State Rep. By Inspector Of Police vs. Eluri Srinivasa Chakravarthi

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2025 INSC 758

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. OF 2025
[@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NOS. 5941-5951 OF 2022]

STATE REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR
OF POLICE, CBI, ACB, VISAKHAPATNAM … APPELLANT(S)


VERSUS


ELURI SRINIVASA CHAKRAVARTHI AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T
S.V.N. BHATTI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The criminal appeals arise from the common order dated 27.12.2021 in
Criminal RC No. 3388/2017 and ten other cases in the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh at Amaravati. The prosecution/CBI is the Appellant in the batch of
appeals.
3. On 27.06.2006, the CBI, Visakhapatnam registered FIR RC No.
11(A)/2006-CBI/VSP under sections 120B read with 420 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (‘PC Act’). The registration of crime was against one,
Rayapati Subba Rao/A-1 and a few other unknown individuals.
4. Between November 1994 and May 2006, A-1 served as Cotton Purchase
Officer (‘CPO’) in the Cotton Corporation of India (‘CCI’), Guntur Branch. The
Signature Not Verified
alleged offences for which the suo motu FIR was registered by the CBI are said
Digitally signed by
geeta ahuja
Date: 2025.05.22
16:00:54 IST
Reason:
to have happened in the financial year 2004-05. The CCI, as part of a policy,
buys cotton at the Minimum Support Price (‘MSP’) on a year-to-year basis.
1



The CCI, for the financial 2004-05, released the policy of MSP through letters
CCI/HO/PUR/MSP/2002-2003 dated 10.01.2003, CCI/HO/PUR/2004-2005
dated 18.10.2004, and CCI/HO/PUR/2005-2006 dated 26.12.2005.
5. The relevant parts of the above circulars are excerpted below:
“ CCI/HO/PUR/MSP/2002-2003
(…)
Through this letter, it is again advised that whenever kapas purchases
are effected under MSP, the same should be made only from the market
yards/functional market yards and in the presence of representatives
of the APMCs so that cotton farmers get due benefit of MSP operations.
(…)
The kapas produce brought directly by farmers only in the market yard
be purchased and prices be offered based on the quality of kapas under
MSP guidelines so that farmers get due benefit for their produce.

xxx xxx xxx

CCI/HO/PUR/MSP/2004-05
(…)
The kapas meeting the quality parameters of FAQ grade, can be
purchased at the minimum support price without any quantitative
limits. However, in actual practice, a good portion of daily arrivals may
fall short of the FAQ grade parameters and in order to help the cotton
farmers, Corporation may purchase below FAQ grade kapas with
suitable discounts from the support price of the concerned variety.
(…)
Needless to say all purchases under MSP are to be made strictly
through the market yards and in the presence of APMC
representatives.

xxx xxx xxx

CCI/HO/PUR/MSP/2005-2006
(…)
As the main objective of MSP operations is to protect the interests of
the cotton farmers therefore through this circular, it is again advised
that whenever kapas purchases are effected under MSP, the same
should be made only from the market yards/functional market yards
and in the presence of officials/representatives of the APMCs so that
the farmers get due benefit of MSP operations.
(…)
The kapas produce brought directly by farmers only in the market
yard/notified market yards be purchased and prices be offered based
on the quality of kapas under MSP guidelines so farmers get due
benefit for their produce.

xxx xxx xxx”

2



6. The investigation into RC No. 11(A)/2006-CBI/VSP disclosed a pattern
of buying cotton at the then prevailing market rate, which is lower than the
MSP and selling the hoarded cotton to CCI and availing the MSP made
available for the farmers of cotton. The investigation revealed an alleged
conspiracy between A-1 and one RVK Prasad/A-3, proprietor of M/s
Balachamundeswari Cotton Company Limited. Notably, A-3 is the son of A-1.
The investigation further implicated Syed John Syda/A-2, a supervisor at the
Agricultural Market Committee (‘AMC’), Phirangipuram and 45 others as
accused in RC No. 11(A)/2006-CBI/VSP.

7. The modus operandi, briefly stated as per the prosecution, is that A-1
and A-3 allegedly purchased cotton from genuine farmers at lower prices
before the announcement of MSP by the Government of India, and they
hoarded these cotton stocks. Once CCI started purchasing cotton at MSP, A-
1, with the support of A-3, resold the hoarded cotton under benami names of
farmers, A-4 to A-47, to CCI at the higher MSP rates. These transactions
occurred at Pericherla and Phirangipuram in the Guntur District, and
Madhira in the Khammam District, where A-1 was the in-charge CPO during
the 2004-2005 financial year. Many of the farmers (A-4 to A-47) allegedly did
not have sufficient land to cultivate the large quantities of cotton they
purportedly sold to CCI. A few of the accused did not have cultivable land at
all, while a few others had very small holdings, and the volume of cotton sold
at MSP is disproportionate to their land holdings. Bank accounts were opened
in the names of these farmers, often introduced by A-3 or his employees.
Payments from CCI (in the form of cheques) were routed through these
accounts and allegedly were encashed and utilized by A-3 and A-2 by forging
the signatures of farmers on takpatties and katachitta (weighment slips)
3



pertaining to Phirangipuram. The investigation revealed that the thumb
impressions were used on relevant material, whereas the said person
acknowledged through signature in English/Telugu.
8. The prosecution alleges wrongful loss under the MSP for a sum of Rs.
21,19,35,646/- to the CCI/Government of India, and the wrongful gain is to
the accused persons. The premise of the accusation is that the MSP is meant
and intended for cotton farmers and growers, and through the alleged modus
operandi, it has been subverted by the accused for gain. On 31.12.2009,
chargesheet no. 31/2009, along with a list of documents (452), were filed
before the special judge for CBI cases against A-1 to A-48. On 09.06.2011,
the learned special court took cognizance of the chargesheet and numbered
the case as CC No. 16/2011. The gist of the chargesheet against the accused
is stated thus:
8.1 The chargesheet first reiterates the conspiracy and modus operandi.
After which, it details the procedure for cotton purchase by CCI,
including (i) testing quality, (ii) fixing rates under MSP, (iii) weighment,
preparation of katachitta, (iv) takpatti, and (v) payment through
cheques via the AMC. The chargesheet notes that A-1 was in charge of
Pericherla, Phirangipuram, and Madhira centers, and alleges that A-3
connived with A-7 to open bank accounts in the names of the villagers
of Jamalapuram and Banjara. A-1 and A-3 purchased cotton at lower
prices before the MSP announcement and purportedly resold it to CCI
at MSP through benami farmers. It lists the farmers (A-4 to A-47), their
bank account details, amounts credited, and alleged land possession,
highlighting discrepancies between land held and cotton sold.
4



8.2 The chargesheet also specifically mentions that A-2 forged the
signatures of farmers on bidding slips, takpatties and weighment slips.
The Government Examiner of Questioned Documents’ (‘GEQD’) opinion
also confirms the alleged forgery. It also highlights discrepancies in
fathers’ names and residential addresses mentioned in the Bidding Slip
versus actual details. Further, it states that many farmers denied
selling such large quantities or even visiting the market centres. Some
stated they signed blank cheque books at the instance of A-3 or A-7,
and the chargesheet further notes that employees of A-3’s company
(M/s Balachamundeswari Cotton Company) were also shown as
farmers selling cotton by availing the subject MSP.
8.3 The chargesheet concludes that A-1 abused his official position,
conspired with others, and caused wrongful loss to CCI and gain to
themselves to the tune of Rs. 21,19,35,646/- by showing procurement
from traders and fictitious persons under the guise of small and
marginal farmers. Consequently, sanction for prosecution against A-1
(Rayapati Subba Rao) under Section 19(1) of the PC Act was obtained,
and no sanction was sought for A-2 (Syed John Syda) as he had retired.
8.4 Therefore, charges were filed under sections 120-B read with sections
420, 468, 471 IPC and section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the PC
Act.
9. The record discloses that before the framing of charges was taken up
by the special court, the accused filed Criminal MP No. 1056/17 to summon
the letter dated 08.01.2007 addressed by the CBI to the Deputy General
Manager of CCI, Guntur and the reply of the CCI dated 31.01.2007 to the CBI.
It is contextual to note two aspects of the matter – (a) documents have been
5



summoned before the charge is considered by the special court, and (b) the
communication by CBI and the reply given by CCI to CBI.
9.1 The CBI in its letter dated 08.01.2007 to CCI posed questions pertaining
to the difference in purchases made by A-1, the deviation of rules by A-
1, the loss caused by A-1’s purchase, complaints made by AMC or
farmers against A-1, objections by audits and unsold cotton purchased
by A-1 resulting in loss.
9.2 The reply by CCI dated 31.01.2007 replies to these queries by noting
that the purchases were made as per the MSP guidelines in force for
the year, and no loss was caused by A-1. The reply further notes that
no complaints were received from the AMC against the purchases made
by A-1, no objections were raised by statutory auditors and all the
purchases made by A-1 were sold and lifted by buyers.
10. The Respondent Nos. 1 to 11 filed Criminal MPs in CC no. 16/2011
under section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’). The details
of the alleged wrongful gain, Criminal MP, Criminal Revision, and the
Criminal Appeal in the Court are stated in the following table:

6

11. The accused raised the objection that the subject chargesheet is
without merit and groundless, primarily because there exists no case for
framing charges under sections 120B, 420 and 471 of the IPC. They make
this objection by noting that (i) there are no witnesses or documents that
prove wrongful loss to CCI, (ii) there is no specific overt act of forgery,
fabrication, or use of forged documents by these accused, (iii) the court in
Visakhapatnam is jurisdictionally barred from trying transactions related to
Madhira Centre under section 177 of CrPC, (iv) there are contradictions with
respect to land holdings and amounts credited in the chargesheet, (v) the
Petitioners are legitimate cultivators, either holding land personally, or
cultivating on lease and (vi) the CCI letter dated 31.01.2007 states that there
was no loss caused to CCI.
12. The CBI opposed the prayer for discharge and the summary of the
objections raised by the accused, noting that there is sufficient evidence of
conspiracy, cheating and forgery, resulting in wrongful gain/loss as the case
may be. The CBI further places stress on the modus operandi used by the
accused to procure cotton at low prices and sell it to CCI at MSP through
benami transactions. It further stresses the GEQD’s opinion, which supports
the allegation of forgery. Consequently, the CBI alleges that there is a
diversion of the MSP benefit, which has caused a loss to the public exchequer.
7



The CBI finally notes in its opposition that the application for discharge is
merely an attempt to prolong the trial.
13. The special court, through a similar order and reasoning, allowed the
prayer for discharge under section 239 of the CrPC. The view of the special
court is that the letter dated 31.01.2007 of the CCI is an important document
that categorically states that purchases by A-1 were as per MSP guidelines,
and there were no differences compared to other officers. Crucially, the court
held that no loss was caused by A-1 in this regard. The special court then
found that there was (i) no wrongful loss, (ii) no prima facie case, and (iii) an
abuse of the process of law by requiring a full trial despite the letter by CCI
dated 31.01.2007. In this light, the special court held that the threshold
under section 239 of the CrPC was met since the material did not create a
strong and serious suspicion. Therefore, the special court allowed the
discharge petition.
14. To appreciate the grounds of challenge to the order of discharge, it is
necessary to reproduce the following paragraphs from the order dated
05.09.2017 of the special court.
“11. A combined reading of Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C. makes it abundantly
clear, that before a charge is framed, trial Court is expected to consider the
material placed before it to decide whether charges could be framed against
the accused.
12. Bearing the said crucial aspects in mind, if we switch back to the material
placed before the Court, the petitioner along with some other accused filed
Crl.M.P.1056/17 to summon certain documents from the custody of Cotton
Corporation of India, Guntur.
(…)
17. In the result the petition is allowed with a finding that the petitioner is
entitled to get discharge from main case. Accordingly, the petitioner is
discharged from main case.”

15. CBI filed a criminal revision case before the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, and through the common order impugned in the criminal appeals,
8



the revisions were dismissed . The High Court, in assessing the scope of
revisional jurisdiction and the principles of discharge under section 239 of
the CrPC, affirmed that a judge can sift and weigh evidence to find a prima
facie case, justifying a charge if ‘grave suspicion’ exists but allowing discharge
if only ‘some suspicion’ arises or if two views are equally possible and the
evidence gives rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion, the accused
can be discharged. The judge is not merely a ‘post office’ and must consider
broad probabilities and basic infirmities without conducting a full trial,
ensuring that facts at face value disclose all ingredients of the alleged offense.
In this specific case, the High Court relied on the letter from the CCI dated
31.01.2007, which asserted that no financial loss to CCI was caused by the
accused, that all purchases adhered to MSP guidelines, and no complaints
were received, thereby directly contradicting the prosecution's central claim
of a Rs. 21 crore loss and procedural violations. Given the CCI's exonerating
letter, the High Court found no incorrectness, illegality, or impropriety in the
special court's order discharging the accused due to allegations being
groundless.
16. We have heard advocate Ms. Rukhmini Bobde for the appellant and Mr.
Shoeb Alam, learned senior counsel, for the respondents/accused.
17. Learned counsel for the appellant, by taking us through, the
chargesheet, the modus operandi allegedly put in place by the accused,
argues that there appears to be conspiracy by A-1, an officer of CCI, in concert
with his son/A-3, A-2/supervisor of AMC and A-48 who purchased cotton
from the farmers at the prevailing market price, hoarded the stocks by
introducing A-4 to A-48 as farmers, sold the cotton in favour of CCI at the
MSP in operation for the purpose of encashment, facilitated opening of bank
9



accounts and from the forensic report, there is forgery and impersonation.
From the allegations in the chargesheet, read with the accompanying
documents, the special court should have examined the prayer for discharge.
The order of discharge does not show as one being compatible with an order
of discharge, but sounds like an order of acquittal on merits by appreciating
the likely defence of the accused. The order, both in the procedure stipulated
under section 239 of the CrPC and the available ground, i.e., the allegations
being groundless, has exceeded its statutory discretionary jurisdiction.
Consequently, the order of discharge is illegal. The reasoning in the orders of
discharge is erroneous and based on assumptions. The order of discharge, in
law, has a different connotation, but the discharge impugned sounds like an
order of acquittal. The courts below have not appreciated the principal
accusation of wrongful gain/loss and the conspiracy to make CCI purchase
hoarded cotton from the accused. A few of the accused do not have
agricultural land, and bank accounts are opened on the same day to receive
the MSP. Thus, there is enough intrinsic material warranting a trial. MSP is
meant for the benefit of farmers, and it cannot be syphoned off, and such
syphoning, if proved, amounts to wrongful gain. The counsel invites our
attention to specific allegations on this behalf and argues that a case involving
triable charges has been abruptly closed through the impugned discharge
orders.
18. Mr. Shoeb Alam, appearing for the accused, in reply, argues that the
registration of FIR, investigation, and the chargesheet are misappreciated
circumstances of the case. The accused in the subject criminal appeals are
small farmers, and the cotton supplied is not only from the agricultural lands
owned by them, and could also be as noticed by the impugned orders, from
10



the agricultural lands taken on lease. There is no restriction on the source of
procurement of cotton, and the statement of A-2 demonstrates that the
guidelines have been scrupulously followed. The special court and the High
Court have rightly appreciated the underlying offence for trial, i.e., wrongful
gain/loss. It is argued with sufficient emphasis that the commissions or
omissions do not qualify as a penal act in the circumstances warranting
prosecution or trial. The loss alleged in the purchase of the subject cotton is
denied by the CCI, and consequently, there cannot be a trial on these charges
except to conduct prosecution as an abuse of the process of law. The CBI, suo
motu , registered the FIR, and the material gathered in the investigation on
forgery, misrepresentation, etc., either from the chargesheet or from the
documents, cannot be made out. Among the Respondents-accused, two of
them are no more. It cannot be gainsaid that the cotton supplied is of lesser
quality or quantity, so a case for examination of cheating needs to be tried.
On the forgery and fabrication, the case is without merit. The case does not
warrant interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
19. We have taken note of the rival arguments and perused the record. The
chargesheet, read with documents placed on record, runs into more than a
thousand pages. The alleged commonality, participation, and resultant
benefit can be for the limited purpose of appreciating the correctness in the
orders impugned in the succinct way, and is tabulated thus:

11

12

20. Immediately, we hasten to add that whether the chargesheet in any way
presents a triable charge by the special court or not. The issue is examined at
the stage of section 239 of the CrPC. Therefore, the present consideration
shall not be understood as this Court is examining the allegations vis-à-vis
the lack of grounds for framing or not framing charges. In other words, we are
not delving into the merits of the matter.
21. Having summarily noticed the contours of controversy between the
prosecution and the accused, we will examine the fundamental illegality of
the courts below while passing the orders impugned.
22. It is noticed that through Criminal MP No. 1056/17, letters
communicated between the investigating officer-CBI and CCI have been
summoned. The petition and the order are referred to in the orders impugned.
The letter sent by CBI to CCI dated 08.01.2007, and the letter sent in reply to
CBI by CCI dated 31.01.2007, were summoned by the special court. The
consideration by the special court to arrive at a finding where there is no loss
to CCI is primarily based on the reply dated 31.01.2007. Section 239 of the
CrPC, which facilitates discharge of an accused in a warrant case triable by
the magistrate if the charge against the accused is groundless, reads thus:
“ s.239 When accused shall be discharged: If, upon considering the police report
and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such
examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and
after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the
Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall
discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing.”

13



23. The question for consideration is whether the two letters could have
been looked at or relied upon by the special court for exercising its jurisdiction
under section 239 of CrPC.
24. The decisions of this Court in Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration and
1 2
another and State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh took divergent views on the
competence of a special court/magistrate to look at material other than the
final report read with documents filed by the prosecution in terms of section
173 of the CrPC. The issue was referred to a three-judge bench for decision in
3
State of Orissa v. Debendranath Padhi . The full bench in a detailed
examination of the statutory scheme and also the precedents on the point has
held that the accused at the stage of framing of charge does not have a right
to file material or documents. It is apt to excerpt the following paragraphs
from the said decision.
“ 8. What is the meaning of the expression “the record of the case” as used in
Section 227 of the Code. Though the word “case” is not defined in the Code
but Section 209 throws light on the interpretation to be placed on the said
word. Section 209 which deals with the commitment of case to the Court of
Session when offence is triable exclusively by it, inter alia, provides that when
it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court
of Session, he shall commit “the case” to the Court of Session and send to that
court “the record of the case” and the document and articles, if any, which are
to be produced in evidence and notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment
of the case to the Court of Session. It is evident that the record of the case and
documents submitted therewith as postulated in Section 227 relate to the case
and the documents referred in Section 209. That is the plain meaning of
Section 227 read with Section 209 of the Code. No provision in the Code grants
to the accused any right to file any material or document at the stage of
framing of charge. That right is granted only at the stage of the trial.

15. In State of Maharashtra v. Priya Sharan Maharaj (1997) 4 SCC 393 it was
held that at Sections 227 and 228 stage the court is required to evaluate the
material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the
ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The court may, for this limited
purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to
accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to
common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.”

1
(1996) 9 SCC 766.
2
(1977) 4 SCC 39; see also, Supdt. And Remembrancer Of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil
Kumar Bhunja And Others , (1979) SCC 4 274.
3
(2005) 1 SCC 568
14




18. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The reliance on Articles
14 and 21 is misplaced. The scheme of the Code and object with which Section
227 was incorporated and Sections 207 and 207-A omitted have already been
noticed. Further, at the stage of framing of charge roving and fishing inquiry
is impermissible. If the contention of the accused is accepted, there would be
a mini-trial at the stage of framing of charge. That would defeat the object of
the Code. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the defence
of the accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of the
learned counsel for the accused would mean permitting the accused to adduce
his defence at the stage of framing of charge and for examination thereof at
that stage which is against the criminal jurisprudence. By way of illustration,
it may be noted that the plea of alibi taken by the accused may have to be
examined at the stage of framing of charge if the contention of the accused is
accepted despite the well-settled proposition that it is for the accused to lead
evidence at the trial to sustain such a plea. The accused would be entitled to
produce materials and documents in proof of such a plea at the stage of
framing of the charge, in case we accept the contention put forth on behalf of
the accused. That has never been the intention of the law well settled for over
one hundred years now. It is in this light that the provision about hearing the
submissions of the accused as postulated by Section 227 is to be understood.
It only means hearing the submissions of the accused on the record of the
case as filed by the prosecution and documents submitted therewith and
nothing more. The expression “hearing the submissions of the accused”
cannot mean opportunity to file material to be granted to the accused and
thereby changing the settled law. At the stage of framing of charge hearing
the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced
by the police.
(emphasis supplied)

4
25. Recently, in State of Rajasthan v. Swarn Singh @ Baba , to which one
of us, Justice Pankaj Mithal, was a part of, relied on Debendra Nath Padhi
(supra) to hold that the accused cannot and does not have the right to invoke
section 91 of the CrPC at the time of framing of charge. Under the statutory
scheme of the CrPC, sections 227/239 are positioned in the midway of
continuing or abandoning the prosecution if no case is discernible from the
chargesheet and documents. The common belief of the
prosecution/complainant is that the report filed warrants trial and conviction,
which is to be balanced by the magistrate against the belief of the accused
that every prosecution initiated is false and nothing short of an abuse of
process. The magistrate, at this stage, by exercising the jurisdiction within

4
Criminal Appeal No. 856 of 2024.
15



the parameters set out by sections 227/239 of the CrPC, decides whether the
narrative of the complainant warrants prosecution/trial or the accused is
entitled to be discharged. The discretion is exercised in the manner stipulated
by sections 227/239. The inner and outer limits of the discretion under these
sections are no more res integra, and a few of the precedents having a bearing
on the conspectus of the case are referred to hereunder.
5
25.1 In Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., it is observed that
inconsistency in material produced by the prosecution cannot be looked
into for discharge of the accused in the absence of a full-fledged trial.

25.2 Reiterating the dictum in Debendra Nath Padhi again in State of Madhya
6
Pradesh v. Rakesh Mishra , it has been held that only the chargesheet
along with accompanying materials are to be considered at the stage of
framing of charges, so as to satisfy the existence of a case for trial.
7
25.3 Further, in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap , this Court
reiterates beyond debate that defence on merits is not to be considered
at the stage of framing of charges/discharge.
26. We do not intend to refer to too many precedents on a well-established
proposition of law on the method and mode of exercising jurisdiction by a
magistrate under section 239 of the CrPC. It is correct that Union of India v.
8
Prafulla Kumar Samal and another lays down the standard for discharge of
an accused under section 239 of the CrPC. The application of the principle for
the documents relied upon by the special court and the High Court is both
debatable. Discharge under the CrPC is salutary, and the magistrate, through

5
(2013) 11 SCC 476.
6
(2015) 13 SCC 8.
7
(2021) 11 SCC 191.
8
(1979) 3 SCC 4.
16



the expression used in these sections, is under an obligation to discharge the
accused where, from the chargesheet and the appended documents, it is
noticed that the trial of such charges is worthless. Therefore, to sustain the
exercise of discretion, the order of discharge conforms to the requirements of
these sections.
26.1 The jurisdiction conferred on the magistrate by section 239 of the CrPC
is appreciated from the language of the said provision. In a civil suit,
the triable issues of fact or law are culled from a material proposition of
fact or law affirmed by one party and denied by the other, and the issue
in a civil suit is an admixture of a case to parties to the lis . In contrast,
section 239 of the CrPC, which deals with the trial of warrant cases by
a magistrate, confines the examination to the final report and
documents sent with it under section 173 of the CrPC. The allegations
in the FIR, transformed through investigation and the collection of
evidence, are shaped into a final report. This receives the attention of
the magistrate to decide whether the charge so presented against the
accused is groundless.
26.2 The salutary duty fastened on the magistrate is exercised not only for
aborting unwanted and groundless prosecutions, but also for ensuring
the continuation of prosecution of a final report with documents
presenting a triable charge. Considering the importance of either
discharging the accused or continuing the prosecution, the magistrate
neither acts as a post office nor conducts a mini-trial of the report and
the documents before it while exercising the power under section 239
of the CrPC. Stated briefly, the learned magistrate, in sufficient
measure, examines the report and documents while taking a decision
17



for discharge or for proceeding with the prosecution. We propose to
examine whether the order impugned before us withstands the scrutiny
and requirement of this Court.
26.3 However, since the order of discharge is amenable to the jurisdiction of
the revisional court, the order of discharge must speak for itself, and
only a warranted conclusion is arrived at by the magistrate. The
deviation from the discretionary limits definitely attracts the
supervisory jurisdiction of the revisional courts. The issue of whether
discharge is warranted or trial is continued depends on the
circumstances of each case.
27. Reverting to the circumstances of this case, it is borne out by the record
that the plea for discharge is founded on the correspondence dated
08.01.2007 and 31.01.2007. Thereafter, by referring to the very gist of the
communication, prayer for discharge has been made. In clear terms and
reasoning, the discharge has been ordered not by referring to any of the
situations referred in section 239 of the CrPC, but by relying on the
documents made available by the accused. The procedure followed by the trial
court and as confirmed by the High Court is patently illegal, and contrary to
the binding precedent. The passing remark by the High Court in the common
order that there is no material for cheating and forgery belies the existence of
allegations and documents. The consideration of material, i.e., chargesheet
and list of documents, in the background of allegations made against the
accused is the available path for discharge by the special court and the High
Court. But, a path unavailable to the special court and the High Court is the
consideration of material invited at the instance of the defence for ordering
discharge. The orders impugned proceed on the assumption of the absence of
18



loss to the CCI on the basis of the letter dated 31.01.2007. The case of
prosecution established looks at wrongful gain through conspiracy and
forgery to defraud the CCI and the farmers to the tune of Rs.21,19,35,646/-.
Non-compliance with the discretionary limits as set out under section 239 of
the CrPC warrants the interference of this Court.
28. Hence, for the above discussion and reasons, the orders impugned are
set aside, and the prayer for discharge of the accused by looking at the
documents brought on record is set aside. Consequently, the Criminal MPs
filed by the accused are dismissed. The special court is directed to exercise its
jurisdiction in terms of section 239 of the CrPC, particularly, uninfluenced by
any of the observations made in this Judgment, and decide whether a case
for discharge is available or charges are to be framed for trial of the alleged
offences. The Criminal Appeals are allowed. Pending applications, if any, are
disposed of accordingly.


..……….…………………J.
[PANKAJ MITHAL]







..…………………………J.
[S.V.N. BHATTI]

New Delhi;
May 22, 2025.

19