M/S PRAKRUTI CENTURY PROPERTIES vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

ORDER I. The Regular Second Appeal is allowed. II. The judgment and decree of the Courts below are hereby set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed. - 111 - 22.49. By relying on Mohd. Fayazoddins case, he submits that the Civil Court would not have jurisdiction to pass any order of declaration or injunction when notice has been issued under Section 4 and 17 of the Forest Act, there would be total bar on the Civil Court to entertain the suit to establish any right as envisaged under subsection (3) of Section 6 of the Forest Act. Thus, he once again reiterates that irrespective of the petitioner itself having filed the suit, the said suit could not be considered by the Civil Court and orders passed as regards land which is forest land coming within the purview of the Forest Act. 22.50. On all the above grounds, he submits that the writ petition is required to be dismissed with a direction to the petitioners to submit a reply which would be considered by the Respondents in accordance with law. 23. In reply, Sri. Chandan, learned counsel for petitioners submits that, 23.1. The judgment in Kunishetty Satyanayanas case would not be applicable to the present facts. In that case, a show cause notice had been issued in respect of securing employment on the basis of a forged caste certificate. In the present case, the issue is pertaining to the title of the land. The Respondent-Forest department itself had initiated civil proceedings which came to be dismissed and now a show cause notice has been issued after more than 80 years. By relying on para No.16 in Kunishetty Satyanarayanas case, he submits that in exceptional cases the Honble Apex Court has held that the High Court can quash charge sheet or show cause notice if it is found without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is - 113 - wholly illegal. The said para 16 in Kunishetty Satyanarayanas 21 case is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter. 23.2. He submits that Kunishetty Satyanarayanas case was also distinguished by the Honble High Court of Madras in S. Sridharan vs Engineer in Chief (WRO) and Chief Engineer (General), PWD 22 , more particularly para nos. 19 and 20 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 19. The decision relied on by the learned Government Advocate in Union of India and Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana is not applicable to the question involved in this matter. In the said decision, the Honourable Apex Court has considered about the merits and legality of issuing a show cause notice or charge sheet and the question of delay in issuing the charge memo was not at all considered in the said decision. On the other hand, the Honourable Apex Court has specifically held even in that decision as here under: 22 Manu/TN/1088/2009 - 114 - Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show cause notice or charge sheet. Albeit, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge sheet or show cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. 20. As far as the case on hand is concerned, it is to be reiterated that there is an inordinate and unexplained delay of six years in issuing the first charge memo as the incident took place during the year 1984 and the first charge memo was issued in the year 1990 and the said charge memo was ultimately cancelled without any enquiry by order dated 20.04.2004 without indicating any contemplation of issuing fresh charge memo against the petitioner. The impugned second charge memo was issued two months thereafter, i.e., on 30.06.2004 and as such the second charge memo was issued against the petitioner nearly 20 years after the alleged incident causing grave prejudice to the petitioner resulting miscarriage of justice and such action of the first respondent is no doubt wholly illegal and unjustified warranting interference of this Court to quash the impugned charge memo. For the foregoing reasons, this Court has no hesitation to come to an irresistible conclusion to the effect that the inordinate and unexplained delay in issuing the impugned charge memo would vitiate the disciplinary proceedings and the charge memo dated 30.06.2004 issued by the respondent herein in his proceedings in Charge Memo No. CII(2)/17421/90-45 is liable to be quashed and accordingly quashed and the Writ Petition is allowed. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. There is no order as to costs. 23.3. He submits by relying on S.Sridharans case that this Court could exercise jurisdiction when there is a gross delay in the initiation of the proceedings. As regards the contention that the proceedings before the Civil Court are without jurisdiction and the findings of the Civil Court are not required to be looked into, he submits that the said proceedings had not been initiated by the Petitioners but were initiated by the Respondents, the Respondents after having initiated civil proceedings cannot now contend otherwise, in fact in the first proceedings filed by Contending that there is interference with his possession by the Forest Department, Petitioner No. 2-Mohammad Sanaullah, had filed a suit in O.S. No. 600/1981 seeking a permanent injunction against the Forest Department, restraining the Forest Department from interfering with the peaceful possession of - 116 - Petitioner No.2 in Survey No. 69/2. The said suit came to be dismissed on 13.12.1985 with costs. 23.4. One of the petitioners at the second appeal stage filed by the Forest department and the suit having been dismissed, the first appeal having been allowed, in the second appeal filed by the Forest department, the Forest department withdrew the appeal on the ground that it had filed the said suit. The State, having competent persons to advise them, having acted on such advice and filed civil suits, cannot now contend that the civil suit is not maintainable and the findings given in the civil suit are not binding. 23.5. As regards the contention that boundaries prevail over the measurement, his submission is that in the joint survey, it has been clearly - 117 - and categorically indicated that there is no encroachment by the Petitioners in Sy. nos.68 and 69, another unilateral survey got carried out by the forest department which will not enure to their benefit and as such, once there is no encroachment, the issue of whether the boundaries prevail over the measurement or measurement prevail over boundaries or whether there is a dispute as regards identity of the property itself is not something which will be required to be considered. 23.6. As regards the contention that there is a fundamental duty on the Government to preserve forest land, he submits that such duty is required to be exercised within a reasonable period of time. The notification having been issued on 08.01.1921, the grant having been made in the year 1932, an auction having been held in the year 1936 in respect of Sy.No.69, - 118 - the grant in respect of Sy.No.68 having been made in the year 1945, proceedings could have been initiated in the year 2006-07 and once again in the year 2021, that not being so, there is a delay of more than 80 years and as such, this Court ought to intervene and allow the instant petition. 23.7. He differs from the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that once lands are declared as reserved forests, entries in revenue records in subsequent transactions are of no consequence. He submits that the government itself, having granted the said lands and thereafter having auctioned the land, the government cannot contend to the contrary; the same would be a dishonest contention. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Honble Apex Court in Anand Arya and Anr vs - 119 - Union of India and Anr 23 , more particularly para nos. 19, 20 and 21 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 19. Mr K.K. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of U.P. strongly supported the view taken by the CEC. The learned counsel submitted that the omission to identify the trees at the project site as forest or deemed forest was not due to any mistake or by chance. He pointed out that in the parameters set out by the State Level Expert Committee for identification of forests or forest-like areas it was clarified that trees mean naturally grown perennial trees and it was further stipulated that the plantation done on public land or private land will not be identified as forest-like area. Mr Venugopal submitted that the guidelines made by the Expert Committee were reported to this Court and accepted by it on 12-12-2007. The project site clearly did not come within the parameters fixed by the Expert Committee and it was rightly not identified as a forest-like area. The parameters fixed by the Expert Committee for identification of forests or forest-like area were never challenged by anyone and now it was too late in the day to question those parameters, more so after those were accepted by this Court. Mr Venugopal contended that the non-inclusion of the project site as a forest or forest-like area by the State Level Expert Committee should be conclusive of the fact that the area was not forest land and the trees standing there were no forest. 20. Mr Bhushan contended that a tract of land bearing a thick cluster of trees that would qualify as forest land and forest as defined by the orders of this Court would not cease to be so simply because the parameters adopted by the Expert Committee were deficient and inconsistent with this Court's orders. In support of the submission that there was actually a forest in that area that was cut down for the project - 120 - he relied upon the report of the FSI dated 7-8-2009 in which the forest cover status at the project site based on IRS 1D/P6 LI88 III data is shown as follows: Forest Cover Status in the Area of Interest (AOI) of Noida from 2001 to 2007 Area in ha Assessment (State of Forest Report) Date of satellite data (sic) Very dense forest Moderately dense forest Open forest Total forest cover Non- forest Total area 8 th (2001) Oct 2000 9 th (2003) Nov 2002 10 th (2005) Nov 2004 11 th (2007) Oct 2006 21. In the report it was also stated that the latest forest cover assessment by the FSI was based on satellite data of 2006 and it did not have any data of the later period. It further stated that the felling of trees might have taken place after October 2006. Mr Bhushan invited our attention to the order of this Court in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (98) v. Union of India [(2006) 5 SCC 28] (SCC paras 16, 18, 33, 37, 38) to show that this Court had accepted the reliability of the FSI Report based on satellite imagery. 23.8. By relying on Anand Aryas case, he submits that the Honble Apex Court took into consideration the revenue records and considered the factum that the land had never - 121 - been shown as forest and accepted the contents of the revenue records. 23.9. He also relies upon the decision of the Honble Apex Court in Elizabeth Jacob vs District Collector, Idukki and Ors. 24 , more particularly para nos. 13 and 14 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 13. The records also showed that the Forest Department planted some trees in the land in the year 1992 after the property was attached and that on 3-11-1994, the Tahsildar, Peermade wrote to the Forest Department to vacate the land, as it had to be sold by public auction. The Forest Department did not initiate any action in regard to the land even thereafter. On the other hand, the Revenue Authorities asserted their possession and put up the land for sale in 1998 under the provisions of the Act. The appellant purchased the land in the auction-sale and obtained a sale certificate, under which the land vested in her free from encumbrances. 14. The Division Bench also noticed that the land had been shown as government poramboke (that is wasteland belonging to the Government) in the revenue records at the relevant time and that the notification under the Forest Act relied upon by the respondents did not show that the land was forest land. The Division Bench did not record any finding that the land was a forest land, but on the other hand, held that the State Government had not produced any material to show that the land was forest land or part of reserve forest. It also observed that as the Revenue Authorities had proceeded on - 122 - the basis that Ansari and others had right over the land and as the Revenue Authorities had sold the land to the appellant in a revenue auction, the State Government could not in the normal course turn around and say that no rights were acquired by the appellant as purchaser at the revenue auction. 23.10. By relying on Elizabath Jacobs case, he submits that when a common man is led to believe that lands have a good title and there are no encumbrances whatsoever by way of an action of the government itself, the rights of such a common man are required to be protected. 23.11. He also relies upon the decision of the Honble Apex Court in Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Company Ltd. vs State of Maharashtra and Ors. 25 more particularly paras nos. 81 to 84 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 81. In Pratibha [Pratibha Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (1991) 3 SCC 341] the eight unauthorised floors were constructed in clear and flagrant violation and disregard of the FSI. The demolition order had already attained finality in this Court and thereafter six of the unauthorised floors had been demolished and the seventh was partially demolished. This Court found no justification to interfere with the demolitions. Again, the issue of compensation does not arise in such a situation. 82. The application of the principle laid down by this Court, therefore, depends on the independent facts found in a case. The remedy of demolition cannot be applied per se with a broad brush to all cases. The State also seems to have realised this and that is perhaps the reason why it moved the application that it did in Godavarman. 83. Looking at the issue from the point of view of the citizen and not only from the point of view of the State or a well-meaning pressure group, it does appear that even though the basic principle is that the buyer should beware and therefore if the appellants and the purchasers of tenements or commercial establishments from the appellants ought to bear the consequences of unauthorised construction, the well-settled principle of caveat emptor would be applicable in normal circumstances and not in extraordinary circumstances as these appeals present, when a citizen is effectively led up the garden path for several decades by the State itself. The present appeals do not relate to a stray or a few instances of unauthorised constructions and, therefore, fall in a class of their own. In a case such as the present, if a citizen cannot trust the State which has given statutory permissions and provided municipal facilities, whom should he or she trust? 84. Assuming the disputed land was a private forest, the State remained completely inactive when construction was going on over acres and acres of land and of a very large number of buildings thereon and for a few decades. The State permitted the construction through the development plans and by - 124 - granting exemption under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and providing necessary infrastructure such as roads and sanitation on the disputed land and the surrounding area. When such a large-scale activity involving the State is being carried on over vast stretches of land exceeding a hundred acres, it is natural for a reasonable citizen to assume that whatever actions are being taken are in accordance with law otherwise the State would certainly step in to prevent such a massive and prolonged breach of the law. The silence of the State in all the appeals before us led the appellants and a large number of citizens to believe that there was no patent illegality in the constructions on the disputed land nor was there any legal risk in investing on the disputed land. Under these circumstances, for the State or Bombay Environment Action Group to contend that only the citizen must bear the consequences of the unauthorised construction may not be appropriate. It is the complete inaction of the State, rather its active consent that has resulted in several citizens being placed in a precarious position where they are now told that their investment is actually in unauthorised constructions which are liable to be demolished any time even after several decades. There is no reason why these citizens should be the only victims of such a fate and the State be held not responsible for this state of affairs; nor is there any reason why under such circumstances this Court should not come to the aid of victims of the culpable failure of the State to implement and enforce the law for several decades. 23.12. By relying on Godrej and Boyces case he submits that citizens having acted for several decades on the basis of what has been held out by the State, the State cannot belatedly take action to the contrary thereto. - 125 - 23.13. He relies upon the decision of the Honble Apex Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs Ashalata S. Guram 26 , more particularly para nos. 16 to 21 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 16. This appeal challenges the said judgment and order. As mentioned hereinbefore two questions require consideration how far and to what extent in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and in this respect regarding power to deal with factual findings, the jurisdiction of the High Court is akin both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, can the High Court interfere with the findings of fact? It is well settled that the High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of an appropriate court if there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the courts below have come or in other words a finding which was perverse in law. This principle is well settled. In D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee [(1952) 2 SCC 619 : AIR 1953 SC 58 : 1953 SCR 302, 305] it was laid down by this Court that unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention it was not for the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere. If there is evidence on record on which a finding can be arrived at and if the court has not misdirected itself either on law or on fact, then in exercise of the power under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court should refrain from interfering with such findings made by the appropriate authorities. We have noted that both the trial court and the appellate court after discussing evidence have come to the conclusion that the appellant was a licensee in possession on or before - 126 - February 1, 1973. The learned trial court had expressed doubt about Ex. A but ultimately accepted the position. There was leave and licence agreement. The learned Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes doubted Ex. A and said that it was a concocted story. It is true that there were discrepancies in the evidence of the obstructionists and there was inconsistency in the conduct of the judgment-debtor in resisting the suit. Yet all these are for the courts finding facts and it such fact- finding bodies have acted properly in law and if the findings could not be described as perverse in law in the sense that no reasonable person properly instructed in law could have come to such a finding, such findings should not be interfered with within the exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution. 17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta [(1975) 1 SCC 858 : AIR 1975 SC 1297] where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath [AIR 1954 SC 215 : 1954 SCR 565] that the - 127 - ... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee [AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB)] to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division [AIR 1958 SC 398 : 1958 SCR 1240] and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. 18. The history and the development of the writ of certiorari, and scope and ambit of its application have been emphasised by Lord Denning in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex Parte Shaw [(1952) 1 All ER 122, 128] . It is not necessary to reiterate these. But the courts must guard themselves against the error mentioned by Morris, L.J. in the said decision at page 133 to use the power under Article 227 as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. The writ of certiorari does not lie in order to bring up an order or decision for rehearing of the issues raised in the proceedings. These inhibitions are more often than not transgressed by the courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227. 19. In this connection reference may also be made to the observations of this Court in Harbans Lal v. Jagmohan Saran [(1985) 4 SCC 333] . See in - 128 - this connection the observations of this Court in Trimbak Gangadhar Telang v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide [(1977) 2 SCC 437 : AIR 1977 SC 1222] , Smt M.M. Amonkar (Smt) v. S.A. Johari [(1984) 2 SCC 354] and also the observations of this Court in Harbans Lal v. Jagmohan Saran [(1985) 4 SCC 20. It is true that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court could go into the question of facts or look into the evidence if justice so requires it, if there is any misdirection in law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence. But the High Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to look into the fact in the absence of clear-cut down reasons where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence. The High Court also should not interfere with a finding within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal except where the findings were perverse and not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice (see Trimbak Gangadhar Telang [(1977) 2 SCC 437 : AIR 1977 SC 1222] ). Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction. In our opinion therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case on the question that the High Court has sought to interfere, it is manifest that the High Court has gone into questions which depended upon appreciation of evidence and indeed the very fact that the learned trial Judge came to one conclusion and the Appellate Bench came to another conclusion is indication of the position that two views were possible in this case. In preferring one view to another of factual appreciation of evidence, the High Court transgressed its limits of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. On the first point, therefore, the High Court was in error. 21. But the findings of the High Court on the factual aspect would not help the appellant to become a licensee under Section 15-A of the said Act. It is to that question, therefore, attention must be given. - 129 - 23.14. By relying on Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Raos case, he submits that a Constitutional Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 could go into questions of fact and look into the evidence if justice so requires it, in the present case, he submits that justice would require this Court to consider all the facts and pass necessary orders and in this regard he submits that the show-cause notice issued by the Forest Department in unjust, moreover, the Forest Department has been harassing the Petitioners for the last several years and the Petitioners do not expect to be served any justice from the Forest Department itself. 23.15. He relies upon the decision in Shamshad Ahmad and Ors. Vs Tilak Raj Bajaj and Ors. 27 , more particularly para nos. 31 & 32 - 130 - thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 31. So far as the larger question, namely, whether subsequent events can be taken into consideration by an appellate, revisional or writ court, we express no opinion in view of the fact that the appeal can be decided without entering into the said controversy. We may, however, note that the learned counsel for both the sides referred to leading decisions of this Court. In some of the cases, the Court held that the crucial date for deciding requirement of a landlord is the date of institution of suit/proceeding. In other cases, however, a contrary view has been taken. There is thus a cleavage of opinion on that vexed issue. We leave the matter there. 32. On merits, in our judgment, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is well founded that the prescribed authority was wrong in dismissing the application filed by the landlords. We had already observed that the prescribed authority negatived the contention of the tenant that the application was not maintainable. It, therefore, entered into the merits of the matter and decided it against the landlords. It observed that Applicant 6 hailed from a reputed family of Dehradun and they had a very big business of timber wood. It also noted that Applicant 6 had been enjoying the facilities of car, scooter, telephone, etc. 23.16. By relying on Shamshad Ahmads case he again submits that the powers of the High Courts under Article 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive, it is for this Court to exercise such jurisdiction to render justice otherwise, - 131 - the powers which have been conferred on this Court would be rendered redundant. 23.17. He relies upon the decision in Sanjay Kumar Jha vs Prakash Chandra Chaudhary and Ors. 28 , more particularly para No. 13 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 13. It is well settled that in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over the findings recorded by a competent administrative authority, nor reappreciate evidence for itself to correct the error of fact, that does not go to the root of jurisdiction. The High Court does not ordinarily interfere with the findings of fact based on evidence and substitute its own findings, which the High Court has done in this case. Even assuming that there had been any error in the computation of marks in respect of fixed and movable assets, the High Court could, at best, have remitted the case of respondent Prakash Chandra Chaudhary to the authorities concerned for reconsideration. 23.18. By relying on Sanjay Kumar Jhas case his submission is that the High Courts cannot function as a Court of appeal, insofar as the reappreciation of evidence is considered when a - 132 - fact in question is concerned; at most, it may remit such a matter to cure evidential deficiencies, if any. 23.19. At this stage, on enquiry with the counsels if they are agreeable for a fresh joint survey in terms of the notification 08.01.2021, though Sri.Kiran Ron, learned AAG submits that the State is ready for such a joint survey to be carried out, Sri. Chandan submits that there is no fresh survey which is required to be carried out, survey has already been carried out and a report is placed on record which could be considered by this Court. 23.20. On further enquiry, as to whether the claim of the Petitioners is that the lands subject matter of the present petition were the forest lands mentioned in the notification dated 08.09.2021, but only on account of grant they were not - 133 - forest land or is the case of the Petitioners that the land in Sy.No.68 and 69 belonging to the Petitioners were never forest land; the submission of Sri.Chandan, learned counsel is that the land which is owned and possessed by the Petitioners are not forest lands as per the joint survey report and as such, there is no requirement of a fresh survey to be carried out. 23.21. In this regard he refers to the pleadings and or applications which have been filed as also the orders which have been passed in the earlier proceedings. By referring to the application under Order 6 Rule 17 filed by the plaintiff in OS No.1424/2006 he submits that the application for amendment filed therein has been rejected, hence the question of any survey now to be conducted would not arise. The said order having been challenged in WP No.23284/2023, he submits that this Court vide - 134 - its order dated 27.10.2023 recording the submission of the learned AAG has dismissed the Writ Petition as not pressed. Thus, the amendment not having been pressed into service, there is no challenge to the sale deeds executed by I.N.Mutthanna nor is there any allegation that false documents have been created over the forest property, as such, the question of appointment of a Commissioner would not arise. 23.22. He relies upon the IA under Order 26 Rule 9 filed in RFA No.160/2024 for conduct of a detailed joint survey as per the boundaries mentioned in Notification dated 08.01.2021, which has been objected to by the Petitioners herein and the said application is still pending consideration. When such an application is pending in RFA 160/2024 he submits that this Court ought not to appoint a Commissioner to - 135 - conduct a survey of the aforesaid property in terms of the notification dated 08.1.2024. 24. Heard Sri Chandan, learned counsel for the Petitioners , Sri. Kiran Ron, learned AAG for the State. Perused papers. 25. The points that would arise for the consideration of this Court are: i. Whether once a notification has been issued under Section 17 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, notifying a particular land as a forest land, would that land be forest land in perpetuity or would grant of a portion of the land covered under the said notification exempt such granted land from the notification under the rigours of the said Regulations? ii. Whether the present Writ Petition is maintainable on account of the same, requiring this Court to consider a disputed question of fact? iii. Whether the respondents could have issued a fresh show cause notice in F.O.C.No. 7/2006-07, F.O.C. 8/2006-07, F.O.C. 9/2006-07, F.O.C. 13/2006-07 and F.O.C. 14/2006-07 after the said proceedings have been quashed in Crl.P.1852-57 OF 2012? - 136 - iv. Whether the survey carried out in pursuance of the orders in Crl.Petitions No.1852-57 of 2012 indicating that there is no encroachment of forest land would enure to the benefit of the Petitioners, requiring the Writ Petitions to be allowed? v. Whether the filing of the civil suit by the Forest Department and the orders passed therein would disentitle the Forest Department from initiating proceedings under Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963? vi. Can the government, after notifying a land to be forest land under Mysore Forest Regulations, 1990 vide notification 08.01.2021 grant any land to defence personnel or otherwise, and what is the effect thereof? vii. Whether there is any delay and if there is delay, would it disentitle the Forest Department from taking action under Section 64A? viii. What order? 26. I answer the above points are as under; 27. ANSWER TO POINT NO.1: Whether once a notification has been issued under Section 17 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, notifying a particular land as a forest land, would that land be forest land in perpetuity or would grant of a - 137 - portion of the land covered under the said notification exempt such granted land from the notification under the rigours of the said Regulations? 27.1. In terms of Section 3 of the MFR 1900, any land at the disposal of the government may be constituted as a State Forest in the manner provided thereunder. Section 3 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 3. Any land at the disposal of Government may be constituted a State Forest in the manner hereinafter provided. 27.2. In terms of Section 4, whenever it is proposed to constitute any land as State forest, the government shall publish a notification in the Official Gazette specifying as nearly as possible the situation limits of such land, declare that it is proposed to constitute such land as forest land, and appoint an officer called the Forest Settlement Officer [FSO] to enquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of - 138 - any rights claimed by or at least to exist in favour of any person. Section 4 of the MFR 1900 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 4. Whenever it is proposed to constitute any land a State Forest the Government shall publish the notification in the official Gazette- (a) Specifying as nearly as possible the situation and limits of such land. (b) declaring that it is proposed to constitute such land a State Forest and; (c) appointing an officer (hereinafter called the the Forest Settlement Officer) to inquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of any rights claimed by, or alleged to exist in favour of, any person in or over and land comprised within such limits or to any forest produce of such land, and to deal with the same as provided in the chapter The officer appointed under clause(e) of this section ordinarily be a person other than a Forest Officer; but a Forest Officer may be appointed by the Government to assist the Forest Settlement Officer in the enquiry prescribed by this Chapter. 27.3. In terms of Section 5, where a notification has been published under Section 4, the FSO shall publish in the official Gazette and the headquarters of each Taluk in which any portion of land comprised in such notification is - 139 - situate, and every town and village in the neighbourhood of such land proclamation, specifying as nearly as possible the situation limits of the proposed forest, setting forth the substance of the provision of Section 4, explaining the consequences that would ensue on such forest being constituted by fixing a period of not less than three months from the date of publication of such proclamation, and requiring every person claiming any right or making any claim either to present to such officer within such period a written notice specifying or to appear before him within such period and state the nature of such right or claim by producing document in support thereof. Section 5 of the MFR 1900 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 5. When a notification has been published under section 4, the Forest Settlement Officer shall publish, in Kanarese, in the official Gazette and at the headquarters of each taluk in which any portion of the - 140 - land comprised in such notification is situate, and in every town and village in the neighbourhood of such land, a proclamation- (a) specifying as nearly as possible the situation and limits of the proposed forest; (b) setting forth the substance of the provisions of section 6; (c) explaining the consequences which, as hereinafter provided, will ensue on such forest being constituted a State Forest; and (d) fixing a period of not less than three months from the date of publishing such proclamation, and requiring every person claiming any right or making any claim referred to or mentioned in section 4, either to present to such officer within such period a written notice specifying, or to appear before him within such period and state, the nature of such right or claim, and in either case to produce all documents in support thereof. 27.4. In terms of Section 7 the FSO shall take into consideration all the statements and contention and thereafter, enquire into all claims duly preferred as regards the rights mentioned under Section 4(c) as also under Section 5(d), so far as they may be ascertainable from the Government records and the evidence of every person likely to be acquainted with the same in - 141 - such a manner as to assist in ascertaining the existence and extent of any right or claim. 27.5. In terms of Section 13, after recording all the claims and considering the same, the FSO is empowered to pass such an order which, as far as possible, shall ensure the continued exercise of admitted rights. Section 13 of MFR 1900 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference; 13. After making such record, the Forest Settlement Officer shall pass such order as will as far as possible, a ensure the continued exercise of admitted rights. For this purpose the Forest Settlement Officer may- (a) provide some other reasonably convenient right of way; or (b) set out some other forest tract of sufficient extent, and in a locality reasonably convenient, for the exercise of rights to pasturage or other forest produce, and record an order conferring such rights on claimants to the admitted extent; or (c) so alter the limits of the proposed State Forest as to exclude the tract over which rights of way or water extend or to exclude forest land of sufficient extent and in a locality reasonably convenient for the purposes of the claimants with regard to pasturage or other forest produce. Land so excluded may be either outside the boundaries of the forest as finally settled - 142 - or within them, in which latter case it shall be demarcated and notified as an enclosure within which the rules relating to State Forest shall not apply; or (d) record an order, continuing to claimants the right of way or to pasturage or other forest produce or water (as the case may be) to the admitted extent, at such seasons, within such portions of the pro-posed State Forests, and under such rules, as may from time to time be prescribed by Government to ensure the continuance but non-abuse of such rights. 27.6. Any person who is aggrieved by the order of the FSO can file an appeal under Section 15 of the MFR 1900. On consideration of the appeal and orders being passed in terms of Section 16, thereafter under Section 17, the government may publish a notification in the Official Gazette specifying the limits of the forest, which is intended to constitute a State forest and declaring the same to be a State forest from the date fixed by such notification. 27.7. In the present case, the preliminary notification under Section 4 having been published, after - 143 - following the due procedure, the final notification under Section 17 was published on 08.01.1921 declaring the lands as indicated therein to be forest land. Thus, it is after an exhaustive procedure, which is intended to address the rights of all concerned, that a Final notification was published, which has attained finality, the same not having been challenged by anyone till date. 27.8. It is the above provisions and the above notification, which are required to be considered by this court to ascertain the rights of the parties. 27.9. The submission of Sri.Chandan K., learned counsel for the petitioners, is that even if the land were said to be covered under the final notification of Section 17, the said land had been granted in favour of Sri Manik Raj, a - 144 - defence personnel on 17.11.1932 by Darkast No.807/3233 as entered in the Kethwar register. The grant having been made in favour of Sri.Manik Raj, who had not paid the due taxes, the property was brought to auction in the year 1936 with respect to survey No.69, when the same was purchased by Sri.Subbaraya, Mudaliyaar, who subsequently sold the property to various persons. 27.10. The grant having been made in favour of Sri.Manik Raj, the State cannot contend otherwise by now claiming that there is no such grant. In terms of Section 20 of the MFR 1900, the restriction in obtaining any right is only otherwise than through succession or grant or contract in writing made on behalf of the government. In the present case, there being a grant in favour of Mr. Manikaraj, the restriction under Section 20 would not be applicable. The - 145 - right obtained by Manikaraj is in accordance with the MFR 1900, which cannot be disturbed. The grant having been made for and on behalf of the government, the same is found mentioned in the Kethwa Register, pursuant to which taxes have been paid by Sri.Manikaraj and thereafter by Sri.Subramanya Mudaliyar and as such, irrespective of whether a notification has been issued under Section 17 or not, the requirement of Section 20 of the MFR 1900 being satisfied, the respondent-State cannot agitate any claim over the property. 27.11. His submission is also that, insofar as survey No.68 is concerned, this land had been granted in favour of Sri Muniyappa Devanahalli, which also complies with the requirement of Section 20 of the MFR 1900. A mortgage had been created on the said land, due to default in payment of the monies, the Assistant Registrar - 146 - of Co-operative Societies had initiated proceedings, conducted an auction of the property when Smt.Sajeeda Begum, participated in the auction and was declared the successful bidder. As such, his submission in respect of survey No.68 is that the lands initially granted in favour of Muniyappa Devanahalli were later on auctioned by a government officer, which also stands the test of section 20 of MFR 1900, and no claim can be made by the State in relation thereto. 27.12. As regards the proceedings which have been initiated on Section 64 of the FCA 1980, he submits that those proceedings could be initiated only as regards a reserved forest, district forest, village forest, or protected forest, if found to be unauthorisedly occupied by any person. Contending that the requirement of Section 20 has been satisfied, - 147 - his submission is that once the grant has been made, the land will no longer be forest land but would be private land belonging to the grantee and as such Section 64A would not be applicable. It is on that basis a submission is made that if a grant of land is made under Section 20, the said land cannot be subjected to a proceedings under Section 64A. 27.13. Reliance has been placed on the decision in B.S. Sandhu's case to contend that the word forest must be understood according to dictionary meaning and for the same to be so done, the particular land is required to be recorded as forest land in government records. 27.14. In the present case, survey Nos.68 and 69 not being shown as forest land or government land in the revenue records, the government cannot make any claim to initiate proceedings under Section 64. - 148 - 27.15. By relying on Anand Arya's case, it has been contended that the contents of the revenue records have to be looked into and when the revenue records do not indicate the land to be shown as forest land, the claim of the State that it is forest land is unsustainable. 27.16. Reliance is placed on Elizabeth Jacobs case to contend that when a common man on the basis of the government documents is led to believe that the land is not forest land, the notification even if issued under Section 17 of the MFR 1900 would not be applicable thereto, entitling the Respondent-State from invoking the powers under Section 64A of the KFA. 27.17. Per Contra , the submission of Sri.Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General is that, the notification issued on 8.01.1921 refers to Survey Nos.66 and 67 of Chikkasane and - 149 - survey No. 14 of Bhuvanahalli, these survey numbers underwent a change with survey No.66 being renumbered as survey No.68 and survey No.67 being renumbered as survey No.69 and survey No.14 being renumbered as survey No.30 and as such, it is both the old numbers and the new numbers which are to be taken into consideration together. His submission is that the notification being in respect of old survey Nos.66 and 67, new survey No.68 and 69, it is those survey numbers which will be covered under the Section 17 notification. 27.18. The reference made by the petitioners to survey Nos.68 and 69 are as regard the old survey Nos.68 and 69 and not new survey Nos.68 and 69, therefore by referring to lands in old survey Nos.68 and 69, the petitioners are seeking to assert the title on new survey Nos.68 and 69 - 150 - which is impermissible since new survey No.68 was earlier survey No.66 and new survey No.69 was earlier survey No.67 which were declared to be Bhuvanahalli State forest vide notification dated 8.01.1921. On that basis, he submits that there is a very basic issue as regards the identity of the property. There is no grant of land made in old survey Nos.66 and 67. 27.19. His submission is that it is not the survey number which is required to be considered, but it is the identification and boundaries of the property which are required to be considered. 27.20. In this regard, by relying on various judgments cited supra, namely Narasimha Sastry's case, Sheodhyan Singhs case, Y. Subbarao's case and Mallaiah's case that it is the boundaries which would prevail over the measurement or, the identification of a land by - 151 - way of survey number or the like and as such in so far as the boundaries forming part of the notification in Section 17 of the MFR 1900, the said notification in Section 17 would operate perpetually. 27.21. Alternatively, by relying on Nirvana Gowda's case, he submits that when a land is included as a reserved forest, the revenue records and the contents thereof are irrelevant. Issuance of saguvali chits and/or the like would not confer any title on the said land. Once the land is declared to be forest land, the revenue authorities have no power to deal with the forest land and by relying on Section 30 of MFR 1900, he submits that until and unless a notification is issued categorically stating that a land ceases to be a State forest or a portion of a State forest, the land would continue to be a State forest. - 152 - 27.22. His submission is also that the notification dated 8.01.1921 not having been challenged, the same continuing to be in force, the Petitioners cannot allege contrary to the said notification and in this regard, he relies upon the decision in Brijesh Reddy and Surjan Singh . On that basis he submits that a land once reserved as a forest or reserved forest cannot be de-reserved without a notification having been issued under section 30 in that regard. 27.23. It is in the background of the above submission that the above point framed would have to be considered and answered. The relevant provisions have been extracted hereinabove, as also the submissions made by both the Counsels. - 153 - 27.24. What has been challenged is only a Show Cause notice and this court would have normally relegated the petitioners to reply to the show cause notice, however, there being an insistence on part of the counsel for Petitioners that all issues have to be considered by this court and the petitioners having submitted to the jurisdiction of this court for such consideration that the same have been taken up for consideration. 27.25. There is substance in the submission of Learned Additional Advocate General Sri. Kiran Rhon, learned counsel appearing for the State, Section 20 cannot be considered to be an exception to Section 17 of the MFR 1900 in all circumstances. Section 20 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 20. No right of any description shall be acquired in or over a State Forest, except by succession or under grant or contract in writing made by or on behalf of the Government or of some person in whom such right or the - 154 - power to create such right was vested when the notification under section 17 was published. 27.26. Section 20 would indicate that no right of any description be acquired in or over a state forest except by succession or under a grant or contract in writing, made by or on behalf of the government or of some person in whom such right or the power to create such right was vested when the notification under Section 17 was published. For Section 20 to be applicable it is required that a grant or contract in writing is made by or on behalf of the Government or of some person in whom such right or the power to create such right was vested when the notification under section 17 was published, i.e., to say the time period for consideration of such grant is at the time when the section 17 notification was issued and not subsequently. - 155 - 27.27. Section 17 provides for the land declared as forest to be deemed as a State forest, and Section 20 provides an exception for a private person to acquire the land declared to be a State forest, subject to the conditions being satisfied. By an ex facie reading of Section 20, it is clear that though Section 17 is one which will operate in perpetuity but is however subject to the rights exercised by the State under Section 20, those conditions are required to be satisfied for Section 20 to be made applicable. 27.28. Section 20 is worded in the negative, categorically indicating that no right of any description shall be acquired in or over a State Forest and qualifies the same by exceptions namely (i) by succession or (ii) under grant or contract in writing made by or on behalf of the Government or of some person in whom such - 156 - right or the power to create such right was vested when the notification under section 17 was published. The Petitioners seek to rely not on the general law but on the exception, hence it is required for the petitioners to satisfy the requirement/s of the exception/s. 27.29. In so far as the First Exception is concerned, if a person had a right over the forest land, which had not been considered before the issuance of the Section 17 notification, such rights could be passed on by way of succession, which the person claiming to have acquired would have to prove, be that as it may, this aspect is not being considered in detail in the present case since no claim has been made under this exception. 27.30. As regards the second exception, a right over forest land can be acquired under a grant or - 157 - contract in writing made by or on behalf of the Government or of some person in whom such right or the power to create such right was vested when the notification under section 17 was published. Thus, the grant or contract has to be firstly in writing and secondly made by or on behalf of the Government and cannot be by way of any agreement with a private party. 27.31. Insofar as survey No.69 is concerned, by relying on the Khetwar register, it is sought to be contended that the said land has been granted in favour of Sri. Manik Raj on 17.11.1932, who was a defence personnel in terms of dharkast No.807/32-33 as entered in the Khetwa register, which has been placed on record. Thus, what has been placed on record is only the Khetwar register to indicate the alleged acquisition of title by Sri. Manikaraj was by way of a grant/dharkast made in the year - 158 - 1932. The dharkast No.807/32-33 is not placed on record, and there are no other documents other than the Khetwar register placed on record. Thus, the Khetwar register cannot be regarded as establishing the grant by or on behalf of the Government. The report of the Thasildar indicates that there is no such grant made and despite a search having been made no documents have been traced in that regards, thus categorically establishing that there is no such grant, the petitioners themselves have not placed on record any such grant order. 27.32. The alleged grant/ Dharkast is admittedly subsequent to the notification issued under Section 17, which was issued on 8.1.1921. It has not been established that the grant is in accordance with law, the subsequent event of the said Sri. Manik Raj not having made - 159 - payment of the land revenue in relation to the said land, which had been granted to him, the said land was brought for auction in the year 1936, and in the said auction, Sri. Subbaraya Mudilyar is stated to have purchased the said property, is a private transaction and not one which can be said to be a grant in terms of Section 20. The auction having been conducted on account off non-payment of land revenue, Sri. Subbaraya Mudaliyar being successful in the said auction, a sale deed is stated to have been executed in favour of Sri.Subbaraya Mudaliyar, which would not satisfy the requirement of Section 20, since the acquisition of title by Sri. Subbaraya Mudaliyar is under contract, in writing, in furtherance of an auction and not a grant made by the government, or on behalf of the government. Subsequent thereto, there have been various private sales in respect - 160 - of survey No.69, which would not satisfy the strict requirement of Section 20. Section 20 being an exception it is required that the same is strictly construed and no liberal interpretation can be given to the same as contended by Shri K. Chandan. 27.33. Insofar as survey No.68 is concerned, the said land had been allegedly granted to Sri. Muniyappa Devanahalli in the year 1945, again, no document of grant has been placed on record. Sri. Muniyappa of Devanalli had borrowed money by mortgaging the property. A dispute had been initiated under the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act. The Assistant Registrar Co-operative Societies had bought the property for auction, where the same was purchased by Smt. Sajeeda Begum. insofar as the grant is concerned in favour of Sri. Muniyappa Devanahalli, the same would again - 161 - would not satisfy the requirement of Section 20 of the MFR 1900, insofar as the sale in favour of Smt.Sajeeda Begum is concerned, it is on account of the mortgage dues that the property, which was mortgaged as security for a private loan, was brought for sale and the sale, though having been conducted by an officer of the government, and a sale deed came to be executed in favour of Smt.Sajeeda Begum, the transaction was essentially a private transaction and would not satisfy the strict requirement of a Grant under section 20 of the Act. Thus, even insofar as the land in survey No.68 is concerned, the manner of acquisition of title would not satisfy the requirement of Section 20, which is an exception to Section 17, as indicated supra . 27.34. As regards the aspect of boundaries prevailing over the measurements and the confusion - 162 - regarding survey numbers, many arguments have been advanced on this aspect. The submission of the counsel for the petitioners is on the basis of the Survey Number and not as per the boundaries in the notification of the year 1921. 27.35. On enquiry with the counsels if they are agreeable for a fresh joint survey in terms of the notification 08.01.2021, though Sri.Kiran Ron, learned AAG submits that the State is ready for another such joint survey to be carried out, Sri. Chandan submits that there is no fresh survey which needs to be carried out; a survey has already been carried out, and a report has been placed on record, which could be considered by this Court. 27.36. On further enquiry, as to whether the claim of the Petitioners is that the lands subject matter - 163 - of the present petition were the forest lands mentioned in the notification dated 08.09.2021, but only on account of grant they were not forest land or is the case of the Petitioners that the land in Sy.No.68 and 69 belonging to the Petitioners were never forest land; the submission of Sri.Chandan, learned counsel, is that the land which is owned and possessed by the Petitioners is not forest land as per the joint survey report, and as such, there is no requirement of a fresh survey to be carried out. In that background, it would be required to be considered if the Survey report can be accepted as is. 27.37. A joint survey was conducted on 28.01.2015 and 29.01.2015 by the Tahsildar Bhuvanahalli, in pursuance of the Order Dated 13.06.2012 in Criminal Petition No. 1852-1857 of 2012. The old survey No. 66 of Chikkasane village has - 164 - now been renumbered as survey No. 68, Survey No. 67 of Chikkasane village is now renumbered as survey No. 69. 27.38. The Tahsildar has submitted a survey report in respect of old survey No. 66 and old survey No. 67, and not with reference to new survey No. 68 and 69 is the contention of Shri Kiran Rohn, and in that backround the survey report was not accepted and fresh survey was directed to be conducted since the survey was not conducted in accordance with the Gazette notification dated 08.01.1921. 27.39. Thereafter, the Technical Assistant and Deputy Director of Land Records, Bangalore Rural District, were directed by the Tahsildar, Devanahalli Taluk to conduct a joint survey, according to the notification dated 08.01.1921, vide their correspondence dated 21.04.2017. - 165 - 27.40. On 10.07.2017, the ADLR, Devanahalli Taluk, issued a notice to attend the joint survey to be conducted on 25.07.2017. Though Petitioner No.1 received the notice, the other Petitioners refused to receive the notice. A survey was conducted in the presence of Petitioner No. 3- Sri. M. A. Mohammad Amanullah, who refused to sign the Mahazar, which is apparent from the report of the Assistant Conservator of Forests dated 16.09.2017 addressed to the Deputy Conservator of Forests. The new Survey report it is claimed indicates that the land of the petitioners comes within the boundaries of the notification dated 08.01.1921 and as held in Narasimha Sastry's case, Sheodhyan Singhs case, Y. Subbarao's case and Mallaiah's case irrespective of the change in Survey numbers, if the land falls within the - 166 - boundaries of the notification of 1921, it would be a forest land. 27.41. Irrespective of the numbering of the survey numbers, what is required to be considered is the boundaries of the notification of 1921; if the land claimed by the Petitioners comes within the boundaries of the forest land, action has to be taken which cannot be faulted with. 27.42. Liberty having been reserved by this Court in an order dated 13.06.2012 in criminal petition No. 1852 to 1857 of 2012, the first survey was conducted of the Survey numbers and not as per the notification of the year 1921, as such a fresh survey has been conducted as per the notification of the year 1921 and proceeded therefrom in the very same proceedings, namely FOC No.7, 8, 9, 13 and 14 of 2006-07. A survey has now been conducted in terms of - 167 - the notification dated 08-01-1921, encroachment having been found, the authorities are well within their rights to initiate proceedings. 27.43. Hence I answer point No.1 by holding that once a notification has been issued under Section 17 of the MFR 1900 notifying a particular land as a forest land, the said notification would apply in respect of the said land in perpetuity, subject to denotification in terms of Section 30 and or the exceptions detailed under Section 20, which would have to be strictly established by the person/s claiming such benefit of the exception/s. 28. ANSWER TO POINT No.2: Whether the present Writ Petition is maintainable on account of the same, requiring this Court to consider a disputed question of fact? 28.1. Much has been sought to be made out by Sri.Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, that the present writ petition is not maintainable since the same relates to the consideration of disputed questions of fact and in this regard, reliance has been placed by him on the decision of the Honble Apex Court in Kunishetty Satyanarayana's case to contend that firstly, the disputed questions of fact. Secondly, that what has been challenged is only a show cause notice under Section 64, which is required to be replied to by the petitioners. 28.2. Per contra , Sri.K.Chandan., learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relied on Anand Arya's case to contend that when land has never been shown as forest land and those lands have been granted by the government, the land loses the character of a forest land and even if it was a forest land and as such, no - 169 - notice under Section 64A could be issued. Reliance has also been placed on Elizabeth Jacobs' case to contend that when the official document itself indicated that the property was not government land, private rights in respect thereto could not be granted. 28.3. By relying on Godrej and Boyce case, it has been submitted that when citizens acted for several decades on the basis of what has been held out by State, the State cannot belatedly take action contrary thereto. These, he submits, are points of law which are required to be considered. It is not disputed questions of fact which would be considered by this Court. Even as regards that aspect, by relying on Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Raos case, his submission is that a constitutional Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 could go into the question of facts on the basis of a - 170 - question of law to render justice where so required. The petitioners, having been harassed by the respondent-State, this Court ought to come to the rescue of the petitioners. 28.4. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shamshad Ahmads case, indicating that the powers of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive, and this Court can exercise such writ jurisdiction to render justice as may be required. On that basis he submits that in law, the action taken by the respondent being illegal, the enquiry to be conducted by this Court limited to whether there was a grant made under Section 20 bringing out the exception under Section 20 to the notification of Section 17 thereby confirming right on the grantee and his successors, his submission is that this Court ought to excise its powers under - 171 - Article 226 and 227, in the background of the above submission that the above point is required to be answered. 28.5. Normally, though this Court has wide powers under Articles 226 and 227, which cannot be fettered by any particular provision of law, this Court would refrain from entering into a deep enquiry as regards disputed questions of facts and leave the same to be decided by a Court/authority exercising appropriate jurisdiction. 28.6. A Judge of the High Court functions in various capacities depending on the roster allocated by the Honble Chief Justice as the Master of Rolls. It is not that a Judge of the High Court cannot enquire into a disputed question of fact, which is normally done in the case of a first appeal, where the entire evidence is re-appreciated, - 172 - thereby requiring an enquiry into all the facts relating thereto. In a second appeal, a Judge of the High Court would restrain himself to consider the point of law, which is termed as a substantial question of law to be determined. In exercise of powers in different rosters like a writ petition under Article 227, a Judge of the High Court would exercise supervisory powers to ascertain if the orders passed by the trial Court are proper and correct. While exercising revision jurisdiction, a Judge of the High Court would consider if there is an error of jurisdiction or an error in the exercise of powers, and so on and so forth. 28.7. Insofar as the writ petition is concerned, the same being as summary proceedings whereunder the reliefs in the nature of issuance of writ is sought for, a Judge of the High Court exercising summary jurisdiction would normally - 173 - refrain from enquiring into disputed questions of facts unless they are ex facie evident. 28.8. Thus, the restriction imposed is a self-induced restriction and not a restriction on the basis of the Judge not having the power or ability to do so. This restriction is also self-imposed to protect the interest of the parties, inasmuch as if there are disputed questions of fact, the parties are required to be provided an opportunity of adducing evidence, placing the documents on record and also permitting them to cross-examine each other to ascertain the veracity thereof so as to arrive at the truth in the matter. 28.9. Insofar as the present case is concerned, essentially what has been contended is that a grant made in favour of the petitioners is one which would constitute an exception under - 174 - Section 20 of the MFR 1900 and as such is an exception to the restriction imposed by a notification under Section 17 of MFR 1900. 28.10. Ex facie w hat has been placed on record is the khetwa register on which basis it is alleged that there is a grant made in respect of land in survey No.69 in favour of Sri.Manik Raj, way back in the year 1932, and of the subsequent auction of the said property in the year 1936. However, no order of grant has been placed on record. 28.11. Similar, is the case as regards survey No.68, which is alleged to be granted to Sri. Muniyappa Devanahalli in the year 1945, again, no document of grant has been placed on record. 28.12. The actual grant orders in writing made by or on behalf of the Government have not been - 175 - placed on record, more so when the location of the property has been ascertained to be located within the boundaries of the notification of the year 1921. The report of the Thasildhar indicates that there is no such order of grant available in respect of both the above survey numbers. 28.13. Once the land is within the boundaries of the notification as held by the Honble Apex Court in the celebrated judgment in Godavarmans case, in which case, on account of continuous mandamuses which have been issued and the constant monitoring by the Honble Apex Court, has resulted in saving of numerous forests and removal of encroachments, all encroachers in a forest area being required to be evicted. 28.14. A show-cause notice under Section 64-A is issued only with a view to enable the person to whom the notice is issued to show that his land - 176 - does not fall within the boundaries of the forest as drawn up by the Survey of India and as contained in the notification issued in regard thereto, in the present case the notification of the year 1921. If the land is identified as falling within the Survey of India boundary and/or the notification, then there could be no other defence open to the person concerned, namely the encroacher, and the State would be under an obligation and duty to evict the encroacher, by force if necessary. The facts being ex-facie clear that, as per the second survey carried out, the subject land is within the forest boundaries, the Petitioners or anyone claiming through or under them cannot have any defence. 28.15. These aspects being explicitly clear from the documents on record, I am of the considered opinion that there is no in-depth enquiry which - 177 - is required to be conducted by this Court to ascertain if there are any exfacie rights vested with the petitioners. 28.16. Thus, I answer point No.2 by holding that, insofar as the present case is concerned, as regards the challenge to the notice under section 64A, firstly, they do not involve any disputed question of fact requiring in-depth enquiry. Secondly, the survey report indicating that the subject property lies within the boundaries of the forest notified in the year 1921, the petitioners have no defence to any eviction order to be passed against them, however they have to be given an opportunity to place any mitigating circumstances on record for the purpose of consideration of the time to be granted for such eviction. 29. ANSWER TO POINT NO.3. Whether the respondents could have issued a fresh show cause notice in F.O.C. No.7/2006-07, F.O.C. No.8/2006-07, F.O.C. No.9/2006-07, F.O.C. No.13/2006-07 and F.O.C. No.14/2006-07 after the said proceedings have been quashed in Crl.P.1852-57 OF 2012? 29.1. The submission of Sri K. Chandan, learned counsel for the petitioners, is that a similar notice under Section 64 was issued earlier in the year 2006-07, and in furtherance thereof, criminal FOC Nos. 7, 8, 9, 13, and 14 of 2006- 07 were registered. Challenging the same, the petitioners had filed criminal petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Criminal Petition No. 1852 to 1857 of 2012 and this court, vide order dated 13.06.2012 had quashed those proceedings, reserving liberty to the Forest Department to conduct a survey. The said orders having attained finality, the FOC proceedings having been quashed, the question of issuance of one more set of notices - 179 - as done now in the very same FOC proceedings, albeit after a unilateral survey carried out by the Forest Department, is untenable. 29.2. The submission of Sri.Kiran Ron, Additional Advocate General, notes that although the proceedings were quashed, liberty was reserved to the Forest Department to conduct a survey. A survey having been carried out by the Forest Department, where encroachment was found, proceedings have been continued in the said FOC matters. As such, he submits that the continuation of the said proceedings is proper and correct and no fault was committed. 29.3. Having heard the arguments of both the counsels and having perused the papers, there is no dispute as regards the earlier proceedings having been initiated in the year 2006-07 and - 180 - the same having been quashed. The allegations made in those proceedings are the very same allegations which are made in the present proceedings. The orders passed in criminal petition No.1852 to 1857 of 2012 are categorical inasmuch as those FOC proceedings initiated in the year 2006-07 have been quashed only on the ground that there was no survey conducted and in that background liberty was reserved to the forest department to carry out a survey in the presence of the petitioners to ascertain if there was any encroachment. In furtherance thereof, a survey has been carried out in the presence of the petitioners as regards the aforesaid survey numbers and a categorical remark made in the said survey by the surveyor that there is no encroachment by the petitioners of any forest land. 29.4. Liberty having been reserved by this Court in an order dated 13.06.2012 in criminal petition No. 1852 to 1857 of 2012, the first survey which was conducted of the Survey numbers not being as per the notification of the year 1921, as such a fresh survey has been conducted as per the notification of the year 1921 and proceeded therefrom in the very same proceedings, namely FOC 7. The quashing of FOC No.7, 8, 9, 13 and 14 of 2006-07 was only with reference to the joint survey not having been conducted and liberty having been reserved to conduct such a survey. A survey has now been conducted in terms of the notification dated 08-01-1921, encroachment having been found, the authorities are well within their rights to initiate proceedings. 29.5. The subsequent survey, in my considered opinion, is not a unilateral survey conducted by - 182 - the forest department. On 10.07.2017, the ADLR, Devanahalli Taluk, issued a notice to the Petitioners to attend the joint survey to be conducted on 25.07.2017. Though Petitioner No.1 received the notice, the other Petitioners refused to receive the notice. A survey was conducted in the presence of Petitioner No. 3- Sri. M. A. Mohammad Amanullah, who refused to sign the Mahazar, which is apparent from the report of the Assistant Conservator of Forests dated 16.09.2017 addressed to the Deputy Conservator of Forests. The new Survey report indicates that the land of the petitioners comes within the boundaries of the notification dated 08.01.1921. 29.6. As indicated supra , the orders passed in Crl.Petitions No.1852 to 1857 of 2012 are categorical. The entire order thereof is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: - 183 - ORDER Learned Government Pleader has filed statement of objections. 2. In these petitions, petitioners have sought for quashing of the proceedings in FOC Nos.7/06-07, 8/06- 07, 9/06-07, 13/06-07, 14/06-07 pending on the file of CJ (Jr. Dn.) and JMFC, Devanahalli. 3. The allegation in the complaint is that, the petitioners have encroached upon the forest land and accordingly case was registered in FOC Nos.7/06-07, 8/06-07, 9/06- 07, 13/06-07, 14/06-07 for the offences punishable under Sections 24(g), (gg), 73(d) of Karnataka Forest Act and Rule 41 of Rules made there under and Section 41(2) of Karnataka Conservative of Forest Act and Section 2 of Central Forest Protection Act. As against the registration of the cases, the petitioners are before this court. 4. The facts, which are not in dispute are that, in the year 1936 itself it appears that public auction conducted in court proceedings for non payment of the revenue. In the court proceedings, one Subbaraya Mudaliyar purchased the properties. Thereafter, these petitioners each have purchased portion of the properties in 1977. It is also not in dispute that, the Forest and State had filed a suit against one of the purchasers in O.S.No.1424/2006 seeking declaration that the land in possession of the said properties, land encroached upon by the petitioners. It is also not in dispute that the said suit has been dismissed. 5. If, really the forest department finds that there is any encroachment which the petitioners or their predecessor were in possession for more than half century, it is open to the forest department to conduct survey of the land in the presence of the occupier/owner/purchaser of the said property and based on the survey, if they find there - 184 - is any encroachment they can proceed against the occupier in accordance with law. 6. Further, considering that the even before the purchase of the properties by the petitioners, the title deeds were in the name of the vendor, these petitioners have been in possession for over complaint ought not have been filed without proper verification. Hence, I find complaints filed by the forest authority are perverse and liable to be quashed. Accordingly, these petitions are allowed. Proceedings in FOC Nos.7/06-07, 8/06-07, 9/06-07, 13/06-07, 14/06- 07 pending on the file of CJ (Jr. Dn.) and JMFC, Devanahalli stand quashed. Liberty is reserved to the Forest Department, if there is any encroachment, it may conduct the survey and proceed with the matter in accordance with law. 29.7. Though the FOC proceedings initiated in furtherance of the notices issued under section 64A of the FC Act had been quashed, the said proceedings did not come to an end. Liberty was reserved to the Forest Department, if there is any encroachment, it may conduct the survey and proceed with the matter in accordance with law. 29.8. If a survey were to be carried out and encroachment found, matter could be proceeded with in accordance with law, it is in view thereof that fresh notices under Section 64A would be required to be issued and have been so issued, the petitioner would be heard on the same, which is what has been done. The petitioners will be given an opportunity to reply to the same, and thereafter, action to be taken. 29.9. In the present matter, a joint survey was conducted on 28.01.2015 and 29.01.2015 by the Tahsildar Bhuvanahalli, in pursuance of the Order dated 13.06.2012 in Criminal Petition No. 1852-1857 of 2012. The old survey No. 66 of Chikkasane village has now been renumbered as survey No. 68, Survey No. 67 of Chikkasane village is now renumbered as survey No. 69. - 186 - 29.10. The Tahsildar has submitted a survey report in respect of old survey No. 66 and old survey No. 67, and not with reference to new survey No. 68 and 69, it is in that backround that the survey report was not accepted and fresh survey was directed to be conducted since the survey was not conducted in accordance with the Gazette notification dated 08.01.1921. 29.11. Liberty having been reserved by this Court in an order dated 13.06.2012 in criminal petition No. 1852 to 1857 of 2012, the first survey which was conducted of the Survey numbers and not as per the notification of the year 1921, as such a fresh survey has been conducted as per the notification of the year 1921 and proceeded therefrom in the very same proceedings, namely FOC No.7, 8, 9, 13 and 14 of 2006-07. The proceedings were quashed only with reference to the joint survey not having been - 187 - conducted and liberty having been reserved to conduct such a survey. A survey has now been conducted in terms of the notification dated 08- 01-1921, encroachment having been found, the authorities are well within their rights to initiate proceedings. 29.12. I answer point No.3 by holding that the Respondents have rightly issued fresh show cause notices dated 13.11.2020 in FOC No.7, 8, 9, 13 and 14 of 2006-07. 30. ANSWER TO POINT No.4: Whether the first survey carried out in pursuance of the orders in Crl.Petitions No.1852-57 of 2012, indicating that there is no encroachment of forest land, would enure to the benefit of the Petitioners requiring the Writ Petitions to be allowed? 30.1. Some of the contentions relating to this point have been considered in answer to point No.3 above. Suffice it to say that in the first survey, which had been carried out, the petitioners had - 188 - participated, and in the second survey, which had been carried out, the petitioners had chosen not to participate, as indicated supra. 30.2. In my considered opinion, the Petitioners cannot choose not to participate when it had been pointed out that there was an error in the earlier survey on account of the earlier survey having been done of the Survey Numbers and not as per the boundaries of the notification of the year 1921. The First Survey, which had been carried out, was contrary to the orders passed by this court; it would be for the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests and the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department to ascertain if there was any mischief in the carrying out of such a survey with reference to the survey numbers rather than the boundaries of the notification of the year 1921 and take necessary action against the errant officials. 30.3. Respondent-Forest Department was well within its authority to conduct a fresh survey when such an error was found, more so, when in furtherance of the orders passed in Criminal Petition No.1852 to 1857 of 2012, the Forest Department was granted liberty to carry out a survey of the land as per the notification of the year 1921, in the presence of the petitioners. The liberty which has been granted by this court in its order passed in criminal petition No.1852 to 1857 of 2012 did not come to an end once the first survey was carried out. When the aforestated error was found, it was required for any responsible officer of the Forest Department, who is obliged and duty-bound to protect all forest lands, to conduct a fresh survey as per the notification of the year 1921. It is if the survey report of the survey numbers were to be accepted by the forest department - 190 - that the officers could have been said to have abdicated their duties. An action taken to protect forest land cannot be said to be outside the powers of the Officials of the Forest Department, the same being to correct the mistake committed by the surveyor carrying out the survey activity without reference to change in the survey numbers and or the boundaries of the notification of the year 1921. 30.4. As such I answer point number 4 by holding that when a survey was carried out in pursuance of the orders in criminal petition No. 1852 to 1857 of 2012 indicating that there is no encroachment of forest land, the same would not enure to the benefit of the petitioners if the survey was not properly carried out. A subsequent survey after the issuance of notice to the petitioners carried out as per - 191 - the boundaries of the notification of the year 1921 is perfectly valid and binding on the petitioners, more so when they chose not to particiapate in the said arrvey, the Petitioners or anyone claiming through or under them cannot seek to take advantage of their own wrongs by not participating in the survey despite notice having been issued in that regard. 31. ANSWER TO POINT No.5: Whether the filing of the civil suit by the Forest Department and the orders passed therein would disentitle the Forest Department from initiating proceedings under Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963? 31.1. The submission of Sri Chandan, learned counsel for the petitioners, is that a suit having been filed by the Forest Department, the Forest Department failed in the same, and the matter is now pending before the first appellate court, - 192 - proceeding under section 64A of the KFA, 1963 could not have been initiated. 31.2. Per contra, the submission of Kiran Ron, learned the Additional Advocate General, is that the proceedings in OS No.1424 of 2006 were not required to be initiated. They have been so initiated on ill-advise. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded insofar as Forest lands are concerned. A survey has been conducted on 28-01-2015 and 29-01-2015 in pursuance of the Order dated 13.06.2012, passed in Criminal Petition No.1852-1857 of 2012, the Assistant Conservator of Forest having received the said survey report on 12.06.2015 being of the opinion that the said survey was not conducted in accordance with the gazette notification dated 8-01-1921, had requested the Range Forest Officer, the Assistant Conservator Forest and the Deputy Conservator of Forest for a - 193 - fresh survey in terms of the notification dated 8.01.1921. Thereafter on 10-07-2017, notice was issued by the ADLR to the petitioners for conducting a joint survey on 25-07-2017, the petitioners refused to receive the notice and as such, a survey was carried out. Though petitioner No. 3 was present at the time of the survey, he refused to sign the mahazar. It is in furtherance of the same that the survey report has been submitted by the Assistant Conservator of Forest on 16-09-2017 to the Deputy Conservator of Forest. Thus, he submits that this is a survey which has not been carried out unilaterally by the Forest Department but through the ADLR and the officials of the respondent. Notice having been issued to the petitioners, the petitioners had not participated in the said survey. It is on that basis that notices had been issued under section 64A on - 194 - account of encroachment being found during the course of the said survey. 31.3. His submission, therefore, is that irrespective of a civil suit having been filed by the Forest Department, the statutory remedies available to the Forest Department could have been and have in fact been invoked. It is in the background of the aforesaid submission that this issue would have to be answered. 31.4. Though it is not in dispute that a civil suit in OS No.1424/2006 has been filed by the Forest Department, the said suit is only in respect of a portion of the subject property. The title, as observed supra, in that suit and in the present proceedings can be traced to either the grant made in the year 1932 in respect of survey number 69 or the grant made in respect of survey number 68 made in the year 1945. 31.5. Irrespective of the title to the property what would have to be looked into in these kind of matters relating the Forest lands, is whether the land claimed by a private party like the petitioners comes within the boundaries of the Forest notification, if it does, then it would be a forest land, and the Petitioners or anyone claiming through or under them would not have any defence from being evicted in order to clear the encroachment over forest land. 31.6. The filing of the suit, though only reflects the ineptitude on part of the forest officials who had then filed the suit, would not deprive the forest department from exercising its powers in accordance with law. It would, however, be for the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests to take such action as may be permissible, in accordance with law, against such delinquent - 196 - officials, who had, instead of taking up proceedings by exercising powers in accordance with the applicable law, filed a suit and subsequently an Appeal which is still pending. 31.7. As such, I answer point number 5 by holding that proceeding under Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act 1963 can be initiated and continued irrespective of the Forest Department having filed a civil suit relating to the title of the property, since what is required to be decided is whether the property falls within the boundaries of the notification of the year 2021. 32. ANSWER TO POINT No.6: Can the government after notifying a land to be forest land under Mysore Forest Regulations 1990 vide notification 08.01.2021 grant any land to defence personnel or otherwise and what is the effect thereof? 32.1. The submission of Sri. K.Chandan, learned counsel for the petitioners, is that even if the - 197 - land had been notified as a forest land vide notification date 8.01.1921, the land in survey number 69 had been granted to Sri.Manik Raj, a defence personnel in the year 1932 and the land in survey no. 68 was granted to Muniyappa Devanahalli in the year 1945. It is in that background that Section 20 of the KFR 1900 has been brought into service to contend that the grantees Manik Raj and Muniyappa Devanahalli acquired ownership rights in terms of the grant, and there is no prohibition in terms of Section 20 in relation thereto. 32.2. Reliance is also placed on Rule 99 of the Mysore Land Revenue Rules and Section 187 of the Mysore Land Revenue Code, which have been reproduced hereinabove. On that basis, it is contended that if a sale has been executed by an officer of the State representing the State, more particularly when the auction has been - 198 - conducted, on confirmation of the sale, the purchaser is required to be put in possession by the State and a certificate of purchase is required to be issued. 32.3. Reference is also made to Section 24G, 24GG, 24H, 73D of the KFA 1963 and Rule 41(2) of the KFR 1969 and Section 2(2) of the FCA 1980, on which basis it is submitted that it is only after the FCA 1980 came into force that the restriction in respect of forest land came to be introduced and therefore the grant made in the year 1932 and 1945 would be outside the mischief of the FCA 1980. 32.4. Per contra , the submission of Sri.Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General is that once a land has been declared as forest land, it will continue to forest land and by relying on the decision of the Hobble Apex Court in - 199 - Godavermans case, his submission is that no defence is available to any person who is found to be in occupation of forest land once the said land is admitted/found to be forest land. It is in the background of the aforesaid submission that this issue would have to be answered. 32.5. There cannot be any dispute as regards 24G, which provides that clearance of any land for cultivation is prohibited in forest land. 24GG, which prohibits the occupation of forest land for any purpose. Section 24H, prohibits damaging, altering or removing any cairn, wall, ditch, embankment, fence, hedge, or railing in forest land, etc. There can be no dispute as regards Section 73D, which provides for a penalty for any person altering, destroying or defacing any boundary mark of forest land. All these provisions would be attracted in the present case since, as admitted by the Petitioners - 200 - themselves, they have formed a layout and are selling the same to third parties, some of whom are putting up construction of houses on those plots. Once the land has been found to be within the boundaries of the notification of the year 1921, none of these actions could have been undertaken by the petitioners or anyone claiming through or under them. The petitioners took this risk knowing fully well that the Forest Department had laid a claim over this land, in fact the first suit was filed by one of the petitioners contending that there is interference with his possession by the Forest Department, Petitioner No. 2-Mohammad Sanaullah, had filed a suit in O.S. No. 600/1981 seeking a permanent injunction against the Forest Department, restraining the Forest Department from interfering with the peaceful possession of Petitioner No.2 in Survey No. 69/2. The said - 201 - suit came to be dismissed on 13.12.1985 with costs. 32.6. Section 2(2) of the Forest Conservation Act which came into effect from the year 1980 has imposed a restriction on the de-reservation of forest which came into effect in the year 1980 in terms of Subsection (2) of Section 2 thereof. 32.7. Even according to the learned counsel of the Petitioners, de-reservation can only be made with the prior approval of the Central government. This is for the simple reason that the lands in question continue to be part of the Notification of the year 1921, which has not been challenged. No de-reservation having been made and the honble Apex Court in Godavarmans case having prohibited any such dereservation, the petitioners cannot now claim that there is any such dereservation - 202 - without placing any document in regard thereto on record. 32.8. In that view of the matter there could not be any grant made of the subject land, once it was notified to be forest land, there cannot be an estoppel against statute, there being a clear bar under the statute for using a forest land for non forestry purpose, the petitioners are fully aware of such embargo and the claim of the Forest department, this I say so for the simple reason that no action had been taken to develop the property or the like until the turn of the century, by which time action had been taken by the forest department, and the dispute was pending before the court, the first suit having been filed by Petitioner No. 2-Mohammad Sanaullah, in O.S. No. 600/1981 seeking a permanent injunction against the Forest Department, restraining the Forest Department - 203 - from interfering with the peaceful possession of Petitioner No.2 in Survey No. 69/2. The execution of the joint development agreement, obtaining of plan sanction, and agreements of sale having been entered into in that regard are all after the forest department had initiated action and the suit had been filed. Hence, all these acts having been committed by the Petitioners or by persons claiming through or under them, would not entitle them to any equitable consideration. Insofar as third-party purchasers are concerned, they would always have recourse against the petitioners. 32.9. Thus, I answer point number 6 by holding that after the Government notifying the land to be forest land under the Mysore Forest Regulation 1990 vide notification dated 8-01-1921, the alleged grant of land in survey number 69 in the year 1932 and - 204 - the grant of land in survey number 68 in the year 1945 is contrary and violative of the Mysore Forest Regulation 1900 (though no such grant order/s have been placed on record), the further actions taken in entering into a joint Development Agreement, formation of a Lay out, sale thereof and proposed construction houses is violative of the Karnataka Forest Rules, 1969 and Forest (Conservation) Act 1980 . 33. ANSWER TO POINT No. 7 : Whether there is any delay and if there is delay, would it disentitle the Forest Department from taking action under Section 64A? 33.1. Much has been argued by Sri.Chandan, learned counsel for the petitioners as regards the alleged delay. His submissions have been detailed out hereinabove. The sum and substance of his submission is that the grant having been made in the year 1932 in respect - 205 - of survey number 69, in the year 1945 in respect of survey number 68, for the first time interference was sought to be made by the Forest department in the year 1979, as regards which the first suit having been filed by Petitioner No. 2-Mohammad Sanaullah, in O.S. No. 600/1981 seeking a permanent injunction against the Forest Department, restraining the Forest Department from interfering with the peaceful possession of Petitioner No.2 in Survey No. 69/2. Thereafter, the forest department filed a suit in OS No.1424/2006 in the year 2006. Simultaneously, FOC proceedings were initiated in the year 2006-07. The suit in OS No. 1424 of 2006 came to be dismissed on 8.03.2012, as regards which RFA 1287 of 2012 has been filed, which also came to be dismissed. An appeal having been filed before the Honble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. - 206 - 5801 of 2022, the said appeal had been remanded to the trial Court vide order dated 20.09.2022. The trial court once again dismissed the suit on 15.12.2023, which is pending in appeal in RFA No. 160 of 2024. 33.2. In reply, Sri Kiran Ron, Additional Advocate General would submit that once a land has been declared to be Forest land, it will always continue to be Forest land and any encroachment thereof in violation of a notification would provide a continuing cause of action to the Forest department to initiate action. It is on the basis of the above submission that this point would have to be answered. 33.3. It is not in dispute that the Forest Department sought to take action in the year 1979, as regards which the first suit having been filed by - 207 - Petitioner No. 2-Mohammad Sanaullah, in O.S. No. 600/1981 seeking a permanent injunction against the Forest Department, restraining the Forest Department from interfering with the peaceful possession of Petitioner No.2 in Survey No. 69/2, which came to be dismissed, it is on an appeal being filed that the said appeal was allowed, challenging which the Forest Department filed the second Appeal, which was withdrawn to file a comprehensive suit which was so done in the year 2006 as indicated supra, simultaneously the FOC proceeding in FOC 7, 8, 9, 13 and 14 of 2006-07, were taken up which were challenged after 5 years by the Petitioners in Criminal Petitions No. 1852 to 1857 of 2012, the said criminal petition came to be allowed, reserving liberty to the Forest Department to conduct a joint survey as per the notification of the year 1921. 33.4. These facts would indicate that at best till the year 1981 it could be said that no action had been taken by the Forest Department in respect of the aforesaid lands. From 1981, the parties have been battling each other in one fora or the other. Thus, at this stage, having initiated action more than 40 years ago, it cannot be said that there is a delay on the part of the forest department or that no such action can be taken. All the citations relied upon by the learned counsel for the Petitioners would not therefore apply the litigation going on the in present matter for more that 40 years. 33.5. On facts, it is clear that the lands are within the boundaries of the notification of the year 1921. 33.6. Thus, I answer point number 7 by holding that there is no gross delay on the part of the Forest department; the proceedings - 209 - pending for more that 40 years, the aspect of alleged delay does not arise. 34. General Directions/recommendations: 34.1. Forests are more than just collections of trees; they are complex, dynamic ecosystems that provide essential ecological services and significant economic and social benefits. From a global perspective, forests are considered "carbon sinks," absorbing vast amounts of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, which helps to mitigate climate change. The loss of these forests, however, turns them from carbon sinks into carbon sources, contributing to rising global temperatures and more frequent extreme weather events. 34.2. The ecological health of forests is critical for the stability of the entire planet and for all living things more particularly the Human Race to - 210 - survive. They harbour a vast majority of the worlds land-based biodiversity, providing homes for countless species. Deforestation leads to habitat loss, forcing species into fragmented areas where they are more vulnerable to hunting, poaching, and extinction. Furthermore, forests play a vital role in local water cycles, helping to generate rainfall, and their removal can disrupt precipitation and river flow patterns, leading to soil erosion. This erosion can, in turn, degrade arable land, compelling agricultural producers to clear more forest land and perpetuate a destructive cycle, which also results in global warming, change in seasons, net result of which is the suffering of all living organisms, more so the human species. In Cities like Bangalore it can result in reduced water table, increased pollution, dust and the like which are not conducive, there is - 211 - therefore a need for maintaining green spaces as lung spaces to have better environmental balance in cities 34.3. Forests and lung spaces in and around a city offers valuable respite from natures vagaries, ground water protection, protection from pollution etc., 34.4. Despite their importance, forests face constant threats from deforestation and diversion for non-forest purposes. While laws like the Forest Conservation Act of 1980 mandate that any diversion of forest land for non-forest use requires prior approval from the central government, illegal diversion still occurs in some areas, leading to degradation and loss of forest cover. The cumulative effect of these activities is not only a loss of forest land but a profound destabilisation of the entire ecosystem - 212 - that is vital for the survival of wildlife, flora, and the communities that depend on them, which today also includes humans. 34.5. The current case demonstrates that the traditional, paper-based, and siloed administrative systems are inadequate to resolve complex land title conflicts. While Karnataka has made significant strides in land records modernisation, the current situation proves that digitisation alone is insufficient. The critical failure is the lack of a single, unified source of truth. 34.6. The Digital India Land Records Modernisation Programme (DILRMP) has been a significant initiative, succeeding in computerising land records and integrating Sub-Registrar Offices with land records. Karnataka's Bhoomi portal, - 213 - for instance, has enabled online access to Records of Rights (RTCs) and mutation details. 34.7. The current dispute demonstrates the program's fundamental limitation: while records are digitised, they are not necessarily integrated. The Tahsildar's 2015 survey, which failed to identify the land as forest property, was likely based solely on the Revenue Department's records, which had not been reconciled with the Forest Department's historical gazette notifications. This lack of interoperability between different departmental databases means that a seemingly "clean" title in one system (e.g., Revenue) can conceal a fatal legal defect in another system (e.g., Forest). The problem is not the absence of digital records but the absence of a single, authoritative, and consolidated database that - 214 - all government departments must mandatorily reference. 34.8. The solution lies in a radical transformation from siloed digitisation to a unified, integrated technological platform that serves as a single source of verifiable and credentialised truth for all land-related information. 34.9. Geographic Information System (GIS)- based platform: The foundational component must be a Geographic Information System (GIS)-based platform. This system would function as a digital, unified, and immutable map of all land parcels in the state. Leveraging high-resolution satellite imagery from agencies like the Forest Survey of India (FSI) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), this platform is digitally demarcating and geo- tagging all notified forest boundaries as per - 215 - historical gazette notifications, as also conducting forest cover mapping using remote sensing data to monitor the status of forests at the state level. This unified map would then have to be integrated with all other land-related data, including the Revenue Department's cadastral maps, the Urban Planning Authority's master plans, and all other public and private land records. The platform is assigning a Unique Land Parcel Identification Number (ULPIN), or "Bhu-Aadhar," to every land parcel, linking all textual, spatial, and legal records to a single, immutable digital identity, which is to be incorporated in all land records, which are required to be QR code enabled as also date and time stampted in order to enable public verification. - 216 - 34.10. Automated System: An automated system must be built on top of the integrated geospatial platform to streamline all land- related applications. This system would ensure that no land-related action is taken without mandatory, real-time verification against the unified database. For instance, the Deputy Commissioner and planning authorities like BIAPPA would have to be legally barred from processing any land conversion or layout sanction application until the automated system performs a check against the integrated forest map. 34.11. Conflict Alert: If a parcel falls within a notified forest boundary, the system must automatically reject the application and generate a "Conflict Alert" for all concerned departments. Similarly, the Sub-Registrar's Office must be linked to this system to prevent the registration of any sale - 217 - deed for a parcel with a "Conflict Alert," as the existence of litigation or dispute over a property makes it difficult to legally transfer. The online portal for building plan approvals would also be required to integrate with this system to automatically verify that the land is legally converted and free from disputes. 34.12. Publicly Accessible Portal: To empower citizens and foster public trust, the unified platform must include a publicly accessible portal. Through this portal, any individual, including prospective buyers, can enter a ULPIN, a survey number or such other identifiable details to view a comprehensive, colour-coded report of the land parcel. This report would display the land-use classification, ownership history (mutation records), details of any litigation or encumbrances, and a clear, explicit warning if the land falls within a notified - 218 - forest boundary and or reserved for any public purpose or a no development zone. This transparency mechanism would serve as a powerful deterrent to fraud, enabling citizens to perform their own due diligence and effectively acting as a "fraud alert" for every future buyer. By allowing the public to easily verify land status, it would address the core issue of a lack of information, which results in misinformation that leads to fraudulent transactions. 34.13. Reconciliation of Historical Records: The Department of Land and Revenue is directed to immediately undertake a time-bound, state- wide project to reconcile all historical records, including Record of Tenancy and Crops, Form 10, Form 11, Mutation Register, Grant registers, Saguvali Chits, Kethwar registers, Darkast registers, Conversion orders, and any other land revenue records which may be - 219 - maintained as regards that particular land or any other register where the details of that particular property are available, with the digitised forest and revenue maps. The outcome of this reconciliation must be a single, authenticated, and immutable record for each land parcel. The power to rectify errors in revenue records is limited to clerical and typographical mistakes and cannot be used to alter fundamental land rights or ownership without a proper legal process. 34.14. ULPIN Implementation: The department shall ensure the mandatory adoption and use of the Unique Land Parcel Identification Number (ULPIN) for all land parcels. The ULPIN shall serve as the primary key for linking all textual, spatial, and legal data for each parcel, ensuring data integrity and preventing future discrepancies. - 220 - 34.15. Establishment of an Inter-Departmental Land Dispute Resolution Cell (IDLDRC): A dedicated, high-level cell, comprising representatives from the Revenue Department, the Forest Department, and Urban Planning Authorities, shall be established under the direct supervision of the Chief Secretary. This cell shall be the sole body authorised to mediate and issue binding, inter-departmental rectification orders for conflicting records. The Regional Commissioners shall head this cell, as they are tasked with coordinating the work of all departments at the regional level to resolve inter-departmental problems. 34.16. Digital Demarcation of Boundaries: The Forest Department is directed to complete the mandatory geo-tagging and digital demarcation of all notified forest land boundaries, based on - 221 - historical gazette notifications. This geo- referenced data must be integrated into the central geospatial platform established under these directions. The Forest Survey of India, through its use of remote sensing and satellite data, can create digital maps of forest boundaries with a high degree of precision, which is essential for this task. 34.17. Mandatory Geo-Verification: The department shall be legally barred from issuing any notice or initiating prosecution for alleged encroachments without first verifying the land parcel's location against the unified, geo- referenced database. Once the system is set up all future notices must explicitly include the land parcel's ULPIN and a geo-referenced map. The Honble Supreme Court has also noted that the only defense open to an encroacher is to - 222 - prove that their land does not fall within the notified forest boundaries. 34.18. Alerts: This court also recognises that there may be cases where diversion of forest land is made without seeking for necessary permissions or in excess of permissions granted, in such situations, an alert mechanism to be incorporated in the digital maps, to monitor any changes, which alert would be sent to all the concerned officers of the Forest and Revenue department to enable them to take immediate action. The obligation to take action always resting with such officials, the Alert system will aid in the discharge of their obligations/duties. 34.19. Mandatory Automated Conflict Checks: All urban planning authorities and local bodies, including BIAPPA and the Deputy - 223 - Commissioner, shall be under a legal obligation to perform a mandatory automated conflict check against the unified land database before sanctioning any layout plan, land conversion, or building permit. Any application related to a land parcel identified as forest land shall be automatically and immediately rejected by the system. 34.20. Accountability of Officials: Any official who issues any order/licence/permission/no- objection, like a land conversion order or a plan sanction, etc., on a land parcel with a conflicting title, after the implementation of the automated verification system, shall be held personally accountable for his actions. 34.21. Use of Geo-Referenced Data as Primary Evidence: The Department of Land Resources is to link e-Courts with land records and - 224 - registration databases, providing courts with firsthand, substantive evidence, including geo- referenced maps and digital records from the unified geospatial platform. 34.22. Green Watch Platform: A unified mobile app and web portal where any citizen can report an environmental violation with geotagged photos, videos, and documents. 34.23. Aforestation and Carbon Credits: The Government will have to consider the issuance of Carbon credits for persons or organisations which contribute to afforestation and other projects with measurable conservation outcomes (e.g., restoring a wetland, reforesting a degraded corridor segment, achieving a verifiable positive outcome), which would create a direct financial flow from development to conservation. - 225 - 34.24. High-Level Committee: To ensure these directions are not merely pronouncements but are effectively implemented, a robust monitoring mechanism is essential. A joint, high-level committee shall be convened, comprising representatives from the Chief Secretary's office, and the heads of the Land and Revenue, Forest, and Urban Development Departments, the Law Department, a law officer like an Additional Advocate General and such other departments that the Chief Secretary, in her wisdom, may decide. The HLC's mandate will be to oversee the phased implementation of these directions, resolve inter-departmental conflicts as they arise, and provide a quarterly compliance report to the court. Such a committee, with its multi-sectoral expertise, can bridge the gap between departments and prevent the "abdication of - 226 - responsibilities" that has historically plagued environmental administration. 34.25. The implementation of these directions is to be done in a time-bound, phase-wise manner: 34.26. Phase I (Immediate - 3 months): The IDLDRC and HLC are to be established. Mandatory data sharing protocols for all new land transactions must be put into place, ensuring no new contradictory records are created. These protocols would function like "data contracts," ensuring a common understanding and quality of data exchanged between departments. Blockchain methodology could also be considered to be used. 34.27. Phase II (Mid-term 3 months to 1 year): The unified geospatial platform and the automated verification system must be completed and made operational. The ULPIN - 227 - shall be implemented for all new land parcels, and a public-facing portal shall be launched to enable transparency and citizen due diligence. 34.28. Phase III (Long-term - 1-2 years): The full integration of all legacy records will be completed. A significant number of pending disputes will be resolved through the IDLDRC and the system will achieve its full potential for transparent, secure, and definitive land governance. 34.29. The recommendations and suggestions above are based on the consideration of a few of the aspects which have arisen in the matter, the HLC will be free to consider any other aspect/s relevant to formulate a comprehensive methodology for bringing about transparency and efficiency while protecting the most - 228 - revered and vulnerable forest areas as also other no development zones in the state. 35. ANSWER TO POINT NO.8: What Order? 35.1. In view of my findings in respect to point Nos.1 to 7, I am of the considered opinion that the writ petitions are required to be dismissed. Hence, I pass the following: ORDER i. Writ Petitions are dismissed. ii. The petitioners, within 15 days of the receipt of the certified copy of this order, are permitted to place on record before the respondents such mitigating factors as are available for the purposes of consideration of the time for eviction of the petitioners and anyone claiming through or under them from the lands coming with in the boundaries of the Gazette Notification No.R7807-FT-126-20- 8, dated 08.01.1921. - 229 - iii. Respondents are directed to consider the said mitigating factors and pass such orders as required within 30 days thereafter. iv. Respondents are permitted to take such action as is permissible under the applicable law. v. Though the above matter is disposed for reporting progress in compliance with the general directions above, relist on 27.10.2025. Learned AGA is directed to communicate the above order to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Karnataka. Sd/- (SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) JUDGE Ln/-