Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SRI SUDHANSU SHEKHAR SINGH DEO
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
21/09/1960
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
DAS, S.K.
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
CITATION:
1961 AIR 196 1961 SCR (1) 779
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1964 SC 444 (12)
R 1966 SC1260 (5)
RF 1971 SC 530 (232,319,395)
ACT:
Agricultural Income Tax-Ex-Ruler of Indian State-Exemption
from taxation-Claim based on agreement of merger--Whether
justiciable-Definition of " Person "-Whether excludes"
Ruler "Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1947 (Orissa 24
of 1947), SS. 2(i), 3-Constitution of India, Arts. 291, 362,
363.
HEADNOTE:
On December 15, 1947, the Ruler of the erstwhile State of
Sonepur, the appellant, executed a merger agreement whereby
the Government of India acquired full sovereign rights over
the territory of the State, but ownership and full enjoyment
of private properties belonging to the appellant and the
personal rights, privileges, dignities etc., enjoyed by him
immediately before August 15, 1947, were guaranteed to him
under Arts. 4 and 5. On July 27, 1949, the Governor-General
of India issued an order providing that the merged Orissa
States including the State of Sonepur shall be administered
in all respects as if they formed part of the Province of
Orissa. The Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1947, had
in the meantime been enacted by the Legislature of the
Province of Orissa and by virtue of an Ordinance promulgated
by the Governor of Orissa on December 30, 1949, the Act
became applicable to the merged Orissa States. Section 2(1)
of the Act defined a " person " as inclusive of a Ruler of
an Indian State, but by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 195o,
reference to Rulers of Indian States was deleted as from
January 26, 195o. The appellant contended that he was not
liable to be assessed to tax on agricultural income under
the provisions of the Act because (1) as a Ruler of the
State of Sonepur, he was, before merger of his State, immune
from liability to taxation in respect of his private
property and that his immunity from taxation was Guaranteed
by Arts. 4 and 5 of the agreement of merger; and (2) that by
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virtue of the amendment of S. 2, cl. (1), of the Act, he was
not a "person" within the meaning of the Act and therefore
he was not liable to pay agricultural income-tax.
Held: (i) that the amendment in the definition of "person"
in S. 2, Cl. (i), of the Act was made not with the object of
excluding the Rulers of former Indian States from liability
to pay tax, but only to delete a clause which in view of
political changes which had taken place since the Act was
enacted had no practical significance. The appellant could
not claim exemption from taxation on the ground that he was
not a " person ", in the absence of an express exemption
clause in the Act.
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(2)that the privileges guaranteed by Arts. 4 and 5 of the
agreement of merger were only personal privileges of the
appellant as an ex-Ruler and that these privileges did not
extend to his private property.
Vishweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1952]
S.C.R. 1020, followed.
(3)that the claim made by the appellant of immunity from
taxation relying upon the agreement of merger was not
justiciable.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 307 to 309
of 1958.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated August 1, 1956, of
the Orissa High Court in O. J. C. Nos. 16, 19, 137 and 61 of
1954.
C.B. Aggarwala and P. C. Aggarwala, for the appellant (In
C. As. Nos. 307 to 309 of 58).
N.C. Chatterjee, J. H. Umrigar and T. M. Sen, for the
respondents (In all the appeals).
1960. September 21. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SHAH J.-This is a group of three appeals filed with
certificate of fitness under Art. 132 of the Constitution
issued by the High Court of Judicature, Orissa.
The Legislature of the Province of Orissa enacted the Orissa
Agricultural Income-tax Act XXIV of 1947-hereinafter
referred to as the Act-providing for the levy of income-tax
on agricultural income derived from lands situated in the
Province of Orissa. This Act was brought into operation
from July 10, 1947. By s. 3, agricultural income-tax at the
rate or rates specified in the schedule was made payable for
each financial year on the total income of the previous year
of every person. By the proviso to that section,
agricultural income of the Central Government or of the
State Government or of any local authority was exempt from
’taxation. Section 2, cl. (1), defined a " person " as
inclusive of a Ruler of an Indian State. The appellant in
these three appeals is the former Ruler of the State of
Sonepur. After
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the establishment of the Dominion of India on August 15,
1947, the appellant as the Ruler of the State of Sonepur
executed an instrument of accession to the., Dominion
restricted to three subjects-Defence, External Affairs and
Communications. On December 15, 1947, he executed a merger
agreement whereby the territory of the State of Sonepur
became merged with the territory of the Dominion of India.
By virtue of the merger agreement, the Government of India
acquired full sovereign rights over the territory of the
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State, but ownership of private properties belonging to the
appellant and full enjoyment thereof were under the
agreement guaranteed to him under Art. 3. In exercise of the
powers conferred by the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act 47
of 1947, the Government of India by notification dated March
23, 1948, delegated to the Provincial Government of Orissa
full powers to administer the merged States of Orissa
including the State of Sonepur. The Government of the
Province of Orissa applied to the merged States s. 1 of the
Act as from January 19, 1949, and by notification dated
April 1, 1949, the remaining provisions of the Act. In the
meantime, by amendment, two new sections, s. 290(A) and s.
290(B) were incorporated in the Government of India Act,
1935. The Governor-General of India was thereby given power
to direct by order that a merged State shall be administered
in all respects as if it formed part of the Governor’s
Province specified in the order. The Governor-General of
India exercising authority under ss. 290(A) and 290(B)
issued on July 27, 1949, an order providing that the merged
Orissa States including the State of Sonepur shall be
administered in all respects as if they formed part of the
Province of Orissa with effect from August 1, 1949. On
December 30, 1949, the Governor of Orissa promulgated
Ordinance No. IV of 1949 providing inter alia that the
Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1947, be applied to the merged
Orissa States. This Ordinance was later replaced by the
Orissa Merged States (Laws) Act, XVI of 1950. The appellant
was then called upon by the Agricultural
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Income-tax Officer to furnish a return of his agricultural
income. The appellant disputed his liability to pay the
agricultural income-tax and declined to furnish the return.
The Agricultural Income-tax Officer then proceeded to make
enquiries about the income received from the lands held by
the appellant and assessed him to pay tax for the years
1949-50 to 1953-54. He also imposed a penalty upon the
appellant for failure to submit his returns for the years
1949-50 and 1950-51. Against the order assessing him to
tax and directing him to pay penalty, the appellant
preferred appeals to the Assistant Collector of Agricultural
Income-tax, Sambalpur. The appeals were dismissed by that
officer. Revision applications to the Collector of
Commercial Taxes, Cuttack and to the Board of Revenue were
unsuccessful.
The appellant filed four petitions in the High Court of
Orissa, being petitions Nos. 17, 16, 19 and 137 of 1954
challenging the assessments made by the taxing authorities
for the years 1949-50, 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53
respectively, and two more petitions being petitions Nos. 18
and 138 of 1954 against orders imposing penalty for the
years 1949-50 and 1950-51 respectively. These six petitions
and certain other petitions were heard by a Division Bench
of the Orissa High Court. The High Court held that by the
guarantee of full ownership, use and enjoyment of the
private properties under the merger agreement the Properties
of the appellant were not rendered immune from liability to
pay tax imposed by the Act and that in the absence of an
express provision, his income from lands was liable to pay
agricultural income-tax. The High Court also held that even
though the appellant was the Ruler of a former Orissa State,
he was a " person " within the meaning of the Act and was
liable to pay agricultural income-tax. The learned Judges
therefore dismissed the petitions challenging the liability
of the appellant for the assessment years 1950-51, 1951-52
and 1952-53 to pay agricultural income-tax, and they
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cancelled the order of assessment in respect of the year
1949-50 and the orders imposing penalty in respect of years
1949-50 and
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1950-51. Against the orders dismissing the applications for
setting aside the assessments in respect of years 1950-51,
1951-52 and 1952-53, these appeals have been preferred with
certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 132 of the
Constitution.
The appellant was undoubtedly the Ruler of an Indian State
before August 15. 1947, but by reason of the merger
agreement executed by him on December 15, 1947, his
sovereignty was extinguished. By Art. 1 of the terms of
the merger agreement, the appellant ceded to the Dominion of
India full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and power
for and in relation to the governance of the State and
agreed to transfer the administration of the State on the
appointed day and as from the said day, the Dominion
Government became competent to exercise the power, authority
and jurisdiction in relation to the governance of the State
in such matters and through such agency as the Government
thought fit. By Art. 3, the appellant remained entitled to
full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties
(but not of the State properties) belonging to him on the
date of the merger. By Art. 5, the Dominion Government gua-
ranteed the succession according to law and customs, to the
gadi of the State and to the personal rights, privileges,
dignities and titles of the appellant. It was provided by
Art. 4 that " the Raja, the Rani, the Rajmata, the Yuvraja
and the Yuvrani shall be entitled to all personal privileges
enjoyed by them whether within or outside the territories of
the State, immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947
".
The appellant contends that as a Ruler of the State of
Sonepur, he was, before merger of his State, immune from
liability to taxation in respect of his private property
both within his territory and outside. He claims that he
was so immune in respect of his property within his State as
a Ruler and in respect of his property outside the State by
the rules of International Law which, he submits, protect
from taxation the properties of a Ruler of a State, situate
in a foreign State. The appellant says that by Arts. 4 and
5, the Dominion Government guaranteed to him all
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his personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles
enjoyed within or without the territory immediately before
the 15th August, 1947, and that any attempt to tax his
private property by the State of Orissa or by the Union
Government violates that guarantee. The appellant submits
that to give effect to this guarantee, all legislation must
be interpreted in the light of the merger agreement which he
claims is incorporated in Art. 362 of the Constitution and
he must be held exempt from liability to pay tax even though
no express provision in that behalf has been made by the
Legislature. In our view, there is no force in the
contentions raised by the appellant. The privileges
guaranteed by Arts. 4 and 5 are personal privileges of the
appellant as an ex-Ruler and those privileges do not extend
to his personal property. In dealing with a similar
contention raised on the interpretation of Art. 4 of the
merger agreement entered into by the Ruler of Khairagarh
(which was in material terms identical with the terms of
Art. 4 of the agreement executed by the appellant), S. R.
Das, J., (as he then was), observed in Visweshwar Rao v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh(1):
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" The guarantee or assurance to which due regard is to be
had is limited to personal rights, privileges and dignities
of the Ruler qua a Ruler. It does not extend to personal
property which is different from personal rights ".
The Act imposes on the agricultural income of "every person
" liability to pay agricultural income-tax. By the proviso
to s. 3, agricultural income of the Central Government,
State Government and of local authorities is exempt from
tax, but this exemption is not extended to any other body or
person. It is true that in the definition of the expression
" person " as originally enacted in s. 2, cl. (1), a Ruler
of an Indian State was expressly included and by the
Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, reference to Rulers of
Indian States was deleted as from January 26, 1950. But by
that amendment, an intention to exclude the Rulers of Indian
States from liability to pay
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 1020, 1054.
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agricultural income-tax was, in our judgment, not evinced.
Between the dates on which the Act wag enacted and the
Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950. several political events of
far reaching effect had taken place, in consequence of which
the appellant bad ceased to be a Ruler of an Indian State.
On January 26, 1950, the date on which the Adaptation of
Laws Order, 1950, became operative, there were in, existence
no Indian States. The sovereign rights of the erstwhile
Rulers of the Indian States were extinguished, and their
territories were merged in the, Indian Union. The amendment
in the definition of
"person " in s. 2, cl. (i), of the Act was made not with)
the object of excluding the Rulers of former Indian States
from liability to pay tax: it was only made to; delete a
clause which, in view of political changes, had no practical
significance. Liability to pay tax is imposed by the Act
and there is in the Act no express exemption in favour of
the appellant. The claim of the appellant to exemption on
the ground that he is not a " person " cannot therefore be
sustained.
Article 362 of the Constitution provides:
"In the exercise of the power of Parliament or of the
Legislature of a State to make laws or in the exercise of
the executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard
shall be bad to the guarantee or assurance given tinder any
such covenant or agreement as is referred to in Art. 291
with respect to the personal rights, privileges and
dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State ".
Article 291 of the Constitution deals with the privy purse
of the Rulers under any covenant or agreement entered into
by the Ruler of any Indian State before the commencement of
the Constitution payment whereof is free from tax as has
been granted or assured by the Government of the Dominion of
India. Article 362 recommends to the Parliament and the
State Legislatures in making laws after the Constitution "
to have due regard to the guarantee or assurance given under
any covenant or agreement ". Even though Art. 362 is not
restricted in its recommendation to agreements relating to
the privy purse and
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covers all agreements and covenants entered into by the
Rulers of Indian States before the commencement of the
Constitution whereby the personal rights, privileges and
dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State were guaranteed,
it does not import any legal obligation enforceable at the
instance of the erstwhile Ruler of a former Indian State.
If, despite the recommendation that due regard shall be had
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to the guarantee or assurance given under the covenant or
agreement, the Parliament or the Legislature of a State
makes laws inconsistent with the personal rights, privileges
and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State, the exercise
of the legislative authority cannot, relying upon the
agreement or covenant, be questioned in any court, and that
is so expressly provided by Art. 363 of the Constitution.
The plea of the appellant that he was not seeking to enforce
the terms of the merger agreement and that be was merely
resisting the claim made by the authority appointed by the
State of Orissa to levy a tax inconsistently with the terms
of the merger agreement, has no substance. In truth, the
appellant sought by his petitions under Art. 226 of the
Constitution to enforce the terms of Art. 4 of the merger
agreement. By his petitions, the appellant contended that
in enacting the Agricultural Income-tax Act and in seeking
to enforce it against him, the State of Orissa acted
contrary to the terms of the merger agreement and he asked
the High Court to enforce the terms of the merger agreement.
On the grounds therefore that liability to pay agricultural
income-tax in respect of his private property is imposed
upon the appellant by s. 3 of the Act, and the immunity
claimed by the appellant is not one of the personal rights
or privileges within the meaning of the merger agreement and
that the claim made by the appellant is not justiciable, the
objection raised by the appellant to liability to pay
agricultural income-tax assessed under the Act cannot be
sustained.
Two subsidiary contentions which were sought to be raised
before us may be briefly referred to. It was urged that of
the forty-two villages of which the
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appellant is held by the assessing authority to be the
holder, two were in the year 1945 transferred by him to the
Yuvrani (the appellant’s son’s wife) and on that,, account,
the income of those villages was not liable to be taxed in
his hands. It appears from the assessment order that this
contention was raised before the Agricultural Income-tax
Officer and that officer rejected the contention relying
upon s. 14, cl. (1), of the Act. It is unnecessary for the
purpose of these appeals to decide whether the assessing
officer was right in the view which he took. In the
petitions filed by the appellant in the High Court, this
plea was not raised and no relief was claimed by him in
respect of the income of the two villages. The question was
never mooted before the High Court and the State of Orissa
had no opportunity of meeting the claim now sought to be
made by the appellant. On the ground that the question was
never raised in the High Court, we reject this contention.
It was also urged that whereas the assessing officer has
found that the appellant had lands in forty-two villages, in
the inventory of properties submitted by the appellant to
the Government, only eighteen villages were set out and this
inventory was accepted by the Government of India. Relying
upon this premise, the appellant contends that he is liable
to pay tax in respect of his income from these eighteen
villages and no more. But even this plea was never raised
in the High Court and we cannot, in dealing with these
appeals, enter upon an enquiry into a question which was
never raised on which no evidence was led, and on which no
finding was given by the High Court.
On the view taken by us, appeals Nos. 307, 308 and 309 of
1958 fail and are dismissed with costs. There will be one
hearing fee.
Appeals dismissed.
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