Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SMT. GULWANT KAUR & ANOTHER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MOHINDER SINGH & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT20/07/1987
BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 2251 1987 SCR (3) 576
1987 SCC (3) 674 JT 1987 (3) 121
1987 SCALE (2)82
CITATOR INFO :
D 1991 SC1581 (9,10)
ACT:
Hindu Succession Act, 1956--Section 14--Hindu lady
receiving land from husband in lieu of maintenance--Suffi-
cient title to enable ripening of possession into full
ownership.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant-wife and her husband were estranged and
living apart. The husband, by a letter dated July 28, 1956,
entrusted.to the appellant the land in dispute alongwith
another piece of land and a house and agreed to pay a sum of
Rs.100 per mouth for her maintenance. After a few years, the
husband conceived the idea of selling the land in dispute.
The appellant protested by her letter dated June 15, 1966
and implored him not to sell the land. Despite this, the
husband sold the said land to the plaintiff-respondents.
The purchaser instituted a suit for an injunction re-
straining the appellants from interfering with possession,
which was contested initially on the ground that the land
had been gifted to the appellant orally by the husband, and
that title had been acquired by adverse possession. Later,
the written statement was amended and a further plea was
taken that the said land had been given in lieu of mainte-
nance and that she had become the absolute owner of the land
under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. All courts
found that there was no oral gift.
A Single Judge of the High Court held that the land was
given to the appellant by her husband in lieu of maintenance
and that by Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, she had
become full owner of the property.
On appeal under the Letters Patent, a Division Bench of
the High Court held that "The reading of the letter left no
meaning of doubt that there was never any intention on the
part of the husband to give away the land to the lady and
that instead of sending the total amount in cash he allowed
her to utilise the amount of ckakota for meeting her day to
day expenses", that she did not at all acquire any such
right or interest in the property as could be termed ’limit-
ed ownership’ so as to permit
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577
her to take the benefit of the provisions of Section 14(1)
of the Hindu Succession Act, that "if the husband had given
over the land in dispute completely to the lady, then the
question of sending more money could not have arisen" and
reversed the Judgment of the Single Judge.
The appellant appealed to this Court. On behalf of the
respondents, it was contended that even if the land was
given to the appellant in lieu of maintenance, it must be
established that what was given to her was a limited estate
in the sense of ownership without the right of alienation
and that under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act only
such a limited estate would blossom into an absolute estate.
Allowing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: 1.1 Section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions
or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a
full owner, property possessed by her so long as her posses-
sion is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she
has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference whether the
property is acquired by inheritance or devise or at a parti-
tion or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or
by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by
prescription or in any other manner whatsoever. The Explana-
tion to the Section expressly refers to property acquired in
lieu of maintenance and the widow is not required to estab-
lish her further title before she could claim full owner-
ship, under Section 14(1) in respect of property given to
her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. [582F-H]
1.2 The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient
title to enable the ripening of possession into full owner-
ship if she is in possession of the property in lieu of
maintenance. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature
of an exception to Section 14(1) and provides for a situa-
tion where property is acquired by a female Hindu under a
written instrument or a decree of court and not where such
acquisition is traceable to any antecedent right. [582H;
583A]
2. If a female Hindu is put in possession of property
pursuant to or in recognition of a right to maintenance, it
cannot be denied that she has acquired a limited right or
interest in the property and once that position is accepted,
it follows that the right gets enlarged to full ownership
under Section 14(1) of the Act. That is clear from the
language of Section 14(1) of the Act. [586B-C]
3.1 In the instant case, the question was not whether the
husband
578
intended to give away the land in dispute absolutely but
whether the land was given to her in lieu of maintenance. A
perusal of the letters exchanged between the husband and the
appellant-wife clearly establishes that the land in dispute
was given by the husband in lieu of maintenance. The Divi-
sion Bench of the High Court was wrong in making distinction
between day-to-day expenses and maintenance. [581F-G]
3.2 It is rather late in the day to contend that the
land which was given to the appellant in lieu of maintenance
did not vest in her absolutely. [586F]
[The Judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court
set aside and that of the Single Judge restored. ]
Eramma v. Verrupanna & Ors., [1966] 2 SCR 626, distin-
guished.
Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95;
Naraini Devi v. Smt. Rano Devi and Ors., [1976] 3 SCR 55; V.
Tulasamma & Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddi (Dead) by L.Rs., [1977] 3
SCR 261; Bai Vajia (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai
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and Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 291; Santhanam v. Subramanya AIR 1977
SC 2024 and Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai,
[1987] 2 SCC 572, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1112 of
1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.5. 1980 of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No. 521 of 1976.
Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Appellants.
V.M. Tarkunde, Harbans Singh and S.K. Bagga for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Major General Gurbux Singh and his
wife Gulwant Kaur were estranged and were living apart.
Their son and daughter-in-law were living with Gulwant Kaur
at Chandigarh. Gulwant Kaur was apparently complaining that
Major General Gurbux Singh was not providing her with ade-
quate maintenance. Therefore, on July 28, 1958, he wrote her
a letter, the relevant parts of which are as follows:.
579
"To,
Shrimati Gulwant Kaur,
You have been complaining that I have
not paid even a penny for maintenance for the
last seven/eight months. Here is an account
from November 1957 to July, 1958, the details
of which run as under:
XXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXX
Now, so far as the question of future expenses
is concerned, the maintenance shall be like
this:
FOR YOURSELF:
1. The land and house situated at
Mangwal, which was constructed with the
earning of my whole life, is entrusted to you,
the half portion of which already stands in
your name and in lieu of the produce thereof
Madanjit shall provide to you, if not more,
free lodging and boarding (expenses for
maintenance). You stay in your own home.
2. The land at Khurana is also
entrusted to you. Its produce, lease money,
etc. will fetch you a minimum of Rs. 1200
annually i.e. Rs. 100 per month for
maintenance.
3. I shall pay Rs. 100 every month for
maintenance.
xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
XXXXXX
The letter of Gurbux Singh suggested that he was making
adequate provision for meeting the expenses of Gulwant Kaur
even at the cost of great inconvenience and discomfort to
himself and so. Gulwant Kaur was not entitled to complain.
Gulwant Kaur apparently felt disgusted and frustrated at the
tone of the letter and by her letter dated August 5, 2958,
she queried if she was not to take maintenance from
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Gurbux Singh from who else was she to get any maintenance.
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She said that she was not demanding anything and made no
claim on him and that everything including the land and
kothi belonged to him. The Khurana land also belonged to
him. He might give her maintenance or not give her mainte-
nance as he chose. She said that she was nothing more than a
heap of dust and her life was not worth living. In another
portion of the letter, she mentioned that the Khurana land
had not yet been leased and that there had been some delay.
Other correspondence passed between the parties which is not
important for the present case. Later, after a few years,
Gurbux Singh conceived the idea of selling the Khurana land.
The wife protested. Her letter dated January 15, 1966 was as
follows:-
"Most respected husband,
Sat Siri Akal;
Previously in the summer, Col.
Gurcharan Singh told us that you want to sell
the land of Khurana. Now, on the day you
visited Sangrur, it was learnt from you that
you were interested in selling the land. I
also told you that we depend upon only that.
This land was given to me by you voluntarily.
You had written letters to me and Madanjit on
July 28, 1958 copy whereof is being sent to
you by me. Therein, it was decided that I
would continue enjoying the produce thereof
till my life. Now, on hearing that you want to
sell it, I was very much
shocked ................ Now this letter is
being written to you in order to impress upon
you not to sell the land of Khurana because
Madanjit and I depend upon it. You are very
well aware that we do not possess anything
else ................... I fully hope that
you will continue giving me this land and the
maintenance grants to me as per your decision
and will not think of selling this land. You
are aware how we are hardly mai
ntaining ourselves. I have made this prayer to
you. I have full right over it. I hope that
you will reply soon."
Gulwant Kaur’s letter did not have any effect on Major
General Gurbux Singh. Instead of replying her, he sold the
Khurana land to the plaintiff-respondents on June 18, 1968.
The purchaser instituted the present suit out of which the
appeal arises for an injunction restraining Gulwant Kaur and
Madanjit Singh from interfering with their possession. The
defendants contested the suit initially on the ground that
the
581
land had been gifted to Gulwant Kaur orally by Major General
Gurbux Singh. It was also claimed that Gulwant Kaur had
acquired title by adverse possession. Later the written
statement was amended and a further plea was taken that the
land in dispute had been given to Gulwant Kaur in lieu of
maintenance and that she had become the absolute owner of
the land under sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. All the
courts found that there was no oral gift. A learned single
Judge of the High Court who heard the second appeal held
that the Khurana Land was given to Gulwant Kaur by her
husband Major General Gurbux Singh in lieu of maintenance
and that by virtue of sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act,
she had become full owner of the property. On an appeal
under the Letters Patent, a Division Bench of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana held that Gulwant Kaur was merely al-
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lowed to receive the proceeds of the land in dispute in
order to meet her day-to-day expenses and that she did not
at all acquire any such right or interest in the property as
could be termed ’limited ownership’ so as to permit her to
take the benefit of the provisions of sec. 14(1) of the
Hindu Succession Act. According to the learned Judges, "If
the General had given over the land in dispute completely to
the lady then the question of sending more money could not
have arisen ..... The reading of the letter leaves no
manner of doubt that there was never any intention on the
part of the General to give away the land of village Khurana
to the lady and that instead of sending the total amount in
cash, the General allowed her to utilise the amount of
ckakota for meeting her day-to-day expenses." The Division
Bench reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
We are unable to agree with the conclusions of the
Division Bench of the High Court. The question was not
whether Major General Gurbux Singh intended to give away the
Khurana land absolutely to Gulwant Kaur but whether the land
was given to her in lieu of maintenance. A perusal of the
letter dated July 28, 1958 from Major General Gurbux Singh
to Gulwant Kaur and the letter dated January 15, 1966 clear-
ly establish that the Khurana land was given to Gulwant Kaur
by Gurbux Singh in lieu of her maintenance. We are unable to
understand the distinction made by the High Court between
day-today expenses and maintenance. It was argued by Shri
Tarkunde, learned counsel for the respondents that even if
the land was given to Gulwant Kaur in lieu of maintenance,
it must be established that what was given to her was a
limited estate in the sense of ownership without the right
of alienation and that under sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession
Act only such a limited estate would blossom into an abso-
lute estate. We are unable to agree with the submission of
Shri Tarkunde. Shri
582
Tarkunde invited our attention to some decisions of this
court as supporting the preposition stated by him. We will
presently refer to all of them.
Sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act is as
follows:
"(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu,
whether acquired before or after the
commencement of this Act, shall be held by her
as full owner thereof and not as a limited
owner.
Explanation--In this sub-section,
"property" includes both movable and immovable
property acquired by a female Hindu by
inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or
in lieu of maintenance or arrears of
maintenance, or by gift from any person,
whether a relative or not, before, at or
after her marriage, or by her own skill or
exertion, or by purchase or by prescription,
or in any other manner whatsoever, and also
any such property held by her as stridhana
immediately before the commencement of this
Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-
section (1) shall apply to any property
acquired by any of gift or under a will or any
other instrument or under a decree or order of
a civil court or under an award where the
terms of the gift, will or other instrument or
the decree, order or award prescribe a
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restricted estate in such property."
It is obvious that sec. 14 is aimed at removing restric-
tions or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to
enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as
her possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to
say, if she has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference
whether the property is acquired by inheritance or devise or
at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of
maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by
purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoev-
er. The explanation expressly refers to property acquired in
lieu of maintenance and we do not see what further title the
widow is required to establish before she can claim full
ownership under sec. 14(1) in respect of property given to
her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. The very
right to receive maintenance is sufficient title to enable
the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is in
possession of the property in lieu of maintenance. Sub-sec.
2 of sec. 14 is in the nature of an exception to sec.
583
14(1) and provides for a situation where property is ac-
quired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a
decree of court and not where such acquisition is traceable
to any antecedents right.
In Bramma v. Verrupanna, [1966] 2 SCR 626 on the death
of the last male holder, his two step mothers who had no
vestige of title to the properties got possession of the
properties and in answer to a suit by the rightful heirs,
one of them claimed that she had become full owner of the
property under sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The
Supreme Court pointed out that the object of sec. 14 was to
extinguish the estate called limited estate and to make a
Hindu woman who would otherwise be a limited owner, a full
owner of the property but it was not to confer a title on a
female Hindu, who did not in fact possess any vestige of
title. The case did not deal with the case of Hindu a woman
who was given property in lieu of maintenance and in whom
therefore a right or interest was created in the property.
In Badri Pershad v, Smt, Kanso Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95.
The Court pointed out that a Hindu widow who after the death
of her husband obtained properties under a partition award
between herself and her sons, would be entitled to an abso-
lute estate under sec. 14(1) of the Act and that merely
because the partition was by means of an arbitration award,
sec. 14(2) would not be attracted. It was made clear that
sec. 14(2) was in the nature of a proviso or an exception to
sec. 14(1) and that it came into operation only if the Hindu
woman required the property in any of the methods indicated
therein for the first time without their being any pre-
existing right in her to the property. The principle of the
case far from supporting Shri Tarkunde’s submission supports
the submission of the appellants,
In Naraini Devi v. Smt. Rano Devi and Ors., [1976] 3 SCR
55 the case of Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi (supra) was
distinguished on the ground that the widow had no pre-exist-
ing right in the property which she obtained under an award
and therefore, the case fell squarely within sec. 14(2) of
the Hindu Succession Act.
In Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, [1977] 3 SCR 261, it was
clearly laid down that sec. 14(1) would be applicable to
property given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance. It
was also made clear that sec. 14(2) would apply only to
cases where the acquisition of property was made by a Hindu
female without any pre-existing right. It was said.
"It will, therefore, be seen that sub-sec. (1) of sec.
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584
14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acqui-
sition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition
in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed
by her at the date of commencement of the Act or
subsequently acquired and possessed, she would become the
full owner of the property. Now, sub-section (2) of sec. 14
provides that nothing contained in sub-sec. (1) shall apply
to another property acquired by way of gift or under a will
or any instrument or under a decree by order of a civil
court or under an award when the terms of the gift, will or
other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribed a
restricted estate in such property. This provision is more
in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-sec. (1)
and it was regarded as such by this court in Badri Pershad
v. Kanso Devi (supra) ...................................
...........................................................
It is, therefore, clear that under the Shastric Hindu Law a
widow has a right to be maintained out of joint family
property and this right would ripen into a charge if the
widow takes the necessary steps for having her maintenance
ascertained and specifically charged in the joint family
property and even if no specific charge is created, this
right would be enforceable against joint family property in
the hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with
notice of her claim. The right of the widow to be maintained
is of course not a jus in rem, since it does not give her
any interest in the joint family property but it is certain-
ly jus ad rem, i.e., a right against the joint family
property. Therefore, when specific property is allotted to
the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allot-
ment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the
right to be maintained out of the joint family property. It
would not be a grant for the first time without any preex-
isting right, in the widow. The widow would be getting the
property in virtue of her pre-existing right, the instrument
giving the property being merely a document effectuating
such pre-existing right and not making a grant of the
property to her for the first time without any antecedent
right ’or title. There is also another consideration which
is very relevant to this issue and it is that, even if the
instrument were silent as to the nature of the interest
given
585
to the widow in the property and did not, in
so many terms, prescribe that she would have a
limited interest, she would have no more than
a limited interest in the property under the
Hindu Law ’as it stood prior to the enactment
of the Act and hence a provision in the
instrument prescribing that she would have
only a limited interest in the property would
be, to quote the words of this Court in Nirmal
Chand’s case (supra), "merely recording the
true legal position" and that would not
attract the applicability of sub-section (2)
but would be governed by sub-section (1) of
section 14. The conclusion is, therefore,
inescapable that where property is allotted to
a widow under an instrument, decree, order or
award prescribes a restricted estate for her
in the property and sub-section (2) of section
14 would have no application in such a case."
In Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai, [1979] 3
SCR 291, the court referred to the earlier
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judgment in Tulsamma’s case and
said, "All the three Judges were thus
unanimous in accepting the appeal on the
ground that Tulsamma’s right to maintenance
was a pre-existing right, that it was in
recognition of such a right that she obtained
property under the compromise and that the
compromise therefore did not fall within the
ambit of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the
Act but would attract the provisions of sub-
section (1) thereof coupled with the
Explanation thereto. With respect we find
ourselves in complete agreement with the
conclusions arrived at by Bhagwati and Fazal
Ali, JJ., as also the reasons which weighed
with them in coming to those conclusions."
Shri Tarkunde particulary relied on the
following passage in Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai’s
case:
"A plain reading of sub-section(1)
makes it clear that the concerned Hindu female
must have limited ownership in property, which
limited ownership would get enlarged by the
operation of that sub-section. If it was
intended to enlarge any sort of a right which
could in no sense be described as ownership,
the expression "and not as a limited owner"
would not have been used at all and becomes
redundant, which is against the well-
recognised
586
principle of interpretation of statutes that
the Legislature does not employ meaningless
language."
We do not understand the court as laying down that what was
enlarged by sub-sec. 1 of sec. 14 into a full estate was the
Hindu woman’s estate known to Hindu law. When the court uses
the word ’limited estate’, the words are used to connote a
right in the property to which the possession of the female
Hindu may be legitimately traced, but which is not a full
right of ownership. If a female Hindu is put in possession
of property pursuant to or in recognition of a right to
maintenance, it cannot be denied that she has acquired a
limited right or interest in the property and once that
position is accepted, it follows that the right gets en-
larged to full ownership under sec. 14(1) of the Act. That
seems to us to follow clearly from the language of sec.
14(1) of the Act.
In Sellammal v. Nellammal, AIR 1977 SC 1265, the court
held that property allotted to a Hindu widow in lieu of her
maintenance in recognition of her pre-existing right became
her the asbolute property.
In Santnanam v. Subramanya, AIR 1977 SC 2024, it was
again held that property in the possession of a widow of the
deceased coparcener which had been allotted to her for life
in lieu of maintenance without power of alienation became
her absolute property under s. 14(1) of the Act with powers
of alienation.
In Krishna Das v. Venkayya, AIR 1978 SC 36 1, it was
reiterated that where a widow was put in possession of joint
family property in lieu of her right to maintenance, her
right to the property became enlarged into an absolute
estate under s. 14(1). We, therefore, think that it is
rather late in the day for Shri Tarkunde to contend that the
Khurana land which was given to Gulwant Kaur in lieu of
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maintenance did not vest in her absolutely.
We may finally refer to a recent decision of this Court
in Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai, [1987] 2 SCC
572 where Thakkar and Ray, JJ. pointed out.
" On an analysis of Section 14(1) of the
Hindu Succession Act of 1955, it is evident
that the legislature has abolished the concept
of limited ownership in respect of a Hindu
female and has enacted that any property
possessed by her would thereafter be held by
her as a full owner. Section 14(1) would come
into operation if the property
587
(Sic) at the point of time when she has an
occasion to claim or assert a title thereto.
Or, in other words, at the point of time when
her right to the said property is called into
question. The legal effect of section 14(1)
would be that after the coming into operation
of the Act there would be no property in
respect of which it could be contended by
anyone that a Hindu female is only a limited
owner and not a full owner. (We are for the
moment not concerned with the fact that sub-
section(2) of section 14 which provides that
Section 14(1) will not prevent creating a
restricted estate in favour of a Hindu female
either by gift or will or any instrument or
decree of a civil court or award provided the
very document creating title unto her confers
a restricted estate on her). There is nothing
in Section 14 which supports the proposition
that a Hindu female should be in actual
physical possession or in constructive
possession of any property on the date of the
coming into operation of the Act. The
expression ’proposed’ has been used in the
sense of having a right to the property or
control over the property. The expression ’any
property possessed by a Hindu female whether
acquired before or after the commencement of
the Act’ on an analysis yields to the
following interpretation:
(1) Any property possessed by a Hindu
female acquired before the commencement of the
Act will be held by her as a full owner
thereof and not as a limited owner.
(2) Any property possessed by a Hindu
female acquired after the commencement of the
Act will be held as a full owner thereof and
not as a limited owner."
In view of the foregoing discussion, we allow the ap-
peal, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the
High Court and restore that of the learned single Judge.
N.P.V. Appeal
allowed.
588