KESHAV CHANDER THAKUR & ANR. vs. KRISHAN CHANDER & ORS.

Case Type: Regular First Appeal Original Side

Date of Judgment: 19-05-2014

Preview image for KESHAV CHANDER THAKUR & ANR.  vs.  KRISHAN CHANDER & ORS.

Full Judgment Text

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment Reserved on : April 16,2014
Judgment Pronounced on : May 19, 2014

+ RFA(OS) 86/2013

KESHAV CHANDER THAKUR & ANR. .... Appellants
Represented by: Mr.Sanjay Jain, Senior Advocate
instructed by Mr.Keshav Thakur,
Ms.Noor Anand, Mr.Bhupesh Narula
and Mr.Sarfaraz Ahmed, Advocates.

versus

KRISHAN CHANDER & ORS. .... Respondents
Represented by: Mr.Samar Singh Kachwaha,
Advocate with Mr.Raghvendra
Mohan Bajaj, Advocate.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT NATH

JAYANT NATH, J.

1. The present appeal is filed challenging the order dated May 24,2013
passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the application filed by
defendant No.1/respondent No.1 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, being IA
No.13394/2011, was allowed and the plaint was rejected.
2. The appellants filed the suit seeking a decree for partition of
properties B-11, Krishna Niwas, West End Colony, New Delhi and 245-A,
Puran Nagar, Jammu (Tawi), Jammu and Kashmir and other connected
reliefs.
3. It is averred in the plaint that the parties to the present suit are legal
RFA(OS)86/2013 Page 1 of 21


heirs of late Lt.Col.Dina Nath and late Smt.Krishna Thakur. Appellants are
legal representatives of their deceased son late Major Puran Chander i.e. the
son and widow. Respondents No.1 to 3 are the sons while respondents No.4
to 6 are the daughters of late Lt. Col.Dina Nath and Smt. Krishna Thakur. It
is urged that late Lt.Col.Dina Nath from his own funds, funds received from
the LIC Policy upon the demise of the father of appellant No.1 and funds
received from sale of ancestral properties situated in District Poonch, Jammu
and Kashmir constructed the aforesaid two immovable properties. The father
of appellant No.1 and husband of appellant No.2 expired in 1965 in the Indo
Pak conflict. Based on the above facts, it is averred that each of the
th
respondent and the appellants have 1/7 share in the two properties and
hence the suit for partition.
4. Respondent No.1 filed the written statement in the suit stating that
there is gross suppression of material facts by the appellants in the plaint. It
is stated that on April 21, 1975 Respondent No.3 herein filed a suit for
partition titled Suresh Chander versus Lt. Col. Dina Nath and Others before
Principal & District Judge, Jammu. Appellant No.1 through appellant No.2,
as his guardian was arrayed as a party to the suit. By consent of the parties
the suit was decreed. A Local Commissioner was appointed to recommend
partition. The Jammu property as per report of the Local Commissioner was
divided into three parts, one part falling to the share of respondent No.2, one
to the share of Respondent No.3 and one to the share of appellant No.1. The
report further stated that the Delhi property would devolve entirely upon
respondent No.1. A final decree in terms of the report of the Local
Commissioner was passed on March 30, 1976 which has become final and is
binding on the parties. The sisters of respondents No. 1 to 3 i.e. respondents
No.4 to 6 did not claim any share in the two properties. It is urged that
RFA(OS)86/2013 Page 2 of 21


appellant No.1 has been enjoying the sole exclusive ownership over his
separate share of property in Jammu. He has even been collecting rent by
letting out different portions of the suit property in Jammu which had fallen
to his share in the partition decree. All these facts it is averred have been
mischievously and malafidely suppressed in the plaint.
5. Regarding the Delhi property it is further urged that the said property
measuring 800 sq.yards was purchased in 1961 by Smt.Krishna Thakur. In
1966 Smt.Krishna Thakur wrote to DDA requesting for transfer of her rights
in the said property in favour of respondent No.1. On August 31, 1970
DDA accepted the request of Smt.Krishna Thakur. Accordingly, on
December 11, 1970, a perpetual sub-lease was made and executed in favour
of Respondent No.1 which was duly registered in accordance with law. It is
urged that by virtue of execution and registration of the sub-lease dated
December 11, 1970, respondent No.1 become the sole, absolute and
exclusive owner of the said property in Delhi. He has been enjoying
undisputed ownership rights in the property since 1971. He has let out
various portions of the property in accordance with law and has been
collecting rents continuously. He has also been paying all relevant statutory
government dues and taxes in relation to the said property. The decree of
the Jammu Court continued this position.
6. On the basis of the above averments the said written statement raises
various pleas i.e. that the plaint filed suffers from gross suppression, the suit
is barred by doctrine of resjudicata, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain
the suit, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation and appropriate court fee
has not been paid. Respondents 2, 3 and 4 to 6 have also respectively filed
their written statement. They have supported the stand of respondent No.1.
7. After filing of the written statement the appellant moved an
RFA(OS)86/2013 Page 3 of 21


application IA No.22835 of 2012 under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking
amendment of the plaint. In the application for amendment it was averred
that the appellant was unaware of the alleged partition decree dated March
30,1976 or of the sub-lease dated December 11, 1970 till the same were
produced before this Court by defendant No.1 alongwith the written
statement. Hence, various amendments are sought in the plaint including
addition of prayers to declare decree dated March 30,1976 passed by the
District Judge, Jammu, in the suit titled Suresh Chandra versus Lt.Col.Dina
Nath and the Local Commissioner’s report filed in the suit as void ab initio
and to also declare the sub-lease dated December 11,1970 executed by
DDA in favour of respondent No.1 as void ab initio and non est.
8. Respondent No.1 also filed the application under Order VII Rule 11
CPC for rejection of the plaint.
9. The learned Single Judge heard arguments on both the applications
i.e. application for amendment of the plaint and for rejection of the plaint.
By the impugned order the application for rejection of the plaint has been
allowed. Regarding the application for amendment, the Court was of the
opinion that even if the case set up by the appellant by way of amendment is
taken on record the averments in the plaint are farfetched, untenable and
unsustainable in law and no purpose would be served in putting the said
claim to trial. Rather the order further notes that it would be a disservice to
the family settlement of 1976.
10. The learned Single Judge rejected the contention of the appellant that
the decree passed by the Jammu Court dated March 30, 1976 is null and
void as no guardian was appointed for the appellant who was then a minor.
For the said purpose the learned Single Judge relied upon Order XXXII Rule
3A CPC and the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High
RFA(OS)86/2013 Page 4 of 21


Court in the case reported as AIR 1974 P&H 315 Amrik Singh & Anr. vs.
Karnail Singh & Ors. and judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case
reported as (2001)2GLR 1348 , Sarjubhai Kantilal Patel vs. Bikhubhai
Maganbhai Patel . The court was further of the view that the status which
had prevailed in the family for the last 35 years should not be permitted to
be changed on technicalities. It also noted that the appellant has not been
able to dispute that he has been dealing with the Jammu property exclusively
as absolute owner without interference from other family members and that
similarly other family members have also been dealing with the portion of
the property which fell to their share as per family settlement.
11. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has strenuously
urged that the impugned order is liable to be set aside. He has urged that the
decree of the Jammu Court dated March 30, 1976 is a complete nullity. It
has been urged that the first time the appellant came to know about the
decree is when the same was mentioned by respondent No.1 in the written
statement filed in the present suit and a copy thereof was filed along with the
written statement. It is further urged that the distribution of Jammu property
as stated in the decree causes prejudice to the appellant as he has got a much
smaller percentage as compared to the other members of the family. He has
further urged that appellant No.2 was neither made a party to the Jammu suit
nor any summons were issued to her on behalf of the minor appellant No.1.
She has not signed the vakalatnama and/or authorized anyone to appear on
their behalf. The entire proceedings were collusive. No guardian for the
minor appellant No.1 was appointed under Order XXXII Rule 3 CPC. It is
urged that the impugned order has wrongly taken the knowledge of the
appellant of the decree to be 35 years old. Knowledge about the decree of
the Jammu Court is from the date of the filing of the written statement. The
RFA(OS)86/2013 Page 5 of 21


same is said to be the position regarding the Delhi property as the appellants
learnt about the perpetual sub lease only on filing of the written statement by
respondent No.1. It is further urged that Order XXXII Rule 3A CPC is not
attracted.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has strongly refuted
the contentions of the appellant .
13. He submits that various documents placed on record by the
respondents clearly and unequivocally demonstrate that the appellant had
full knowledge about the suit for partition and the decree passed therein on
March 30, 1976 by the Jammu court. Reliance is placed on a communication
dated March 01, 2007 said to have been written by the appellant to the
Deputy Commissioner, Jammu and AEE, Assessing Authority Bahu Plaza,
Jammu regarding assessment of House No.245-A, Puran Nagar, Jammu
along with which communication the appellant as proof of ownership
attached copy of the decree sheet of the District and Sessions Judge, Jammu
passed on March 30, 1976 and the partition recommended by the Local
Commissioner. As per the respondent these documents were made available
based on an application filed under the RTI Act, 2005. It is further urged
that when the respondents sought to get a copy of the lease deed executed by
the appellant for the Jammu property under the RTI Act, the appellant No.1
objected to the same claiming that there exists no rent agreement which may
be valid in law and that the request of the respondent amounts to invasion of
his right to privacy. Hence the department concerned did not give a copy of
the lease deed to the respondent. It is further urged that the appellant had
also attested a photocopy of the Local Commissioner’s report based on
which the partition had taken place in Jammu court and had handed over the
same to respondent No.1. That document has been placed on record in the
RFA(OS)86/2013 Page 6 of 21


present appeal. He further submits that the appellants have been enjoying the
portion of Jammu property that has fallen to their share exclusively. They
have been renting out the property that has fallen to their share and enjoying
the fruits thereof exclusively and cannot back out to claim ignorance about
the decree dated March 30, 1976 and the partition effected thereof.
14. On the basis of these documents and conduct of the appellant it is
stated that the appellant all along knew about the decree passed by the
Jammu court. It is strongly urged that even otherwise appellant No.1
attained majority in 1984. He is a practicing advocate. The present suit filed
26 years after having attained majority is misconceived and nothing but an
abuse of the process of the court.
15. It is further urged that it is the case of appellant No.1 himself that his
grandfather late Lt.Col.Dina Na th treated him with love and affection and
brought him up. It is stated that admittedly the grandfather was also a party
to the Jammu Suit. It is inconceivable that he would not have taken care to
protect the interest of the appellant. The grandfather is said to have died in
19 9 4 , 18 years after the decree was passed. Hence, it is urged that the
decree passed by the court is legal and valid.
16. Regarding the West End Property in New Delhi, it is stated that the
property was originally allotted to Mrs.Krishna Thakur, the mother of the
respondents and grandmother of appellant No.1. In 1966 Smt.Krishna
Thakur wrote to DDA requesting that the allotment be changed in favour of
respondent No.1. DDA accepted the request of by letter dated August 31,
1970. The perpetual sub-lease was executed and registered in favour of
respondent No.1 on December 11, 1970. It is urged that thereafter
respondent No.1 has constructed the house and has been in possession of the
said property and has been utilizing the same as exclusive owner to the
RFA(OS)86/2013 Page 7 of 21


exclusion of all the brothers and sisters including the appellant. He has also
been renting out a part of the property and is exclusively enjoying the rent
without any objection or protest.
Learned counsel further submits that none of the other children of late
Lt.Col.Dina Nath has any objection whatsoever to the settlement that was
worked out and bifurcation of the family estates that has taken place by
means of the Jammu decree or otherwise. Hence it is urged that the present
suit is an utterly frivolous suit filed at a very belated stage is hopelessly
barred by limitation and the impugned order has validly dismissed the same.
17. We will first deal with the challenge of the appellant to the decree
passed by the Jammu court dated March 30, 1976. As per the appellant, the
decree is null and void as appellant No.2 who was impleaded as a guardian
of appellant No.1, who was then a minor, was never served and never
entered appearance nor signed any vakalatnama, though the court passed a
consent decree. Another contention that is raised, which is presumably a
contention in the alternative is that even otherwise there is no compliance of
Order 32 CPC which is a mandatory procedure. No application was moved
for appointment of a guardian of the minor and no guardian was appointed
under Order 32 Rule 3 CPC to represent the minor applicant. Reliance is
placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1968 SC 954 Ram
Chander vs. Man Singh to contend that if there is violation of the provisions
of Order XXXII Rule 3 CPC, the consequent decree passed is void.
18. We will first deal with the first contention of the appellant, namely,
that appellant No.2 though a party as guardian of appellant No.1 was never
served and neither entered appearance nor signed any vakalatnama. It is
strongly contended in the proposed amendment to the plaint that the
appellants were not aware of the court proceedings in Jammu at all and were
RFA(OS)86/2013 Page 8 of 21


not represented by anybody.
19. However, having made these averments, the appellant have failed to
place on record anything to substantiate the said contentions. The record of
the Jammu suit which is placed on record shows a contrary picture. The
appellants themselves have placed on record copies of the ordersheets of the
hearing that have taken place in the Jammu suit on various dates. These
proceedings sheets are in urdu and translated copies have been placed on
record. The Court proceedings show the presence being marked for counsel
for defendants in the Jammu Suit (which include appellant No.2) on various
dates. On 27.3.1976 statements of advocates for the parties are recorded
accepting the report of the Local Commissioner appointed to partition the
properties. The presence of Mr.Vinod Chopra, Advocate, is noted who has
signed as counsel for defendants of the Jammu Suit (including appellant
No.2). These documents suggest that appellant No.2 was being represented
in court. Appellants have not placed anything on record to even prima facie
show that appellant No.2 was not served the summons in the Jammu suit or
did not sign the vakalatnama. Official records of court proceedings cannot
be brushed aside in this manner 35 years after the decree was passed.
20. Apart from the above infirmity, in our view undisputed facts on
record show that the appellants were aware of the proceedings of the Jammu
Court. The stand of the appellant on record shows that the appellant has
been enjoying the fruits of the decree of the Jammu Court. A categorical
averment is made in the written statement of defendant No.1 that the
appellant has been enjoying the benefits of the decree since 1984. This
averment is further elaborated in reply to IA No.22835/2012 (an application
filed by the appellant for amendment of the plaint under Order VI Rule 17
CPC). Respondent No.1 in the said reply has categorically stated that the
RFA(OS)86/2013 Page 9 of 21


appellant have re-constructed the house on the portion of the Jammu
property that has fallen to his share and has since the past many decades
been renting out the same and collecting rentals to the exclusion of all other
parties herein. Reliance is also placed on a document obtained from the
District Soil Conservation Officer, Jammu obtained under the RTI Act.
Relevant portion of the said reply of respondent No.1 to IA No.22835/2012
reads as follows:-
“1.1 …. The Plaintiff No.1 re-constructed a house on the said
portion and has since the past many decades been renting out
the same and collecting rentals to the exclusion of all other
parties herein. Apart from other evidence to the plaintiff’s
knowledge of the 1976 Jammu Partition Decree, there exists on
the record a document, which clearly shows beyond a shadow
of a doubt that the Plaintiffs knew about the said decree before
filing of the present Suit. This document is a letter obtained
under the RTI Act, from a tenant of the Plaintiff No.1, namely
The District Soil Conservation Officer, Department of Soil
Conservation, Jammu. The said letter is dated 01.03.2007 and
bears the signature of the Plaintiff No.1. It is addressed by the
said Plaintiff to his tenant, and includes attached therein all
relevant documents of the 1976 Jammu Partition Decree,
including the final decree sheet, judgment, layout maps etc. The
documents obtained from the District Soil Conservation officer,
Department of Soil Conservation, Jammu under the RTI Act
have already been placed on record and are also attached
herein as Annexure R-1 for ease of reference. …”

21. The appellant in his rejoinder to the said reply has denied carrying out
any construction. However, regarding renting out of the property which has
fallen to his share and enjoying the benefits thereof he submits as follows:-
“7…. The alleged documents produced by the defendant No.1
under the RTI were not filed by the plaintiffs before the concern
Government Authority. The said documents were filed by
defendant No.2 who was already in possession of the said
documents and had rented the ancestral house to the same
department namely District Oil Conservation Office, Jammu
RFA(OS)86/2013 Page 10 of 21


Sometime in year 2006. That in March 2007 the same
department took the first floor of Jammu premises on rent
which was at the behest of defendant No.2 who prevailed upon
the plaintiffs to give the first floor on rent for their stock
keeping as the department was short of space and were
threatening to leave the said premises and thereafter, the said
department used the said premises for a short time. When the
department insisted for assessment of the premises it was at the
behest of defendant No.2 that the said letter requesting the
department to assess the Jammu premises at first floor and
along with the proof of ownership which pertains to water bills,
election documents and a map of only portion of land that had
to be assessed and the actual building map but nothing
happened as the Government department shifted out of the said
premises while retained the main ancestral house wherein
defendant No.2 has been illegally collecting rent till date.”

22. The document in question, namely, the letter which appellant No.1
admits to have sent to the concerned department of the State of Jammu &
Kashmir reads as follows:-
“To

1) The Deputy Commissioner
Mub-Circular Road,
Jammu.

2) AEE,
Assessing Authority,
Bahu Plaza, Jammu.

Subject: Assessment of House at 245-A, Puran Nagar, Jammu.

Sir,

My house at 245-A, Puran Nagar, Post Office Lane, Jammu has
been given on rent to the Directorate of Soil Conservation
Department, J&K District Govt. of J&K and the assessment
needs to be carried out now.

RFA(OS)86/2013 Page 11 of 21


Enclosed please find photocopy of papers of Ownership and the
maps along with measurement thereto which have been rented
out to the Department w.e.f. 15.2.2007.

I request you to kindly assess my house and inform me the due
date when your team can inspect and measure the rented
portion so that I can send someone to assist you.

Thanking you

Keshav Thakur
R/o 245-A, Puran Nagar,
Jammu (Tawi),
J&K-180 005.
Tele No.191-2540234

CC 1) The Estate Officer,
Directorate of Soil Conservation Department,
J&K District-Jammu:- For information and for getting
the house assessed.
Encl- 1) Ownership Papers.
2) Maps .”

23. There is a strong controversy as to what documents were sent by the
appellant along with the aforesaid admitted communication to the concerned
department to show ownership of the appellant. As per the respondent it was
a copy of the decree sheet of the Jammu Court along with the partition as
done by the Local Commissioner appointed by the Jammu Court. The
appellant has strongly refuted the same and states that he had only annexed
certain electricity bills and electoral roll documents. However, for the
purpose of the present adjudication we may ignore the annexures to the said
document as it is not appropriate for this court to go into the said issue while
adjudicating upon an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
24. The pleadings of IA No.22835/2012 as reproduced above and the
admitted document being letter dated March 01, 2007 sent by the appellant
RFA(OS)86/2013 Page 12 of 21


to the Jammu & Kashmir State Government unequivocally show that there is
no denial of the fact that the appellant has been renting out the property in
Jammu and has been utilizing the rents thereof for his own exclusive use and
to the exclusion of the alleged co-owners. The communication also clearly
shows that the appellants refers to the area given on rent as his own
property. Even otherwise, if the property was joint, there was no reason to
have rented out the property only with the consent of the appellant. It would
have needed the consent of all the co-owners of the suit property some of
whom are admittedly residing in the said suit property. There is no
explanation given by the appellants in their pleadings as to how they have
been renting a portion of the property in Jammu to the exclusion of others
and as to how they have been referring to the said portion of the property as
their own property to the exclusion of other alleged co-owners.
25. In the background of these facts one cannot help but concluding that
the contentions of the appellant regarding having no knowledge of the
decree passed by the Jammu Court is incorrect and without any merits
whatsoever. Based on the pleadings and the admitted document we conclude
that appellants had knowledge about the decree of the Jammu Court.
26. The next contention sought to be raised by the appellant regarding the
Jammu Court decree is non-compliance of Order 32 Rule 3 CPC. It is
submitted that as no guardian was appointed for appellant No.1, who was a
minor and a party to the suit the decree is a nullity.
27. Reference may be had to the statutory provisions which read as
under:-
SUIT BY OR AGAINST MINORS AND PERSONS OF
UNSOUND MIND
3. Guardian for the suit to be appointed by Court for minor
defendant
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(1) Where the defendant is a minor the Court, on being satisfied
of the fact of his minority, shall appoint a proper person to be
guardian for the suit for such minor.
(2) An order for the appointment of a guardian for the suit may
be obtained upon application in the name and on behalf of the
monor or by the plaintiff.
(3) Such application shall be supported by an affidavit verifying
the fact that the proposed guardian has no interest in the
matters in controversy in the suit adverse to that of the minor
and that he is a fit person to be so appointed.
3A. Decree against minor not to be set aside unless prejudice
has been caused to his interest .-(1) No decree passed against a
minor shall be set aside merely on the ground that the next
friend or guardian for the suit of the minor, but the fact that by
reason of such adverse interest of the minor, shall be a ground
for setting aside the decree.
(2) Nothing in this rule shall preclude the minor from obtaining
any relief available under any law by reason of the misconduct
or gross negligence on the part of the next friend or guardian
for the suit resulting in prejudice to the interests of the minor.”

28. The learned Single Judge has in the impugned order held that the
provisions of Order 32 CPC are procedural in view of the provisions of
Order 32 Rule 3A CPC. A decree for non compliance of Order 32 would be
a nullity only on prejudice being suffered by a minor being shown and not
merely by reason of non-compliance of some procedure. The grandfather
of the appellant No.1 Late Lt.Col. Dina Nath was a defendant in the suit and
did not claim any share in any of the properties. It is the claim of the
appellants themselves that Late Ltd.Col.Dina Nath was very protective
towards the appellant No.1 and had brought him up like his own son. The
proceedings were duly conducted under his supervision. Hence, the
impugned order holds that no prejudice was caused to appellant No.1.
29. We may first see the judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab &
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Haryana High Court in the case of Amrik Singh & Anr. (supra).The Punjab
and Haryana High Court in the said case held as follows:-
“13….The object of Order 32 is to see that no decrees are
passed against minors where they are not effectively
represented. I have deliberately used the words 'effectively
represented' in contradistinction to the 'representation'
contemplated by Order 32, Rule 3. If a minor is represented by
a guardian ad-litem and the interests of the other major
defendants are identical with him and those defendants are
effectively prosecuting the litigation it can hardly be said that a
minor is not effectively represented. Too much insistence on
technical provisions of a procedural law can at times lead to
absurd results and cause injustice to parties. It is only where a
Court comes to the conclusion that the minor was not
effectively represented and thus he was in fact not a party to the
proceedings that the result envisaged by the learned Judges
would necessarily follow. But where the minor is effectively
represented, though technically not in line with the provisions
of Order 32, Rule 3, the said result will necessarily not follow.”

30. Similarly, in AIR 1973 Madras 12 (V 60 C 5), Rangammal vs. Minor
Appasami and Ors. the Madras High Court held as follows:-
“9…..Ramamsami who had no interest adverse to that of the
adopted son represented his son in the further proceedings and
he filed an appeal against the preliminary decree on his behalf
and as guardian of his son and in the second appeal in the High
Court he represented the minor's interest. He put forward the
adoption of the minor in the above proceedings and no
contention was put forward by him contrary to the minor's
interest. In the above circumstances, it cannot be said that any
prejudice has been caused to the minor on account of the
formal defect in not passing a formal order appointing him as
guardian ad litem to the minor…..”

applicable to the facts of this case. The facts of the present case would show
that the appellant No.1 was represented by his mother appellant No.2 in the
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proceedings. In that eventuality merely because a formal order was not
passed appointing the mother as a guardian would not be a ground to set
aside the decree passed by the Jammu Court.
32. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chander
(supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case a
suit had been filed against one Ram Lal for recovery of money. Ram Lal
was a lunatic. An ex-parte decree was passed against him and in execution
the house was sold and sale certificate was issued. Formal delivery of
possession took place. Admittedly Ram Lal continued to live in the house
till he died leaving no heir. Ram Lal being a subject of the Maharaja of
Jaipur, on his death the servants of the Maharaja took possession of the
house. The son of the person who was successful in the auction filed a suit
for possession. The court held that the decree against Ram Lal was a nullity
as Order XXXII CPC had not been complied with and no guardian for the
lunatic was appointed. The Supreme Court held that in these circumstances
the decree has to be treated as without jurisdiction and the sale in execution
is also void. The Supreme Court held as follows:-
“(3) …. It is now a well-settled principle that, if a decree is
passed against a minor without appointment of a guardian, the
decree is a nullity and is void and not merely voidable. This
principle becomes applicable to the case of a lunatic in view of
R.15 of O.32 of the Code of Civil Procedure so that the decree
obtained against Ram Lal was a decree which has to be treated
as without jurisdiction and void. In these circumstances, the
sale held in execution of that decree must also be held to be
void.”

33. In the above case Ram Lal was not represented at all in the suit. The
facts of the present case are quite different from the case of Ram Chander
(supra) . In the present case the appellant was arrayed as a party through his
mother as guardian.
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34. Hence, in view of the pleadings of the parties and admitted documents
on record the decree of the Jammu Court cannot be set aside as being void as
claimed by the appellants.
35. We shall now deal with the challenge made by the appellants to the
claim of respondent No.1 of being owner of the property at West End, New
Delhi. The only argument pertaining to the property at West End, New Delhi
which has fallen to the share of respondent No.1 is that it was part of the
joint family property. It is claimed that on the death of the father of the
appellant Late Major Puran Chander in the 1965 war, the grand parents had
withheld the proceeds of an LIC Policy and had given the proceeds to
respondent No.1 for construction of the house/purchase of the property at
Delhi. In the application for amendment of the plaint being IA No.
22835/2012 it is urged that the sub-lease of 1970 pertaining to the said
property has been suppressed throughout and the same is false and frivolous.
The letter said to have been written by Smt.Krishna Thakur, the
grandmother who had applied to DDA to transfer the property to respondent
No.1 written within six months of the death of her elder son, namely, the
father of appellant No. 1 is said to be vitiated by fraud and suspicion
inasmuch as on the sudden death of a young son in war, the entire family
and locality was in a state of shock and there was no question of the
grandmother sending such a letter to DDA. Hence, the contention that the
sub-lease is null and void.
36. The allegations of the appellant to claim that the registered sub lease
is void, are vague and have no merits. Merely because the grandmother was
in a state of shock in 1966 when she wrote the letter to DDA cannot mean
that she cannot write to DDA to register the property in the name of
respondent No.1. In fact a perusal of letter dated August 31, 1970 written by
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DDA accepting the request of Smt.Krishna Thakur to register the plot in the
name of respondent No.1 would show that the said letter is in response to
letter dated August 14, 1970 of Smt.Krishna Thakur. Hence, the request to
transfer the plot has been repeated by Smt.Krishna Thakur in 1970, five
years after the death of her son. The conclusion is obvious. The said
Smt.Krishna Thakur has repeated her request to DDA to transfer the
property in the name of Respondent No.1 and it is not possible to accept the
allegations of the appellant. The position regarding the Delhi Property is
repeated with consent of all in the proceedings in the Jammu Court. There is
no merit in the contentions of the appellant in this regard.
37. We cannot also help noticing that the sub-lease was registered in
favour of respondent No.1 for the said property in West End, New Delhi on
December 11, 1970 by DDA. Respondent No.1 has been treating the said
property as exclusive owner to the complete exclusion of the family
members enjoying unhindered possession and accepting rent from the
tenants to the exclusion of others. The original owner of the property
Smt.Krishna Thakur expired in 1975. Lt.Col.Dina Nath, her husband expired
in 1994. Had the transfer of the said West End, New Delhi property been
actuated by fraud played upon them by respondent No.1, surely somewhere
down the line after lapse of so much time from the death of their elder son
who died in 1965, the said two persons would have taken steps to challenge
the registration of the sub-lease in favour of respondent No.1. The parents in
their life time did not take any such steps. Clearly there are no merits in the
contentions of the appellants pertaining to the property at West End, New
Delhi. The plaint fails to disclose any cause of action in favour of the
appellants regarding the said suit property.
38. We concur with the view of the learned Single Judge. However, we
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may like to note that the learned Single Judge has exercised powers under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC while rejecting the plaint. The scope of exercise of
powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is limited by the contours of the
provision. While exercising those powers what has to be seen is only the
averments in the plaint and the documents filed alongwith the plaint. The
defence as taken in the written statement is not to be gone into for the said
purpose. To that extent, the judgment of the learned Single Judge may
suffer from an infirmity. However, in our view given the nature of
pleadings and admitted documents on record and the extensive arguments
advanced by the parties on the issues discussed herein, this was a fit case for
the Court to exercise powers under Order XII Rule 6 CPC where the Court
has powers to suo moto pass a judgment. There is no requirement in Order
XII Rule 6 CPC for filing of a formal application. The Court can on its own
motion without any application by a party proceed to pass a decree on
admissions as stated in Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Order XII Rule 6(i) CPC
reads as follows:-
6 . Judgment on admissions .- (1) Where admissions of
fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise,
whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage
of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its
own motion and without waiting for the determination of
any other question between the parties, make such order
or give such judgment as it may thing fit, having regard
to such admissions .”

In our view based on the pleadings and documents placed on record
by the parties there are clear admissions of fact which warrant passing of the
order of dismissal of the plaint.
39. We also concur with the view expressed in the impugned order that
the appellants by the present suit seek to challenge the fairness of the
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distribution of the assets done in 1976 nearly 35 years afterwards. Given the
lapse of time the impugned order rightly holds that the status that has
prevailed for the last 35 years ought not to be disturbed. We also cannot help
noticing that what is being sought by the appellants is the share of Late
Major Puran Chander, the appellants being his legal heirs. Appellant No.2
being the widow, suffered from no legal disability but has chosen not to
challenge the distribution that has taken place for 35 years. Appellant No.1
became a major in 1984. He has woken up now 27 years later to claim a
partition of the properties, claiming ignorance of the registered perpetual
sub-lease and the partition decree. The whole exercise appears to be
motivated by the fact that the property in Delhi is located in a prime
residential area of South Delhi whose value has appreciated hugely in the
last decade or so. The present suit is clearly vexatious.
40. The Division Bench of this court in the case reported as 2012 (127)
DRJ 70 Aniruddha Dutta & Ors. vs. Bhawani Shanker Basu & Ors. held as
follows:-
“28. A Court of record has every inherent power to prevent the
abuse of its process and Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is not the complete reservoir of the power of nip a
frivolous suit when it is still in the stage of infancy. The
inherent powers of a Court of record, and we highlight that
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not confer, but
saves the inherent power of a Court also constitutes the
reservoir of the power of a Court of record to throw out
vexatious suits.”

41. Similarly the Rajasthan High Court in the case reported as 2008 (1)
ILR (Raj) 619 Temple of Thakur Shri Mathuradassji vs. Shri Kanhaiyalal &
Ors. in para 16 held as follows:-

16. … If the suit is abuse of process of the court and cannot
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be dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC then the court is not
helpless and can accordingly invoke the powers under Section
151 CPC and can dismiss the suit under Section 151 CPC.
Frivolous litigations are required to be nipped in the bud at the
earliest possible stage otherwise no relief to the aggrieved
party because of the reason that sole object of the frivolous
litigation is to drag adversary in the litigation till it is dismissed
consuming several years in trial. If court reaches to the
conclusion that suit is frivolous from the totality of the facts
brought on record or which have come on record then by not
dismissing the suit at earliest, the court virtually declares that a
frivolous suit can demand trial of suit and aggrieved party has
no remedy against frivolous suit. If there are creases in the law
or sometimes is left out or not specifically provided in statute
then they are required to be ironed out by the courts by
interpreting the law in a manner to advance the cause of justice
and no party can be left with no remedy against frivolous suits.
At the cost of repetition, it is observed that the continuation of
frivolous suit against any person on the ground that it cannot
be dismissed since there is no provision under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC is virtually denying an aggrieved party his right to crush
the frivolous litigation without suffering the trial of suit.”

42. The present suit is utterly frivolous. The family affairs which have
been settled long back in 1970-1976 cannot be permitted to be disturbed on
the frivolous and vexatious grounds as sought to be done in the present
proceedings. We feel this is a frivolous suit that should be nipped in the
bud at this stage. We see no merits in the appeal. The same is dismissed.
43. Keeping in view the fact that appellant No.2 is a war widow, we do
not impose any costs.

JAYANT NATH
(JUDGE)


PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
MAY 19, 2014/n/rb (JUDGE)
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