding month. The
respondent did not deposit the arrears of rent and filed an
appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal. The Rent Control
Tribunal dismissed the appeal and even after passing of the
said order, did not deposit the arrears of rent and filed an
appeal before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court
dismissed the said appeal. In the meantime, it may be
mentioned that the petition for eviction under Section
14(1)(a) of the Act proceeded and the Rent Controller duly
passed an order of eviction on that which was upheld by the
Rent Control Tribunal. In appeal the High Court has set
aside the said order on the ground that there was no proper
notice of demand to pay arrears of rent in terms of proviso
to Section 14(1)(a) of the Act. It is from this order of the
High Court these matters have come to this Court. But, in
order to complete the narration of events it must be
mentioned that against the striking off of the defence of
the respondent in default of payment of arrears of rent
which was duly confirmed by the High Court the appellant had
come up in Special Leave Petition to this Court being SLP
(C) No. 8120/84 and this Court dismissed the Special Leave
Petition on 18.11.1984. It is important in the background of
the facts of this case to emphasise that so far as striking
off the defence is concerned by the order of dismissal that
order stands confirmed i.e., the striking off the defence
was validly done because of the failure to pay the arrears
of rent. This is an important aspect of the matter.
In the special leave petition preferred by the
appellant, it had specifically raised the question of
legality and validity of a notice dated 19th April, 1982
issued by the appellant. While the receipt of the said
notice was duly admitted, ground (C) of that special leave
petition read as follows:
"C. Because no valid notice demanding arrears of
rent as required under Section 14(1)(a) of the
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D.R.C. Act had been received by the petitioner
(Annexure P-3) the question of issuing any order
under Section 15(1) of the said Act did not arise
and the orders issued by the lower court, as such,
were ultra vires."
It appears from these words that the precise point that
there was no valid notice demanding the arrears in view of
the facts and circumstances of these cases, is concluded by
the dismissal of the Special
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Leave Petition as mentioned hereinbefore.
The relevant provisions of Section 14(1)(a) of the Act
are as follow:
"14.(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law or contract, no order
or decree for the recovery of possession of any
premises shall be made by any court or Controller
in favour of the landlord against a tenant:
Provided that the Controller may, on an
application made to him in the prescribed manner,
make an order for the recovery of possession of
the premises on one or more of the following
grounds only, namely:
(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered
the whole of the arrears of the rent legally
recoverable from him within two months of the date
on which a notice of demand for the arrears of
rent has been served on him by the land lord in
the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882;"
The notice upon which the eviction was sought for was
the notice dated the 19th April, 1982. The relevant portion
of the said notice read as follows:
"That for both these shops, FF-I and FF-2, you
have not paid the rent for the months of February,
March and April, 1982. Therefore, a sum of Rs.
7,800 is due from you as rent for the said shop
No. FF-2 and a sum of Rs.12,214.50 is due as rent
in respect of shop No. FF-l. However I have the
instruction to say that you have demolished the
internal wall of the premises under your tenancy
without the con sent of my client in writing or
otherwise and have therefore, committed the
violation of the terms of the lease and the
agreement executed between my client and M/s. H.
Dohil Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd., Dohil Chambers,
Nehru Place, New Delhi, the promoters of the
buildings.
5. That in view of the above facts and
circumstances my clients do not wish to keep you a
tenant in its premises any longer and they clearly
show their intention by means
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of this notice to terminate your tenancy which is
hereby terminated by means of this notice. You are
no longer tenant of my client. You are requested
to hand over the peaceful vacant possession of the
two shops i.e., FF-1 and FF-2, Dohil Chambers,
46-Nehru Place, New Delhi, under your
tenancy/occupation on 31st May, 1982. You are also
requested to place the premises under your tenancy
in the same condition as they were at the time
when the possession was given to you.
Further my client reserves its right to claim
damages for causing damage, to the property of my
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client."
In reply to the aforesaid notice the respondent wrote a
letter dated 1st June, 1982 wherein the respondent stated
inter alia as follows:
"Without prejudice to the above, we have to state
that a sum of Rs. 10,400 and a sum of Rs.16,286 is
due from us to Sarvashri Shakti Kumar and Rakesh
Kumar as on date in respect of rent of Flat Nos.
F-1 and F-2 at Dohil Chambers, 46-Nehru Place, New
Delhi, and we are arranging to send the rent
directly to them."
In view of the statutory provision which has been set
out before it appears that for obtaining recovery of
possession under the Act there must be relationship of
landlord and tenant between the parties, and that the tenant
must have been in arrears of legally recoverable rent on the
date of the notice of demand, and that a notice of demand
had been served upon the tenant in the manner provided under
section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, but the tenant
neither pays nor tenders the rent within two months from the
service of demand.
On reading the notice along with the letter dated 1st
June, 1982 it appears that the respondent was in arrears of
rent for the months mentioned hereinbefore and was intimated
that in default of payment of rent the eviction would follow
in accordance with law. This is the proper way of reading
the notice and in our view the appropriate logical way in
which notices of such type should be read. These notices
must be read in common sense point of view bearing in mind
how such notices are understood by ordinary people. That is
how the appellant, it appears from the reply and the
background of the previous letter to be mentioned
hereinafter understood the notice.
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More or less, a similar notice was considered by the
Delhi High Court in Shri Ram Sarup v. Shri Sultan Singh
etc., (1977) All India Rent Control Journal, Vol. II 552
where Mr. Justice V.S. Deshpande, as the learned Chief
Justice then was, held that the notice of the landlord
stating therein about the arrears of rent and threatening to
file a petition for eviction against the tenant was
sufficient and the learned Judge held that the notice of
demand could be expressed or implied and the conduct of the
landlord showed that the demand was implied. We are in
respectful agreement with the approach to such type of
notices taken by the High Court in that case.
It may be mentioned in these cases that there was
another notice prior thereto dated the 8th March, 1982
wherein it was clearly stated as follows:
"This is to bring to your attention that you are
again behind with the payment of your monthly rent
of FF-1 & FF-2 premises occupied by you on the
first floor at Dohil Chambers, 46-Nehru Place, New
Delhi- 110 019. As per the lease agreement with
you, you are to pay your rent in advance by the
5th of each calendar month. Rent for February was
due and you kept on delaying this payment on one
pretence or another. Finally, you agreed about a
fortnight age that you will pay the rent for
February and March, 1982 by 5th March, 1982. You
still have not paid.
You are, therefore, requested to please pay
your rent arrears immediately and in future to
make your payment promptly and regularly as per
the lease agreement."
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If these two notices are read together, in our opinion,
as it must be, it is clear that the respondent was in
arrears for payment of rent and there was a demand to pay
rent. There were intimations that in default of payment of
rent an eviction petition as consequence thereof would
follow. If that was so in our opinion, the relevant
requirement of the proviso to section 14(1)(a) of the Act
was fulfilled in this case.
Dr. Shanker Ghosh, Counsel for the respondent had
contended before us that the notice dated the 8th March,
1982 as referred to hereinbefore, was not a notice upon
which the eviction order was passed. That is true. He has
further submitted that the notice was not proper in as much
as notice regarding rent for the month of February could not
be issued on 8th March, 1982. It may be so. We are not
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concerned with the facts of this case whether the notice was
legal but how the parties have understood. There is clear
notice of demand as it appears from the terms set out
hereinabove. We have been shown the chart at Page No. 77 of
the present records which indicate how belated attempts were
made to pay certain arrears.
Dr. Shanker Ghosh, however, placed strong reliance on
the three decisions of this Court and contended that the
notice in this question was not valid and the High Court
was, therefore, right in dismissing the eviction petition
while setting aside the order of eviction affirmed by the
Rent Control Tribunal.
The first decision to which our attention was drawn is
Mangoo Singh v. The Election Tribunal, Bareilly & Ors.,
[1958] SCR 418. That decision, however, was not on the Rent
Act but was a decision on an election dispute. The appellant
therein was elected by the Municipal Board under the U.P.
Municipalities Act, 1916. He was in arrears in the payment
of Municipal Tax in excess of one year’s demand to which
section 166 of the Act applied, at the time of filing of
nomination, but made the payment before the date of the
poll. Under section 13D, clause (g) of the Act "a person
shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a
member of a Board if he is in arrears in the payment of
Municipal tax or other dues in excess of one year’s demand
to which Section 166 applies, provided that the
disqualification shall cease as soon as the arrears are
paid." on an election petition filed by a defeated
candidate, the election was set aside by the Election
Tribunal on the ground that the appellant was not entitled
to the benefit of the proviso to s. 13-D, Cl. (g) of the
Act. It was contended for the appellant that the relevant
date for the operation of the disqualification was the date
of the poll and that in any case, he did not come within the
mischief of the disqualification clause in that section, as
a bill for payment of the tax was not presented to him, nor
a notice of demand served on him under section 168. It was
held so far as relevant for the present purpose that the
word "demand" in S. 13-D, Cl. (g) of the Act meant "claim"
or "due" and only referred to the amount of arrears or dues
on which the disqualification depended did not attract the
operation of Section 168 of the Act.
In the facts of that case this Court observed at page
427 of the report that the word ’demand’ in that context and
in the collocation of the words in which it had been used,
could only mean ’in excess of one year’s municipal tax or
other dues’. The Court referred to several meanings of the
word ’demand’ in standard English dictionaries and
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law lexicons. When the context makes the meaning of a word
quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select
a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is
capable of, according to lexicographers. It was sufficient
for the Court to state that even in standard dictionaries
and law lexicons, it was well recognised that the word
’demand’ might mean simply a ’claim’ or ’due’ without
importing any further meaning of calling upon the person
liable to pay the claim or due. The said observations are
against the appellant, in the light of the actual demand
mentioned in the letters as aforesaid.
The next decision to which reference was made is
Chimanlal v. Mishrilal, [1985] 1 SCC 14, wherein it was
found by this Court that the notice of demand did not relate
to the premises in question. In the background of the facts
of that case the said decision cannot also be of much
assistance to the appellant and the observations made
therein must be understood in that background. This Court at
page 18 of the report reiterated in the background of the
relevant statutory provision with which the Court was
concerned, that there must be notice demanding rent and the
arrears must be legally recoverable. In the light we have
read the notice in these cases the two ingredients have been
fulfilled.
The last decision upon which reliance was placed is
Mangat Ram & Anr. v. Sardar Meharban Singh, A.I.R. 1987 SC
1656-1987 4 SCC 319 where the facts were entirely different.
Indeed the Court recorded that the tenant had to pay more
rent than what was due. The Court, however, recorded that
there was no prior notice of demand. But the notice in this
case was differently worded.
In the context and facts of this case we are of the
opinion that the High Court was in error in setting aside
the judgment of the Rent Control Tribunal. In the premises
these appeals are allowed and the judgment and orders of the
High Court are set aside. The parties, however, will pay and
bear their respective costs.
Since, however, the respondent is in possession of the
premises for sometime, in the interests of justice we direct
that the decree for eviction will not be executed till 30th
September, 1988 provided the respondent files the usual
undertaking in this Court within four weeks from today to
the following effect:
1. That the respondent will hand-over vacant and
peaceful possession of the suit premises to the
appellant on or before 30th September, 1988.
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2. That the respondent will pay to the appellants
arrears of rent, if any, within one month from today.
3. That the respondent will pay to the appellant future
compensation for use and occupation of the suit
premises month by month before 10th of every month.
4. That the respondent will not induct any other person
in the suit premises.
We further direct that in default of compliance with
any one or more of these conditions or if the undertaking is
not filed as required within the stipulated time, the decree
shall become executable forthwith.
P.S.S. Appeals allowed.
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