Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SOM NARTH PURI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT15/02/1972
BENCH:
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
BENCH:
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
SHELAT, J.M.
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
CITATION:
1972 AIR 1490 1972 SCR (3) 497
1972 SCC (1) 630
CITATOR INFO :
APR 1972 SC2522 (8)
R 1974 SC 794 (14)
ACT:
Penal Code, Indian (45 of 1860)--Section 405, 409--Criminal
Breach of Trust--’Entrusted,’ meaning.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant who was an employee of the Indian Airlines
Corporation was convicted under s. 409, Penal Code, and
section 5(2) read with section 5 (1) (c) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1947. The appellant’s duty was to make
reservations for the passengers. The practice was that
whenever the quota was full intending travellers were re--
quired to pay trunk telephone charges for enabling the
Corporation to obtain release of seats from quotas allotted
to other centers. The appellant who was incharge of this
arrangement, it was alleged, collected Rs. 184.90 towards
trunk telephones charges but actually deposited with the
corporation only a sum of Rs. 44.90 and misappropriated the
balance. The modus operandi, it was alleged, was that he
would demand a higher, amount for Trunk Call charges than
was likely to be incurred and he would issue a correct
receipt for this amount on behalf of the corporation but
after making the trunk call, he would alter the counterfoil
with the actual amount of trunk call charges. In the appeal
to this Court it was urged that since the prosecution case
as disclosed by the evidence was that the appellant had
collected excess charges representing them to be actual
charges for trunk calls and not that any excess over the
actual charges would be returned to the appellant he could
not be-convicted either under s. 5(2) read with 5(1)(c) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act or under s. 409 penal code,
because, the important ingredient, viz., entrustment of the
amount was absent.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (i) The expression, ’entrusted in section 409 is used
in a wide sense and includes all cases in which property is
voluntarily handed over for a specific purpose and is
dishonestly disposed of contrary to the terms on which
possession has been handed over. As long as the accused is
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given possession of property for a specific purpose or to
deal with it in a particular manner, the ownership being in
some person other than the accused, he can be said to be
entrusted with that property to be applied in accordance
with the terms of entrustment and for the benefit of the
owner. It may be that a person to whom the property is
handed over may ’cc an agent of the person to whom it is
entrusted or to whom it may belong in which case, if the
agent who comes into possession of it on behalf of his
principal, fraudulently misappropriates the property, he is
nonetheless guilty of criminal breach of trust, because, as
an agent he is entrusted with it. A person authorized to
collect moneys on behalf of another is entrusted with the
money when the amounts are paid to him, and though the
person paying may no longer have any proprietary interest,
nonetheless, the person on whose behalf it was collected
become the owner as soon as the amount is handed over to the
person so authorized to collect on his behalf. [502 D]
498
The State v. Dahyalal Dalpatram, A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 53; In re:
Ram Soonder Poddar & Ors. 1878 (2) Cal. L.R. 515; In re :
Ramappa, (1911) 22 M.L.J. 112; in re : Venkata Raghunatha
Sastri, (1923)45 M.L.J. 133 and the, Crown Prosecutor v. J.
Mclyer and K. S. Narasimhachari, 69 M.L.J. 681, referred to.
(ii)In the present case the amounts for trunk call charges
were demanded on behalf of the Corporation and were paid to
the Corporation. The receipts in respect of the sums, were
given on behalf of the Corporation and it would be the
Corporation that would be liable directly to ,the person who
had paid this amount, if no trunk calls were made, or any
excess over the actual amount of the trunk call charges was
charged by it. The amount was not paid by passengers to the
accused as such but to the corporation and as soon as the
receipt for the amount actually received from the passengers
was given by the accused on behalf of the corporation, he
was entrusted with that amount. His subsequent con.duct in
falsifying the counterfoils and fraudulently
misappropriating the amount would make him guilty of
criminal breach of trust under s. 409 I.P.C., as also under
section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c) of the Act. [604 E-H]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 101 of
1969.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
April 16, 1969 of the Rajasthan High Court in S. B. Criminal
Appeal No. 558 of 1966.
A. S. R. Chari and S. B. Wad, for the appellant.
K. B. Mehta, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Jaganmohan Reddy, J. This is an appeal by special leave
against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court. The
accused was initially charged on three counts, firstly,
under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 (hereinafter referred ’to
as ’the Act’), secondly, under section 409, I.P.C., and
thirdly, under section 477A, I.P.C. Thereafter on 15-1-1964
another Special Judge charged him on two counts, namely,
under section 5 (2) read with section 5 ( 1) (c) and section
5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (w) of the Act. After the
trial, the appellant was, however, convicted under section
409, I.P.C. and section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c) and
(d) of the Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of 18
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months and a fine of Rs. 250/- under-section 409, I.P.C. and
18 months’ rigorous imprisonment, and a fine of Rs. 250/-
under section 5(2) read with sections 5(1)(c) and 5(1)(d) of
the Act. The sentences on both these counts were, directed
to run concurrently. The High Court, however, thought that
the Special Judge had not recorded any conviction under
section 5(1)(d) of the Act and in that view confirmed the
conviction and sentence of the appellant of 18 months"
rigorous imprisonment on each of the counts, namely, under
499
section 409, I.P.C. and section 5(2) read with section
5(1)(c) of the Act, but reduced the fine for each of the
offences from Rs. 250/- to Rs. 150/-.
The appellant was employed as a Traffic Assistant in the
Indain Airlines Corporation’s office at Jaipur and his duty
was to make reservations of the passengers intending to go
by air and issue tickets. As it happens, when the quota of
seats allotted to Jaipur is full, intending travellers who
request for accommodation would be required to pay trunk
telephone charges for enabling the Airlines Corporation to
obtain release of seats from quotas allotted to other
centers. The practice of the Airlines was to collect the
approximate charges and issue a receipt therefore and if a
seat was available, the reservation would be confirmed and
accommodation given to the passengers if seats could be
released from other centers for Jaipur. The appellant who
was incharge of these arrangements between 16-2-62 and 30-8-
62, collected Rs. 184.90 towards trunk telephone charges but
actually deposited with the Airlines Corporation a sum of
Rs. 44.91 and misappropriated the balance of Rs. 139.99. The
modus operendi followed by him, it is alleged, was that he
would demand a higher amount for Trunk Call charges than
were likely to be incurred and he would issue a correct
receipt for those amounts on behalf of the Airlines
Corporation but after making the trunk call, he would alter
the counter-foil with the actual amount of trunk call
charges. On the same day he would make a daily return
showing the actual amounts and deposit them with the
Cashier. A typical sample of the receipts given by him on
behalf of the Airlines Corporation is Exhibit 40 which is as
follows
INDIAN AIRLINES CORPORATION NEW DELHI.
No. 354577 Station Jaipur. Date : 30-8-62.
Received with thanks from M/s. M/Travels, Jaipur sum of
Rupees Twenty three and forty nP, being the amount T/Call
charges to Udaipur and AMD for re-lease of seat.
for INDIAN AIRLINES CORPORATION.
Sd/-
Cashier".
Rs. 23.40
On 31-8-62, one M.D. Singh of_the Mercury Travel Agency,
Jaipur complained to B.S. Gupta, Incharge of the Office of
the Indian Airlines Corporation at Jaipur that the
appellant had
500
collected Rs. 23.40 for proposed trunk call charges from the
Agency but made no call and no seat was allotted to the
passenger of the Mercury Travel Agency even though one was
available and that seat was given by B. S. Gupta to someone
else. B. S. Gupta questioned the appellant who then made; a
confession of his having collected the amount but not having
made a call. After-making this confession he immediately
resigned his job. A preliminary inquiry was conducted by
the Area Manager who thereafter lodged the First Information
Report. The accused denied having collected the amounts or
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of having issued the receipts and further stated that
whatever amounts were; collected by him were paid in the
office of the Airlines everyday.
Both the Courts found on the evidence that the appellant
used to make trunk calls whenever he was on duty from the
Indian Airlines Corporation office at Jaipur for the release
of seats and that he would call for and receive trunk call
charges from intending passengers. It was further held
proved that the appellant gave receipts Exhibited in the
case which were in his own hand-writing and signed by him;
and that it was he who realised the total sum of Rs. 185/-
which was entrusted to him and over which he, had a dominion
in his capacity as a public servant. We have already
pointed out that the High Court did not confirm the
conviction of the appellant under section 5(2) read with
section 5(1)(d) on the assumption that the-said Special
Judge had not convicted the accused for that offence, and
since there is no appeal by the State against this part of
the judgment, the contention on behalf of the State that he
was convicted under section 5(1)(d) has no merits and cannot
be sustained.
On behalf of the appellant it was urged before the High
Court that as the appellant had to fare a trial extending
over more than 3 years incurring enormous expenses for
coming to and from Chandigarh where he was practicing law
and was also in Jail for some time, the benefit of the
Probation of Offenders Act should be given to him] This
contention was rejected because the provisions of that Art
were inapplicable in view of his conviction under section
409, I.P.C. As the offence of criminal breach of trust under
section 409, I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment for
life, the High Court, in our view, was right because the
provisions of section 4 are only applicable to a case of a
person found guilty of having committed an offence not
punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Apart from
this reasoning, section 18 of the Probation of Offenders Act
makes, the provisions of that Act inapplicable to are
offence under sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act.
On behalf of the appellant it is submitted by the learned
Advocate that the prosecution case as disclosed by the
evidence was that the appellant had collected excess charges
from the passengers
501
representing them to be the actual charges for trunk calls
and not that any excess over the actual charges would be
returned to them. In view of this evidence, the appellant
could not be convicted either under section 5(2) read with
section 5(1)(c) of the Act or under section 409, I.P.C.
because the important ingredient which is entrustment of the
amounts is absent. In order that any amount can be said to
be entrusted it should be lawfully made over, but in this
case the appellant obtained the amount by cheating and by
the commission of an offence. If there was no entrustment
of the moneys to the appellant, he could not be convicted
either under section 409 or under section 5(2) read with
5(1)(c) of the Act and is accordingly entitled to an
acquittal on both these charges. In support of this
contention reliance has been placed on Surendra Pal Singh v.
The State(1), where a Bench of the Allahabad High Court held
that the amounts collected from cultivators by the Canal
Amin in excess of the amount actually due from them and
misappropriated by him, did not amount to an entrustment as
he could not be a trustee of that money on behalf of the
cultivators, from whom he realised it because when they
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banded over the money to the accused, they purported to
surrender all their rights in that money, nor could it be
said that this money had become the property of the
Government at any stage for him to be considered a trustee
on its behalf. This decision was, however, disapproved in
The State v. Dahyalal Dalpatram(2), by a Bench of the Bombay
High Court, a view with which the High Court agreed. In
that case the accused who was employed as a Talati in the
Revenue Department, was invested with the authority to
collect land revenue and fines. He was ordered to recover
from the land-holders who had defaulted in paying the moneys
but having collected them, be did not pay them into the
Government Treasury as required by the rules made under the
Land Revenue Code. The accused was convicted under section
409, I.P.C. On the question that when the accused collected
the amount as tax alleged to be due by the land-holder
though the liability whereof could not be enforced according
to law. could it be said that he was then entrusted with the
money, the High Court after noticing that the Allahabad High
Court appears to have taken the view that a public servant
collecting the money claiming that it was, due to the State
but which in fact was not due to the State, could not be
regarded as entrusted with the money collected by him, held
that that was not a necessary ingredient of section 405.
The learned Advocate sought to distinguish this case on the
ground that in the Bombay case there was a definite
direction to collect a specific amount and when that amount
was collected there was entrustment of that money which was
lawfully collected, as such the accused was rightly
convicted. It was further contended that if looked at from
the point of view of the passengers from whom
(1) A.I.R. 1957 All. 122. (2) A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 53.
502
trunk call charges were collected, they had not entrusted
money to the accused because they had parted with the
proprietary rights thereon and if viewed from the point of
view of the Airlines Corporation, the money collected did
not be-come the property of the Corporation and consequently
there was no entrustment of it.
There can be no doubt ’that before a public servant can be
convicted of an offence under section 5(1)(c) or under
section 409, I.P.C. the property which is said to, have been
misappropriated must be entrusted to him. Section 405
merely provides, whoever being in any manner entrusted with
property or with any dominion over the property, as the
first ingredient of the criminal breach of trust. The words
’in any manner’ in the context are significant. The section
does not provide that the entrustment of property should be
by someone or the amount recieved must be the property of
the person on whose behalf it is received. As long as the
accused is given possession of property for a specific
purpose or to, deal with it in a particular manner, the
ownership being in some person other than the accused, he
can be said to be entrusted with that property to be applied
in accordance with the terms of entrustment and for the
benefit of the owner. The expression ’entrusted’ in section
409 is used in a wide sense and includes all cases in which
property is voluntarily handed over for a specific purpose
and is dishonestly disposed of contrary to the terms on
which possession has been handed over. It may be that a
person to whom the property is handed over may be an agent
of the person to whom it is entrusted or to whom it may
belong in which case if the agent who comes into possession
of it on behalf of his principal, fraudulently
misappropriates the property, he is nonetheless guilty of
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criminal breach of trust because as an agent he is entrusted
with it. A person authorized to collect moneys on behalf of
another is entrusted with the money when the amounts are
paid to him, and though the person paying may no longer have
any proprietary interest nonetheless the person on whose
behalf it was collected becomes the owner as soon as the
amount is handed over to the person so authorized to collect
of different High Courts in this country for nearly a
century, a few of which alone need be examined.
In the matter of Ram Sounder Poddar & Ors.(1), a Deputy
Magistrate convicted the accused under section 406, I.P.C.,
an offence over which he had jurisdiction, instead of under
section 409, i.p.c. which was cognizance only by the Court
of Session. on revision the High Court held that the
proceedings were contrary to law and the Deputy Magistrate
was directed to commit the accused for trial by the Court of
Session. It appears that the accused who were charged were
Treasury employees. One of the accused
(1) 1878 (2) al. L.R. 515.
503
was allowed to, write the Treasury Cash Book which was the
duty of the Treasurer. Taking advantage of it, he
misappropriated Rs. 16/- by scoring off the entry in the
account book. In this misappropriation he was assisted by
the other accused who was employed to do stamp work. While
holding the trial to be without jurisdiction, it was
observed that section 409 does not as supposed by the
Deputy Magistrate, require the property in respect of which
criminal breach of trust is committed, to be the property of
Government, but only requires that it should be entrusted to
a public servant in his, capacity as such public servant.
In re : Ramappa(1), the accused who was the Superintendent
of some Coffee Curing Works was convicted of criminal breach
of trust by misappropriating a large sum of money made up of
amounts which he had received from the Manager on the false
pretense that they were required for paying coolies who
garbled coffee. One of the arguments urged against the
conviction was that the receipt of the money by false
representation amounted to an offence of cheating and that
the subsequent appropriation of it by the accused to his own
use was not a criminal breach of trust as the criminal
intent was present at the time of the receipt of the moneys
from the Manager. Benson and Sundara Aiyar, J., while
rejecting that argument, observed:
"When the accused received the money he did so
as a servant of the Company for the express
purpose of using it for his master’s benefit
in a particular way. He was, therefore,
entrusted with the money and his appropriating
it to himself clearly amounts to criminal
breach of trust".
In Venkata Raghunatha Sastri(2), Spencer, J., held that
where a person who had pledged promissory notes with another
as seenrity for a loan dishonestly induced the latter to
hand over the same to him by pretending that he required the
same for collecting money from his creditors with the aid of
which he would pay cash to the complainant, his act
constituted an offence of cheating punishable under section
420, I.P.C. and that when he dishonestly disposed of the
notes in violation of his contract with the pledgee to use
the money collected in paying off his debt, there was both
entrustment and dishonest misappropriation and that the
conviction for the offence of criminal breach of trust under
section 406, I.P.C. was legal.
Both these cases were referred to in The Crown Prosecutor v.
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J. McIver and K. S. Narasimhachari(3). The facts in this
case also were somewhat similar to those in
Venkataraghunatha Sastri’s case (4 ) Madhavan Nair, J (as he
then was) examined the meaning of the word ’entrusted’ in
section 406 and rejected a similar contention as was urged
in this case on behalf of the appellant that when the
accused by deceiving the complainant fraudulently and
(1) (1911) 22 M.L.J. 112.
(3) 69 M.L.J. 681.
(2) (1923) 45 M.L.J. 133
(4) 45 M.L.J. 133.
504
dishonestly induced him to part with the property in
question, the offence of cheating was complete and that
there is no room for further holding that the accused have
committed criminal breach of trust also by their subsequent
misappropriation of the property.
In the case before us, the practice which was being followed
by the Jaipur office of the Indian Airlines Corporation is
spoken to by M. U. Menon, P.W. 6, who was a Personal
Assistant to the General Manager of the National Engineering
Industries Ltd., Jaipur. He says that on 16-2-1962 his
General Manager had directed him to issue instructions to
the accounts branch for arranging for flight tickets by air
for Delhi. He first rang up the Indian Airlines Corporation
about the air passage for eight persons and received, a
reply from that office that 8 tickets were not available at
Jaipur and they would try from Udaipur and Ahmedabad by
trunk calls. After some time the Indian Airlines
Corporation people rang up telling him that tickets can be
arranged and he should end the money amounting to Rs. 410.50
which included trunk call charges of Rs. 26.50. He thereupon
sent a slip, Exhibit P-6 to the accounts department for
further necessary action. There was no cross-examination on
behalf of the accused. Similarly Ganesh Singh, P.W. 3 who
is working for the National Engineering Indus’ his people
contacted Indian Airlines tries Ltd., Jaipur said that when
Corporation on telephone and enquired about the fare etc.
they would ask for trunk call charges along with the amount
for tickets. This would be paid and in fact he pointed out
to the accused and said that he might be one of the persons
whom he met at the office and after he paid the amounts for
the tickets and trunk call charges, he would obtain a
receipt and give it to the company. This evidence read with
other evidence which has been accepted by both the Courts
would show that whatever may have been the criminal in-
tention of the accused, the amounts for trunk call charges
were demanded on behalf of the Indian Airlines Corporation
and were paid to the corporation. The receipts in respect
of the sums were given on behalf of the Corporation and it
would be the Corporation that would be liable directly to
the person who had paid this amount, if no trunk calls were
made, or any excess over the actual amount of the trunk call
charges was charged by it. The amount was not paid by
passengers to the accused as such but to the Indian
Airline.,, Corporation and as soon as the receipt for the
amount actually received from the passengers was given by
the accused on behalf of the Corporation, he was entrusted
with that amount. His subsequent conduct in falsifying the
counter-foils and fraudulently misappropriating the amounts
would make him guilty of criminal breach of trust punishable
under section 409, I.P.C. as also under section 5(2) read
with section 5(1)(c) of the Act.
There is, therefore, no merit in this appeal and it is
accordingly dismissed.
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Appeal dismissed.
K.B.N.
505