Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MANAGEMENT OF M/S M.S. NALLY BHARATENGG. CO. LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT09/02/1990
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
THOMMEN, T.K. (J)
CITATION:
1990 SCR (1) 290 1990 SCC (2) 48
JT 1990 (2) 96 1990 SCALE (1)156
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Section 33-B--Transfer of
proceedings-Obligation to record reasons--Whether
mandatory--Denial of opportunity to management to
represent--Order whether vitiated.
HEADNOTE:
Sub-section (1) of S. 33-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 provides that the appropriate Government may, by
order in writing and for reasons to be stated therein,
withdraw any proceedings pending before a Labour Court or
Tribunal and transfer it for disposal to another Labour
Court or Tribunal.
Respondent No. 4, a workman of the appellant-company at
Dhanbad, was caught red-handed while stealing certain goods.
The domestic enquiry found him guilty of committing theft.
Consequently,. he was dismissed from service. The dispute
arising therefrom was referred to the Labour Court, Dhanbad
under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act for adjudication. When the
matter was pending consideration the respondent sought
transfer of the case to the Labour Court at Patna on the
plea that since he was residing at his village near Patna it
would be difficult for him to attend the proceedings at
Dhanbad. That application was made without intimation to the
management. The Government, however, without giving opportu-
nity to the management transferred the case to Patna by a
notification dated August 8, 1988 issued under S. 33B of the
Act. The writ petition filed by the management seeking to
quash the notification was dismissed by the High Court on
the view that no prejudice was being caused to the manage-
ment and no allegation of mala fide had been made against
the presiding officer.
Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court.
HELD: 1.1 The power to transfer a pending case under S.
33B of the Industrial Disputes Act is not a mere administra-
tive but quasijudicial power and the appropriate Government
cannot transfer a case on the basis of allegations of one
party without giving a reasonable opportunity to the other
party to represent its point of view. Such
291
allegations may not be valid or relevant or may not be true
at all. That could be tested only if the other party has
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notice of the same. [296A-C]
Punjab Worsted Spinning Mills, Chheharta v. State of
punjab & Ors., [1965] II LLJ 218 and Management of Sri Rani
Lakshmi Ginning & Weaving Mills Ltd. v. State of Madras,
[1975] 3 FLR 166, referred to.
Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial Tribu-
nal, Calcutta, [1977] (Lab) I.C. 1739; Muthe Steels (India)
Ltd. v. Labour Court, Hyderabad, [1979] (Lab) I.C. 325 and
Pioneer Ltd. v. Labour Court, Gorakhpur, [1983] (Lab) I.C.
335, overruled.
1.2 What is important in the modern administration is
the fairness of procedure with elimination of element of
arbitrariness, for fairness is a fundamental principle of
good administration. It is a rule to ensure that vast power
in the modern State is not abused but properly exercised.
The State power is used for proper and not for improper
purposes. The authority is not misguided by extraneous or
irrelevant consideration. Fairness is also a principle to
ensure that statutory authority arrives at a just decision
either in promoting the interest or affecting the rights of
persons. The concept that ’justice should not only be done
but be seen to be done’ is the essence of fairness and is
equally applicable to administrative authorities. Fairness
is thus a prime test for proper and good administration. It
has no set form or procedure. It does not necessarily re-
quire a-plurality of hearings or representations and counter
representations. It depends upon the facts of each case.
[297C, 299C-E]
Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] AC 40; A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v.
Union of India, [1970] 1 SCR 457; Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v.
Union of India, [1973] 3 SCR 22; Pearlberg v. Varty, [1972]
1 WLR 534, 547; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Com-
missioner, [1978] 1 SCC 405; Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of
India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of
India, [1981] 1 SCC 664; Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,
[1974] 2 SCR 348; Union of India v. Tulsi Ram, [1985]
(Supp.) 2 SCR 131; Charan Lal Sahu & Ors. v. Union of India,
JT 1989 4 SC 582; Natural Justice by Paul Jackson, 2nd ed.
p. 11 and Pannalal Binjraj & Anr. v. Union of India, [1957]
31 ITR 565, referred to.
1.3 In the instant case, the State had withdrawn the
pending reference from the Labour Court, Dhanbad and trans-
ferred it to another Labour Court at the distant District of
Patna, on the represen-
292
tation of the workman without getting it verified from the
management. The State in fairness ought to have got it
verified by giving an opportunity to the management which
was a party to the pending reference. The management was not
required to establish particular prejudice for want of such
opportunity. The non-observance of natural justice was
itself prejudice to the management and proof of prejudice
independently of proof of denial of natural justice was
unnecessary. Denial of the opportunity to the management was
thus a fatal flaw to the decision of the Government. [300H-
30 IA, B-D]
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, [1981] 1 SCR 746 and Altco Ltd.
v. Sutherland, [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 515, referred to.
2. The expression ’may’ in Sub-s. (1) of S. 33B of the
Act only makes it discretionary in so far as the appropriate
Government taking a decision as to whether the power con-
ferred thereunder has to be exercised or not. But when once
a decision has been taken to transfer a pending case then
the requirement of giving reasons becomes mandatory. The
authority would be under legal obligation to record reasons
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in support of its decision. Failure to give reasons or
giving reasons not germane would thus be fatal to the deci-
sion. [295C-D]
Associated Electrical Industries (P) Ltd. v. Its Work-
men, [1961] II LLJ 122 and Ajanta Industries v. Central
Board of Taxes, [1976] 2 SCR 884, referred to.
2.2 In the instant case, the Government has stated that
the workman was having his residence at his village near
Patna and it would be, therefore, inconvenient for him to
attend the Labour Court regularly at Dhanbad. Most of the
factors, however, do not point that way. The workman and his
family members seem to be still residing in the colony
quarter at Dhanbad. His two sons are studying in a school at
a nearby village. The letter dated September 8, 1988 of the
Headmaster of the said school speaks of that fact. The
letter from the Assistant Electrical Engineer in proof of
the electricity supplied to the quarter occupied by the
workman at Dhanbad is also relevant. As against these mate-
rials, the workman has not produced any proof in support of
his allegation that he has been residing in a village home
near-Patna. He has not denied the documents annexed to the
special leave petition and not seriously disputed the factum
of his residence in the colony quarter at Dhanbad. The
Government was, therefore, misled by the representation of
the workman. [301E-H]
293
3. The notification dated August 8, 1988 is quashed. The
Labour Court, Dhanbad shall proceed to dispose of the matter
as expeditiously as possible. [302A]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1102 of
1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.10.1988 of the Patna
High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2075 of 1988.
A.K. Sen, K.D. prasad, J. Krishna and Mrs. Naresh Bakshi
for the Appellant.
S.K. Sinha and U.S. Prasad for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:
K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. Special Leave is granted.
This appeal from an order of the Patna High Court raises
an important question as to the scope of section 33-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (’The Act’).
The facts can be quite shortly stated: The appellant-
company is mainly engaged in construction of coal washeries
on contract basis in different collieries and also doing
allied and incidental work. Shivaji Prasad Sinha--respondent
No. 4 was a Senior Supervisor in the company’s establishment
at Dhanbad. It is said that he was caught red handed when
carrying 55 pieces of electromagnetic clutch plates kept
concealed in the tool box of his scooter. The management
held domestic enquiry into the incident and found him guilty
of committing theft. He was accordingly dismissed from
service. The dispute arising therefrom was referred under
Section 10(1)(c) of the Act to Labour Court Dhanbad for
adjudication. The Labour Court registered the case as refer-
ence case No. 4 of 1988 and issued notice to the parties.
The parties entered appearance and filed their respective
pleadings. When the matter was thus pending consideration
the respondent seems to have written to the Government
stating that it would be difficult for him to attend the
Labour Court Dhanbad since he has been residing at Hajipur
and it would be convenient for him if the case is trans-
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ferred to Labour Court Patna. That application was made
without intimation to the management. The Government howev-
er, has acceded to the request of the respondent and without
opportunity to
294
the management transferred the case to Labour Court Patna.
The Notification issued in that regard reads as follows:
"NOTIFICATION Patna dated 8th August 1988
S.O. In exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of
Section 33-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of
1947) the Governor of Bihar after careful consideration of
the application of the petitioner Shri Shivajee Prasad Sinha
wherein he has prayed for the transfer of adjudication
proceedings to Patna keeping in view to the difficulties
expressed by him to attend the labour court, Dhanbad, regu-
larly due to his residence at Hajipur is pleased to withdraw
the proceeding shown in Annexure ’A’ pending before Labour
Court, Dhanbad and transfer the said proceeding to the
Labour Court, Patna for speedy disposal from the stage at
which the case is transferred."
The management moved the High Court by way of writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to have the
Notification quashed. The High Court did not agree and
summarily dismissed the writ petition with an observation:
"Since no prejudice is being caused to the petitioner and no
allegation of mala fide has been made against the presiding
officer, Patna, we are not inclined to interfere with the
order under challenge.
This application is dismissed"
The management in the appeal challenges the Government
notification withdrawing and transferring the pending case
from the Labour Court Dhanbad to Labour Court Patna.
Since the impugned notification has been issued under
Section 33-B of the Act, we may for immediate reference set
out that Section. Omitting immaterial words, it is in these
terms:
"33.B. Power to transfer certain proceedings:
(1) The appropriate Government may, by order in writing and
for reasons to be stated therein, withdraw any proceeding
under this Act pending before a Labour Court,
295
Tribunal, or National Tribunal and transfer the same to
another Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the
case may be, for the disposal of the proceeding and the
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to which the
proceeding is so transferred may, subject to special direc-
tions in the order of transfer, proceed either de novo or
from the stage at which it was so transferred."
The Section 33-B provides power to the appropriate
Government to withdraw any proceedings pending before a
labour court or Tribunal and transfer it for disposal to
another labour court or Tribunal. It could be exercised suo
motu or on representations of the parties. The expression
’may’ in sub-section (1) of Section 33-B only makes it
discretionary in so far as the appropriate Government taking
a decision as to whether the power conferred thereunder has
to be exercised or not. But when once a decision is taken to
transfer a pending case then the requirement of giving
reasons becomes mandatory. The authority is under legal
obligation to record reasons in support of its decision.
Reasons would be life of the decision. Failure to give
reasons or giving reasons not germane would be fatal to the
decision.
In Associated Electrical Industries (P) Ltd. v. Its
Workmen, [1961] II LLJ 122, 130 the Government withdrew and
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transferred a reference from one tribunal to another tribu-
nal merely stating that expediency required the withdrawal
and transfer. The validity of the order of withdrawal and
transfer was challenged inter-alia on the ground that no
reasons were stated for passing the order. Gajendragadkar,
J., (as he then was) speaking for this Court observed that
the requirement about the statement of reasons to be record-
ed must be complied with both in substance and in letter. To
say that it is expedient to withdraw a case from one tribu-
nal and transfer it to another does not amount to giving
reasons as required by the Section.
In the instant case, the key question for consideration
is whether the Government before accepting the representa-
tion of the workman and transferring the case from the
labour court, Dhanbad to labour court, Patna should have
given an opportunity to the management? The validity of the
reasons given by the Government for transferring the case is
another question to be considered.
We will presently consider the question but before doing
so a brief survey of some of the High Courts decisions
bearing on this aspect may be usefully made. The Punjab High
Court in Workman of Punjab
296
Worsted Spinning Mills Chheharta v. State of Punjab & Ors.,
[1965] II LLJ 2 18 has expressed the view that the power to
transfer pending case under section 33-B is not a mere
administrative but quasi-judicial power and the appropriate
Government cannot transfer a case on the basis of allega-
tions of one party without giving reasonable opportunity to
other party to represent its point of view. This was also
the view recognised by the Madras High Court in Management
of Sri Rani Lakshmi Ginning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. State
of Madras, [1975] 3 FLR 166 at 167. It was explained by the
Madras High Court that the reasons given by a party who
moved for transfer may not be valid or relevant or may not
be true at all. Whether such reasons in fact exist and
whether those reasons have any relevance for a transfer
could be tested only if the other party has notice of the
same.
The High Courts of Calcutta, Andhra Pradesh and Allaha-
bad have however, taken contrary view. In Jay Engineering
Works Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta, [1977]
(Lab) 1C 1739 at 1750 the Calcutta High Court has observed
that it would be difficult to appreciate how under such
circumstances, the Government could be called upon to give a
notice to the parties before making an order under section
33-B. There could be no principle involved in giving such a
notice. Nobody’s rights could possibly have been effected in
taking such action and there is no question of observing the
principles natural justice. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Muthe Steels (India) Ltd. v. Labour Court, Hyderabad, [1979]
(Lab) IC 325 at 329 has adopted a similar line of reasoning.
It was emphasized that Section 33-B in terms does not con-
template any notice being given before a transfer is made of
any proceeding from one Labour Court to another. There is no
right to any party to have any question decided by a partic-
ular court. An arbitrary exercise of power of transfer is
adequately safeguarded by the statutory requirement to
record reasons for such transfer. The Allahabad High Court
in Pioneer Ltd. v. Labour Court, Gorakhpur, [1983] (Lab) IC
335,338 has also expressed similar views.
After the leading English case of Ridge v. Baldwin,I
[1964] AC 40 and an equally important case of this Court in
A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India, [1970] 1 SCR 457
there was a turning point in the development of doctrine of
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natural justice as applicable to administrative bodies. Both
the authorities laid down that for application of rules of
natural justice the classification of functions as ’judi-
cial’ or ’administrative’ is not necessary. Lord Reid in
Ridge case explained, ’that the duty to act judicially may
arise from the very nature of the
297
function intended to be performed and it need not be shown
to be super added’. Hegde, J., in Kraipak case said that
under our Constitution the rule of law pervades over the
entire field of administration. Every organ of the State
under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the
rule of law. The concept of rule of law would lose its
vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not
charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a
fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially
in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and
fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures
which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial
power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just
and fair decision.
What is thus important in the modern administration is
the fairness of procedure with elimination of element of
arbitrariness. The State functionaries must act fairly and
reasonably. That is, however, not the same thing to state
that they must act judicially or quasijudicially. In Keshav
Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 SCR 22 Mukherjea,
J., said (at 30):
"The administrative authority concerned should act fairly,
impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers
are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as
to act fairly."
The procedural standards which are implied by the duty
to act fairly has been explained by Lord Pearson in Pearl-
berg v. Varty, [1972] 1 WLR 534,547:
"A tribunal to whom judicial or quasi-judicial functions are
entrusted is held to be required to apply those principles
(i.e. the rules of natural justice) in performing those
functions unless there is a provision to the contrary. But
where some person or body is entrusted by Parliament with
administrative or executive functions there is no presump-
tion that compliance with the principles of natural justice
is required although, as ’Parliament is not to be presumed
to act unfairly’, the courts may be able in suitable cases
(perhaps always) to imply an obligation to act with fair-
ness."
In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner,
[1978] 1 SCC 405 at 434 Krishna Iyer, J. commented that
natural justice though
298
varying is the soul of the rule as fair play in action. It
extends to both the fields of judicial and administrative.
The administrative power in a democratic set-up is not
allergic to fairness in action and discretionary executive
justice cannot degenerate into unilateral injustice. Good
administration demands fair play in action and this simple
desideratum is the fount of natural justice. Fairness is
flexible and it is intended for improving the quality of
government by injecting fairplay into its wheels.
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621
Bhagwati, J., expressed similar thought that audio alteram
partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to
ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision
and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse
or misuse of power.
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In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, [1981] 1 SCC
664 Sarkaria, J., speaking for himself and Desai, J., said
that irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statu-
tory body or tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial, a
duty to act fairly, that is, in consonance with the funda-
mental principles of substantive justice is generally im-
plied. The presumption is that in a democratic polity wedded
to the rule of law, the State or the Legislature does not
intend that in the exercise of their statutory powers its
functionaries should act unfairly or unjustly. In the same
case, Chinnappa Reddy, J., added (at 2 12) that the princi-
ples of natural justice are now considered so fundamental as
to be ’implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’. They
are, therefore, implicit in every decision-making function,
call it judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. The
learned Judge went on to state that where the statute is
silent about the observance of the principles of natural
justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance
with the principles of natural justice. The implication of
natural justice being presumptive, it should be followed by
the authorities unless it is excluded by express words of
statute or by necessary implication.
Citations could be multiplied since there is fairly
abundant case law has come into existence: See, for example,
Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1974] 2 SCR 348 and Union
of India v. Tulsi Ram, [1985] (Supp.) 2 SCR 13 1. More
recently in a significant judgment in Charan Lal Sahu & Ors.
v. Union of India, JT 1989 (4) SC 582 learned Chief Justice
Sabyasachi Mukharji has referred to almost all the authori-
ties of this Court on this aspect and emphasized that the
principles of natural justice are fundamental in the consti-
tutional set up of this country. No man or no man’s right
should be affected without an
299
opportunity to ventilate his views. The justice is a psycho-
logical yearning, in which men seek acceptance of their view
point by having an opportunity before the forum or the
authority enjoined or obliged to take a decision affecting
their right.
It may be noted that the terms ’fairness of procedure’,
’fair play in action’, ’duty to act fairly’ are perhaps used
as alternatives to "natural justice" without drawing any
distinction. But Prof. Paul Jackson points out that "Such
phrases may sometimes be used to refer not to the obligation
to observe the principles of natural justice but, on the.
contrary, to refer to a standard of behaviour which, in-
creasingly, the courts require to be followed even in cir-
cumstances where the duty to observe natural justice is
inapplicable" (Natural Justice by Paul Jackson 2nd ed. p.
11).
We share the view expressed by Professor Jackson. Fair-
ness, in our opinion, is a fundamental principle of good
administration. It is a rule to ensure the vast power in the
modern state is not abused but properly exercised. The State
power is used for proper and not ’for improper purposes. The
authority is not misguided by extraneous or irrelevant
consideration. Fairness is also a principle to ensure that
statutory authority arrives at a just decision either in
promoting the interest or affecting the rights of persons.
To use the time hallowed phrase "that justice should not
only be done but be seen to be done" is the essence of
fairness equally applicable to administrative authorities.
Fairness is thus a prime test for proper and good adminis-
tration. It has no set form or procedure. It depends upon
the facts of each case. As Lord Pearson said in Pearlberg v.
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Varty, (at 547), fairness does not necessarily require a
plurality of hearings or representations and counter repre-
sentations. Indeed, it cannot have too much elaboration of
procedure since wheels of administration must move quickly.
A case with a not dissimilar problem was in Pannalal
Binjraj and Anr. v. Union of India, [1957] 31 ITR 565. There
the Commissioner of Income Tax by the power vested under
section 5(7A) of Income Tax Act, 1922, transferred an asses-
see’s case from one Income Tax Officer to another without
hearing the assessee. Section 5(7A) of the Income Tax Act,
1922 provided:
"The Commissioner of Income-Tax may transfer any case from
one Income-Tax Officer subordinate to him to another, and
the Central Board of Revenue may transfer any case from any
one Income-Tax Officer to another. Such
300
transfer may be made at any stage of the proceedings, and
shall not render necessary the re-issue of any notice al-
ready issued by the Income tax Officer from whom the case is
transferred."
This Section did not provide for affording an opportuni-
ty to the assessee before transferring his case from one
Income Tax Officer to another. The assessee challenged the
constitutional validity of the Section. This Court upheld
its validity on the ground that it is a provision for admin-
istrative convenience. N.H. Bhagwati, J., speaking for this
Court, however remarked (at 589):
" ..... it would be prudent if the principles of natural
justice are followed, where circumstances permit, before any
order of transfer under section 5(7A) of the Act is made by
the Commissioner of Income-Tax or the Central Board of
Revenue, as the case may be, and notice is given to the
party affected and he is afforded a reasonable opportunity
of representing his views on the question and the reasons of
the order are reduced however briefly to writing ... There
is no presumption against the bona fide or the honesty of an
assessee and normally the income-tax authorities would not
be justified in refusing to an assessee a reasonable oppor-
tunity of representing his views when any order to the
prejudice of the normal procedure laid down in section 64(1)
and (2) of the Act is sought to be made against- him, be it
a transfer from one Income-Tax Officer within the State to
an Income-Tax Officer without it, except of course where the
very object of the transfer would be frustrated if notice
was given to the party affected."
Section 5(7A) was replaced by Section 127 of the Income
Tax Act, 1961, which now makes it obligatory to record
reasons in making the order of transfer after affording a
reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee in the
matter. In Ajantha Industries v. Central Board of Taxes,
[1976] 2 SCR 884 this Court considered the validity of a
transfer order passed under Section 127 and it was held that
merely recording of reasons on the file was not sufficient.
It was essential to give reasons to the affected party. The
order of transfer in that case was quashed for not communi-
cating reasons to the assessee.
In the present case, the State has withdrawn the pending
refe-
301
rence from the Labour Court, Dhanbad and transferred it to
another Labour Court at the distant District of Patna, on
the representation of the workman, without getting it veri-
fied from the management. The State in fairness ought to
have got it verified by giving an opportunity to the manage-
ment which is a party to the pending reference. Denial of
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that opportunity is a fatal flaw to the decision of the
Government.
The management need not establish particular prejudice
for want of such opportunity. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagrnohan,
[1981] 1 SCR 746 at 765 Chinnappa Reddy, J., after referring
to the observation of Donaldson, J., in Altco Ltd. v. Suth-
erland, [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 515 said that the concept that
justice must not only be done but be seen to be done is
basic to our system and it is concerned not with a case of
actual injustice but with the appearance of injustice or
possible injustice. It was emphasized that the principles of
natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on
whether it would have made any difference if natural justice
had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is
itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independ-
ently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary.
This takes us to the reasons given by the Government in
support ’of the order of transfer. The Government has stated
that the workman is having his residence at Hajipur and it
would be therefore, inconvenient for him to attend the
labour court regularly at Dhanbad. However, most of the
factors do not point that way. The workman and his family
members seem to be still residing in colony quarter at
Dhanbad (Annexure C). His two sons are studying in De Nobili
School at Mugma which is a nearby village. Reference may be
made to a letter dated September 8, 1988 (Annexure D) of the
Headmaster of the School in which the children of the work-
man are studying. Reference may also be made to a letter
(Annexure E) from the Assistant Electrical Engineer in proof
of the electricity supplied to the quarter occupied by the
workman at Dhanbad. As against these material, the workman
has not produced any proof in support of his allegation that
he has been residing in a village home near Patna. In fact,
in the counteraffidavit, he has not denied the documents
annexed to the Special Leave Petition, and not seriously
disputed the factum of his residence in the colony quarter
at Dhanbad. Even the alleged recommendation of the Ward
Commissioner referred in his counter-affidavit has not been
produced. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that
the Government was misled by the representation of the
workman.
302
In the result, we allow the appeal and quash the notifi-
cation dated August 8, 1988 by which the Government of Bihar
transferred the case from the Labour Court, Dhanbad to the
Labour Court, Patna. The Labour Court, Dhanbad shall now
proceed to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possi-
ble.
In the ’circumstances of the case, we make no order as to
costs.
P.S. S Appeal
allowed.
303