Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2050 OF 2010
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.15458 of 2007)
Maharashtra University of Health
Sciences & others ..Appellant(s)
Versus
Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal & others ..Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
GANGULY, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Maharashtra University of Health Sciences
through its Registrar and its Grievance
Committee and Management Council as appellants
impugn the judgment dated 8.6.07 rendered by the
Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court on several
1
writ petitions filed by the Management Council
and the employees.
3. The basic facts of the case are as under:
The appellant No.1, the Maharashtra University
of Health Sciences has been constituted under
Maharashtra University of Health Sciences Act, 1998
nd
(for short ‘the said Act’). The 2 appellant is the
Committee constituted under Section 53 of the said
rd
Act and the 3 appellant is the Management Council of
the appellant No.1 and also constituted under the
said Act.
st
4.
The 1 respondent in this appeal is a public
trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust
Act, 1950 and the said trust runs several
nd rd
colleges including the 2 respondent. The 3
respondent is the Principal of the said college
th
and the 4 respondent is a Lecturer therein.
th th
Both the 5 and 6 respondents were appointed
Lecturers in the said college but their
appointments were not approved but they
2
continued to work as lecturers in the said
college.
th
5.
On 7.8.05 a representation was made by the 5
respondent to the effect that after she had
served the said college for the last three and a
half year suddenly she was informed on 6.8.05
that the college authorities accepted her
resignation. That was shocking to her since the
th
5 respondent could never resign as she had
several liabilities and had no other income. The
education of her two children had to be looked
after while her husband was disabled in view of
an accident and her father-in-law was a retired
person. In her representation to the Vice
Chancellor of the appellant-University she
stated that at the time of her appointment,
college authorities took her signature on a
resignation letter without mentioning any date
and that might have been used to remove her from
the college. The University on receipt of the
said representation sent a letter to the said
th
college on 19 August, 2005 for its explanation
3
and explanation was submitted by the said
college on 31.08.05.
6.
Thereafter, the appellant-University formed a
th
Committee to look into the grievance of the 5
respondent and the said Committee after visiting
the college and conducting an enquiry on
29.08.05, 01.09.05 and 02.09.05 submitted its
report to the appellant-University.
th
7. Again on 09.09.05, the 5 respondent submitted
another representation to the Grievance
Committee of the appellant-University which was
also forwarded to the said college for its
response. That was submitted by the said college
on 04.10.05 and 08.11.05. Thereafter, the
th
appellant-University gave the 5 respondent a
hearing in respect of her complaint which she
raised in her representation. The said meeting
was held before the Grievance Committee and the
Grievance Committee gave a detailed report on
the basis of its enquiry. Before the report was
th
given, the 5 respondent and the person against
whom complaint was lodged were examined along
4
with some witnesses. Thereafter, the Grievance
Committee took a decision to refer the matter to
the State Commission for Women for further
investigation and it was decided that the report
of the said Commission was to be considered in
the next meeting of the Committee.
th th
8.
Thereafter, on 18 January, 2006 the 6
respondent lodged a further complaint with the
th
police station Sadar against the 4 respondent
as a result of which offence punishable under
Section 509 of I.P.C was registered against the
th
4 respondent and the Summary Criminal Case
No.4332/06 was registered in the Court of
th
J.M.F.C., Nagpur. On 19.01.06, 5 respondent
also lodged report with the police station and
on the basis of the said report an offence came
to be registered on 04.02.06 vide Crime No.22/06
under Sections 468, 471, 354, 509, 506 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In
connection with the aforesaid criminal case, the
rd th
3 and 4 respondents were arrested by the
police on 05.02.06 and were remanded to police
custody for two days. They were granted bail by
5
the Court of J.M.F.C., Nagpur on 08.02.06. The
Principal of the college was also granted
anticipatory bail on 06.02.06 and which order
was subsequently confirmed on 23.02.06.
th
9. Then on 18.02.06, the services of the 6
respondent were terminated by the said college.
th
10.
In view of the complaint of the 6 respondent,
st nd th
the University called the 1 , 2 and 4
respondents for hearing on 08.03.06 before the
th
Grievance Committee and on 04.03.06 the 6
respondent sent a complaint to the appellant-
University seeking action against the
th
respondents. In that complaint the 6
respondent gave details of ill-treatment and
sexual harassment which she and other lady
lecturers and employees of the college including
th
the 5 respondent were subjected to by the
authorities of the said college. In view of
such complaints, the Grievance Committee of the
th
University met on 8 March, 2006 to consider the
issues in the light of complaints received by
th
the 6 respondent against the college
6
authorities. Pursuant to the meeting of the
Grievance Committee, the University by its
st
communication dated 21 March, 2006 directed the
st nd
1 and 2 respondents to take steps against the
th
3rd and 4 respondents with a direction to
suspend them and it was also directed that the
th
5 respondent may be reinstated. It was also
directed that approval granted in respect of the
rd th
service of 3 and 4 respondent be frozen. A
st
reply was sent by the 1 respondent to the order
of the appellant-University dated 21.03.06.
Thereafter, the appellant-University further
informed the college authorities that the
rd th
decision to freeze the approval of the 3 and 4
respondents was taken under the provision of
Clause 25.2 of the University Direction No.25/01
and it was done in accordance with Section 16
(8) of the said Act. The governing body of the
respondent college in its meeting held on
27.03.06 refused to comply with the direction
st
issued by the University by its letter dated 21
March, 2006 and this fact was communicated to
st
the appellant by the said college. On 1 April
st nd
2006, the 1 and 2 respondents addressed a
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letter of the same date and contended therein
that the appellant-University does not have the
power to freeze the approval of appointment of
rd th
permanent teachers like the 3 and 4
respondents and the appellant was asked to
th
withdraw its communication dated 29 March,
2006.
st
11.
Assailing those communications dated 21 March,
th
2006 and 29 March, 2006 of the appellants, the
respondents namely, the Trust, the College
Authorities and those two teachers filed a writ
petition being 1976/06 contending therein that
the appellant-University has no authority to
issue those communications. That writ proceeding
was heard on contest by the Hon’ble High Court.
12. By the impugned judgment dated 08.06.07, the
Hon’ble High Court partly allowed the writ
petition and quashed the orders passed by the
University in respect of action taken against
those respondents on the basis of the
th th
allegations of 5 and 6 respondent of sexual
harassment at the work place.
8
13. Challenging the said judgment, this Court has
been moved.
14.
The main question on which the matter was argued
by the appellants was that the High Court was in
error in deciding that the Grievance Committee
constituted under Section 53 of the said Act,
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any
th th
complaint filed by the 5 and 6 respondent, as
they are not approved teachers of the respondent
college.
15. In order to appreciate the legal issues involved
in this argument, it is better to set out the
definition of ‘teacher’ under Section 2(35) of
the said Act. Section 2(35) of the said Act
runs as under:-
“2(35) “teachers” means full time approved
Demonstrators, Tutors, Assistant Lecturers,
Lecturers, Readers, Associate Professors,
Professors and other persons teaching or
giving instructions on full time basis in
affiliated colleges or approved institutions
in the university;”
16. Section 53 of the said Act provides as follows:
9
“53. (1) There shall be a Grievances Committee
in the University to deal with the grievances
of teachers and other employees of the
University, Colleges, institutions and
recognised institutions and to hear and settle
grievances as far as may be practicable within
six months, and the committee shall make a
report to the Management Council.
(2) It shall be lawful for the Grievances
Committee to entertain and consider grievances
or complaints and report to the Management
Council for taking such action as it deems fit
and the decisions of the Management Council on
such report shall be final.
(3) The Grievances Committee shall
consist of the following members, namely:
(a) The Pro-Vice Chancellor, - Chairperson
(b) Four members of the management
council nominated by the Management Council
from amongst themselves – Members
(c) The Registrar - Member Secretary
(4) The Registrar shall not have a right
to vote.”
17.
Construing the aforesaid two Sections, the High
Court, following the principle of “ ejusdem
th th
generis ” held that 5 and 6 respondent, being
unapproved teachers, do not come within the
definition of ‘teachers’ under Section 2(35)
quoted above.
10
18. This Court cannot accept the aforesaid decision
of the High Court for various reasons indicated
hereinafter.
19.
If the definition of teachers, as quoted above,
is properly perused it would appear that within
the definition of teachers not only full time
approved Demonstrators, Tutors, Assistant
Lecturers, etc., are included but the definition
is wide enough to include “and other persons
teaching or giving instructions on full time
basis in affiliated colleges or approved
institutions in the university.” Similarly, the
Grievance Committee which is established under
Section 53 of the said Act has also been given
wide powers to deal with not only the grievances
of teachers but also of other employees of the
University, college, institution and to settle
their grievances as far as may be practicable
within a certain time-frame. Sub-section (2) of
Section 53 of the said Act provides for
consequential steps which the Grievance
Committee may take after entertaining the
grievances of the category of persons named in
11
Section 53(1). Section 53(3) provides for the
constitution of the Grievance Committee and
Section 53(4) is procedural in nature.
20. On a combined reading of Section 2(35) with
Section 53 of the said Act, this Court is of the
opinion that in respect of unapproved teachers
also Grievance Committee has the jurisdiction to
entertain complaint and undertake the statutory
exercise conferred on it under Section 53 of the
said Act.
21. The definition of teachers under Section 2(35)
is wide enough to include even unapproved
teacher. In fact the said definition has two
parts, the first part deals with full time
approved Demonstrators, Tutors, Assistant
Lecturers, Lecturers etc. and the second part
deals with other persons teaching or giving
instructions on full time basis in affiliated
colleges or approved institutions in the
University.
12
22. Even though the approved teachers and those
‘other persons’ who are teaching and giving
instructions fall in two different classes both
are encompassed with the definition of teacher
under Section 2(35) of the Act. The word ‘and’
before ‘other persons’ is disjunctive and
indicate a different class of people.
23. A class is a conceptual creation taking within
its fold numerous categories of persons with
similar characteristics. Here in the group of
‘other persons’ fall those who, on full time
basis, are teaching or giving instructions in
colleges affiliated with the University and they
are also teachers even if they are unapproved.
This seems to be the purport of Section 2(35) of
the Act.
th th
24.
It cannot be disputed that 5 and 6 respondent
were engaged in teaching on full time basis in
the respondent college, which is an affiliated
college of the appellant-University.
13
25.
This Court is constrained to observe that the
Hon’ble High Court has not properly appreciated
the principle of ejusdem generis in
understanding the scope of Section 2(35) read
with Section 53 of the Act.
26. The Latin expression “ ejusdem generis ” which
means “of the same kind or nature” is a
principle of construction, meaning thereby when
general words in a statutory text are flanked by
restricted words, the meaning of the general
words are taken to be restricted by implication
with the meaning of restricted words. This is a
principle which arises “from the linguistic
implication by which words having literally a
wide meaning (when taken in isolation) are
treated as reduced in scope by the verbal
context.” It may be regarded as an instance of
ellipsis, or reliance on implication. This
principle is presumed to apply unless there is
some contrary indication (See Glanville
Williams, ‘The Origins and Logical Implications
of the Ejusdem Generis Rule’ 7 Conv (NS) 119).
14
27.
This ejusdem generis principle is a facet of the
principle of Noscitur a sociis . The Latin maxim
Noscitur a sociis contemplates that a statutory
term is recognised by its associated words. The
Latin word ‘ sociis ’ means ‘society’. Therefore,
when general words are juxtaposed with specific
words, general words cannot be read in
isolation. Their colour and their contents are
to be derived from their context [See similar
observations of Viscount Simonds in Attorney
General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover ,
(1957) AC 436 at 461 of the report]
28.
But like all other linguistic canons of
construction, the ejusdem generis principle
applies only when a contrary intention does not
appear. In instant case, a contrary intention
is clearly indicated inasmuch as the definition
of ‘teachers’ under Section 2(35) of the said
Act, as pointed out above, is in two parts. The
first part deals with enumerated categories but
the second part which begins by the expression
“and other” envisages a different category of
persons. Here ‘and’ is disjunctive. So, while
15
construing such a definition the principle of
ejusdem generis cannot be applied.
29.
In this context, we should do well to remember
the caution sounded by Lord Scarman in Quazi v.
Quazi – [(1979) 3 All-England Reports 897]. At
page 916 of the report, the learned Law Lord
made this pertinent observation:-
“If the legislative purpose of a statute
is such that a statutory series should be
read ejusdem generis, so be it; the rule
is helpful. But, if it is not, the rule
is more likely to defeat than to fulfil
the purpose of the statute. The rule,
like many other rules of statutory
interpretation, is a useful servant but a
bad master.”
30.
This Court while construing the principle of
ejusdem generis laid down similar principles in
the case of K.K. Kochuni v. State of Madras and
Kerala , [AIR 1960 SC 1080]. A Constitution
Bench of this Court in Kochuni (supra) speaking
through Justice Subba Rao (as His Lordship then
was) at paragraph 50 at page 1103 of the report
opined:-
16
“...The rule is that when general words
follow particular and specific words of
the same nature, the general words must
be confined to the things of the same
kind as those specified. But it is
clearly laid down by decided cases that
the specific words must form a distinct
genus or category. It is not an
inviolable rule of law, but is only
permissible inference in the absence of
an indication to the contrary.”
(Emphasis supplied)
31.
Again this Court in another Constitution Bench
decision in the case of Amar Chandra Chakraborty
v. The Collector of Excise, Govt. of Tripura,
Agartala and others , AIR 1972 SC 1863, speaking
through Justice Dua, reiterated the same
principles in paragraph 9, at page 1868 of the
report. On the principle of ejusdem generis ,
the learned Judge observed as follows:-
“…The ejusdem generis rule strives to
reconcile the incompatibility between
specific and general words. This
doctrine applies when (i) the statute
contains an enumeration of specific
words; (ii) the subjects of the
enumeration constitute a class or
category; (iii) that class or category is
not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv)
the general term follows the enumeration;
and (v) there is no indication of a
different legislative intent.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17
32. As noted above, in the instant case, there is a
statutory indication to the contrary.
Therefore, where there is statutory indication
to the contrary the definition of teacher under
Section 2(35) cannot be read on the basis of
ejusdem generis nor can the definition be
confined to only approved teachers. If that is
done, then a substantial part of the definition
under Section 2(35) would become redundant.
That is against the very essence of the doctrine
of ejusdem generis . The purpose of this
doctrine is to reconcile any incompatibility
between specific and general words so that all
words in a Statute can be given effect and no
word becomes superfluous (See Sutherland:
th
Statutory Construction, 5 Edition, page 189,
Volume 2A).
33. It is also one of the cardinal canons of
construction that no Statute can be interpreted
in such a way as to render a part of it otiose.
18
34.
It is, therefore, clear where there is a
different legislative intent, as in this case,
the principle of ejusdem generis cannot be
applied to make a part of the definition
completely redundant.
35. By giving such a narrow and truncated
interpretation of ‘teachers’ under Section
2(35), High court has not only ignored a part of
Section 2(35) but it has also unfortunately
given an interpretation which is incompatible
with the avowed purpose of Section 53 of the
Act.
36. The purpose of setting up the Grievance
Committee under Section 53 of the Act is to
provide an effective grievance redressal forum
to teachers and other employees. Any
interpretation of ‘teachers’ under Section 2(35)
of the Act which denies the persons covered
under Section 2(35) an access to the said forum
completely nullifies the dominant purpose of
creating such a forum. It goes without saying
that unapproved teachers need the protection of
19
this forum more than the approved teachers. By
creating such a forum the University virtually
exercised its authority and jurisdiction as a
loco-parentis over teachers-both approved and
unapproved and who are working in various
colleges affiliated with it. The idea is to give
such teachers and employees a protection against
any kind of harassment which they might receive
in their work place. The creation of such a
forum is in tune with protecting the ‘dignity of
the individual’ which is one of the core
constitutional concepts.
37. Therefore, the doctrine of ejusdem generis
cannot be pressed into service to defeat this
dominant statutory purpose. In this context we
may usefully recall the observations of the
Supreme Court of United States in Guy T.
Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank , 293 US
84, 88-89, 79 L Ed 211, 55 S Ct 50, 52 (1934),
as under:-
“while the rule is a well-established and
useful one, it is, like other canons of
statutory construction, only an aid to
20
the ascertainment of the true meaning of
the statute. It is neither final nor
exclusive. To ascertain the meaning of
the words of a statute, they may be
submitted to the test of all appropriate
canons of statutory construction, of
which the rule of ejusdem generis is only
one. If, upon a consideration of the
context and the objects sought to be
attained and of the act as a whole, it
adequately appears that the general words
were not used in the restricted sense
suggested by the rule, we must give
effect to the conclusion afforded by the
wider view in order that the will of the
Legislature shall not fail.”
(Emphasis supplied)
38. Therefore, with great respect, this Court is
constrained to hold that the Hon’ble High Court
possibly fell into an error by holding that the
Grievance Committee has no jurisdiction to
th th
entertain the complaints made by 5 and 6
respondent since they are not approved teachers.
39.
Various other factual aspects were considered by
the High Court but since the High Court has come
to a clear erroneous conclusion that Grievance
Committee has no jurisdiction in dealing with
th th
the complaint filed by the 5 and 6 respondent,
21
the very basis of the High Court judgment is
unfortunately flawed and cannot be sustained.
40. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is
allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set
aside.
41.
The High court shall now dispose of the writ
petition filed before it in the light of the
observations made hereinbefore about the
jurisdiction of the Grievance Committee.
However, this Court makes it clear that the
th
order of reinstatement made in respect of 5 and
th
6 respondent shall be maintained and their
continuity in service cannot be disturbed
without following the provision of University
Acts and Statutes.
42. The appeal is allowed with the directions
mentioned hereinabove. Parties are left to bear
their own costs.
.......................J.
22
(G.S SINGHVI)
.......................J.
(ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)
New Delhi
February 25, 2010
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