Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1909 OF 2004
Trans Mediterranean Airways ………….. Appellant
versus
M/s Universal Exports & Anr. ………..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
H.L. DATTU, J.
1) This appeal is filed under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act,
1986 [hereinafter referred to as “the C P Act”] against the order in
Original Petition No. 161 of 1994 of the National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, New Delhi [“the National Commission” for
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short] dated 15 January, 2004, whereby the National Commission
has directed the appellant to pay a sum equivalent to US $71,615.75
with 5% interest from the date of the complaint, till its realization, and
imposed costs of ` 1 lakh for deficiency of service.
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2) The appellant before us is an International Cargo carrier, with its
principal place of business at Beirut, Lebanon. Respondent No.1 is a
garment exporter and respondent No.2 is an accredited International
Air Transport Association agent. By this appeal, we are called upon
to examine and reconcile the area of operation of the C P Act on the
one hand, and the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 [hereinafter referred to as
“the CA Act”] along with the Warsaw Convention of 1929
[hereinafter referred to as “the Warsaw Convention”] on the other.
The appellant, respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2, hereinafter, for
the sake of brevity, referred to as “appellant carrier”, “the consignor”
and “agent” respectively.
3) The core issues that arise for our consideration and decision in this
appeal are:
1. Whether the National Commission under the CP Act
has the jurisdiction to entertain and decide a complaint
filed by the consignor claiming compensation for
deficiency of service by the carrier, in view of the
provisions of the CA Act and the Warsaw Convention.
Or whether domestic laws can be added to or substituted
for the provisions of the conventions.
2. Whether the appellant can be directed to compensate
the consignor for deficiency of service in the facts and
circumstances of the case.
Brief Facts
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4) The facts leading to this appeal are as follows:
The agent made out three airway bills for shipping of garments
to Spain on behalf of the consignor through the appellant-carrier. In
the consignee column, the consignment was addressed as :
“BB SAE MADRID, SPAIN
NOTIFY: M/S LIWE ESPANOLA S.A.,
MAYOR S/N, 30006 PUENTE TOCINOR
APARTADO, 741, MORCIA, SPAIN,
L.C. No. C. 1036-92-00276”
In the box titled ‘Handling Information’, the following
information was recorded:
“MARKS: SPAIN N/C NOS: 1027-1185
TOTAL ONE HUNDRED FIFTY NINE CARTONS
ONLY/PLS INF CNEE IMM ON ARR/DOCUMENTS
ATTACHED”
The airway bills from Bombay to Amsterdam were dated
25-08-1992 and the consignment through the appellant-carrier reached
Amsterdam on 30-08-1992. From Amsterdam, the consignments
were sent to Madrid by road on the following day, and they reached
Madrid on 03-09-1992 and were cleared by the Customs Authorities.
The appellant-carrier delivered the consignment to M/s Liwe
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Espanola, as according to them, that was the only recognizable
address available from the documents furnished by the consignor.
5) After nine months from the date of shipment, the agent made enquiry
regarding two of the three airway bills. Since there was no response,
the agent made further enquiry again after four months. In response to
the query, the appellant-carrier informed the consigner that on finding
the full name and complete postal address of the consignee as M/s
Liwe Espanola, the appellant-carrier has delivered the goods to it. It
was at this stage, the consignor claimed that the consignee of the said
consignment was Barclays Bank, Madrid, which had only one branch
in Madrid and since the appellant carrier had wrongly delivered the
consignment to the address mentioned in the Block column instead of
routing it through Barclays Bank and, therefore, there is deficiency of
service. Accordingly, the consignor instituted a complaint under
Section 12 of the CP Act before the National Commission, inter alia ,
claiming compensation for the alleged deficiency of service by the
appellant-carrier and the agent for not delivering the said consignment
to the consignee. The National Commission, after considering the
entire evidence on record, has come to the conclusion that the services
rendered by the appellant-carrier was deficient and thereby, it was
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liable to pay compensation equivalent to US $71,615.75 with 5%
interest from the date of the Complaint till its realization, and imposed
costs of 1 lakh. It is the correctness or otherwise of this order, which
`
is called in question in this appeal.
6) Since this is the first appeal under Section 23 of the CP Act, we are
required to consider both the questions of facts as well as questions of
law.
Impugned Order of the National Commission
7) The appellant-carrier before the National Commission, by way of
preliminary objection, had raised jurisdiction of the National
Commission in entertaining the complaint filed by the complainant. It
was the contention of the appellant-carrier that in view of Rule 29 and
Rule 33 of the Second Schedule to the CA Act, the National
Commission in Delhi has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
complaint. It was contended that only the Courts at the four places
mentioned in the said provision have jurisdiction to adjudicate the
complaint and, therefore, no other courts, Tribunal or Commission has
jurisdiction to decide the complaint filed by the complainant. It was
also contended that in view of the Warsaw Convention, the National
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Commission had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute. The National
Commission, after a detailed analysis of the provisions of the CP Act
and carrier laws, has negatived the contention by holding that the CP
Act has vested jurisdiction to the Consumer Courts to adjudicate upon
a claim for compensation in cases of deficiency of service. It was also
held that due to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the National
Commission, even a matter that arose in Mumbai of value of more
than ` 20 lakhs, could be filed for adjudication before the National
Commission (prior to the 2002 amendment).
8) On merits, it was the case of the consignor before the National
Commission that the services offered by the appellant-carrier and the
agent were deficient and the consignment meant for the consignee was
not delivered to the notified person. It was also the case of the
consignor that in view of the conditions of contract on the reverse of
the airway bill, it was required for the appellant-carrier to have
delivered the consignment to the consignee only, and in case of any
doubt regarding the address of delivery, the appellant-carrier was
required to enquire with the consignor and not deliver the
consignment to any other person than the notified party. Therefore, it
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was contended that there is a deficiency of service by the appellant-
carrier.
9) The appellant-carrier has taken the defense that the address given by
the agent of the consignor was incorrect and incomplete, and the only
address that was properly given was that of the notified party, to
which address they have delivered the said consignment. Further, it
was contended that at no point of time, the appellant-carrier was made
known that the “BBE SAE, MADRID SPAIN” stood for Barclays
Bank, Madrid. Further, it was contended that the consignor had to file
a suit within 120 days by relying on Rule 12 and the complaint was
barred by limitation. It was further contended that if there was any
damage that was suffered by the consignor, it was due to the
negligence of the agent. It was also contended that the consignor has
received payment from the notified party. The appellant-carrier also
made reference to the CA Act, Warsaw Convention and several other
authorities in support of its claim.
10)
The National Commission, in the impugned order, has concluded that
the agent was not only the agent of the consignor, but also of the agent
of the appellant-carrier, and hence any mistake committed by the
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agent would make the principal (appellant-carrier) liable for such
damages. Further, it is held by the National Commission that the
appellant-carrier was duty bound to have contacted the consignor in
case it was not able to locate the address of the consignee or in the
event, the consignee refused to accept the consignment. It is held that
it is not open to the appellant-carrier to have delivered the
consignment to the notified party without informing the consignor. On
the point of limitation, the National Commission has observed that by
virtue of Rule 30 of the Second Schedule, a suit could be brought
within two years, and hence Rule 12 is not applicable in the facts of
the case. In the light of the above findings, the National Commission
has held that the services provided by the appellant-carrier were
deficient and ordered payment of the compensation to the consignor.
11) Shri. Vinoo Bhagat, learned counsel, appears for the appellant-carrier,
Shri. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel, appears for the consignor
(Respondent No.1) and Shri. Siddhartha Dave, learned counsel,
appears for the agent (Respondent No.2). On the question of
jurisdiction of the National Commission, we were assisted by
Shri. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, as the amicus curie . For
the sake of convenience, we will deal with the submissions made by
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the learned counsel on the issue of jurisdiction first and then, on the
factual matrix.
Issue of Jurisdiction of the National Commission
12) Shri. Vinoo Bhagat, learned counsel, submits that the Warsaw
Convention exclusively governs any claims arising under it, and
domestic law cannot be applied for deciding such claims. The learned
counsel relies on Rule 29 of the Second Schedule to the CA Act, to
contend that it was only at the places mentioned in this Rule, the claim
for compensation could have been filed. He further submits that the
appellant-carrier could be sued at a court in Mumbai (where the
contract was made), or at Beirut (where it has its principal place of
business), or at Madrid (place of destination), and no where else. He
further submits that the Court in Delhi has no jurisdiction to entertain
any claim against the appellant-carrier and that the provisions of the
CP Act could not alter the jurisdiction vested on Courts by the
Warsaw Convention. By pointing out to Rule 33 of the Second
Schedule, the learned counsel submits that this provision fortifies his
contention of the exclusive operation of Rule 29 and states that not
only are the places where the appellant-carrier can be sued are
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mentioned, but also the places where arbitration can take place, are
expressly stated. The learned counsel also states that there is no cause
of action under the CP Act, to invoke the jurisdiction of the National
Commission. He further contends that the National Commission is not
a Court and that a suit is maintainable only in a Court having
jurisdiction. He states that it is not permissible to read the word
“Court” to include quasi-judicial authorities and Tribunals. He places
reliance on some decisions of this Court, the House of Lords,
Supreme Court of the United States and the National Commission.
13) Shri. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel, appearing for the
consignor supports the finding of the National Commission. He
submits that even assuming that Rule 29 of the Second Schedule to
the CA Act was applicable, the jurisdiction of the National
Commission is not ousted in any manner whatsoever. He further
submits that the word “Court” is not used in the strict sense of the
term, thereby it cannot be said that a quasi-judicial Tribunal is
excluded. He submits that the Warsaw Convention was reproduced in
two languages (being English and French), and that the term “Court”
seems to be used in a sense to indicate a body that resolves disputes
and cannot be restricted to the meaning accorded by our judicial
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system. Shri. Gupta further submits that the Warsaw Convention does
not contemplate the situation of alternate Tribunals replacing Courts
of Law. He relies on Rule 29(2) of the Second Schedule to the CA
Act and submits that the procedural law of the country, in which the
suit is filed, is what is applicable, and in India, the CP Act was the
legislation that lays down the remedy and procedure for the deficiency
of service. He would further state that the CP Act was brought into
force to expedite the justice delivery system for matters relating to
deficiency of service, and the CP Act not only prescribes territorial
jurisdiction, but also the pecuniary jurisdiction of the various Forums.
The learned senior counsel would contend that since the State Forum
did not have the pecuniary jurisdiction, the National Commission
could and, in fact, has entertained the complaint. He would further
submit that since deficiency of service was computed in more than
twenty lakh rupees at the relevant time (it is presently one crore
rupees after the 2002 amendment) or more, the National Commission
would have jurisdiction by virtue of Section 29 of the CP Act. He
also cited some judgments in support of his submissions and
differentiated those cited by Shri. Vinoo Bhagat.
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14) Shri. Siddhartha Dave, learned counsel appearing for the agent
submits that the provisions of the CP Act can co-exist with those of
other Statutes and the option is given to the parties as to which
remedy they would like to pursue and would support this argument by
referring to decisions of this Court.
15)
Due to the importance of the question of law involved, Shri.
Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, was requested to assist the
Court. The learned amicus has submitted a note on the question of
jurisdiction raised by the appellant-carrier. The learned amicus has
stated that it is clear from Section 3 of the CP Act that Consumer
Courts are additional Forums to ensure that consumers get speedy
disposal of their cases/complaints with regard to deficiency of service.
He lays emphasis on the phrase “An action for damages must be
brought” at the beginning of Rule 29 and states that this Rule gives an
option to the plaintiff to sue in the Courts on any one of the places
mentioned. He further states that Rule 33 provides an alternate
remedy to parties to resort to proceedings of arbitration in case of
disputes between the parties. He concludes that there is no express bar
in the CA Act to oust the jurisdiction of the Forums under the CP Act.
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16) To appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to notice the
scheme of the CA Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
CA Act reads:
“India is a signatory to the Warsaw Convention of 1929,
which is an International Agreement governing the
liability of the air carrier in respect of international
carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo by air.
Under that convention ‘international carriage’ means
any carriage in which according to the contract made by
the parties, the place of departure and the place of
destination, whether or not there be a break in the
carriage or transshipment, are situated either within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the
territories of a single High Contracting Party, if there is
an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another
Power, even though that Power is not a party to the
Convention. The Convention provides that when an
accident occurring during international carriage by air
causes damage to a passenger, or a shipper or cargo,
there is a presumption of liability of the carrier. The
carrier, however, is not liable if he proves that he or his
agent had taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take
such measures. The Convention balances the imposition
of a presumption of liability on the carrier by limiting his
liability for each passenger to 1,25,000 gold francs.
There is no limitation of liability if the damage is caused
by the willful misconduct of the carrier, or by such
default, on his part as, in accordance with the law of the
Court ceased of the case, is equivalent to willful
misconduct. The Convention also contains detailed
provisions regarding documents of carriage.
2. The Warsaw Convention has been given effect to in
India by the enactment of the Indian Carriage By Air
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Act, 1934 (20 of 1934) in regard to international
carriage and the provisions of that Act have been
extended to domestic carriage, subject to certain
exception, adaptations and modifications, by means of a
notification issued in 1964.
3. A diplomatic conference under the auspices of
International Civil Aviation Organization was held at
Hague in September, 1955 which adopted a protocol to
amend the provisions of the Warsaw Convention. The
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Hague protocol was opened for signature on 28
September, 1955 and more than the required number of
States have ratified the protocol which came into force
st
between the ratifying States on 1 August, 1963.
4. Some of the amendments effected by the Hague
protocol to the Warsaw Convention are – (a)
simplification of documents of carriage; (b) an increase
in the amount specified as the maximum sum for which
the carrier may be liable to a passenger, that is to say,
the limits of the liability of the carrier in respect of a
passenger has been doubled, and unless a higher figure
is agreed to by a special contract, the liability is raised
from 1,25,000 gold francs per passenger to 2,50,000
gold francs; (c) making the carrier liable where the
damage was caused by an error in piloting or in the
handling of the air craft or in navigation.
5. Acceptance of the Hague Protocol would put our
national carrier on the same footing as many of its
international competitors, since the passengers will be
able to avail the limit of liability guaranteed by the
Hague Protocol the limit being double than that
stipulated under the Warsaw Convention.
6. Fifty seven countries have already ratified the Hague
Protocol and passengers traveling between those
countries would be ensured of the higher limit of
compensation.
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7. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a law, in place of the
existing Indian Carriage By Air Act, 1934, to apply the
existing provisions based on the Warsaw Convention to
countries which would choose to be governed by that
Convention and also to apply the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol
to countries which may accept the provisions thereof.
Under Section 4 of the Indian Carriage By Air Act, 1934,
the rules contained in Warsaw Convention have already
been applied to non-international carriages subject to
certain exceptions, adaptations and modifications. It is
now proposed to take power to apply the rules contained
in the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague
Protocol also to non-international carriages subject to
exceptions, adoptions and modifications.
8. The Bill seeks to give effect to the above objectives.”
17) The preamble to The Carriage by AIR Act, 1972 reads as follows:
“An Act to give effect to the Convention for the
unification of certain rules of international carriage by
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air signed at Warsaw on the 12 day of October, 1929
and to the said Convention as amended by the Hague
th
Protocol on the 28 day of September, 1955 and to make
provision for applying the rules contained in the said
Convention in its original form and in the amended form
(subject to the exceptions, adaptations and
modifications) to non-international carriage by air and
for matters connected therewith.”
18)
The CA Act was enacted to give effect to the convention for
unification of rules relating to international carriage by air signed at
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Warsaw as amended at Hague in 1995 and the Montreal Convention
of 1999.
19) Section 2 of the CA Act is the definition clause. Section 2(ii) of the
CA Act defines convention to mean convention for unification of
certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw
on 12.10.1929. Section 3 provides for the application of the Warsaw
Convention to India. It says that the rules contained in the First
Schedule being the provisions of the convention relating to the rights
and liabilities of carriers, passengers, consignors, consignees and
other persons, shall have the force of law in India in relation to any
carriage by air to which those rules apply irrespective of the
nationality of the aircraft performing the carriage, subject to the
provisions of the Act. Section 4 provides for application of amended
convention to India and also provides for Second Schedule in
consonance with the amended convention. This Schedule applies to
the claim made in the present case as it is a dispute that occurred in
1994 before the Montreal Convention in 1999. Section 4A provides
for the application of the Montreal Convention to India and provides
for the Third Schedule. Section 5 sets out the liability in case of death
of a passenger as being those governed by the First and Second
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Schedules. Sections 6 and 6A provide for conversion of francs and
conversion of special drawing rights. Section 7 provides that every
high contracting party to the convention shall, for the purpose of any
suit brought in a Court in India in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 28 of the First Schedule or of the Second Schedule, as the case
may be, enforce a claim in respect of the carriage undertaken by him.
Section 8 enables the application of the Act to carriages which are not
international.
20) The First Schedule to the Act, vide Rule 1, provides that the rules
under this Schedule shall apply to all international carriage of persons,
luggage or goods performed by aircraft for reward. Sub-Rule 2
defines “the High Contracting Party” to the convention. Sub-Rule 3
defines international carriage. Rule 18 provides for liability of the
carrier for damages. Rule 19 provides for liability of the carrier for
damages occasioned by delay and Rule 28 provides for territorial
jurisdiction for suing for damages. The Second Schedule of the CA
Act provides for rules for the purpose of the Act. Chapter I of the
Second Schedule gives the definitions and the scope of the Schedule.
Chapter II deals with the documents of carriage, viz. passenger ticket
(Part I), baggage check (Part II), airway bill (Part III). Chapter III
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enumerates the provisions regarding the liability of the carrier with
regard to the acts which the carrier will be held liable for, the
jurisdiction of the Court at which the carrier can be sued, the limit of
the liability, limitation for bringing a suit, etc. Chapter IV and
Chapter V deal with provisions relating to combined carriage and
general provisions respectively. Part III of Chapter II of the Second
Schedule is relevant for the purpose, of the case. Therefore, omitting
what is not necessary, relevant rules are extracted as :
“5. (1) Every carrier of cargo has the right to require
the consignor to make out and hand over to him a
document called as "air waybill"; every consignor has
the right to require the carrier to accept this
document.
(2) The absence, irregularity or loss of this document
does not affect the existence or the validity of the
contract of carnage which shall, subject to the
provisions of rule 9, be nonetheless governed by these
rules.
6. (1) The air waybill shall be made out by the
consignor in the three original parts and be handed
over with the cargo.
(2) The first part shall be marked "for the carrier",
and shall be signed by the consignor. The second part
shall be marked "for the consignee"; it shall be signed
by the consignor and by the carrier and shall
accompany the cargo. The third part shall be signed
by the carrier and handed by him to the consignor
after the cargo has been accepted.
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(3) The carrier shall sign prior to the loading of the
cargo on board the aircraft.
(4) The signature of the carrier may be stamped; that
of the consignor may be printed or stamped.
(5) If, at the request of the consignor, the carrier
makes out the air waybill, he shall be deemed, subject
to proof to the contrary, to have done so on behalf of
the consignor.
10. (1) The consignor is responsible for the
correctness of the particulars and statements relating
to the cargo which he inserts in the air waybill.
(2) The consignor shall indemnify the carrier against
all damage suffered by him, or by any other person to
whom the carrier is liable, by reason of the
irregularity, incorrectness or incompletness of the
particulars and statements furnished by the
consignor.”
12 . (1) Subject to his liability to carry out all his
obligations under the contract of carriage, the
consignor has the right to dispose of the cargo by
withdrawing it at the aerodrome of departure or
destination, or by stopping it in the course of the
journey on any landing, or by calling for it to be
delivered at the place of destination or in the course of
the journey to a person other than the consignee
named in the air waybill, or by requiring it to be
returned to the aerodrome of departure. He must not
exercise this right of disposition in such a way as to
prejudice the carrier or other consignors and he must
repay any expenses occasioned by the exercise of this
right.
(2) If it is impossible to carry out the orders of the
consignor the carrier must so inform him forthwith.
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(3) If the carrier obeys the orders of the consignor
for the disposition of the cargo without requiring the
production of the part of the air waybill delivered to
the latter, he will be liable, without prejudice to his
right of recovery from the consignor, for any damage
which may be caused thereby to any person who is
lawfully in possession of that part of the air waybill.
(4) The right conferred on the consignor ceases at
the moment when that of the consignee begins in
accordance with rule 13. Nevertheless, if the
consignee declines to accept the waybill or the cargo,
or if he cannot be communicated with, the consignor
resumes his right of disposition.
13. ...
14. The consignor and the consignee can
respectively enforce all the rights given to them by
rules 12 and 13, each in his own name, whether he is
acting in his sown interest or in the interest of
another, provided that he carries out the obligations
imposed by the contract.
15. (1) Rules 12, 13 and 14 do not affect either the
relations of the consignor or the consignee with each
other or the mutual relations of third parties whose
rights are derived either from the consignor or from
the consignee.
(2) The provisions of rules 12, 13 and 14 can only
be varied by express provision in the air waybill.
(3) Nothing in these rules prevents the issue of a
negotiable air waybill.
16. (1) The consignor must furnish such
information and attach to the air waybill such
documents as are necessary to meet the formalities of
customs, octroi or police before the cargo can be
delivered to the consignee. The consignor is liable to
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the carrier for any damage occasioned by the
absence, insufficiency or irregularity of any such
information or documents, unless the damage is due to
the fault of the carrier or his servants or agents.
(2) The carrier is under no obligation to enquire
into the correctness or sufficiency of such information
or documents.”
21) We also need to notice Rule 17, 18, 20, 29, 30 and 33 of Chapter III
and V of the Second Schedule. These are :
“ 17. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in
the event of the death or wounding of a passenger
or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger if
the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking.
18. (1) The carrier is liable for damage sustained in
the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage
to, any registered baggage or any cargo, if the
occurrence which caused the damage so sustained
took place during the carriage by air.
(2) The carriage by air within the meaning of the
preceding sub-rule comprises the period during
which the baggage or cargo is in charge of the
carrier, whether in an aerodrome or on board an
aircraft, or in the case of a landing outside an
aerodrome, in any place whatsoever.
(3) The period of the carriage by air does not extend
to any carriage by land, by sea or by river
performed outside an aerodrome. If, however, such
a carriage takes place in the performance of a
contract for carriage by air for the purpose of
loading delivery or transshipment, any damage is
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presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have
been the result of an event which took place during
the carriage by air.
20. The carrier is not liable if he proves that he and
his servants or agents have taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for him or them to take such measures.
29. (1) An action for damages must be brought, at
the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, either before the
Court having jurisdiction where the carrier is
ordinarily resident, or has his principal place of
business, or has an establishment by which the
contract has been made or before the Court having
jurisdiction at the place of destination.
(2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the
law of the Court seized of the case.
30. (1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if
an action is not brought within two years, reckoned
from the date of arrival at the destination, or from
the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived,
or from the date on which the carriage stopped.
(2) The method of calculating the period of
limitation shall be determined by the law of the
Court seized of the case.
33. Any clause contained in the contract and all
special agreements entered into before the damage
occurred by which the parties purport to infringe
the rules laid down by this Schedule, whether by
deciding the law to be applied, or by altering the
rules as to jurisdiction, shall be null and void.
Nevertheless for the carriage of cargo arbitration
clauses are allowed, subject to these rules, if the
arbitration is to take place within one of the
jurisdictions referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 29.”
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22) The CP Act aims to protect the interests of the consumers and provide
for speedy resolutions of their disputes with regard to defective goods
or deficiency of service. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
CP Act are as under:
“The Consumer Protection Bill, 1986 seeks to provide
for better protection of the interests of consumers and for
the purpose, to make provision for the establishment of
Consumer councils and other authorities for the
settlement of consumer disputes and for matter
connected therewith.
2. It seeks, inter alia, to promote and protect the rights of
consumers such as –
(a) the right to be protected against marketing of
goods which are hazardous to life and property;
(b) the right to be informed about the quality,
quantity, potency, purity, standard and price of
goods to protect the consumer against unfair trade
practices;
(c) the right to be assured, wherever possible, access
to an authority of goods at competitive prices;
(d) the right to be heard and to be assured that
consumers interest will receive due consideration at
appropriate forums;
(e) the right to seek redressal against unfair trade
practices or unscrupulous exploitations of
consumers; and
(f) right to consumer education.
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3. These objects are sought to be promoted and protected
by the Consumer Protection Council to be established at
the Central and State level.
4. To provide speedy and simple redressal to consumer
disputes, a quasi-judicial machinery is sought to be set
up at the district, State and Central levels. These quasi-
judicial bodies will observe the principles of natural
justice and have been empowered to give relief of a
specific nature and to award, wherever appropriate,
compensation to consumers. Penalties for non-
compliance of the orders given by the quasi-judicial
bodies have also been provided.
5. The Bills seeks to achieve the above objects.”
23) The relevant provisions of the CP Act that are required to be noticed
for resolving the issues before us are Sections 3 and 21. They are as
under:
“3. Act not in derogation of any other laws. – The
provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in
derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time
being in force.
……
21. Jurisdiction of the National Commission. – Subject to
the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission
shall have jurisdiction –
(a) to entertain –
(i) complaints where the value of the goods or
services and compensation, if any, claimed
exceeds rupees one crore; and
24
(ii) appeals against the orders of any State
Commission; and
(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate
orders in any consumer dispute which is
pending before or has been decided by any
State Commission where it appears to the
National Commission that such State
Commission has exercised a jurisdiction not
vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the
exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with
material irregularity.”
It is to be noted that at the relevant time, the pecuniary
jurisdiction was twenty lakh rupees for the National Commission.
Jurisdiction of the National Commission
24) It was rightly argued by learned counsel Sri Vinoo Bhagat that the
primary question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is
whether the CA Act and the three international conventions in it
constitute all the law governing liabilities of international air carriers
arising out of international carriage of passengers and goods by air or
whether domestic law can be added or substituted for the provisions
of the conventions. In a nutshell, the submission of the learned
counsel for the appellant-carrier is that conventions, viz. Warsaw
Convention, as amended at Hague in 1955 and the Montreal
Convention of 1999 exclusively govern carrier liabilities and,
25
therefore, a remedy under domestic law cannot be invoked.
The frame work for the CP Act was provided by a Resolution
dated 09.04.1985 of the General Assembly of the United Nations
Organization, which is commonly known as Consumer Protection
Resolution No.39/248. India is a signatory to the said Resolution.
The Act was enacted in view of the aforementioned Resolution of the
General Assembly of the United Nations. The preamble to the Act
suggests that it is to provide better protection for the consumers and
their interests. By this Act, the Legislature has constituted quasi-
judicial Tribunals/Commissions as an alternative system of
adjudicating consumer disputes.
Section 3 of the CP Act gives an additional remedy for
deficiency of service and that remedy is not in derogation of any other
remedy under any other law.
25) In Proprietor, Jabalpur Tractors vs. Sedmal Jainrain and Anr. 1995
Supp. (4) SCC 107 , it is held:
“ The Consumer Protection Act is not in derogation of any law .”
26) In Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. and Anr . Vs. N.K. Modi (1996) 6 SCC
385, it is held:
26
“15. Accordingly, it must be held that the provisions
of the Act are to be construed widely to give effect
to the object and purpose of the Act. It is seen that
Section 3 envisages that the provisions of the Act are in
addition to and are not in derogation of any other law in
force. It is true, as rightly contended by Shri Suri, that
the words “in derogation of the provisions of any other
law for the time being in force” would be given proper
meaning and effect and if the complaint is not stayed
and the parties are not relegated to the arbitration, the
Act purports to operate in derogation of the provisions
of the Arbitration Act. Prima facie, the contention
appears to be plausible but on construction and
conspectus of the provisions of the Act we think that
the contention is not well founded. Parliament is
aware of the provisions of the Arbitration Act
and the Contract Act, 1872 and the consequential
remedy available under Section 9 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, i.e., to avail of right of civil action in a
competent court of civil jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Act
provides the additional remedy.”
27) In State of Karnataka vs. Vishwa Bharathi House Building Co-
operative Society and Others (2003) 2 SCC 412, a three Judge Bench
of this Court observed:
“16. ...in asmuch as the provisions of the said Act are in
addition to the provisions of any other law for the time
being in force and not in derogation thereof as is
evident from Section 3 thereof.”
28) In the case of Secy., Thirumurugan Coop. Agricultural Credit Society
v. Ma. Lalitha , (2004) 1 SCC 305, this Court took the view:
27
“12 . As per Section 3 of the Act, as already stated
above, the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to
and not in derogation of any other provisions of any
other law for the time being in force. Having due regard
to the scheme of the Act and purpose sought to be
achieved to protect the interest of the consumers better,
the provisions are to be interpreted broadly, positively
and purposefully in the context of the present case to
give meaning to additional/extended jurisdiction,
particularly when Section 3 seeks to provide remedy
under the Act in addition to other remedies provided
under other Acts unless there is a clear bar.”
29) This Court, in the case of Kishore Lal v. Chairman, Employees’ State
Insurance Corpn. (2007) 4 SCC 579, took the view:
“7. The definition of “consumer” in the CP Act is
apparently wide enough and encompasses within its fold
not only the goods but also the services, bought or hired,
for consideration. Such consideration may be paid
or promised or partly paid or partly promised under
any system of deferredpayment and includes any
beneficiary of such person other than the person who
hires the service for consideration. The Act being a
beneficial legislation, aims to protect the interests of a
consumer as understood in the business parlance. The
important characteristics of goods and services under
the Act are that they are supplied at a price to cover the
costs and generate profit or income for the seller of
goods or provider of services. The comprehensive
definition aims at covering every man who pays money
as the price or cost of goods and services. However, by
virtue of the definition, the person who obtains goods for
resale or for any commercial purpose is excluded, but
28
the services hired for consideration even for commercial
purposes are not excluded. The term “service”
unambiguously indicates in the definition that the
definition is not restrictive and includes within its ambit
such services as well which are specified therein.
However, a service hired or availed, which does not cost
anything or can be said free of charge, or under a
contract of personal service, is not included within the
meaning of “service” for the purposes of the CP Act.”
30) In Skypak Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC
294, this Court observed:
“2. With the industrial revolution and development in the
international trade and commerce, there has been a
substantial increase of business and trade, which
resulted in a variety of consumer goods appearing in the
market to cater to the needs of the consumers. The
modern methods of advertisement in media, influence the
mind of the consumers and notwithstanding the
manufacturing defect or imperfection in the quality, a
consumer is tempted to purchase the goods. There has
been possibility of deficiency in the services rendered.
For the welfare of such consumer and to protect the
consumers from the exploitation to provide protection of
the interest of the consumers, Parliament enacted the
Consumer Protection Act, and the Act itself makes
provision for the establishment of Commissions for
settlement of the consumer disputes and matters
connected therewith. The Commissions, under the Act,
are quasi-judicial bodies and they are supposed to
provide speedy and simple redressal to consumer
disputes and for that purpose, they have been empowered
to give relief of a specified nature and in an appropriate
way, to award compensation…”
29
31). This Court in the case of Patel Roadways Limited v. Birla
Yamaha Ltd. , (2000) 4 SCC 91, has considered this question and has
laid down that the Disputes Redressal Agency provided for in the Act
will have the jurisdiction to entertain complaints in which the claim
for loss or damage of goods entrusted to a carrier for transportation is
in dispute.
32). In our view, the protection provided under the CP Act to
consumers is in addition to the remedies available under any other
Statute. It does not extinguish the remedies under another Statute but
provides an additional or alternative remedy. In the instant case, at
the relevant point of time, the value of the subject matter was more
than ` 20 lakhs, by which the National Commission is conferred
jurisdiction for any cause of action that arises under the Act. Further,
we are not inclined to agree with the argument of Shri. Bhagat that
exercising of jurisdiction was in contravention of International Law,
as the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol have been
incorporated into the domestic law by the passage of the CA Act.
Therefore , we do not find any legal infirmity in the National
Commission exercising its jurisdiction, as the same can be considered
a Court within the territory of a High Contracting Party for the
30
purpose of Rule 29 of the Second Schedule to the CA Act and the
Warsaw Convention. Before we conclude on this issue, we may
usefully notice a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case
of Ethiopian Airlines vs. Ganesh Narain Saboo ( Civil Appeal
No.7037 of 2004 ) which view is binding on us. It is held:
“67. Similarly, the Carriage by Air Act, 1972
explicitly provides that its rules apply to carriage
performed by the State or by legally constituted public
bodies under Chapter 1, Section 2, Sub-section 1.
Thus, it is clear that according to the Indian Law,
Ethiopian Airlines can be subjected to suit under the
Carriage Act, 1972. It may be pertinent to mention
that the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 (69 of 1972) is an
Act to give effect to the Convention for the unification
of certain rules relating to international carriage by
th
air signed at Warsaw on the 12 day of October, 1929
and to the said Convention as amended by the Hague
th
Protocol on the 28 day of September, 1955 and to
make provision for applying the rules contained in the
said Convention in its original form and in the
amended form (subject to exceptions, adaptations and
modification) to non-international carriage by air and
for matters connected therewith.”
33). However, Shri. Vinoo Bhagat, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant-carrier has placed reliance on the decisions of foreign
courts to contend conventions exclusively govern carriers’ liabilities.
We do not wish to refer to all those decisions, since in our view, this
31
issue is no more res integra in view of the decisions of this Court in
Ethiopian Airlines, wherein this Court has observed:
“72. On careful analysis of the American, English and
Indian cases, it is abundantly clear that the appellant
Ethiopian Airlines must be held accountable for the
contractual and commercial activities and obligations
that it undertakes in India.
73. It may be pertinent to mention that the Parliament
has recognized this fact while passing the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 and the Carriage by Air Act, 1972.
Section 86 was itself, a modification and restriction of
the principle of foreign sovereign immunity and thus, by
limiting Section 86’s applicability, the Parliament
though these incorrect acts, further narrowed a party’s
ability to successfully plead foreign sovereign immunity.
In the modern era, where there is close interconnection
between different countries as far as trade, commerce
and business are concerned, the principle of sovereign
immunity can no longer be absolute in the way that it
much earlier was. Countries who participated in trade,
commerce and business with different countries ought to
be subjected to normal rules of the market. State owned
entities would be able to operate with impunity, the rule
of law would be degraded and international trade,
commerce and business will come to a grinding halt.
Therefore, we have no hesitation in coming to the
conclusion that the appellant cannot claim sovereign
immunity.”
National Commission is a ‘Court’?
34) Shri. Bhagat has cited several decisions of this Court in which
this Court has taken the view that Consumer Forums are not Courts
32
but are quasi-judicial bodies or authorities or agencies, in furtherance
of his contention that only a Court in Mumbai has the jurisdiction to
try a suit against the appellant-carrier and that the National
Commission is not a Court. [See Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G.
Industrial Institute, (1995) 3 SCC 583; Charan Singh v. Healing
Touch Hospital, (2000) 7 SCC 668; State of Karnataka v.
Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society, (2003) 2 SCC 412].
This position has been fortified recently by a decision of a
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. R.
Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 1, where
this Court has observed:
“38. The term “courts” refers to places where justice is
administered or refers to Judges who exercise judicial
functions. Courts are established by the State for
administration of justice that is for exercise of the
judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold the
rights, to punish wrongs and to adjudicate upon disputes.
Tribunals on the other hand are special alternative
institutional mechanisms, usually brought into existence
by or under a statute to decide disputes arising with
reference to that particular statute, or to determine
controversies arising out of any administrative law.
Courts refer to civil courts, criminal courts and the High
Courts. Tribunals can be either private tribunals
(Arbitral Tribunals), or tribunals constituted under the
Constitution (Speaker or the Chairman acting under
Para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule) or tribunals authorised
by the Constitution (Administrative Tribunals under
33
Article 323-A and tribunals for other matters under
Article 323-B) or statutory tribunals which are created
under a statute (Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Debt
Recovery Tribunals and Consumer Fora). Some
Tribunals are manned exclusively by Judicial Officers
(Rent Tribunals, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal,
Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals). Other statutory
tribunals have judicial and technical members
(Administrative Tribunals, TDSAT, Competition
Appellate Tribunal, Consumer Fora, Cyber Appellate
Tribunal, etc.)
……
45. Though both courts and tribunals exercise judicial
power and discharge similar functions, there are certain
well-recognised differences between courts and
tribunals. They are:
(i) Courts are established by the State and are
entrusted with the State's inherent judicial power for
administration of justice in general. Tribunals are
established under a statute to adjudicate upon
disputes arising under the said statute, or disputes of a
specified nature. Therefore, all courts are tribunals.
But all tribunals are not courts.
(ii) Courts are exclusively manned by Judges.
Tribunals can have a Judge as the sole member, or
can have a combination of a judicial member and a
technical member who is an “expert” in the field to
which the tribunal relates. Some highly specialised
fact-finding tribunals may have only technical
members, but they are rare and are exceptions.
(iii) While courts are governed by detailed statutory
procedural rules, in particular the Code of Civil
Procedure and the Evidence Act, requiring an
elaborate procedure in decision making, tribunals
generally regulate their own procedure applying the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure only where
34
it is required, and without being restricted by the strict
rules of the Evidence Act.”
35) In the case of Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees , 1950 SCR 459,
this Court took the view that to be a court, the person or persons who
constitute it, must be entrusted with judicial functions, that is, of
deciding litigated questions according to law. This Court further
observed that before a person or persons can be said to constitute a
court, it must be held that they derive their powers from the State and
are exercising the judicial powers of the State. In State of Bombay v.
Narottamdas Jethabhai , 1951 SCR 51, this Court held that the word
“Court” denoted a place where justice was judicially administered,
having been vested the jurisdiction for this purpose by the State. In
the case of Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain , (1955) 2 SCR 955, it
was held that in order to constitute a “Court” in the strict sense of the
term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from
having some trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give decision or
a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which
are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. This Court, in
Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd. , AIR 1956
SC 614, held that a Tribunal which exercised jurisdiction for
35
executing a decree would be a “court” for the purpose of the Banking
Companies Act.
36) While examining the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar
of Orissa High Court, (1974) 1 SCC 374 , observed:
“68. What then is a court? It is
“an agency of the sovereign created by it directly or
indirectly under its authority, consisting of one or
more officers, established and maintained for the
purposes of hearing and determining issues of law and
fact regarding legal rights and alleged violations
thereof, and of applying the sanctions of the law,
authorised to exercise its powers in due course of law
at times and places previously determined by lawful
authority.” Isbill v. Stovall, Rex. Civ. App. 92 SW 2d
1057, 1070.”…”
37) In State of Tamil Nadu v. G.N. Venkataswamy , (1994) 5 SCC
314, this Court observed that the primary function of a Court was to
adjudicate disputes, while holding that a Collector constitutes a
Revenue Court within the meaning of Entry 11-A of the List III of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. In Canara Bank v. Nuclear
Power Corpn. of India, (1995) Supp 3 SCC 81, this Court observed:
36
“26. In our view, the word ‘court’ must be read in the
context in which it is used in a statute. It is permissible,
given the context, to read it as comprehending the courts
of civil judicature and courts or some tribunals
exercising curial, or judicial powers…”
This Court also quoted, with approval, the Halsbury’s Laws of
England and observed thus:
“29. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn., Vol. 10,
paras 701 and 702), this is observed:
“701. Meaning of ‘court’. Originally the term ‘court’
meant, among other things, the Sovereign's palace. It
has acquired the meaning of the place where justice is
administered and, further, has come to mean the
persons who exercise judicial functions under
authority derived either directly or indirectly from the
Sovereign. All tribunals, however, are not courts, in
the sense in which the term is here employed. Courts
are tribunals which exercise jurisdiction over persons
by reason of the sanction of the law, and not merely by
reason of voluntary submission to their jurisdiction.
Thus, arbitrators, committees of clubs and the like,
although they may be tribunals exercising judicial
functions, are not ‘courts’ in this sense of that term.
On the other hand, a tribunal may be a court in the
strict sense of the term even though the chief part of its
duties is not judicial. Parliament is a court. Its duties
are mainly deliberative and legislative; the judicial
duties are only part of its functions. A coroner's court
is a true court although its essential function is
investigation.
702. What is a court in law. The question is whether
the tribunal is a court, not whether it is a court of
justice, for there are courts which are not courts of
37
justice. In determining whether a tribunal is a judicial
body the facts that it has been appointed by a non-
judicial authority, that it has no power to administer
an oath, that the chairman has a casting vote, and that
third parties have power to intervene are immaterial,
especially if the statute setting it up prescribes a
penalty for making false statements; elements to be
considered are (1) the requirement for a public
hearing, subject to a power to exclude the public in a
proper case, and (2) a provision that a member of the
tribunal shall not take part in any decision in which he
is personally interested, or unless he has been present
throughout the proceedings.
A tribunal is not necessarily a court in the strict sense
of exercising judicial power merely because (1) it
gives a final decision; (2) it hears witnesses on oath;
(3) two or more contending parties appear before it
between whom it has to decide; (4) it gives decisions
which affect the rights of subjects; (5) there is an
appeal to a court; and (6) it is a body to which a
matter is referred by another body.
Many bodies are not courts even though they have to
decide questions, and in so doing have to act
judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be
conducted with fairness and impartiality. Examples
are the benchers of the Inns of Court when
considering the conduct of one of their members, the
disciplinary committee of the General Medical
Council when considering questions affecting the
conduct of a medical man, a trade union when
exercising disciplinary jurisdiction over its
members....”
30. These passages, from the earlier edition of Halsbury,
were cited by this Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha
v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd. The question there
was whether the provisions of the Contempt of Courts
Act applied to a Registrar exercising powers under
Section 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies
38
Act. It was held that the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil
and revenue courts of the land was ousted in the case of
disputes that fell under Section 48. A Registrar
exercising powers under Section 48, therefore,
discharged the duties which would otherwise have fallen
on the ordinary civil and revenue courts. He had not
merely the trappings of a court but in many respects he
was given the same powers as were given to the ordinary
civil courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure,
including the power to summon and examine witnesses
on oath, the power to order inspection of documents, to
hear the parties after framing issues, to review his own
order and to exercise the inherent jurisdiction of courts
mentioned in Section 151. In adjudicating a dispute
under Section 48 of the Bihar Act, the Registrar was held
to be “to all intents and purposes a court discharging the
same functions and duties in the same manner as a court
of law is expected to do”.
38) The aforesaid observation has been strongly relied upon by
Shri. Jaideep Gupta in reply to the contention of Shri. Bhagat that the
National Commission was not a Court, and therefore, lacked
jurisdiction to decide the complaint filed by the opposite party. In P.
Sarathy v. State Bank of India , 2000 (5) SCC 355, this Court took the
view that the term “Court” in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
meant any authority or tribunal having the trappings of a court. It may
also be relevant to notice that a Constitution Bench of this Court in the
case of Kihoto Hollohon v. Zachillhu , (1992) Supp (2) SCC 651 held
that all Tribunals may not be Courts, but all Courts are Tribunals.
39
39) Now let us look at the definition of the term “Court” as
commonly understood. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary
th
[8 Edition] defines it as “the place where legal trials take place and
rd
where crimes, etc. are judged.” The Oxford Thesaurus of English [3
Ed] gives the following synonyms: “court of law, law court, bench,
bar, court of justice, judicature, tribunal, forum, chancery, assizes,
th
courtroom”. The Chamber’s Dictionary [10 Ed.] has described a
court as “a body of person assembled to decide causes” . In Stroud’s
th
Judicial Dictionary [5 Ed], the word “court” has been described as
“a place where justice is judicially ministered, and is derived” , and is
further observed, “but such a matter involves a judicial act which
may be brought up on certiorari” .
40) The above dictionary meaning and decision of this Court in the
case of Canara Bank ( Supra. ) and also the observations of the
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of R. Gandhi
( Supra. ) reveal that word “Court” must be understood in the context
of a body that is constituted in order to settle disputes and decide
rights and liabilities of the parties before it. “Courts” are those bodies
that bring about resolutions to disputes between persons. As already
mentioned, this Court has held that the Tribunal and Commissions do
40
not fall under the definition of “Court”. However, in some situations,
the word “Court” may be used in a wide, generic sense and not in a
narrow and pedantic sense, and must, in those cases, be interpreted
thus.
41) In State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop.
Society, (2003) 2 SCC 412, this Court took the view that there is a
legal fiction created in giving tribunals like the Consumer Forum the
powers of a Court. It was held:
“57. A bare perusal of Section 25 of the Act clearly
shows that thereby a legal fiction has been created
to the effect that an order made by District Forum/State
Commission or National Commission will be deemed to
be a decree or order made by a civil court in a suit.
Legal fiction so created has a specific purpose i.e. for the
purpose of execution of the order passed by the Forum
or Commission. Only in the event the Forum/State
Commission or the National Commission is unable to
execute its order, the same may be sent to the civil court
for its execution. The High Court, therefore was not
correct to hold that in each and every case the
order passed by the District Forum/State
Commission/National Commission are required to be
sent to the civil courts for execution thereof.
58. Furthermore, Section 27 of the Act also confers
an additional power upon the Forum and the
Commission to execute its order. The said provision is
akin to Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure
or the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act or
41
Section 51 read with Order 21 Rule 37 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Section 25 should be read in
conjunction with Section 27. A parliamentary statute
indisputably can create a tribunal and might say that
non-compliance with its order would be punishable by
way of imprisonment or fine, which can be in addition to
any other mode of recovery .”
42) The use of the word “Court” in Rule 29 of the Second Schedule
of the CA Act has been borrowed from the Warsaw Convention. We
are of the view that the word “Court” has not been used in the strict
sense in the Convention as has come to be in our procedural law. The
word “Court” has been employed to mean a body that adjudicates a
dispute arising under the provisions of the CP Act. The CP Act gives
the District Forums, State Forums and National Commission the
power to decide disputes of consumers. The jurisdiction, the power
and procedure of these Forums are all clearly enumerated by the CP
Act. Though, these Forums decide matters after following a summary
procedure, their main function is still to decide disputes, which is the
main function and purpose of a Court. We are of the view that for the
purpose of the CA Act and the Warsaw Convention, the Consumer
Forums can fall within the meaning of the expression “Court”.
42
43) This view of ours is fortified by the decision of this Court in the
case of Patel Roadways Ltd. (supra) where this Court has held that a
complaint before the Consumer Forum is within the meaning of the
term “suit” as employed by Section 9 of the Carriers Act, 1865. In
other words, we are of the view that when it comes to legislations like
the CP Act, there can be no restricted meaning given to the word
“Court”. Hence, we reject the argument of Shri. Bhagat that the
National Commission is not a “Court” within the meaning of Rule 29
of the Second Schedule of the CA Act.
Deficiency of Service
44) Shri. Vinoo Bhagat, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant-carrier, would contend that there was no deficiency of
service on the part of the appellants. He would point out that the
appellant-carrier had delivered the consignment to the address that
was given by the consignor in the box with the title “ Consignee’s
Name and Address”. He would further state that the only party in the
consignee box with a name and an address was that of M/s. Liwe
Espanola S.A. He would assail the findings of the National
43
Commission that there was a deficiency of service on the part of the
appellant-carrier for not having delivered the consignment at the
correct address, and state that “BBSAE, MADRID, SPAIN” was not
identifiable address to which any delivery of goods could be made.
He would also state that there was no way of finding out that the
consignment was to be made to a Bank. Shri. Bhagat would lay
emphasis on the fact that it was the duty of the consignor to place the
correct address and particulars while making the airway bill, by
placing reliance on the Air Cargo Tariff Rules framed and notified by
IATA. He states that the entire responsibility for the correct address
of the consignee falls upon the consignor and there is no obligation on
the part of the carrier or shipper to ensure that the address is correct.
The carrier, Shri. Bhagat would submit, is only responsible to ensure
the contents of the consignment and not the addressee. He would
further submit that it would not be practical for the carrier to check the
authenticity of the address in the consignee box for each and every
consignment and that they would only check if there is an address or
not.
45) The learned counsel, Shri. Bhagat would also contend that the
consigner did not invoke the rights under the Warsaw Convention for
44
the non-arrival of goods in a timely manner and as a result, was
disentitled to later complaining about the lost consignment. He would
then refer to Clause 12 of the airway bill and state that if the notice
was not given by the consignor within a period of 120 days, then the
claim would get extinguished. He would further contend that neither
the consignee nor the consignor invoked their rights under Article
13(3) and Article 14 at any time. This fact sufficiently proves,
according to the learned counsel, that the claim made is not genuine.
46) Before the National Commission, appellant-carrier had filed the
affidavit of Mr. Daulat Kripalani, who was working as Manager of the
appellant-carrier in India. In the affidavit, it is stated that the
consignor must provide all the information of the consignee and
further, the consignor did not give the address of the consignee even
when it is asked for and it was also not informed to them that the
goods must be released after obtaining appropriate credit. It is the
responsibility of the consignor to give full particulars of the consignee
as provided in IATA Regulations. It is also stated that Barclays Bank
has several offices in Madrid and the Bank did not receive any letters
of credit (L/C) from Canara Bank, Bangalore. It is also stated that
L/C was not attached to the airway bill and, therefore, there was no
45
way of finding out that the consignment was addressed to the Bank. It
is also stated that if the name and address of the Bank was not given
in full, the custom authorities would not have released the goods. He
also states that there was delay in approaching the air carrier after
shipment of the goods, which would disentitle them from making any
claim.
47) The appellant has also filed the affidavit of Khaled El Tameer,
Asstt. Vice President, Insurance claims, who has also stated in the
same lines on that of Mr. Daulat Kripalani. In his cross-examination,
he has stated that it is the responsibility of the agent of the consignor
to furnish all required documents and they would accept the Airway
bill on the basis of the documents furnished by the agent.
48) The cargo agent/respondent No.2 has filed the affidavit of Mr.
Anil Vazirani, who is the partner of the firm. He has stated that the
airway bills are prepared as per the instructions of the consignor and
the abbreviations used in the airway bills are universally known and in
the dispute between the appellant-carrier and the consignor, it has no
role to play and they are also not liable for any damages for any
deficiency of service.
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49) Mr. Rajendra Hinduja – partner of the consignor, has filed his
affidavit. He has stated in his affidavit that the address of BBSAE has
been given to notify the party, who is the consignee. The same stands
for Barclays Bank, Madrid. It is also stated that since they did not
receive the value of the consignment, they had made several oral
enquires with the appellant-carrier and since they did not get positive
response, they made written correspondence in the year 1993.
50) All the witnesses, who had filed their affidavit by way of
examination-in-chief, have been cross examined by the contesting
parties.
51) The learned counsel Sri Vinoo Bhagat would contend that in
the airway bill, the consignor had indicated the name of the consignee
as M/s. LIWE ESPANOLA in the consignee box and, therefore, the
consignor could not have expected the carrier to have delivered the
consignment to BBSAE, Madrid, Spain. The airway bill is one of the
documents produced along with the Memorandum of civil appeal. A
perusal of the same would show that the agent of the consignor in the
consignee’s box specifically mentions the name of the consignee as
BBSAE, Madrid and immediately thereafter, the name of M/s LIWE
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ESPANOLA is mentioned. It has come in the evidence of the
consignor and his agent that BBSAE, Madrid is Barclays Bank,
Madrid and ‘SAE’ is a Spanish abbreviation for incorporation like
‘limited’. Therefore, the consignee is only Barclays Bank, Madrid. It
is the stand of the appellant-carrier that BBSAE, Madrid is not the
consignee and further, it was the responsibility of the consignor and
his agent to have furnished the correct and accurate particulars of the
consignee and since the name of M/s. LIWE ESPANOLA also finds a
place in the consignee box, the consignment is delivered to the
notified party and, therefore, it cannot be said that there was
deficiency of service. We cannot agree. The consignor, through his
agent, has stated that in the airway bill that is handed over to the
appellant-carrier, in the consignee box, the name of BBSAE, Madrid
is specifically mentioned. If, for any reason, the appellant-carrier was
of the view that the name of the consignee is not forthcoming or if the
particulars furnished were insufficient for effecting the delivery of the
consignment, it was expected from the appellant-carrier to have made
enquiries. In our view, at this belated stage, the appellant-carrier
cannot shift the burden by contending that it was expected from the
consignor and his agent to have furnished the correct and proper
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particulars of the consignee in the airway bill. The appellant is an air
line carrier of high repute and they effect transportation of goods to
various parts of the world including Spain and, therefore, it can safely
be presumed that the carriers were fully aware of the consignee’s
name, which was indicated in the consignee’s box and they should
have notified the notified party immediately after the arrival of the
consignment. Since, that has not been done, the National Commission
was justified in holding that there is deficiency of service on the part
of the carrier in not effecting the delivery of goods to the consignee.
52) Learned counsel for the appellant-carrier has contended that by
virtue of Articles 6, 10 and 16 of the Rules, the consignor is required
to make the airway bill and they are only responsible for correctness
of the airway bill and consequences of errors in it and the carrier is not
required to check correctness of consignors documents. We have
already noticed the relevant rules. Repetition of it may not be
necessary. Rule 6 of the Rules envisages that the airway bill requires
to be made by the consignor and handed over the same to the carrier
with the cargo. Rule 10 stipulates that the consignor is responsible for
the correctness of the particulars and statements relating to the cargo
which he inserts in the airway bill. Sub-clause (2) of Article 10
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provides that the consignor shall indemnify the carrier against all
damages suffered by him or to any other person to whom the carrier is
liable, by reason of the irregularity, incorrectness or incompleteness of
the particulars and statements furnished by the consignor. Rule 16
provides that the consignor should furnish all the information and
attach it to the airway bill to meet the requirements of law enforcing
agencies. In the present case, as we have already noticed that the
consignor had furnished all the relevant information in the airway bill
which would satisfy the requirements of both Rule 6 and 16 of the
rules and, therefore, the consignor cannot be accused of not furnishing
the correct particulars and information in the airway bill which is
handed over to the appellant-carrier with the cargo. In our view, the
appellant-carrier cannot absolve its responsibilities by contending that
it would be practically impossible to verify the correctness of all the
airway bills which are furnished with the cargo. The appellant’s
contention that the name and address of the consignee was inadequate
is difficult to accept. There is evidence on record to show that
documents supporting the letter of credit was sent by the consignors
using the self same name and address and there was no difficulty in
the same being delivered to the consignee bank.
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53) The learned counsel also submits that the consignor, having not
invoked Article 14 of the Rules within a reasonable time, is disentitled
to make any complaints before any forum, much less National
Commission. We are not impressed with the arguments canvassed.
Rule 14 confers the right on the consignor to make complaint to the
carrier if the consignment has not reached its destination qua the
consignee. In the evidence of the consignor, it is elicited that
necessary oral enquiries were made with the carrier within a
reasonable time, when the consignor did not receive the value of the
goods from the consignee and since it did not receive any reasonable
explanation, it had no other alternative but to correspond with the
appellant-carrier by written correspondence. Though, the witnesses of
the consignor are cross examined by the appellant-carrier, nothing
worthwhile is elicited. Therefore, in the absence of any contrary
evidence, the statement made by the consignor and its witness require
to be accepted.
54) It is also contended that Clause 12 of the Conditions of Contract
printed on the reverse of airway bill requires that the person entitled to
delivery must make a complaint to the carrier in writing in the case of
non delivery of the goods within 120 days from the date of the issue
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of the airway bill. If not done within the time stipulated, claim, if any,
against the carrier extinguishes. Per contra, Shri Jaideep Gupta,
learned senior counsel, submits that under CP Act, the cause of action
does not depend on any notice in writing being served on the carrier
unlike in certain other Statutes. While considering this issue, the
National Commission, in the impugned Judgment, has concluded:
“ In our view, this submission cannot be
accepted. Firstly, Clause (12) only provides that
the persons entitled to delivery must make a
complaint to the carrier in writing, in case of non-
delivery of the goods within 120 days from the
date of issue of airway bill. There is no question of
delivery of goods to the shipper/Complainant.
Further, it cannot control the period of limitation
provided under ‘the Act’. Rule 29(2), upon which
heavy reliance was placed by the Respondent, also
nowhere provides that it should be filed within 120
days. On the contrary, Rule 29(2) specifically
provides that questions of procedure shall be
governed by the law of the Court seized of the
case.
In addition, Rule 30 of the second Schedule
leaves no doubt that the right to damages shall be
extinguished only if the action is not brought
within two years as provided therein. It reads thus:
“30(1). The right to damages shall be
extinguished if an action is not
brought within two years, reckoned
from the date of arrival at the
destination, or from the date on which
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the aircraft ought to have arrived, or
from the date on which the carriage
stopped.
(2) The method of calculating the
period of limitation shall be
determined by the law of the Court
seized of the case.”
The Complainant entrusted the goods to the
th
carrier on 25 August, 1992 and the goods
rd
reached Madrid on 3 September, 1992.
Admittedly, the complaint is filed within a period
of 2 years.
Further, Rule 33 which is quoted above,
upon which heavy reliance was placed by the
learned Counsel Mr. Bhagat for Opposite Party
No.1, in contending that this Commission would
have no jurisdiction to decide the matter,
specifically provides that any clause contained in
the contract entered into before the damage
occurred by which the parties purport to infringe
the rules laid down by the schedule, whether by
deciding the law to be applied, or by altering the
rules as to the jurisdiction, shall be null and void’.
Hence, Clause 12 of the airway bill would
not be of any ground for holding that petition filed
by the Complainant is barred by period limitation
(sic.).”
55) We are in total agreement with the conclusion reached by the
National Commission. Therefore, we do not see any merit in the
contention canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant-carrier.
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56) We conclude that the National Commission has jurisdiction to
decide the dispute between the parties and it is a Court and that there
was deficiency in service by the appellant-carrier.
57) In view of the above discussion, we do not see any merit in this
appeal. Accordingly, it is dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their
own costs.
………………………J.
[G.S. SINGHVI ]
………………………J.
[H.L. DATTU ]
New Delhi,
September 15, 2011.
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