Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RATHOD BHIMJIBHAI MASRUBHAI RAJPUT AND ANOTHER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
07/12/1959
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
KAPUR, J.L.
SARKAR, A.K.
CITATION:
1960 AIR 438 1960 SCR (2) 393
ACT:
Taluqdari Tenure-Abolition of-" Lal-liti " lands-Liability
for land revenue-Taluqdari lands--Taluqdari Estate-Bombay
Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Bom. V of 1879), s. 136(1)-Gujrat
Taluqdars’ Act, 1888 (Bom. VI of 1888), ss. 4, 5, 22, 31-
Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 (Bom. LXII of
1949), ss.2(3), (4), 3, 5(1)(a),(b), 5(2)(a) 17(c).
HEADNOTE:
The appellants who were holders of certain lands known as
Lal-liti " lands were assessed to land revenue under the
provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, after the
Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 3 1949, came into
force. "Lal-liti " lands were granted originally by
Taluqdars in Gujrat to cadets, widows of the family and
relations for maintenance and to village servants and
others, either in reward for past services or as
remuneration for services to be performed. Before the
establishment of British rule, Taluqdars had the position of
semi-independent chiefs, but subsequent to the establishment
of British rule they became mere owners of proprietary
estates holding lands directly from Government, and in
respect of such estates the Gujrat Taluq dars’ Act, 1888,
was passed providing for their revenue administration. The
appellants claimed that these lands had been enjoyed without
payment of any " jama " since pre-British times and that the
exemption from payment of land revenue was not affected by
the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949. The High
Court took the view that the lands were liable to be
assessed under s. 5 of that Act. It was contended for the
appellants, inter alia, that no liability for payment of
land revenue in respect of " Lal-liti " lands could arise
under s. 5 of the Act, because (1) the Taluqdar retained no
interest in such lands after the grant and, consequently,
such lands were not taluqdari lands within the meaning of s.
2(3) of the Act, (2) clause (a) of S. 5(1) of the Act was
merely declaratory,
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while cl. (b) was the operative clause by which the only
persons liable for payment of land revenue were (i) a
taluqdar holding any taluqdari land and (ii) a cadet of a
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taluqdari family holding any taluqdari land for
maintenance, and (3) even assuming thatcl. (a) made
taluqdari lands liable to the payment of land revenue Code,
a " Lal-liti " holder could not be made liable, because he
was not an occupant of unalienated land within the meaning
of s. 136(1) of the Code.
Held:(1) that having regard to the history of " Lal-
liti lands and the provisions of the Gujrat Taluqdar’s Act,
1888, such lands are lands which form part of a taluqdari
estate, even though no " jama " was actually paid to the
taluqdar or to Government, and are, therefore, taluqdari
lands within the meaning of s. 2(3) of the Bombay Taluqdari
Abolition Act, 1949;
(2)that cl. (a) of S. 5(1) of the Bombay Taluqdari
Abolition Act was a general provision and applied the Bombay
Land Revenue Code to all taluqdari lands, while cl. (b) was
a particular deeming Provision with regard to the taluqdar
and his cadet and
(3)that whatever might have been the position of a " Lal-
liti " holder earlier, on the abolition of the Taluqdari
tenure by the Bombay Taluqdari Abolition Act, he became a
holder in actual possession of land in respect of which the
Government had not transferred its rights to the payment of
revenue, wholly or partially,to the ownership of any person.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.327 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
January 31,1955, of the Bombay High Court, in Special Civil
Application No. 1100 of 1954.
V. M. Limaye, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar
Nath, for the appellants.
N. P. Nathwani, K. L. Hathi and R. H. Dhebar, for the
respondent.
1959.- December 7. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
S. E. Das J. S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal by special
leave from a decision of the High Court of Bombay, dated
January 31, 1955, by which it dismissed with costs a writ
application (No. 1100 of 1954) made by the petitioners
therein, who are now appellants before us. It raises for
consideration and decision a land revenue
395
problem of some complexity, which resulted from the
enactment of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act,
1949, (Bombay Act LXII of 1949), hereinafter referred to as
the Abolition Act. The problem is if the appellants,
holders of certain lands known as "Lalliti " lands, are
liable to the State Government concerned for payment of land
revenue under the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue
Code, 1879 (Bombay Act V of 1879), hereinafter referred to
as the Revenue Code’ after the enforcement of the provisions
of the Abolition Act.
The problem has to be considered in the light. of certain
incidents of taluqdari tenures in the Ahmedabad district of
Gujrat, with special reference to the changes through which
those tenures had gone in the past by legislation or
otherwise. For the purposes of this appeal it is not
necessary to give a full history of taluqdari estates in
Gujrat; but it is necessary to explain what is meant by "
Lal-liti lands. We get from such books as Baden-Powell’s
Land-systems of British India " and Dandekar’s " The law of
Land Tenure in the Bombay Presidency ", from both of which
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learned counsel for the parties have extensively quoted
before us, a short history of the Taluqdars of Gujrat and of
their estates. Shortly stated, the history is this:
Taluqdars of Gujrat (they were not known as Taluqdars then,
because the name was given much later) originally occupied
the position of Chiefs or Rulers. This was before the
Mahomedan rule in Gujrat. When the Mahomedans invaded
Gujrat, they found the country partitioned out into estates
of large or small Chiefs, whom they forcibly deprived of all
but one-fourth of their possess ions, and the portion thus
left took the name of ’wanta’ (divided). Some ’wantas’ were
free of payment of pent or revenue; other ’wanta’ estates
paid a tribute in the shape of an " udhad jama " (fixed
sum). After the Moguls came the Marathas. The accession
and domination of the Marathas made no substantial
difference to the position of these semi-independent chiefs,
except that the annual payments varied under the Maratha
rule. Then came the British, who for sometime continued
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to realise annual payments according to past years;
but very soon a significant change took place and the
nature of the payment was altered, and instead of
tribute, the Government assumed it to be rent or revenue.
The rent or revenue was also increased by about 50 per cent.
and the result was that the holders of these lands fell
into pecuniary embarrassment and became impoverished and
needy. A system of annual leases was then introduced: this
remedy, however, proved worse than the disease, and it was
sought to improve the’position of the Taluqdars by
legislation it is not necessary for our purpose to refer to
the details of that legislation till we come to the Gujrat
Taluqdars’ Act, 1888 (Bombay Act VI of f888), -which was a
landmark in the history of Taluqdari tenures. We shall have
occasion later to refer to some of the provisions of this
Act. It is sufficient to state here that by the time the
aforesaid Act was passed the Taluqdars of certain districts
of Gujrat including Ahmedabad had really become mere owners
of proprietary estates, who held lands directly from
Government,and the Act provided, inter alia, for the revenue
administration of their estates. Under the provisions of
the Act, the Settlement Registers were prepared for each
village, which served the purpose of the Record of Rights in
those estates. In these estates, large areas of lands were
granted presumably by the Taluqdars to cadets, widows of the
family, and relations for maintenance, and to village
servants and others, either in reward for past services or
as remuneration for services to be performed. The holders
of these transferred lands paid no revenue either to the
Taluqdar or to Government generally. These grants fell into
three categories: (i) those made prior to British rule ;
(ii) those made between 1818 and 1888, that is, after the
introduction of British rule and before the passing of the
Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888 ; and (iii) those made after
1888. The lands thus transferred were called " Lal-liti "
lands because they were recorded inred ink in the old
’faisal patrakas’ and in the Settlement Registers also, they
were recorded in red ink but were shown as subject to " jama
(land revenue)
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liabilities of varying character. The pre-British transfers
were recognised by Mr. Peile (later Sir James Peile) who was
the Taluqdari Settlement Officer 1866, and the holders of
these lands generally paid no " jama ". The 1818-1888
transfers were those which were not so recognised by
prescription, and when these lands reverted to the Taluqdar,
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they became his ordinary lands liable to payment of full."
jama ". The post Act grants were covered by s. 31 of the
Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888 (see in this connection " The
Land Problems of Re-organised Bombay State by Dr. G. D.
Patel, pp. 174-175).
Such, in brief, is the history of Taluqdari estates and "
Lal-liti " lands, so far as that history has a bearing on
the problem before us. It is necessary now to state the
facts which have given rise to the present appeal. In their
writ petition to the High Court, the appellants said that
they were holders of " Lal-liti " lands in villages Kharad
and Rajka of the Dhanduka taluq of Ahmedabad district and
were enjoying the lands without payment of any " jama "
(land revenue) since the pre-British rule, though the
circumstances in which their predecessors originally got the
lands are lost in antiquity. They said inter alia that the
exemption from payment of land revenue which they had all
along enjoyed was not affected by the Abolition Act or by
any later legislation like the Bombay Personal Inams
Abolition Act, 1952 (Bombay Act LXII of 1953), and that the
demand for payment of land revenue made by the State
Government of Bombay for 1950-1953 was not authorised by
law. In the alternative, they also said that they were not
liable to any assessment of land revenue till August, 1953.
Accordingly, they prayed for appropriate writs (a) quashing
the demands for payment of land revenue and (b) directing
the State of Bombay, the Collector of Ahmedabad and the
Revenue Officer of Dhanduka (who are now respondents before
us), to forbear from taking any steps to enforce payment of
land revenue for the " Lal-liti " lands held by them. A
number of similar applications, presumably filed by other
holders of "Lal-liti" lands, were also pending in the High
Court,
51
398
So far as we can gather from the record before us, there
were three sets of such applications. The High
court delivered its leading judgment on writ application No.
1098 of 1954 and the application of the appellants herein
(No. 1100 of 1954) was dismissed with costs on the grounds
given in the leading judgment. The High Court held in
effect that the holders of " Lal-liti " lands were liable
to payment of land revenue under s. 5 of the Abolition Act,
read with the provisions of the Revenue Code, and the
objections raised thereto, on their behalf were not legally
valid. Having been unsuccessful in their application for a
certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution, the
appellants applied for and obtained special leave from this
Court on June 29, 1955. They then preferred the present
appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellants has challenged the
correctness of the decision of the High Court on various
grounds. It will be convenient to take these one by one.
The first point urged is that the relevant provisions of the
Abolition Act do not apply to " Lal-liti " lands, which are
not " taluqdari lands " within the meaning of the Abolition
Act, and, therefore, no liability for payment of land
revenue in respect of " Lal-liti " lands can arise under s.
5 thereof. At this stage, we must read the relevant
provisions of the Abolition Act. The expressions "
Taluqdari land " and " Taluqdari tenure " are defined in s.
2, clauses (3) and (4):
Section 2 :...............................
" (1 )..........................
(lA)........................
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(2).......................................
(3) ’ Taluqdari land’ means land forming part of a
taluqdari estate and includes land forming part of such
estate and held by a cadet of a taluqdar’s family for the
purpose of maintenance;
(4) ’ Taluqdari tenure’ means land tenure on which the
taluqdari land is held
Section 3 states:
" With effect from the date on which this Act comes into
force
399
(i)the taluqdari tenure shall wherever it prevails be deemed
to have been abolished;
(ii)save as expressly provided by or under the provisions of
this Act, all the incidents of the said tenure attaching to
any land comprised in a taluqidari estate shall be deemed to
have been extinguished "
Section 5, which is of great importance for the purpose of
this appeal, read as follows before it was amended in 1953.
Section 5 (1) " Subject to the provisions of subsection (2),
(a)all taluqdari lands are and shall be liable to the
payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of
the Code and the rules made there- under, and
(b)a taluqdar holding any taluqdari land or a cadet of a
taluqdari family any taluqdari land hereditarily for the
purpose of maintenance immediately before the coming into
force of this Act, shall be deemed to be an occupant within
the meaning of the Code or any other law for the time being
in force.
(2)Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to affect-
(a)the right of any person to hold any taluqdari land wholly
or partially exempt from payment of land revenue under
special contract or any law for the time being in force;
(b)the right of any person to pay Jama under any agreement
or settlement recognised under section 23 or under a
declaration made under section 22 of the Taluqdars’ Act so
long as such agreement, settlement or declaration remains in
force under the provisions of this Act."
Now, the argument on behalf of the appellants has proceeded
on the following lines; learned counsel for them has
submitted that the expression " Taluqdari land " is defined
as land forming part of a taluqdari estate; but the
expression " taluqdari estate" is not defined, though the
expression " Taluqdari tenure " is defined; therefore,
taluqdari estate can only mean,
400
such land or estate in which the taluqdar has some
subsisting interest; but in " Lal-liti " lands, at least of
the taluqdar retains no interest after the grant, and,
therefore, " Lal-liti " land is not taluqdari land within
the meaning of s. 5 of the Abolition Act. We have now to
consider the soundness of this line of argument.
In the High Court as also before us an attempt was made on
behalf of the respondents to establish that the taluqdar
retained a reversionary right to " Lalliti " lands in case
the holder died without any heir. The High Court said
rightly in our opinion, that on the materials placed before
it, it could not be said that the respondents had
established that position. The High Court then considered
the meaning of the expression ’ taluqdari estate’ and said
that it was used in a descriptive sense and was not
equivalent to the expression ’Taluqdar’sestate’. Said the
High Court:
" Therefore, the expression " Taluqdari estate " is a
comprehensive expression including all lands which at one
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time belonged to the Taluqdar. In the eye of the law,
although the lands might have been alienated by the
Taluqdar, they still form part of the estate. Therefore,
the expression is more an expression indicating a particular
tenure rather than a particular interest enjoyed by the
Taluqdar . .................................................
...........................................................
...........................................................
............... Therefore, if the lands, the subject matter
of the petition did at any time belong to the Taluqdar which
he subsequently alienated, they would be covered by the
definition in the Act of 1949, not withstanding the fact
that when the Act was passed the Taluqdar had no interst in
those lands."
We are in agreement with the view thus expressed by the High
Court. Having regard to the history of the gig Lal-liti "
lands to which we have earlier adverted and the provisions
of the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, it is manifestly clear
that " Lal-liti " lands are lands which form part of a
taluqdari estate, even though no ’ jama’ was actually paid
for such lands to the taluqdar or to Government. It is
necessary to refer here
401
to ss. 4, 5 and 22 of the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888.
Section 4 empowers the Government to direct a revenue survey
of any Taluqdari estate; section 5 lays down what
particulars the Settlement Registers prepared by the Survey
Officer in respect of a taluqdari estate shall contain. One
of such particulars is " the name and description and the
nature and extent of interest of every alienee and of every
incumbrancer of the estate or any portion thereof together
with a specification of (i) the aggregate area over which
such interest extends; (ii) the amount and nature of rent or
land revenue, if any, payable or receivable by such alienee
and incumbrancer, etc.". It is not disputed before us, and
the High Court has referred to it, that in the Settlement
Registers prepared in respect of the two villages in
question under s. 5 of the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, the
interest of the appellants in the " Lal-liti " lands held by
them was shown as comprised within the Dhanduka Taluqdari
estate. This clearly showed that these " Lal-liti " lands
formed part of a taluqdari estate, apart altogether from the
question what interest, if any, the taluqdar retained in
them after the alienation. Section 22 of the Gujrat
Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, also points the same way. It lays
down how the " jama " of a taluqdar’s estate is to be
calculated: it says that the aggregate of the survey
assessments of the lands composing such estate, minus such
deduction, if any, as the Government shall in each case
direct, shall be the " jama ". Along with their petition,
the appellants filed an annexure marked A": that annexure,
besides showing the lands of the appellants within a
taluqdari estate, also showed the "Jama " payable for each
plot of land. This again showed that whether the "jama " be
actually paid or not, the " Lal-liti " lands held by the
appellants formed part of a taluqdari estate. We
accordingly hold that learned counsel for the appellants is
not right in his contention that " Lal-liti " lands are not
part of a taluqdari estate and, therefore, are not
’taluqdari lands’ within the meaning of the Abolition Act.
Learned counsel for the appellants referred us to certain
decisions of the Bombay High Court as to the
402
meaning of the expression " Taluqdar’s estate " in s.
31 of the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, and contended that it
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meant an estate held by the Taluqdar as a Taluqdar
and on the same analogy, he urged that land forming part of
a taluqdari estate must also mean land in which the taluqdar
has some interest as a taluqdar (Khoda Bhai v. Chaganlal
(1), Bichesbha Mansangji v. Vela Dhanji Patel (2) and
Taluqdari Settlement Officer v. Chhagan Lal Dwarkadas (3) ).
We do not think that those decisions are of any help to the
appellants for the simple reason that the analogy does not
apply; we are concerned here not with the meaning of the
expression " taluqdar’s estate " occurring in s. 31 of the
Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, but with the meaning of a
different expression, viz. " taluqdari estate " in s. 2(3)
of the Abolition Act. Moreover, in some of the decisions
relied on by the learned counsel, it was recognised that
there was a distinction between taluqdar’s estate’ and
’taluqdari estate.
We were also addressed at some length on the effect of the
relinquishment of his land by the taluqdar in favour of the
Collector (Nathuram Hiraram Thakur v. The Secretary of State
for India(4)) or the effect of an attachment of the village
under s. 144 of the Revenue Code on failure of the taluqdar
to pay the assessment (Tulla Sobharam Pandya v. The
Collector of Kaira (5)). We do not think that it is
necessary in the present case to consider those questions.
We now go to the second point urged on behalf of the
appellants. This point was not urged before, nor considered
by, the High Court in the writ application in which it gave
its leading judgment. The appellants wished to urge the
point in the High Court on their own application, but were
told that if the decision of the High Court in Writ
Application No. 1098 of 1954 was wrong, it could be
corrected only by this Court. The argument on this point is
based on s. 5(1) of the Abolition Act, which we have quoted
earlier, and is in two parts: firstly, it is contended that
if clauses (a)
(1) (1907) 9 Bom. L.R. 1122.
(2) (1909) 11 Bom. L.R. 736.
(3) (191O) 12 Bom. L.R. 903.
(4) (1929) 32 Bom. L.R. 907.
(5) (1918) 20 Bom. L.R. 748.
403
and (b) of sub-section (1) of s. 5 are read together, the
only reasonable conclusion is that clause (a) is merely
declaratory and clause (b) is the operative clause and
according to that operative clause, the persons who become
liable for payment of land revenue are only two in number,
namely, (1) a taluqdar holding any taluqdari land and (2) a
cadet of a taluqdari family holding any taluqdari land with
hereditary rights for the purpose of maintenance immediately
before the coming into force of the Abolition Act, and,
therefore, the holder of " Lal-liti " lands, assuming them
to be taluqdari lands, has no liability under s. 5(1);
secondly, it is contended that even if clauses (a) and (b)
of subsection (1) of s. 5 are read distributively the holder
of Lal-liti " lands has still no liability, because cl. (a)
makes taluqdari lands liable to the payment of land revenue
in accordance with the provisions of the Revenue Code and
there is no provision in that Code under which a " Lal-liti
" holder can be made liable to the payment of land revenue.
We take the first part of the argument first. How should we
read clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of s. 5 of the
Abolition Act ? Learned counsel for the appellants states
that if clause (a) is also read as a clause which operates
to charge all taluqdari lands with liability for payment of
land revenue, then clause (b) becomes a wholly unnecessary
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surplusage. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
respondents points out that if the intention was to fasten
liability on two categories of persons only, taluqdars and
cadets, then clause (a) was really unnecessary. We think
that both the clauses have a meaning and purpose. Clause
(a) makes all taluqdari lands liable to the payment of land
revenue in accordance with the provisions of the Revenue
Code. Section 3 of the Abolition Act abolishes taluqdari
tenure and extinguishes all its incidents. If there was
only abolition of taluqdari tenures without anything more,
there would have been a void. Obviously enough, it was
necessary to say what would happen to taluqdari lands after
abolition of the taluqdari tenure. Therefore, clause (a)
states that all taluqdari lands shall be liable,
404
to the payment of land revenue in accordance with the
provisions of the Revenue Code. What then is the meaning of
clause (b)? It is a deeming provision by which the taluqdar
and his cadet shall be deemed to be an occupant within the
meaning of the Revenue Code; and I occupant’ under the
Revenue Code means a holder in actual possession of
unalienated land’.The word ’alienated’ has also a special
meaning in the Revenue Code; it means I transferred in so
far as the rights of Government to payment of rent or land
revenue are concerned, wholly or partially, to the ownership
of any person’. Clause (b) merely clarifies the position of
the taluqdar and his cadet under the Abolition Act; it does
not in any way derogate from clause (a); nor does it cut
down the width of amplitude of clause (a). We are of the
view that clauses (a) and (b) should be read together, but
not in the sense suggested by the learned counsel for the
appellants. Clause (b) clarifies the position as respects
two categories of persons; but that does not mean that if a
third category of persons properly come under clause (a),
they will not be liable to payment of land revenue on a
specious and unwarranted assumption that clause (b) as the
operating clause cuts down the amplitude of clause (a). The
true view is that clause (a) is a general provision and
applies the Revenue Code to all taluqdari lands, while
clause (b) is a particular deeming provision with regard to
the taluqdar and his cadet.
Now, as to the second part of the argument. It is necessary
to read here s. 136(1) of the Revenue Code:
" Section 136 (1): In the case of unalienated land the
occupant, and in the case of alienated land or taluqdari
land, the superior holder, shall be primarily liable to the
State Government for the payment of the land revenue,,
including all arrears of land revenue, due in respect of the
land. Joint occupants and joint holders who are primarily
liable under this section shall be jointly and severally
liable."
The question is if the holder of " Lal-liti " lands is,
after the Abolition Act, an occupant of unalienated
405
land within the meaning of s. 136; if he is, then he is
liable to the payment of land revenue under s. 5(1)(a) of
the Abolition Act read with s. 136 of the Revenue Code. In
dealing with this question, which has caused us some
anxiety, we must remember the meaning of the expressions ’
occupant’ and ’alienated’ used in the Revenue Code. The
argument on behalf of the appellants is that a " Lal-liti "
holder is not an occupant of unalienated land; the
respondents contend that he is, after the enforcement of the
Abolition Act. On a careful consideration of the question
we have come to the conclusion that the contention of the
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respondents is correct.
In respect of " Lal-liti " lands, Government made no
,separate settlement with the holder of such lands; the
settlement was made with the taluqdar, within which
settlement " Lal-liti " lands were included. The right of
Government to payment of land revenue was never transferred
to the holder of " Lal-liti " lands though it is true that
some of the taluqdars got a deduction under s. 22 of the
Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, for the " Lal-liti " lands. We
have been addressed at some length as to what was the
position of taluqdars and " Lal-liti " holders previous to
the Abolition Act. On behalf of the respondents it has been
submitted that one characteristic of the taluqdari tenure
was that the taluqdari estate was neither alienated nor
unalienated within the meaning of the Revenue Code; because
the taluqdars were not grantees of the British but enjoyed
proprietary rights in their estates even before the advent
of British rule. As to " Lal-liti " lands, they were not
generally taken into account at the time of calculating the
" jama " payable by the taluqdars to Government; and as a
result, they were not covered by the Settlement guarantee
operating in favour of the taluqdar. Therefore, so the
argument on behalf of the respondents has proceeded, holders
of "Lal-liti" lands became liable to payment of full
assessment on the footing that they became occupants
52
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of unalienated land, with effect from the date on which the
Abolition Act came into force. Learned counsel for the
respondents has also drawn our attention to the list of
amendments in the Revenue Code made by Schedule 1 of the
Abolition Act in support of his contention that the
taluqdars and all taluqdari lands have been brought into the
scheme of the Revenue Code by the necessary amendments of s.
136 and other sections of the Revenue Code.
The narrow question before us is, as we have stated earlier,
whether a " Lal-liti " holder is an ’occupant’ of
"unalienated land’ within the meaning of the Revenue Code.
We are of the view that whatever may have been his position
earlier, on the abolition of the taluqdari tenure by the
Abolition Act he became a holder in actual possession of
land in respect of which the Government had not transferred
its rights to the payment of revenue, wholly or partially to
the ownership of any person.
Therefore, the second point urged on behalf of the
appellants fails in both parts.
We need notice very briefly three other points urged on
behalf of the appellants; because we are in such complete
agreement with the High Court with regard to them, that it
is unnecessary to re-state in detail the reasons which the
High Court has already given.
(1) As to the saving clause (c) of s. 17 of the Abolition
Act, the High Court has rightly pointed out that it is the
usual saving clause which says in effect that the repeal of
the Gujrat ’ Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, shall not be deemed to
effect any declaration made or any agreement or settlement
recognised etc. under the provisions of the repealed Act.
The aforesaid saving clause affords, no protection against
the liability imposed by s. 5 of the Abolition Act.
(2) Learned counsel also relied on s. 5(2)(a) of the
Abolition Act, before its repeal by the Bombay Personal
Inams Abolition Act, 1952 (Bombay Act 42 of 1953), and based
his alternative claim thereon. Here again, the High Court
rightly pointed out that there was no special contract in
favour of the appellants as to exemption from payment of
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nor was there any law for the time being in force (after the
Abolition Act) which granted the holder of " Lal -liti"
lands exemption, wholly or partially, from pay-ment of land
revenue; therefore, the appellants were entitled to no
protection under s. 5(2)(a) of the Abolition Act till August
1, 1953.
(3) Lastly, it was submitted that there was a settlement
for thirty years with the taluqdari estate in question in
1925-26 and in the absence of any fresh settlement under the
provisions of the Revenue Code, a "Lal-liti" holder was not
liable to pay land revenue within that period. This point
is completely answered by s. 4 of the Abolition Act which in
terms says that all revenue surveys or revised revenue
surveys of taluqdari estates under s. 4 of the Gujrat
Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, and all settlement made shall be
deemed to have been made under Chapters VIII and VIIIA of
the Revenue Code and the settlement registers and other
records prepared at such surveys shall be deemed to have
been prepared under the corresponding provisions of the
Revenue Code. We know that the "Lal-liti" lands of this
case were shown in the Settlement Registers prepared under
the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888. In view of the provisions
of s. 4 of the Abolition Act, no fresh settlement was
necessary.
For the reasons given above, we hold that the appellants
have failed to show that the decision of the High Court is
wrong. The appeal is accordingly dimissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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