Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5982 of 2001
PETITIONER:
J.P. Bansal
RESPONDENT:
State of Rajasthan & Anr.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/03/2003
BENCH:
SHIVARAJ V. PATIL & ARIJIT PASAYAT.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT,J
Appellant’s prayer for issuing a writ of mandamus to the State of
Rajasthan to pay compensation on cessation of functioning as Chairman of
the abolished Rajasthan Taxation and Tribunal (in short ’the Tribunal’)
having been turned down by learned Single Judge and Division Bench of
the Rajasthan High Court, this appeal has been preferred. As the core
question involved is pristinely legal, it is unnecessary to enter into
the factual aspects in detail.
Factual panorama in a nutshell is as follows:
Appellant was appointed as Judicial Member of the Tribunal in
terms of notification dated 16.9.1995 issued by the Finance Department
(Taxation Division) of the Government of Rajasthan. Appointment of the
appellant was made by the Governor in exercise of the powers conferred
by clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Rajasthan Taxes and
Tribunal Act 1995 (in short ’the Act’). By the notification dated
16.9.1995 referred to above, Chairman and the technical member were also
appointed. Subsequently, he was appointed to discharge functions of
Chairman of the Tribunal till appointment of regular Chairman. This
contingency arose on the previous Chairman attaining the age of 65
years. State Government vide notification dated 27.2.1999 issued an
Ordinance No.1/1999 styled The Rajasthan Taxation Tribunal (Repeal)
Ordinance, 1999 (in short ’the Ordinance’). The same became operative
w.e.f. the date of notification i.e. 27.2.1999. By the above Ordinance
under Section 5 matters and proceedings pending before Tribunal on the
date of commencement of the Ordinance stood automatically transferred to
the High Court for disposal. As a consequence of Tribunal being
abolished, continuance of appellant as Chairman automatically came to an
end. Appellant claimed compensation of Rs.5,35,648/- with interest @ 15%
per annum by filing a writ petition on the ground that his tenure
appointment was to continue up to 18.9.2000. Since there was a premature
termination of the tenure appointment, claim of compensation for the
balance period from the date of termination of the appointment till
18.9.2000 (which according to him was the last date of the period of
tenure appointment) was made. The writ application was filed before the
Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench. The stand of the appellant before
the learned Single Judge was that there was a Cabinet decision taken to
release salary to the appellant for the balance period which was to be
paid. As the tenure of the appellant could not have been curtailed, he
was entitled to compensation. By judgment dated 27.9.1999 in SB Civil
Writ Petition No.4379 of 1999 the writ petition was dismissed by learned
Single Judge. It was noted that the validity of the Ordinance was not
challenged. Since the Tribunal itself was abolished and all cases
pending before it have been transferred to the High Court, no
interference was called for. It was noted that the exact amount of
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compensation can only be decided by a competent court after taking
evidence of the parties. So far as implementation of the Cabinet
decision is concerned, it was noted that the same was a matter of
discretion of the Government and it was open to the appellant to make a
representation to the concerned authorities. It was not open to the
High Court to enforce the Cabinet decision. The matter was carried in
appeal before the Division Bench which dismissed the same holding that
the learned Single Judge has pronounced a well-reasoned judgment and no
interference is called for.
Learned counsel for the appellant primarily took three stands in
support of the appeal. Firstly, it was submitted that the decision of
the Cabinet was enforceable. In the meeting of the Cabinet four
decisions were taken. They related to: (1) Promulgation of Ordinance,
(2) repatriation of the Technical Member to his parent department (3)
absorption of the members of the staff and (4) payment of compensation
to the appellant. While the first three decisions were implemented; only
the last one relating to payment of compensation was not implemented.
The stand taken by the State Government cannot partake the character of
Government order under Article 166 of the Constitution of India, 1950
(in short ’the Constitution’) is not tenable. Secondly, clause (2) of
Article 310 of the Constitution deals with payment of compensation on
premature cessation of a tenure appointment on the basis of contract to
that effect. Even though there was no contractual prescription for
payment of compensation, that has to be taken as inbuilt requirement in
the spirit of clause (2) of Article 310. There has to be interpretation
of the provisions for giving effect to constitutional mandates. The
decision taken by the Cabinet was in line with the said provision and,
therefore, the High Court was not justified in refusing the grant of
compensation. Finally, since there has been violation of the legitimate
expectation of the appellant to continue till the end of tenure period,
by application of the principle of legitimate expectation the State
Government was bound to pay compensation irrespective of whether there
was any Cabinet decision earlier or not and that would not make any
difference. Section 4(b) of the Ordinance also has relevance in that
context. Any obligation or liability accrued or incurred under the Act
repealed are not be affected by the repeal.
In support of the stands reliance was placed on following
decisions: (L.G. Chaudhari, vs. The Secretary, L.S.G. Dept., Govt. of
Bihar and Others AIR 1980 SC 383, State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. vs.
Kailash Chand Mahajan and Ors. 1992 Supp (2) SCC 351, R. Rajendran and
Ors. etc. etc. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. AIR 1982 SC 1107, State
of A.P. and Ors. vs. Bollapragada Suryanarayana and Ors. 1997 (6) SCC
258, Dr. L.P. Agarwal vs. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1992 SC 1872, Sri
Justice S.K. Ray, vs. State of Orissa and Ors. JT 2003 (1) SC 166).
In response, learned counsel for the State of Rajasthan submitted
that there was no Cabinet decision in the line submitted by the
appellant. Even if there would have been any such Cabinet decision, it
cannot meet the requirement of Government order, as envisaged under
Article 166 of the Constitution. Further the termination of the
appointment came to be effectuated on the basis of legislative action.
Therefore, there is no scope for grant of any compensation. The
decisions relied upon have no application as there were specific
provisions for payment of compensation in the concerned statutes. The
principles of legitimate expectation have no application to the facts of
the case, as are the provisions of Section 4(b) of the Ordinance.
There is no dispute that under sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the
Act, a Judicial Member was to hold office for a term of five years from
the date on which he enters upon the office or till he attains the age
of sixty two years, whichever is later. In view of this undisputed
position, the controversy lies within the very narrow compass.
Article 166 of the Constitution deals with the conduct of
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Government business. The said provision reads as follows:
"166. Conduct of business of the Government of a
State. (1) All executive action of the Government
of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name
of the Governor.
(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in
the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in
such manner as may be specified in rules to be made
by the Governor, and the validity of an order or
instrument which is so authenticated shall not be
called in question on the ground that it is not an
order or instrument made or executed by the Governor.
(3) The Governor shall make rules for the more
convenient transaction of the business of the
Government of the State, and for the allocation among
Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not
business with respect to which the Governor is by or
under this Constitution required to act in his
discretion."
Clause (1) requires that all executive action of the State Government
shall have to be taken in the name of the Governor. Further there is no
particular formula of words required for compliance with Article 166(1).
What the Court has to see is whether the substance of its requirement
has been complied with. A Constitution Bench in R. Chitralekha etc. vs.
State of Mysore and Ors. (AIR 1964 1823) held that the provisions of the
Article were only directory and not mandatory in character and if they
were not complied with it could still be established as a question of
fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government
or the Governor. Clause (1) does not prescribe how an executive action
of the Government is to be performed, it only prescribes the mode under
which such act is to be expressed. While clause (1) in relation to the
mode of expression, clause (2) lays down the ways in which the order is
to be authenticated. Whether there is any Government order in terms of
Article 166, has to be adjudicated from the factual background of each
case. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant
on L.G. Chaudhari (supra) to contend that for all practicable purposes
the decision of Cabinet has to be construed as a Government order,
because three of the decisions taken by the Cabinet have been
implemented. As noted above, learned counsel for the State took the
stand that neither in the writ petition nor before the High Court, the
Cabinet decision itself was produced. In fact, the Cabinet memorandum
and the order of the Cabinet show that no decision was taken to pay any
compensation. In this connection reference is made to the Cabinet
memorandum dated 18.3.1993 and the decision No. 57 of 1999. It was
further submitted that even if it is conceded for the sake of argument
that such decision was taken, the same cannot be enforced by a writ
petition.
We need not delve into the disputed question as to whether there
was any Cabinet decision, as it has not been established that there was
any Government order in terms of Article 166 of the Constitution. The
Constitution requires that action must be taken by the authority
concerned in the name of the Governor. It is not till this formality is
observed that the action can be regarded as that of the State.
Constitutionally speaking the Council of Ministers are advisors and as
the head of the State, the Governor is to act with the aid or advice of
the Council of Ministers. Therefore, till the advice is accepted by the
Governor, views of the Council of Ministers does not get crystalised
into action of the State. (See: The State of Punjab vs. Sodhi Sukhdev
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Singh AIR 1961 SC 493, Bachhittar Singh vs. State of Punjab and Anr. AIR
1963 SC 395). That being so, the first plea of the appellant is
rejected.
Coming to the plea relating to clause (2) of Article 310, it has
to be noted that compensation is payable for premature termination of
contractual service. The clause is only an enabling provision which
empowers the Governor to enter into the contract with specially
qualified person(s) providing for payment of compensation where no
compensation is payable under the doctrine "service at the pleasure of
the State". In the absence of any specific term regarding
compensation, it cannot be countenanced that the intention was to pay
it. Had there been an inbuilt requirement to pay compensation as
contended by the appellant, there was no necessity for specifically
incorporating a provision in that regard. A bare reading of clause (2)
makes it clear that there can be a stipulation for payment of
compensation in the contract to a person who is holding a civil post
under the Union or a State, if before the expiry of an agreed period
that post is abolished or he is, for reasons not connected with any
misconduct on his part, required to vacate the post. Being an enabling
provision in the matter of payment of compensation on the basis of a
contractual obligation, it cannot be said that even when there is no
stipulation in a contract of employment, the same is implicit.
Submission of learned counsel that such a provision is inbuilt and
has to be read into the Act and the Ordinance is clearly unacceptable.
It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The
elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to
gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.
Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the
words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a
particular thought. The task is not easy as the "language" is often
misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The
tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation
the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be
approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as
the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so
far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret
it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the
law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only
by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of
law-making.
Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is necessary that it
is expressed in clear and unambiguous language. In spite of Courts
saying so, the draftsmen have paid little attention and they still boast
of the old British jingle "I am the parliamentary draftsman. I compose
the country’s laws. And of half of the litigation, I am undoubtedly the
cause", which was referred to by this Court in Palace Admn. Board v.
Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran (AIR 1980 SC 1187 at. P.1195). In Kirby
v. Leather (1965 (2) All ER 441) the draftsmen were severely criticized
in regard to Section 22(2)(b) of the (UK) Limitation Act, 1939, as it
was said that the section was so obscure that the draftsmen must have
been of unsound mind.
Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there
is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly
conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon
itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In
that situation the Judges should not proclaim that they are playing the
role of a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They
have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates
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adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or
erased. This can be vouchsafed by "an alert recognition of the
necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance
to do so". (See: Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes in "Essays on Jurisprudence", Columbia Law Review, P.51.)
It is true that this Court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys
a freedom which is not available in interpreting a statute and,
therefore, it will be useful at this stage to reproduce what Lord
Diplock said in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs (1980 (1) ALL ER 529, at p.
542):
"It endangers continued public confidence in
the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is
essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if
Judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide
their own preferred amendments to statutes which
experience of their operation has shown to have had
consequences that members of the court before whom
the matter comes consider to be injurious to public
interest."
Where, therefore, the "language" is clear, the intention of the
legislature is to be gathered from the language used. What is to be
borne in mind is as to what has been said in the statute as also what
has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support,
addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of
words, has to be avoided, unless it is covered by the rule of exception,
including that of necessity, which is not the case here. (See: Gwalior
Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests (AIR
1990 SC 1747 at p. 1752); Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn.
(AIR 1966 SC 1678 at p. 1682); A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak
(1984 (2) SCC 500, at pp. 518, 519)]. Indeed, the Court cannot reframe
the legislation as it has no power to legislate. [See State of Kerala v.
Mathai Verghese (1986 (4) SCC 746, at p. 749); Union of India v. Deoki
Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96 at p.101)
The decision in Dr. L.P. Agarwal (supra) is also of no assistance
to the appellant because the issues involved was whether in respect of
tenure post concept of superannuation is applicable and the consequences
of premature retirement. In that context direction was given for payment
of arrears of salary etc. The issues were entirely different and,
therefore, that decision has no application.
The decision in R. Rajendran and Ors. etc. etc. (supra) revolves
around altogether different controversy. That related to doctrine of
pleasure incorporated under Article 310. It was, inter alia, observed in
the said case that the power to abolish a civil post is inherent in the
right to create it. The Government has power subject of course to the
constitutional provisions to reorganize a department to provide
efficiencies and to bring about economy. It can abolish an office in
good faith. It was further held in that case that the abolition of the
post of village officers was sought to be achieved by a piece of
legislation passed by the State legislature. Want of good faith or
modalities cannot be attributed to a legislature. The only question to
be considered was whether the legislature is a colorable one lacking in
legislative competence or whether it transgresses any of the
constitutional limitations. The plea that there was violation of Article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution was negatived as the Act did not affect
right of any of the incumbent of the posts to carry on any occupation of
their choice, even though they may not be able to stick on to the post
which they were holding.
So far as Kailash Chand Mahajan and Ors. (supra) is concerned,
there was a specific provision regarding payment of compensation in the
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said case. That makes a great deal of difference.
The decision in State of A.P. and Ors. vs. Bollapragada
Suryanarayana and Ors. (supra) does not in any way assist the appellant
and, in fact, is one which goes against him. That case related to
abolition of posts by legislation. In the said case also there was a
provision for compensation specifically indicated in Section 5 of the
A.P. Abolition of Posts of Part-time Village Officers Act, 1985. As
indicated in the case of Kailash Chand Mahajan and Ors. (supra) clear
stipulation in the Act makes a difference. There is no specific
provision for payment of compensation in the present case.
The relevant observations appeared at paragraph 5 of the judgment
in Bollapragada’s case reads as follows:
"It is contended by the State that the
respondents are not entitled to gratuity or the
benefit of the Family Benefit Scheme because the
posts of part-time Village Officers have been
abolished under the said Act. The Gratuity Scheme
under GOMs dated 18.4.1980 provides, inter alia, for
payment of gratuity to the Village Officer at the
time of demitting office after attaining the age of
58 years after giving notice to the appointing
authority. Therefore, the Gratuity Scheme expressly
provides for the manner of demitting office on
attaining the age of 58 years, or 60 years, as the
case may be. It is only when the office is demitted
in the manner set out in the Scheme that gratuity
under the said GOMs becomes payable. The office is
required to be demitted by the holder concerned after
giving a notice to the appointing authority. This
clearly contemplates a voluntary relinguishment of
office on attaining the specified age. There is no
retirement age for this office. This provision would
not apply when, by legislation, the posts are
abolished. In such a situation there is no question
of voluntary demitting of office after notice. The
provisions of the said GOMs, therefore, cannot be
attracted when the posts are abolished by
legislation. This is precisely the reason why under
Section 5 of the said Act, a provision for
compensation has been made, which the respondents
have received."
One of the pleas of the appellant was with reference to Section
4(b) of the Ordinance, which reads as under:
"4. Savings The repeal made under Section 3 shall
not affect
(a) the previous operation of the Act so repealed or
anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(b) any obligation or liability accrued or incurred
under the Act so repealed; or
xxx xxx xxx"
The said provision also does not in any way assist the appellant
because there is no obligation or liability accrued or incurred under
the repealed Act to pay compensation. There was no obligation or
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liability fixed under the Act for payment of compensation.
The decision in Sri Justice S.K.Ray vs. State of Orissa and Ors.
(JT 2003 (1) SC 166) is also distinguishable on facts. In that case
under the scheme of the enactment under which the appellant was
appointed, there was a bar on the appointee to hold any office of trust
or profit and also there was bar on his acting as a member of the
legislature, Central or State or any other position which may come in
conflict with the office of Lokpal. There was provision also that he
cannot hold any office even after he ceases to hold the office of
Lokpal. There were these disabilities attached to him for all time to
come after ceasing to hold office. In the instant case there is no such
provision, and on the contrary in the Ordinance Section 6 provides as
follows:
"6. FURTHER EMPLOYMENT OF CHAIRMAN AND MEMBER,
-
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (7)
of Section 3 of the repealed Act, the Chairman or any
other member of the Tribunal shall not be ineligible
for further employment under the State Government or
under any local authority or under any corporation
owned or controlled by the State Government."
What remains to be considered is the plea of legitimate
expectation. The principle of ’legitimate expectation’ is still at a
stage of evolution as pointed out in De Smith Administrative Law (5th
Edn. Para 8.038). The principle is at the root of the rule of law and
requires regularity, predictability and certainty in governments’
dealings with the public. Adverting to the basis of legitimate
expectation its procedural and substantive aspects, Lord Steyn in
Pierson v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (1997 (3) All ER
577, at p.606)(HL) goes back to Dicey’s description of the rule of law
in his "Introduction to the study of the Law of the Constitution" (10th
Edn. 1968 p.203) as containing principles of enduring value in the work
of a great jurist. Dicey said that the constitutional rights have roots
in the common law. He said:
"The ’rule of law’, lastly, may be used as a
formula for expressing the fact that with us, the law
of constitution, the rules which in foreign countries
naturally form part of a constitutional code, are not
the source but the consequence of the rights of
individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts;
that, in short, the principles of private law have
with us been by the action of the courts and
Parliament so extended as to determine the position of
the Crown and its servants; thus the constitution is
the result of the ordinary law of the land".
This, says Lord Steyn, is the pivot of Dicey’s discussion of rights to
personal freedom and to freedom of association and of public meeting and
that it is clear that Dicey regards the rule of law as having both
procedural and substantive effects. "The rule of law enforces minimum
standards of fairness, both substantive and procedural". On the facts
in Pierson, the majority held that the Secretary of State could not have
maintained a higher tariff of sentence that recommended by the judiciary
when admittedly no aggravating circumstances existed. The State could
not also increase the tariff with retrospective effect.
The basic principles in this branch relating to ’legitimate
expectation’ were enunciated by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service
Unions and Ors. v. Minister for the Civil Service (1985 AC 374 (408-409)
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(Commonly known as CCSU case). It was observed in that case that for a
legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative
authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or
advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the
decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be
permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to him
some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an
opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the
decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first
an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not
be withdrawn. The procedural part of it relates to a representation that
a hearing or other appropriate procedure will be afforded before the
decision is made. The substantive part of the principle is that if a
representation is made that a benefit of a substantive nature will be
granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit that it
will be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could
be enforced. In the above case, Lord Fraser accepted that the civil
servants had a legitimate expectation that they would be consulted
before their trade union membership was withdrawn because prior
consultation in the past was the standard practice whenever conditions
of service were significantly altered. Lord Diplock went a little
further, when he said that they had a legitimate expectation that they
would continue to enjoy the benefits of the trade union membership, the
interest in regard to which was protectable. An expectation could be
based on an express promise or representation or by established past
action or settled conduct. The representation must be clear and
unambiguous. It could be a representation to the individual or
generally to class of persons.
Even so, it has been held under English law that the decision
maker’s freedom to change the policy in public interest, cannot be
fettered by the application of the principle of substantive legitimate
expectation. Observations in earlier cases project a more inflexible
rule than is in vogue presently. In R. v. IRC, ex p Preston (1985 AC
835) the House of Lords rejected the plea that the altered policy
relating to parole for certain categories of prisoners required prior
consultation with the prisoner, Lord Scarman observed:
"But what was their legitimate expectation.
Given the substance and purpose of the legislative
provisions governing parole, the most that a convicted
prisoner can legitimately expect is that his case be
examined individually in the light of whatever policy
the Secretary of State sees fit to adopt provided
always that the adopted policy is a lawful exercise of
the discretion conferred upon him by the statute. Any
other view would entail the conclusion that the
unfettered discretion conferred by statute upon the
minister can in some cases by restricted so as to
hamper or even to prevent changes of policy."
To a like effect are the observations of Lord Diplock in Hughes
vs. Department of Health and Social Security (HL) 1985 AC 776 (788):
"Administrative policies may change with changing
circumstances, including changes in the political
complexion of governments. The liberty to make such
changes is something that is inherent in our
constitutional form of government."
Before we do so, we shall refer to some of the important decisions
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of this Court to find out the extent to which the principle of
substantive legitimate expectation is accepted in our country. In
Navjyoti Co-op. Group Housing Society vs. Union of India (1992 (4) SCC
477), the principle of procedural fairness was applied. In that case the
seniority as per the existence list of co-operative housing societies
for allotment of land was altered by subsequent decision. The previous
policy was that the seniority amongst housing societies in regard to
allotment of land was to be based on the date of registration of the
society with the Registrar. But on 20.1.1990, the policy was changed by
reckoning seniority as based upon the date of approval of the final list
by the Registrar. This altered the existing seniority of the societies
for allotment of land. This Court held that the societies were entitled
to a ’legitimate expectation’ that the past consistent practice in the
matter of allotment will be followed even if there was no right in
private law for such allotment. The authority was not entitled to
defeat the legitimate expectation of the societies as per the previous
seniority list without some overriding reason of public policy as to
justify change in the criterion. No such overriding public interest was
shown. According to the principle of ’legitimate expectation’, if the
authority proposed to defeat a person’s legitimate expectation, it
should afford him an opportunity to make a representation in the matter.
Reference was made to Halsbury’s Laws of England (p.151, Vol.1 (1) (4th
Ed. re-issue) and to the CCSU case. It was held that the doctrine
imposed, in essence, a duty on public authority to act fairly by taking
into consideration all relevant factors, relating to such legitimate
expectation. Within the contours of fair dealing, the reasonable
opportunity to make representation against change of policy came in.
Lastly we come to the three-judge Bench judgment in National
Building Construction Corporation vs. S. Raghunathan & Others. (1998 (7)
SCC 66). This case has more relevance to the present case, as it was
also a service matter. The respondents were appointed in CPWD and they
went on deputation to the NBCC in Iraq and they opted to draw, while on
deputation, their grade pay in CPWD plus deputation allowance. Besides
that, the NBCC granted them Foreign Allowance at 125% of the basic pay.
Meanwhile their Basic Pay in CPWD was revised w.e.f. 1.1.1986 on the
recommendation of the 4th Pay Commission. They contended that the above-
said increase of 125% should be given by NBCC on their revised scales.
This was not accepted by NBCC by orders dated 15.10.1990. The
contention of the respondents based on legitimate expectation was
rejected in view of the peculiar conditions under which NBCC was working
in Iraq. It was observed that the doctrine of ’legitimate expectation’
had both substantive and procedural aspects. This Court laid down a
clear principle that claims on legitimate expectation required reliance
on representation and resultant detriment in the same way as claims
based on promissory estoppel. The principle was developed in the
context of ’reasonableness’ and in the context of ’natural justice’.
The principles of legitimate expectation have no application to
the facts of the present case.
Looking at from any angle the appeal is devoid of any merit and
deserves dismissal, which we direct.