Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3933 OF 2010
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 14428 of 2009)
The Administrator,
Union Territory of Dadra & Nagar Haveli …Appellant
Versus
Gulabhia M. Lad …Respondent
JUDGEMENT
R.M. Lodha, J.
Leave granted.
2. The question that calls to be determined in this
appeal by special leave is : on consideration of the report of the
Inquiring Authority wherein misconduct of the respondent has
been proved and after following the prescribed procedure, the
Disciplinary Authority ordered his removal from service and the
departmental appeal against that order has been dismissed by
the Appellate Authority, whether Central Administrative Tribunal
was justified, on the facts found, in interfering with the order of
punishment on the ground that co-delinquents were awarded
lesser punishment in departmental appeals and directing the
appellant to reconsider the whole matter and give the
respondent the same treatment which has been meted out to
the co-delinquents.
3. Gulabhia M. Lad – respondent – while functioning
as Land Reforms Officer—I , Dadra and Nagar Haveli for the
period October 14, 1997 to April 27, 1998 allegedly granted
occupancy rights of the government land situate at village
Athola to five persons with ulterior motive by getting the survey
conducted from R.K. Kapdi, Surveyor and without following the
procedure prescribed under the Dadra and Nagar Haveli Land
Reforms Regulation, 1971 (for short, ‘Regulations’). A
disciplinary enquiry was initiated against him under Rule 14 of
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1965. He was charged for misconduct under Rule 3 of
Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Two other
employees, R.K. Kapdi, Surveyor and P.N. Vinod, Patel Talati
were also subjected to disciplinary enquiry in connection with
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illegal grant of occupancy rights of government land to those
five persons. R.K. Kapdi was charged for having connived with
the respondent and prepared a map by not following the
procedure and without verifying the documentary evidence as
required under the Regulations and in assigning new plot
numbers without any authority in flagrant violation of law.
Insofar as P.N. Vinod was concerned, he was charged for
having connived with the respondent and prepared the
statement on oath of each of the applicants in his own
handwriting in the absence of the applicants and thereby
abusing his official position as Patel Talati.
4. A joint enquiry was conducted against the
respondent and two other delinquents, namely, R.K. Kapdi and
P.N. Vinod. The three delinquents submitted their defence
separately and denied any misconduct on their part. The
Inquiring Authority, on consideration of the written statement of
defence; evidence produced in the course of the inquiry and
after hearing the Presenting Officer and the delinquents
recorded its opinion that charges were proved and submitted its
report to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority
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(Administrator, Daman & Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli)
served enquiry report upon respondent and after calling for
explanation, imposed a major penalty of his removal from
service vide order dated April 23, 2004. For the other two
delinquents, the Disciplinary Authority was the
Commissioner/Secretary (Finance), Daman & Diu and Dadra
and Nagar Haveli and the said Disciplinary Authority after
serving the enquiry report and calling for their explanation,
ordered their removal from service by two separate orders.
5. The respondent filed the departmental appeal
against the order of punishment dated April 23, 2004 before the
Appellate Authority but the said appeal was dismissed on
March 8, 2006. Insofar as the other two delinquents are
concerned, their departmental appeals were partly allowed.
The punishment of removal awarded to R.K. Kapdi was
modified to that of compulsory retirement with effect from April
23, 2004 by the Appellate Authority while the punishment
awarded to P.N. Vinod was modified to reduction to lower stage
of pay by five stages with cumulative effect.
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6. The order of punishment dated April 23, 2004 which
was confirmed in departmental appeal by the Appellate
Authority vide order dated March 8, 2006 came to be
challenged by the respondent before the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Bombay Bench at Mumbai (for short, ‘Tribunal’) on
diverse grounds. The Tribunal accepted the argument of the
respondent that he has been discriminated in the matter of
imposition of punishment. The Tribunal vide its order dated
June 22, 2007 allowed the original application and held that
similarly placed persons have been treated differently and the
action of the present appellant in awarding differential
punishment to the respondent by singling him out for the
extreme punishment of removal could not be sustained. In this
regard, the Tribunal relied upon two decisions of this Court,
namely, (1) Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Jitendra
1
Pd. Singh and Another and (2) State of U.P. and Others. v.
2
Raj Pal Singh .
7. The present appellant challenged the order of the
Tribunal before Bombay High Court by filing a writ petition but
1
(2001) 10 SCC 530
2
JT 2001 (Suppl. 1) SC 44
5
that was dismissed on December 1, 2008. The High Court held
that as the authorities did not challenge the orders passed by
the Appellate Authority in respect of co-delinquents, the order of
the Tribunal did not call for any interference.
8. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters
has come up for consideration before this Court time and again.
It is worthwhile to refer to some of these decisions. In the case
3
of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others this Court held:
“18. A review of the above legal position would
establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal
the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities
have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a
view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the
discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in
view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The
High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of
judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own
conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty.
If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority
or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the
High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the
relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority
to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the
litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases,
impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in
support thereof”.
9. In Director General, RPF and Others v. Ch. Sai
4
Babu , this Court stated the legal position thus :
3
(1995) 6 SCC 749
4
(2003) 4 SCC 331
6
Normally, the punishment imposed by a
“6. ….
disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the
High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that
too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment
imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after
examining all the relevant factors including the nature of
charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty
imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having
due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected
of and discipline required to be maintained, and the
department/establishment in which the delinquent
person concerned works.”
10. In the case of Chairman and Managing Director,
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United Commercial Bank and Others v. P.C. Kakkar , this Court
on review of long line of cases and the principles of judicial
review of administrative action under English law summarized
the legal position in the following words :
“ 11. The common thread running through in all these
decisions is that the court should not interfere with the
administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffers
from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in
defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has
been stated in Wednesbury case [(1947) 2 All ER 680
(CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of the
choice made by the administrator open to him and the
court should not substitute its decision to that of the
administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to
the deficiency in decision-making process and not the
decision.
12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed
by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority
shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no
5
(2003) 4 SCC364
7
scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it
may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment by recording cogent reasons in support
thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed
is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to
direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate
Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.
13. In the case at hand the High Court did not record
any reason as to how and why it found the punishment
shockingly disproportionate. Even there is no discussion
on this aspect. The only discernible reason was the
punishment awarded in M.L. Keshwani case . As was
observed by this Court in Balbir Chand v. Food Corpn.
of India Ltd. [(1997) 3SCC 371] even if a co-delinquent
is given lesser punishment it cannot be a ground for
interference. Even such a plea was not available to be
given credence as the allegations were contextually
different”.
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11. In Union of India and Another v. S.S. Ahluwalia ,
this Court reiterated the legal position as follows :
“8. …….The scope of judicial review in the matter of
imposition of penalty as a result of disciplinary
proceedings is very limited. The court can interfere
with the punishment only if it finds the same to be
shockingly disproportionate to the charges found to
be proved…..”.
12. In State of Meghalaya and Others v. Mecken Singh
7
N. Marak this Court stated :
“14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope
for interference is very limited and restricted to
exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to
interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and
cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The
High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate
case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum
of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now
well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers
under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of
6
(2007) 7 SCC 257
7
(2008) 7 SCC 580
8
punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons
therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to
the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to
judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court
no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why
the punishment was considered disproportionate.
Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The
mere statement that it is disproportionate would not
suffice.”
13. The legal position is fairly well settled that while
exercising power of judicial review, the High Court or a Tribunal
cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the Disciplinary
Authority, and/or on appeal the Appellate Authority with regard
to the imposition of punishment unless such discretion suffers
from illegality or material procedural irregularity or that would
shock the conscience of the Court/Tribunal. The exercise of
discretion in imposition of punishment by the Disciplinary
Authority or Appellate Authority is dependent on host of factors
such as gravity of misconduct, past conduct, the nature of
duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of the position
that the delinquent holds, previous penalty, if any, and the
discipline required to be maintained in the department or
establishment he works . Ordinarily the Court or a Tribunal
would not substitute its opinion on reappraisal of facts. In a
matter of imposition of punishment where joint disciplinary
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enquiry is held against more than one delinquent, the same or
similarity of charges is not decisive but many factors as noticed
above may be vital in decision making. A single distinguishing
feature in the nature of duties or degree of responsibility may
make difference insofar as award of punishment is concerned.
To avoid multiplicity of proceedings and overlapping adducing
of evidence, a joint enquiry may be conducted against all the
delinquent officers but imposition of different punishment on
proved charges may not be impermissible if the responsibilities
and duties of the co-delinquents differ or where distinguishing
features exist. In such a case, there would not be any question
of selective or invidious discrimination. Does the present case
make out discrimination in inflicting punishment? We do not
think so. In the first place, the respondent and the two other
delinquents may have been found guilty in connection with the
same incident, i.e. illegal grant of occupancy rights in respect of
government land to five persons but the charges against the
respondent and the other two delinquents cannot be said to be
same or substantially similar. The substance of the charge
against the respondent was that as a Land Reforms Officer-I,
10
he granted occupancy rights to the government land to five
persons with ulterior motive by getting the survey conducted
from co-delinquent R.K. Kapdi, Surveyor and without following
the procedure prescribed under the Regulations. On the other
hand, the main charge against R.K. Kapdi was that he prepared
a map by not following the procedure and without verifying the
documentary evidence as was required under the Regulations
and assigning new plot numbers without any authority in
flagrant violation of law. As regards, P.N. Vinod, he was
principally charged for having prepared the statement on oath
of each of the applicants in his own handwriting in the absence
of the applicants and thereby abusing his official position as
Patel Talati. Thus, there was variation in allegations of
misconduct and all the three delinquents could not have been
put on par although joint enquiry was held and there was
common evidence.
14. Secondly, the Tribunal failed to notice that
respondent was holding an important position as Land Reforms
Officer during the relevant period having been conferred with
various powers and duties under the Regulations. As a Land
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Reforms Officer, the respondent possessed the official authority
for grant of occupancy rights under the Regulations. The co-
delinquents were only his subordinates and they carried out his
instructions. In the facts and circumstances, therefore, the
respondent and the two co-delinquents cannot be said to have
been similarly placed.
15. Thirdly, and more importantly, the Tribunal
overlooked a very important aspect that even the Appellate
Authority has not treated the case of co-delinquents viz., R.K.
Kapdi and P.N. Vinod alike inasmuch as in the departmental
appeal the punishment of removal awarded to R.K. Kapdi was
modified to that of compulsory retirement while the punishment
awarded to P.N. Vinod was modified to reduction to lower stage
of pay by five stages with cumulative effect. There was, thus,
no similarity in award of punishment to the other two co-
delinquents as well.
16. The Tribunal relied upon two decisions of this Court.
1
In Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. , this Court found no
justification to interfere with the order of the High Court that
recorded the following finding:
12
“Since as many as three workmen on almost identical
charges were found guilty of misconduct in connection
with the same incident, though in separate proceedings,
and one was punished with only one month’s
suspension, and the other was ultimately reinstated in
view of the findings recorded by the Labour Court and
affirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, it
would be denial of justice to the appellant if he alone is
singled out for punishment by way of dismissal from
service.”
1
We are afraid Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. has no
application to the facts of the present case.
17. Similarly, the decision of this Court in Raj Pal
2
Singh has no application to the present case. It was found
therein that the charges proved against the delinquents were
same and identical. No dissimilarity was found and, therefore, it
was held that it was not open for the Disciplinary Authority to
impose different punishments for different delinquents. In the
case in hand, we have already noticed above that the charges
against respondent and co-delinquents were not exactly
identical or substantially similar. Moreover, the respondent
being the Land Reforms Officer was the authorized officer
under the Regulations for grant of occupancy rights and for
illegal grant of occupancy rights in respect of government lands,
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it was he who was squarely responsible. We have no hesitation
in holding that on the facts found and conclusions recorded in
the enquiry report, the punishment of removal cannot be said to
be not commensurate with the misconduct proved against the
respondent and the High Court ought to have interfered with the
order of the Tribunal.
18. The result is that appeal is allowed, the order of the
High Court dated December 1, 2008 and that of the Tribunal
dated June 22, 2007 are set aside. The parties shall bear their
own costs.
…….…...…………………J.
(R.V. Raveendran)
…………..……
……………..J
(R. M. Lodha)
New Delhi
April 28, 2010.
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