Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 2751 of 2006
PETITIONER:
State of Haryana & Ors.
RESPONDENT:
M/s AGM Management Services Ltd
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/06/2006
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & ALTAMAS KABIR
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 9913 of 2006)
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Leave granted.
The State of Haryana, Deputy Commissioner-cum-
Collector, Faridabad and the Sub-Registrar, Faridabad call in
question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by which Civil Writ
Petition No.167 of 2006 filed by the respondnt was disposed
of.
The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition with the
following direction :
"The only prayer of the petitioner at this
stage is that the present matter be disposed of
by the respondents by keeping in mind the
order of this Court appended as Annexure P-7
with application. We accordingly issue a
direction to the respondents that necessary
exercise be completed within a period of four
months from the date that a certified copy of
this order is supplied to them."
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the High
Court without indicating as to how the order of the High Court
in an earlier case in Ramesh Chand and Ors. v. The Registrar-
cum-Deputy Commissioner, Jind & Ors. i.e C.W.P. No.14360
of 2005 had any relevance so far as the dispute raised by the
respondent No.1 before it. According to him the judgment in
CWP No. 14360 of 2005 related to refusal to register the sale
deed on two grounds. The present case, according to the
learned counsel for the appellant, does not relate to a refusal
to register the sale deed. By the impugned letter dated
21.12.2005, the respondent was required to obtain "No
objection certificate" from the office of the District and Town
Planner, Faridabad. The High Court, therefore, was not
justified in giving the directions as noted above.
In response, learned counsel for the respondents
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submitted that though the letter dated 21.12.2005 appears to
be innocuous, in a sense that relates to refusal of registration.
Reference is made to Section 7(A) of the Haryana Development
and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (in short the ’Act’) to
substantiate the stand.
We find that the High Court has not even indicated as to
the applicability of the decision in Ramesh Chand’s case
(supra) to the facts of the present case.
The Courts should not place reliance on decisions
without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with
the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.
Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s
theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken
out of their context. These observations must be read in the
context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments
of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret
words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become
necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but
the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges
interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They
interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v.
Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:
"The matter cannot, of course, be settled
merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of
Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of
Parliament and applying the rules of
interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not
to detract from the great weight to be given to
the language actually used by that most
distinguished judge."
In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294)
Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin’s speech.....is not to be treated as
if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in
new circumstances." Megarry, J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062
observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved
judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament."
And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR
537) Lord Morris said:
"There is always peril in treating the
words of a speech or judgment as though they
are words in a legislative enactment, and it is
to be remembered that judicial utterances
made in the setting of the facts of a particular
case."
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact
may make a world of difference between conclusions in two
cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a
decision is not proper.
The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of
applying precedents have become locus classicus:
"Each case depends on its own facts and
a close similarity between one case and
another is not enough because even a single
significant detail may alter the entire aspect,
in deciding such cases, one should avoid the
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temptation to decide cases (as said by
Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case
against the colour of another. To decide,
therefore, on which side of the line a case
falls, the broad resemblance to another case
is not at all decisive."
*
"Precedent should be followed only so far
as it marks the path of justice, but you must
cut the dead wood and trim off the side
branches else you will find yourself lost in
thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the
path to justice clear of obstructions which
could impede it."
As noted above, the High Court has not even discussed
as to how the decision in Ramesh Chand’s case (supra) had
any similarity to the facts of the present case.
In the aforesaid background we set aside the order of the
High Court and remit the matter for a fresh hearing in
accordance with law. We make it clear we have not expressed
any opinion on the merits of the case.
Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that
similar cases are pending in the High Court awaiting decision
in this case. Therefore, it would be proper that the writ
petition is disposed of finally.
Keeping in view the aforesaid submission, we request the
High Court to dispose of the writ petition as early as possible.
The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.