Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 373
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3829 OF 2025
[Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 24400 OF 2024]
BANK OF INDIA & ORS. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
MUTHYALA SAIBABA SURYANARAYANA
MURTHY & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
th
2. The appellants call in question the judgment and order dated 7
March, 2024 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court for the
1 2
State of Telangana , allowing a writ appeal carried by the first
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2025.03.20
17:40:25 IST
Reason:
1
High Court
2
Writ Appeal No. 188 of 2024
1
nd
respondent from the judgment and order dated 22 November, 2023
3
of dismissal of his writ petition by a Single Judge of the same court.
3. The solitary question arising for decision on this appeal is whether the
Division Bench was justified in its interference with the order of
dismissal of the writ petition.
4
4. After serving the first appellant for about 25 years, the first
respondent opted for voluntary retirement and was relieved from the
th
service of BoI on 30 December, 2000.
th 5
5. On 24 August, 2010, BoI published Circular No. 104/64 inviting
st
options from retired employees between 1 September, 2010 and
th
30 October, 2010 to join the Bank of India (Employees’) Pension
Scheme, 1995. The said circular recorded that the option to join the
pension scheme was being extended in terms of an agreement / joint
th
note dated 27 April, 2010 signed between the Indian Banks
6
Association and various Officers’ Associations/Workmen Unions
(United Forum of Bank Unions). The option was available to be
exercised inter alia by employees of BoI who were in service prior to
th
29 September, 1995 and retired prior to the date of settlement, i.e.,
th
27 April, 2010.
6. The first respondent had travelled to the United States of America in
March, 2010. He returned to India a week after the said circular was
3
Writ Petition No. 29659 of 2011
4
BoI
5
said circular
6
IBA
2
issued but much prior to the last date for exercise of option. He
st
claimed that he had to undergo a surgery in the 1 week of October,
2010. He also claimed that not being aware of the opportunity
th
extended by BoI to exercise option within 30 October, 2010 and
th
despite being eligible, he missed such opportunity. It was only on 19
March, 2011, i.e., 4 (four) months beyond the stipulated date, that
the first respondent proceeded to express his interest to opt for the
pension scheme by submitting a representation on that day itself by
filling up the requisite forms claiming that he derived knowledge of
the said circular from two erstwhile employees of BoI.
7. Option not having been exercised by the first respondent within the
stipulated time, obviously, BoI did not accept such option. This
triggered the writ petition, which the Single Judge dismissed. It was
held that the period for exercise of option having expired by the time
the first respondent exercised his option, the decision not to entertain
the option was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary; hence, no
interference was called for.
8. Aggrieved thereby, the first respondent appealed. It is such appeal
that has succeeded by reason of the impugned judgment and order
of the Division Bench.
9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused
the impugned judgment and order. The only reason that can be traced
in the impugned judgment and order for the writ appeal to be allowed
is found in paragraph 6 thereof, reading as follows:
3
“6. This Court, having considered the rival submissions made
by the learned counsel on either side, is of the view that the
respondent-bank has issued Circular dated 24.08.2010
wherein a policy was taken to extend pension to all the retired
employees. When such policy is beneficial in nature, the
respondent-bank ought to have considered the application
submitted by the appellant; though it was submitted
belatedly after expiry of the deadline prescribed in the
Circular 24.08.2010. As the appellant has undergone surgery
during the relevant period of time, the lapse on his part can
be condoned. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was not
justified in dismissing the writ petition and hence, the same
is liable to be set aside.”
10. We have no hesitation to hold that the Division Bench was entirely
wrong in interfering with the dismissal of the writ petition, as ordered
by the Single Judge.
11. It is noted from the judgment and order of the Single Judge that wide
publicity had been given by IBA as well as by BoI through local and
national newspapers and also through its branches that employees,
th
who are otherwise eligible, may opt for the pension scheme by 30
October, 2010. Such recording was made on perusal of the counter
affidavit of BoI to the writ petition of the first appellant. It has not
been shown by the first respondent that the contents of the counter
affidavit, filed by BoI, either did not contain any such material or that
even if it did contain such material, the same did not amount to wide
publicity.
12. Our attention has been invited by learned counsel appearing for the
appellants to a decision of this Court in Calcutta Port Trust and
4
7
Ors. vs. Anadi Kumar Das (Captain) and Ors. , in particular to
paragraph 23 thereof, reading as follows:
“23. We would like to observe that whenever an employer
introduces the pension scheme or makes the same applicable
to retired employees and gives them opportunity to exercise
option, the circulars/instructions issued for that purpose
should either be communicated to the retirees or made known
to them by some reasonable mode. Mere display of such
notice/instructions on the noticeboard of the head office
cannot be treated as an intimation thereof to the retired
employees/officers. The employer cannot presume that all
the retirees have settled in the city where the head office is
located. If the employees belong to the services of the Central
Government or its agencies/instrumentalities, they are likely
to settle in their native places which may be far away from
the seat of the Government or head office of the
establishment or organisation. The retirees are not expected
to frequently travel from their native places to the seat of the
Government or head office to know about additional benefits,
if any, extended by the Government or their
establishment/organisation and it is the duty of the employer
to adopt a suitable mechanism for communicating the
decision to the retired employees so as to enable them to
exercise option. This could be done either by publishing a
notice in the newspaper about which the retirees are told at
the time of their retirement or by sending copies of the
circulars/instructions to the retirees or by sending a copy
thereof to the association of the employees and/or officers
with a direction to them to circulate the same among the
retirees concerned. By taking advantage of the modern
technology, the employer can also display the
circulars/instructions on a designated website about which
prior information is made available to the employees at the
time of their retirement. If one of these modes is not adopted,
the retired employees can legitimately complain that they
have been denied right to exercise the option and can seek
intervention of the court.”
13. In the absence of the first respondent proving to the contrary, we are
left with no option but to hold that BoI did observe the aforesaid
7
(2014) 3 SCC 617
5
directions in letter and spirit and spared no effort to make it known
to all the retired employees, eligible to opt for the pension scheme,
that they would be having the window of opportunity to so opt by
th
submitting the requisite forms by 30 October, 2010.
14. It is the admitted case of the first respondent that he had returned
st
to India from the United States of America on 1 September, 2010.
However, he was not diligent enough to make himself aware of the
developments touching his interest while he was abroad. The bogey
of hospitalisation raised by the first respondent, and that too for a
rd th
short period of four days between 3 October and 7 October, 2010,
was not such so as to overlook his recalcitrance in not acting with
intent and purpose within the period made available by the said
circular.
15. The Division Bench referred to the beneficial nature of the policy to
grant relief to the first respondent. Whenever a policy is formulated,
which is beneficial in nature for the subjects to be governed thereby
but, at the same time, prescribes a time limit for the subjects to act,
it is not and cannot be the law that the proposed benefits can be
availed of by a subject beyond the stipulated period and at any time
in future suiting his convenience.
16. Almost half a century back, this Court in Mani Subrat Jain v. State
8
of Haryana had sounded a word of caution as follows:
“9. … It is elementary though it is to be restated that no one
can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. There must be
8
(1977) 1 SCC 486
6
a judicially enforceable right as well as a legally protected
right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a
mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when
a person is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal
duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. …”
17. In the present case, after the first respondent did not avail the
th
opportunity to exercise option by 30 October, 2010, there was no
occasion for denial or deprivation of a legal right of the first
respondent by the appellants. The harm or loss arising out of failure
of the first respondent to opt for the pension scheme was not
wrongful in the eye of law since it is he who had to be blamed for the
situation where he found himself. The first respondent had neither
sustained any injury to any legally protected interest nor had he been
subjected to a legal wrong. He did not suffer a legal grievance and
had no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Thus, not having
a legally protected right which could have been judicially enforced by
seeking a mandamus, the writ petition of the first respondent was
plainly not maintainable and, thus, the Single Judge rightly dismissed
the same.
18. The Division Bench, in course of its interference with the order
dismissing the writ petition, failed to realise that in exercise of writ
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, the high courts of the
country do not come to the aid of the tardy, the indolent, and the
lethargic. This golden truth has to borne in mind by all courts
exercising high prerogative writ jurisdiction. While mandamus will
7
issue to reach injustice, wherever found, it is equally true that
exercise of discretion should not unnecessarily be coloured by
considerations of sympathy or grace or compassion or charity. These
are beyond the scope of the high courts’ writ powers. In cases such
as these, where acceptable justification for the failure to act with
expedition is not proffered, the high courts should stay at a distance.
19. The Division Bench should have also done well to remember that
considerations of sympathy, grace, charity, or compassion do not
have any place where a subject is called upon to exercise his option
upon a settlement executed by and between the parties, one of which
represents the subject himself, and such settlement is binding on the
parties during its validity. If belated options are to be accepted, it
would bring in its train chaos, confusion and public inconvenience
without there being any end in sight and unsettle the very settlement
reached by and between the parties which is the foundation of the
rights of the subjects.
20. Since it had not been shown to the High Court that the said circular
was not widely published and, therefore, opening up a window of
st th
opportunity for submission of options between 1 September and 30
October, 2010 was nothing more than a mere lip service, no case for
interference had been set up by the first respondent either.
21. Also, there being no unreasonableness or arbitrariness in the process
of decision making adopted by the appellants, the writ petition rightly
came to be dismissed and there was absolutely no occasion for the
8
Division Bench to interfere and allow the writ appeal of the first
respondent.
22. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The impugned
th
judgment and order dated 7 March, 2024 is set aside and the
nd
judgment and order of the Single Judge dated 22 November, 2023
affirmed, with the result that the writ petition of the first respondent
on the file of the High Court shall stand dismissed.
………..…………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…….……..………………J.
(MANMOHAN)
NEW DELHI.
MARCH 18, 2025.
9
2025 INSC 373
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3829 OF 2025
[Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 24400 OF 2024]
BANK OF INDIA & ORS. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
MUTHYALA SAIBABA SURYANARAYANA
MURTHY & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
th
2. The appellants call in question the judgment and order dated 7
March, 2024 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court for the
1 2
State of Telangana , allowing a writ appeal carried by the first
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2025.03.20
17:40:25 IST
Reason:
1
High Court
2
Writ Appeal No. 188 of 2024
1
nd
respondent from the judgment and order dated 22 November, 2023
3
of dismissal of his writ petition by a Single Judge of the same court.
3. The solitary question arising for decision on this appeal is whether the
Division Bench was justified in its interference with the order of
dismissal of the writ petition.
4
4. After serving the first appellant for about 25 years, the first
respondent opted for voluntary retirement and was relieved from the
th
service of BoI on 30 December, 2000.
th 5
5. On 24 August, 2010, BoI published Circular No. 104/64 inviting
st
options from retired employees between 1 September, 2010 and
th
30 October, 2010 to join the Bank of India (Employees’) Pension
Scheme, 1995. The said circular recorded that the option to join the
pension scheme was being extended in terms of an agreement / joint
th
note dated 27 April, 2010 signed between the Indian Banks
6
Association and various Officers’ Associations/Workmen Unions
(United Forum of Bank Unions). The option was available to be
exercised inter alia by employees of BoI who were in service prior to
th
29 September, 1995 and retired prior to the date of settlement, i.e.,
th
27 April, 2010.
6. The first respondent had travelled to the United States of America in
March, 2010. He returned to India a week after the said circular was
3
Writ Petition No. 29659 of 2011
4
BoI
5
said circular
6
IBA
2
issued but much prior to the last date for exercise of option. He
st
claimed that he had to undergo a surgery in the 1 week of October,
2010. He also claimed that not being aware of the opportunity
th
extended by BoI to exercise option within 30 October, 2010 and
th
despite being eligible, he missed such opportunity. It was only on 19
March, 2011, i.e., 4 (four) months beyond the stipulated date, that
the first respondent proceeded to express his interest to opt for the
pension scheme by submitting a representation on that day itself by
filling up the requisite forms claiming that he derived knowledge of
the said circular from two erstwhile employees of BoI.
7. Option not having been exercised by the first respondent within the
stipulated time, obviously, BoI did not accept such option. This
triggered the writ petition, which the Single Judge dismissed. It was
held that the period for exercise of option having expired by the time
the first respondent exercised his option, the decision not to entertain
the option was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary; hence, no
interference was called for.
8. Aggrieved thereby, the first respondent appealed. It is such appeal
that has succeeded by reason of the impugned judgment and order
of the Division Bench.
9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused
the impugned judgment and order. The only reason that can be traced
in the impugned judgment and order for the writ appeal to be allowed
is found in paragraph 6 thereof, reading as follows:
3
“6. This Court, having considered the rival submissions made
by the learned counsel on either side, is of the view that the
respondent-bank has issued Circular dated 24.08.2010
wherein a policy was taken to extend pension to all the retired
employees. When such policy is beneficial in nature, the
respondent-bank ought to have considered the application
submitted by the appellant; though it was submitted
belatedly after expiry of the deadline prescribed in the
Circular 24.08.2010. As the appellant has undergone surgery
during the relevant period of time, the lapse on his part can
be condoned. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was not
justified in dismissing the writ petition and hence, the same
is liable to be set aside.”
10. We have no hesitation to hold that the Division Bench was entirely
wrong in interfering with the dismissal of the writ petition, as ordered
by the Single Judge.
11. It is noted from the judgment and order of the Single Judge that wide
publicity had been given by IBA as well as by BoI through local and
national newspapers and also through its branches that employees,
th
who are otherwise eligible, may opt for the pension scheme by 30
October, 2010. Such recording was made on perusal of the counter
affidavit of BoI to the writ petition of the first appellant. It has not
been shown by the first respondent that the contents of the counter
affidavit, filed by BoI, either did not contain any such material or that
even if it did contain such material, the same did not amount to wide
publicity.
12. Our attention has been invited by learned counsel appearing for the
appellants to a decision of this Court in Calcutta Port Trust and
4
7
Ors. vs. Anadi Kumar Das (Captain) and Ors. , in particular to
paragraph 23 thereof, reading as follows:
“23. We would like to observe that whenever an employer
introduces the pension scheme or makes the same applicable
to retired employees and gives them opportunity to exercise
option, the circulars/instructions issued for that purpose
should either be communicated to the retirees or made known
to them by some reasonable mode. Mere display of such
notice/instructions on the noticeboard of the head office
cannot be treated as an intimation thereof to the retired
employees/officers. The employer cannot presume that all
the retirees have settled in the city where the head office is
located. If the employees belong to the services of the Central
Government or its agencies/instrumentalities, they are likely
to settle in their native places which may be far away from
the seat of the Government or head office of the
establishment or organisation. The retirees are not expected
to frequently travel from their native places to the seat of the
Government or head office to know about additional benefits,
if any, extended by the Government or their
establishment/organisation and it is the duty of the employer
to adopt a suitable mechanism for communicating the
decision to the retired employees so as to enable them to
exercise option. This could be done either by publishing a
notice in the newspaper about which the retirees are told at
the time of their retirement or by sending copies of the
circulars/instructions to the retirees or by sending a copy
thereof to the association of the employees and/or officers
with a direction to them to circulate the same among the
retirees concerned. By taking advantage of the modern
technology, the employer can also display the
circulars/instructions on a designated website about which
prior information is made available to the employees at the
time of their retirement. If one of these modes is not adopted,
the retired employees can legitimately complain that they
have been denied right to exercise the option and can seek
intervention of the court.”
13. In the absence of the first respondent proving to the contrary, we are
left with no option but to hold that BoI did observe the aforesaid
7
(2014) 3 SCC 617
5
directions in letter and spirit and spared no effort to make it known
to all the retired employees, eligible to opt for the pension scheme,
that they would be having the window of opportunity to so opt by
th
submitting the requisite forms by 30 October, 2010.
14. It is the admitted case of the first respondent that he had returned
st
to India from the United States of America on 1 September, 2010.
However, he was not diligent enough to make himself aware of the
developments touching his interest while he was abroad. The bogey
of hospitalisation raised by the first respondent, and that too for a
rd th
short period of four days between 3 October and 7 October, 2010,
was not such so as to overlook his recalcitrance in not acting with
intent and purpose within the period made available by the said
circular.
15. The Division Bench referred to the beneficial nature of the policy to
grant relief to the first respondent. Whenever a policy is formulated,
which is beneficial in nature for the subjects to be governed thereby
but, at the same time, prescribes a time limit for the subjects to act,
it is not and cannot be the law that the proposed benefits can be
availed of by a subject beyond the stipulated period and at any time
in future suiting his convenience.
16. Almost half a century back, this Court in Mani Subrat Jain v. State
8
of Haryana had sounded a word of caution as follows:
“9. … It is elementary though it is to be restated that no one
can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. There must be
8
(1977) 1 SCC 486
6
a judicially enforceable right as well as a legally protected
right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a
mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when
a person is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal
duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. …”
17. In the present case, after the first respondent did not avail the
th
opportunity to exercise option by 30 October, 2010, there was no
occasion for denial or deprivation of a legal right of the first
respondent by the appellants. The harm or loss arising out of failure
of the first respondent to opt for the pension scheme was not
wrongful in the eye of law since it is he who had to be blamed for the
situation where he found himself. The first respondent had neither
sustained any injury to any legally protected interest nor had he been
subjected to a legal wrong. He did not suffer a legal grievance and
had no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Thus, not having
a legally protected right which could have been judicially enforced by
seeking a mandamus, the writ petition of the first respondent was
plainly not maintainable and, thus, the Single Judge rightly dismissed
the same.
18. The Division Bench, in course of its interference with the order
dismissing the writ petition, failed to realise that in exercise of writ
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, the high courts of the
country do not come to the aid of the tardy, the indolent, and the
lethargic. This golden truth has to borne in mind by all courts
exercising high prerogative writ jurisdiction. While mandamus will
7
issue to reach injustice, wherever found, it is equally true that
exercise of discretion should not unnecessarily be coloured by
considerations of sympathy or grace or compassion or charity. These
are beyond the scope of the high courts’ writ powers. In cases such
as these, where acceptable justification for the failure to act with
expedition is not proffered, the high courts should stay at a distance.
19. The Division Bench should have also done well to remember that
considerations of sympathy, grace, charity, or compassion do not
have any place where a subject is called upon to exercise his option
upon a settlement executed by and between the parties, one of which
represents the subject himself, and such settlement is binding on the
parties during its validity. If belated options are to be accepted, it
would bring in its train chaos, confusion and public inconvenience
without there being any end in sight and unsettle the very settlement
reached by and between the parties which is the foundation of the
rights of the subjects.
20. Since it had not been shown to the High Court that the said circular
was not widely published and, therefore, opening up a window of
st th
opportunity for submission of options between 1 September and 30
October, 2010 was nothing more than a mere lip service, no case for
interference had been set up by the first respondent either.
21. Also, there being no unreasonableness or arbitrariness in the process
of decision making adopted by the appellants, the writ petition rightly
came to be dismissed and there was absolutely no occasion for the
8
Division Bench to interfere and allow the writ appeal of the first
respondent.
22. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The impugned
th
judgment and order dated 7 March, 2024 is set aside and the
nd
judgment and order of the Single Judge dated 22 November, 2023
affirmed, with the result that the writ petition of the first respondent
on the file of the High Court shall stand dismissed.
………..…………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…….……..………………J.
(MANMOHAN)
NEW DELHI.
MARCH 18, 2025.
9