Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4821 OF 2012
N.S. Nandiesha Reddy ……Appellant(s)
Versus
Kavitha Mahesh ….Respondent(s)
With
Civil Appeal No. 6171/2012
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna, J.
1. The appellants in both these appeals are assailing
the order dated 01.06.2012 passed by the learned Single
Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in
Election Petition No. 7/2008. By the said order, the
election of the appellant in C.A. No. 4821/2012 (Mr.
Nandiesha Reddy) from 151 K.R. Pura Legislative
Signature Not Verified
Assembly constituency in Bangalore Urban District is
Digitally signed by
Neelam Gulati
Date: 2021.08.03
18:07:07 IST
Reason:
held to be void, in terms of Section 100 (1) (c) of the
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Representation of People Act 1951. Further, in the course
of the said order the learned Judge has directed the
Registrar General of the High Court to register a
complaint against the appellant in C.A. No.6171/2012
(Mr. Ashok Mensinkai) before the Competent Court for
proceeding in accordance with law for the purpose of
provisions of Section 193 Indian Penal Code, 1860. The
said direction is issued since according to the learned
Judge, the appellant in the said appeal who was the
Returning Officer for the said election; on being examined
as PW.3 in the Election Petition had given false evidence
before the Court. In the above circumstance, the
appellant in C.A. No. 4821/2012 (Mr. Nandiesha Reddy)
has assailed the order in its entirety while the appellant
in C.A. No. 6171/2012 (Mr. Ashok Mensinkai) has
assailed the order insofar as directing prosecution
against the appellant.
In the above background, we have heard Mr. Jayant
2.
Mohan, learned counsel for the appellant in C.A.
No.4821/2012 and Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel for the
appellant in C.A. No.6171/2012. We have also heard the
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respondent who had appeared as a partyinperson in
both these appeals and perused the relevant material, as
also the written submission filed on either side.
The issue arises from the election which was held in
3.
April/May 2008 to the Karnataka State Legislative
Assembly. The present case as noted earlier, relates to
one of the constituencies, namely, 151 K.R. Pura
Legislative Assembly Constituency. The elections were
notified on 16.04.2008 and as per the calendar of events
the publication of result was fixed on 27.05.2008, soon
after which the Karnataka State Legislative Assembly for
that term was constituted. In that background, the term
of the Assembly was up to May, 2013 whereafter the
subsequent election to constitute the Karnataka State
Assembly afresh for the next term has taken place. In
that circumstance though by the order impugned dated
01.06.2012, the election of the appellant in C.A.
No.4821/2012 (Mr. Nandiesha Reddy) was held to be
void, immediately thereafter, the instant appeal was filed
and this Court had granted stay of the impugned order
while issuing notice on 11.06.2012. In that view, the
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appellant has completed the term of the Assembly for
which he was elected. As such Mr. Jayant Mohan,
learned counsel for the appellant in C.A. No.4821/2012
(Mr. Nandiesha Reddy) has submitted that the grievance
put forth in the appeal does not survive for consideration.
Having noted the sequence it is evident that the prayer in
C.A. No.4821/2012 has rendered itself infructuous and
the appeal does not survive for consideration.
Though that be the position, Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned
4.
counsel for the appellant in C.A. No.6171/2012 submits
that the said appeal needs consideration in view of the
direction issued by the learned Judge to prosecute the
appellant Mr. Ashok Mensinkai. In that regard, the
learned counsel has drawn our attention to the manner
of consideration made by the learned Judge presiding
over the election tribunal and contends that there is no
proper and definite conclusion reached by the learned
Judge as to the deliberate falsehood uttered in the
statement alleged to have been made by the appellant. It
is contended that the appellant in fact was cited as a
witness by the election petitioner herself and in the
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course of the examinationinchief; in answer to the
questions put by the learned Judge and in the cross
examination, the appellant has been consistent in
narrating the facts sequentially as it had occurred on
that day. The appellant though was initially arrayed as
respondent No.4 to the election petition, he had been
deleted and as such the appellant did not have the
opportunity of putting forth his written
statement/objection statement to the Election Petition so
as to controvert the allegations made against the
appellant. In any event, the election petitioner had
examined the appellant and in respect of the statements
made by the appellant the election petitioner did not
choose to crossexamine the appellant after seeking to
treat him as a hostile witness if the allegation of
tendering false evidence was to be made. Further, the
learned Judge after noticing the two versions, one by the
election petitioner and the other by the appellant, though
was entitled to rely upon one of the versions as probable
to arrive at his conclusion on the merit of the case, that
by itself cannot be made the basis to order prosecution.
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That apart no opportunity was granted to the appellant in
terms of Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 before forming an opinion to direct the Registrar to
lodge a complaint. It is his further case that the action of
the present nature could not have been initiated unless
there was material to indicate that the witness had
uttered falsehood intentionally. The appellant could not
have gained either way if the election petitioner had
contested the election or not. In such situation no
purpose would have been served by not accepting her
nomination if she had actually complied with the
requirement and presented the nomination papers. The
appellant had accepted 30 nomination papers from 18
different candidates for the same election and on
23.04.2008 i.e., the last day itself the appellant had
received 18 nomination papers and one more would not
have made any difference. In that view he contends that
the order is not sustainable.
5. The respondent partyinperson however, contends
that the appellant had by not accepting the nomination,
denied an opportunity for the respondent to contest the
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elections and in such circumstance the learned Judge
had noted the inconsistent statements made by the
appellant in the course of his evidence to justify his
illegal action. The learned Judge has therefore rightly
arrived at the conclusion to direct prosecution and such
order does not call for interference is her contention.
6. Having noticed the contentions put forth in C.A. No.
6171/2012 and also having noted that the dispute in
C.A. No.4821/2012 has rendered itself infructuous, we
restrict our consideration limited to the question as to
whether the appellant in C.A.No.6171/2012 (Mr. Ashok
Mensinkai) should be exposed to criminal prosecution
and whether it is expedient to do so in a matter of the
present nature. It is no doubt true that the election
petition itself is predicated on the allegation against the
appellant in C.A. No.6171/2012 to the effect that as a
Returning Officer for the said election he had wrongly
refused to accept the nomination papers sought to be
submitted by the election petitioner which amounts to
improper rejection of the nomination papers in terms of
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Section 100 (1) (c) of the Act. The consequence of the
same has befallen on the elected candidate. However,
presently the ground of improper rejection of nomination
paper as alleged and the conclusion of the learned
Judge on that aspect fades into insignificance for the
reasons stated earlier.
7. Therefore, the limited aspect we are required to
notice in the present situation is only with regard to the
statements made by the appellant in his evidence as
PW.3 which are considered by the learned Judge to be
inconsistent and, therefore, stated to amount to perjury.
In that regard whether the action initiated by the learned
Judge on that aspect is justified is the issue, if not, it will
call for interference. As noted, the appellant was
examined as PW.3. In the course of his deposition, he
had stated that he can identify the election petitioner as
an intending candidate in 151 K.R. Pura Legislative
Assembly Constituency. He has further stated that he
does not remember if the election petitioner had met him
on three occasions on 23.04.2008 which was the last day
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for filing nomination papers. He has however stated that
he remembers to have seen the election petitioner on two
occasions, on that day. He has also stated that he does
not remember the exact time of the election petitioner
meeting him for the first time, but it could be between
3.00 pm and 3.15 pm. On the second occasion he
recollects to have met the election petitioner on the same
day between 5.30 pm and 6.00 pm while he was going
out from office after work for the day. The request made
by the election petitioner at that stage to accept the
nomination paper was declined since the time for
acceptance was over. In that context he states that the
nomination paper which was marked as Exhibit P1 had
not been presented before him between 11.00 am and
3.00 pm on 23.04.2008 which was the permitted time for
filing. He also states that he did not refuse to accept
Exhibit P1(nomination paper) for the reason it was not
accompanied by other necessary documents but in fact it
was not presented before him.
8. As against what has been stated by the appellant,
the election petitioner who examined herself as PW1 has
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stated that on 23.04.2008 she had submitted her
nomination paper before the appellant for the general
election. On delivering the nomination papers she had
requested the Returning Officer for extracting the new
part number and serial number of the ten proposers to
fill in column no. 2B. The Returning Officer is stated to
have told her that he did not have the electoral roll of
K.R. Pura State Assembly Constituency and that she
should approach the revenue officials working in the
ground floor of the building. She states that as per his
request she had entrusted the job to her husband and
supporters to collect the details from the ground floor
office. Later, she came to know from her husband and
her supporter that everybody in the revenue office were
having lunch break and the details could not be secured.
She thereafter, states that for the first time at 14.00
hours when she delivered nomination papers, the
Returning Officer directed her to collect the details but
she could not get the details of her ten proposers who
had signed the nomination papers. She states that on
realising the time factor that it was the last day for filing
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nomination papers she submitted her nomination papers
by 15.00 hours before the Returning Officer once again
and stated that she would fill the column subsequently
as she has time upto 24 hours to fill the column. She
has further alleged that the appellant refused to receive
the nomination papers. What is relevant to be noted is
that the election petitioner in the course of her cross
examination recorded in para 37 states that after
deputing her husband and supporter to get the details
and while she was waiting, she was outside the hall
where the Returning Officer was sitting. This would
indicate, what the election petitioner has stated is in tune
with the sequence stated by the appellant except for the
variance in the stand insofar as actually tendering the
nomination paper and pressing for acceptance and
according to election petitioner the same not being
accepted.
9. From the two sets of statements, one by the
appellant as PW.3 and the other by the election petitioner
as PW.1 in the course of adjudication, the reliability of
one of them was to be deduced. The crux of the matter
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was to find out as to whether the election petitioner had
actually submitted her nomination paper and the
appellant had declined to receive the same. Insofar as
that aspect, if the conclusion was in favour of the election
petitioner it would be a case of an improper rejection and,
on that aspect, it is not necessary for us to pronounce
upon since the appeal on that question does not survive.
However, only issue for consideration is, from the nature
of the statements made above, can the Court come to a
conclusion that the appellant has uttered deliberate or
intentional falsehood in the course of Court proceedings.
In that regard, it is to be noted that the learned Judge
during the course of the proceedings had made certain
observations and had extracted the earlier order in the
final impugned order dated 01.06.2012, the same reads
as hereunder:
ORDER PASSED IN THE MORNING SESSION
“The witness is not very sure of what
development took place and the manner of his
deposition is inconsistent every second and
minute keeps varying and to support his
version that he had conducted in accordance
with rules and regulations and in a proper
manner states that a certain development had
13
taken place around some time, but goes back
on the earlier version that the last nomination
paper was received at 2.58 pm but later
mentioned it was after 3 pm and on being
cautioned by the court, goes back to the earlier
version of 2.58 pm etc.
This witness is obviously lying on oath, his
deposition is inconsistent, varying by the
second, different version each time. A person
giving different version of the same incident is
not merely uttering falsehood once or the other
time, but also committing perjury.
This witness lacks credibility for deposing
before the court on oath and requires to be
dealt with in accordance with law and being a
public servant who has taken oath to depose
truth and only truth before this court has been
attempting to depose incorrect and false
statements which is not only perjury
per se
within the meaning of section 191 of Indian
Penal Code but also committing contempt of
court.
Therefore, no need or occasion for
recording further evidence of this witness and if
need be, can be summoned later by the court
for questioning. As of now, the witness is
discharged.
Witness is directed to remain present in the
court hall. Call this matter again at 2.30 pm.
ORDER PASSED IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION:
Further crossexamination of the witness is
stopped at this stage to enable the witness to
procure relevant necessary, official records
throwing light on the developments that had
taken place during his functioning as the
returning officer in the K R Pura assembly
constituency.
As the witness states that the records
pertaining to conduct of elections etc. are all
now available at the office of the district election
officer, Mahadevapura Zone, BBMP, Bangalore,
who is ex officio holding this post is otherwise
functioning as joint commissioner, BBMP at
Mahadevapura and as this officer has to part
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with records. The witness to be enabled to
secure these records and attend court for
further cross examination with the records.
Sri Shashikanth, learned counsel for the
respondent submits that for such purpose, it is
necessary for the election petitioner to make an
application listing the documents and records
that are required to be summoned and
summons may be issued on such applications
to the officer who is having the custody of such
records.
It is said that procedure is the handmaid of
justice and procedure should be given only
such importance as is warranted to ensure fair
play, equal opportunity and practical
possibilities of adhering to the procedure.
An election petition though is a creature of
the Representation of People Act 1951 and
being a petition at the instance of an aggrieved
persons with regard to the validity of the
declaration of election result, and for
questioning a correctness or otherwise of the
declaration of results and may have the
characteristics of an adversary litigation, it
nevertheless has a flavour of public interest
imbedded into it as the conduct of free and fair
election is the ‘sine qua non’ of any healthy
democratic process. Records relating to the
conduct of elections in a general election either
to an assembly or to the parliament are not
private documents but are public documents or
records and if any such record can throw light
on the manner of conduct of elections in any
particular assembly segment, while it is a
relevant record, familiarity or ignorance of such
a record on the part of the election petitioner
cannot come in the way of court scrutinizing
the record for being satisfied or even for being
apprised about the manner of conduct of
election.
It is therefore, hereby ordered and the
witness who has appeared before the Court as
PW3 today and who had functioned as the
returning officer of the K R Pura assembly
constituency is hereby directed to contact the
district election officer with this order secure
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the relevant records to enable him to depose
before this court correctly with precision,
unambiguity and then appear with such
records before this court on 28.6.2011 as the
witness states that he requires at least seven
days’ time to complete this exercise.
The district election officer who is also the
joint commissioner, BBMP, Mahadevapura, is
hereby directed to ensure compliance with this
order and to hand over such records which are
in his custody relating to the conduct of K R
Pura assembly election to enable the witness to
depose further before this court in a proper and
precise manner as the then returning officer of
the constituency by identifying the record.
The Registrar General of this Court is
directed to ensure a copy of this order is served
on the district election officer, Mahadevapura
zone, BBMP, Mahadevapura, Bangalore48.
The witness also be furnished with a copy of
this order.
List the petition for further cross
examination of PW3 on 28.6.2011.”
10. As per the version of the election petitioner she had
met the Returning Officer at 2 pm on 23.04.2008 when
certain requirements were indicated due to which she
made an effort to secure the same from the ground floor
and after about 45 minutes her husband and the
supporter came back with the information that they were
unable to get the same. She has also stated that at that
point she waiting outside the room where the Returning
Officer was seated. If that version of the election
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petitioner herself is kept in view, it is not the case of the
election petitioner herself that at 2 pm when she had
come, she had met the Returning Officer and insisted for
receiving the nomination paper even without the details
to be filled in column 2B. On the other hand, if the case
that she made efforts to get the details of the proposers
due to which some time lapsed and then she presented
the nomination paper without the details and if the time
spent in that regard as stated by her is about 45 minutes
which is a rough estimate and not precise, the version of
the appellant that he had met the election petitioner
around 3.00 pm to 3.15 pm on that day is a probable
version. This is more so when the fact remains that the
appellant was taking note of the nomination papers
presented by another independent candidate Smt.
Ambujakshi. If in that context he has stated that the
election petitioner had met him between 3.00 pm and
3.15 pm, it could only mean that it was after the process
of receiving the nomination paper of Smt. Ambujakshi. In
fact, it is in her own deposition the election petitioner has
stated that when she was unable to get the details and
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realising the time factor that it was the last day for filing
nomination papers, she submitted her nomination papers
by 15.00 hours (i.e. 3 pm) before the Returning Officer.
Even in that situation, if the learned Judge were to come
to a conclusion that the election petitioner having already
entered the office of the Returning Officer prior to the
closing hours for receipt of the nomination papers at 3.00
pm and in that context due to the guidelines the
nomination papers were to be received, notwithstanding
the same being incomplete, it could be an aspect on the
question of improper rejection. But certainly, the same
could not have been made the basis to conclude that the
appellant was not truthful.
11. The extracted portion of the earlier order dated
15.06.2011 indicates an observation made by the learned
Judge to indicate that he has gone back on the version
wherein he had stated that the last nomination paper
was received at 2.58 pm but later mentioned it was after
3.00 pm and on being cautioned by the court he goes
back to the earlier version of 2.58 pm etc. On this aspect
also we do not see any deliberate falsehood uttered by the
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appellant, much less is there any inconsistency. The
statement made by the appellant was that he received the
nomination paper of Smt. Ambujakshi i.e. the last
candidate at 2.58 pm and it had taken him about 78
minutes to go through the papers, after which she had to
take an oath as stated in para40 of his further cross
examination. If that be the position, the statement would
mean that the last nomination paper of Smt. Ambujakshi
was presented at 2.58 pm and when the process was over
it was past 3.00 pm. Only after that he had met the
election petitioner that is between 3 pm and 3.15 pm.
Even with regard to the statement that he had met the
General Observer on three occasions and later stated it
was on two occasions are to be noted in the context that
the evidence was being tendered after more than three
years and all inconsequential events cannot be recalled
with precision. The further evidence of the appellant is
referred in para 81 to 87 of the order, but learned Judge
has not pointed out any deliberate or intentional
falsehood arising therefrom. Mere reference to
inconsistent statements alone is not sufficient to take
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action unless a definite finding is given that they are
irreconcilable; one is opposed to the other so as to make
one of them deliberately false.
Therefore, as noticed from the evidence recorded,
12.
the appellant had stated that the nomination papers had
not been presented to him before the closing hours and
had sought to justify his action. He had also stated about
the procedure followed in all cases and the presence of
observers in his office. On the other hand, the election
petitioner had contended that she had made an attempt
to submit the nomination paper which was not received
by the appellant who was the Returning Officer. When he
had received 18 nomination papers on that day there was
no particular reason to refuse the election petitioner’s
nomination, nor has motive been suggested or
established. The learned Judge has no doubt accepted
the version put forth by the election petitioner. That by
itself does not indicate that appellant had uttered
falsehood intentionally and deliberately before the court
so as to initiate action under Section 193 Indian Penal
Code. The proceedings of the day in the office of the
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Returning Officer, namely, the appellant was video
recorded and the same was marked as Exhibit P21 to P24
in the proceedings. The learned Judge did not choose to
refer to the same to come to a definite conclusion as to
whether the election petitioner had actually met the
Returning Officer, if so, the actual time and in that
context a finding was not recorded that the depiction in
the videorecording is quite contrary to the statement of
the Returning Officer so as to indicate that he had
uttered deliberate falsehood.
13. Apart from the factual aspect noted above relating
to the evidence tendered in the instant case, it is not a
case where the appellant was a partyrespondent to the
election petition where his written version was available.
On the other hand, he was examined as a witness by the
election petitioner as PW3. No doubt the learned Judge
has chosen to call him as a court witness by interrupting
the crossexamination and posing questions to him. Be
that as it may, it was also not a situation where the
petitioner had filed an application under Section 340 of
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 seeking action. If that
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was the case the appellant would have had an
opportunity to file his version in reply to the application.
That apart, the learned Judge also had not put the
appellant on notice on the allegation of committing
perjury and provided him an opportunity nor has the
learned Judge come to the conclusion that one of the
versions is deliberate or intentional falsehood and that
therefore, action is necessary to be taken against him. On
the other hand, the learned Judge during the course of
passing the final order has made certain observations
and directed that the Registrar General shall file a
complaint.
14. It is apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in
the case of
KTMS Mohammad and Another vs. Union
of India, 1992 3 SCC 178 wherein it is observed as
hereunder:
“37. The mere fact that a deponent has
made contradictory statements at two
different stages in a judicial proceeding is
not by itself always sufficient to justify a
prosecution for perjury under Section 193
IPC but it must be established that the
deponent has intentionally given a false
statement in any stage of the ‘judicial
proceeding’ or fabricated false evidence for
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the purpose of being used in any stage of
the judicial proceeding. Further, such a
prosecution for perjury should be taken
only if it is expedient in the interest of
justice.”
Further, in the case of
Amarsang Nathaji vs.
Hardik Harshadbhai Patel & Ors., 2017 1 SCC 113
relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, this
Court on referring to the case of KTMS Mohammad vs.
Union of India (supra) has held as hereunder:
“6. The mere fact that a person has made
a contradictory statement in a judicial
proceeding is not by itself always
sufficient to justify a prosecution under
Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code,
1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to
as “IPC”); but it must be shown that the
defendant has intentionally given a false
statement at any stage of the judicial
proceedings or fabricated false evidence
for the purpose of using the same at any
stage of the judicial proceedings. Even
after the above position has emerged
also, still the court has to form an
opinion that it is expedient in the
interests of justice to initiate an inquiry
into the offences of false evidence and
offences against public justice and more
specifically referred to in Section 340 (1)
CrPC, having regard to the overall
factual matrix as well as the probable
consequences of such a prosecution. The
court must be satisfied that such an
inquiry is required in the interests of
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justice and appropriate in the facts of
the case.”
15. The respondentelection petitioner has referred to
the decisions in the case of
Mahavir Singh and Ors. vs.
Naresh Chandra & Anr. (AIR 2001 SC 134) and the
case of (AIR
Jagan Nath vs. Jaswant Singh & Ors.
1954 SC 210) in her written submission. We however, do
not find any assistance from the same as they are not
relevant.
In the light of the above stated facts, we are of the
16.
opinion that notwithstanding the conclusion reached by
the learned Judge on the aspect of improper rejection of
the nomination paper, the correctness of which was not
required to be gone into for the reasons stated supra, the
manner in which the learned Judge has concluded that
the appellant in C.A. No.6171/2012 was inconsistent in
his statements in the course of his evidence tendered by
him as PW3 is not justified. Further the conclusion
reached that he is to be prosecuted, without the findings
being recorded regarding deliberate or intentional
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falsehood cannot be sustained. Hence the direction
issued to the Registrar General of the High Court to
initiate the proceedings by lodging a criminal complaint
also cannot be sustained in the facts and circumstances
arising in this case.
17. As noted from the decision in the case of
Amarsang
Nathaji (supra) and the position of law which is well
established is that even in a case where the Court comes
to the conclusion on the aspect of intentional false
evidence, still the Court has to form an opinion whether
it is expedient in the interest of justice to initiate an
inquiry into the offences of false evidence, having regard
to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable
consequences of such prosecution. The Court must be
satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the interest
of justice and is appropriate in the facts of the case. In
that backdrop, insofar as the observation made by the
learned Judge of the election tribunal relating to the need
for maintaining purity of the election process which is the
heart and soul of democracy and in that situation the
25
role of the Returning Officer being pivotal, we fully concur
with the same. However, it is also to be noted, merely
because of that position the Returning Officer in the
instant case need not be exposed to prosecution.
18. Firstly, from the evidence as tendered, we did not
see reason to permit the prosecution since in our opinion
there is no intentional falsehood uttered. The other
relevant facts also indicate that the factual matrix herein
does not indicate that it is expedient in the interest of
justice to initiate an inquiry and expose the appellant to
criminal prosecution. On this aspect it is to be noted
that the instant case is not a case where the nomination
paper which was complete in all respect was filed and it
had been improperly rejected in the scrutiny stage. The
allegation of the election petitioner is that the Returning
Officer had refused to receive the nomination paper,
which the learned Judge in the ultimate analysis has
accepted and termed the same as an improper rejection.
Even that be so, to indicate that the nonacceptance
alleged by the election petitioner was a deliberate action
by the Returning Officer with a specific purpose, it has
26
neither been pleaded nor proved in the course of the
proceedings so as to penalise the appellant to face yet
another proceeding. The Assembly Constituency
concerned is a vast constituency which had nearly four
lakh voters on the electoral rolls. The election petitioner
had not placed material to indicate that she had
contested in any earlier election or had wide support base
in the election concerned and it is in that view she had
been shut out from the contest. Further there is no
allegation that the Returning Officer was acting at the
instance or behest of any other candidate who was feeling
threatened by the participation of the election petitioner
in the election process.
19. On the other hand, the election petitioner, as per
her own case was seeking to present the nomination
paper which was incomplete and even in that
circumstance, she had come to the office of the Returning
Officer only at 2.00 pm on the last day for filing
nomination which was to close at 3.00 pm. Thereafter
she made attempts to complete the formalities in filling
up the nomination paper and having failed had still
27
presented the nomination paper since according to her
the needful could have been done within 24 hours. In
such a case it cannot be said that the Returning Officer
with an ulterior motive had declined to receive the
nomination paper and to cover up his folly was seeking to
tender false evidence before the Court and thereby to
justify his illegal action. In fact, the appellant had
received the other nomination papers submitted to him
on the last day even as late as 2.58 pm. It is also the
consistent view of this Court that the success of a
candidate who has won at an election should not be
lightly interfered with. In any event it ought not to have
been made the basis to initiate prosecution by terming
the appellant as unreliable witness. Further, we notice
that the appellant was aged 59 years as on 15.06.2011
while recording his deposition and a decade has passed
by and now would be 69 years. As pointed out by the
learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant has
retired from service about eight years back. For all these
reasons also, we find that any proceeding against the
28
appellant is also not expedient apart from not being
justified.
In the result, the following order:
(i) Civil Appeal No. 4821/2012 is disposed of as
infructuous.
(ii) Civil Appeal No. 6171/2012 is allowed.
Consequently, the direction contained in para
175 of the impugned order to the Registrar
General of the High Court to register the
complaint against the appellant, the then
Returning Officer before the competent court
for proceeding in accordance with law for the
purpose of provisions of Section 193 of the
Indian Penal Code is set aside.
(iii) Parties to bear their own costs.
(iv)
Pending applications, if any, shall stand
disposed of.
………….…………CJI
(N.V. RAMANA)
………….…………….J.
(A.S. BOPANNA)
………….…………….J.
(HRISHIKESH ROY)
New Delhi,
August 03, 2021