Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
COL. HIS HIGHNESS RAJA SIR HARINDER SINGH BRAR BANS BAHADUR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
COMMSSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT15/10/1971
BENCH:
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
BENCH:
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
CITATION:
1972 AIR 7 1972 SCR (2) 1
1972 SCC (4) 536
ACT:
Income-tax Act, 1922--Ruler of erstwhile princely state--If
liable to tax in respect of Personal income earned in
British India.
Princely State--Ruler--Status in International law.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant who was the ruler of an erstwhile princely
state, challenged the assessments made against him for the
assessment years 1946-47 and 1947-48 in respect of his
personal income earned in British India, on the ground that
he being a Ruler was immune from taxation-on every source of
income. On the question whether the appellant could claim
immunity from tax under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 in
respect of the income earned in British India,
HELD: The appellant was not entitled to any immunity and,
therefore was liable to tax.
(a) In International law the head of a State representing
the State as such enjoys certain extra territorial
privileges in other States. Some of these privileges and
immunities are political and are generally the subject of
executive and administrative instructions. There are others
in relation to the applicability of the municipal laws, the
immunity from which are either recognised by the common law
and which courts will not enforce, as in England, or are
dealt with by those laws themselves by affording the
necessary exemption; yet others are regulated by treaties
and international conventions.
Whatever might be the various aspects of the privileges and
immunities enjoyed by the Heads of State, the rulers of the
erstwhile princely states did not enjoy the same or similar
privileges as those of the Heads of States recognised as
members of the family of Nations in international law. From
the very nature of these princely states it was clear that
they were subject to the sovereignty and protection of the
British Crown. While their relations with the Crown were
governed by treaties, though initially on terms of equality,
when the British Crown in India became paramount, the re-
lationship between it and the rulers became unequal with the
result that these treaties became subject to the reservation
that they could be disregarded where the interests of the
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British Empire or those of the subjects of the princely
states were involved. The status of these States as inter-
national personalities was negatived by the British
Government even towards the end of the 19th century and it
had been maintained that the principles of International law
had no bearing upon the relations between the Government of
India as representing the Queen Empress on the one hand and
the native states under the suzerainty of Her Majesty on the
other. Again, though the status of these rulers in England
was recognised as being on par with other rulers in the
matter of personal immunity from legal proceedings in so far
as British India was concerned, these were the subject
matter of legislation under which the ruling princes in
India, notwithstanding that they were not recognised as
international personalities, were accorded this immunity.
Therefore, any exemption the Rulers could claim had to be
under the relevant taxing acts. There is no such exemption
under the Income-tax Act. Besides, the fact that the income
of the
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rulers derived from Central Government securities was
specifically exempted by s. 60 implied that the rulers were
not exempted from other provisions of law. The provisions
in certain statutes specifically making every Ruler of an
Indian State liable to tax only militate against the
assumption of immunity from taxation of the property of the
Rulers at any rates provisions might have been ex abundant
ceutela. [21D-22B, 24G].
H. H. Maharajadhiraja’Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Rahadur of
Gwalior etc. v. Union of India, [1971] 1 S.C.C. 85, referred
to.
(b) Further it is now concluded by a decision of this Court
in Commissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh v. H. E. H.
Mir Osman Ali Bahadur, [1966] 2 S.C.R. 296 that the ruler of
a princely state did not acquire international personality
and so could not rely upon International law for claiming
immunity from taxation of his personal properties. [25D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 34 and 35
of 1969.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated
August 5, 1968 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Income-tax Reference No. 40 of 1964.
K. C. Puri, K. L. Mehta, S. K. Mehta and S. S. Hussain, for
the appellant (in both the appeals).
B. Sen, P. L. Juneja, Badri Das Sharma for R. N. Sachthey,
for the respondent (in both the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. These two Appeals are by Special
Leave against the Judgment Of the Punjab & Haryana High
Court answering the Reference under Section 66(1) of the
Indian Income-tax Act 1922 (hereinafter referred to as ’the
Act’) against the assessee-the Appellant. The Appellant who
was admittedly a Ruler of the erstwhile Faridkot State
challenged the assessments made against him for the years
1946-47 and 1947-48 with respect to which the accounting
years were Vikram year 2002 and.2003 corresponding to the
period 13th April 1945 to 12th April 1946, and 13th April
1946 to 12th April 1947 respectively. The; assessment in
each of these years was made under Sec. 34 read with Sec. 23
of the Act, as the assessee’s income from dividends and
interest and capital gains earned by the assessee during the
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relevant accounting year in what was then British India had
not been brought to tax. The assessee objected to these
proceedings and contended before the Income-tax Officer that
he ’being a Ruler of the Faridkot State was immune from
taxation on every source of income. He could not therefore,
by virtue of his sovereignty be treated as an assessee for
any purpose under the Act. It was also contended that the
notices under Sec. 34 were time barred. The Income-tax
Officer however, rejected these objections and held that
though under the
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International Law the Rulers of Indian States were
sovereigns and immune from Municipal Laws of other
countries, there was no exemption at far as the personal
incomes of the Rulers are concerned from being taxed under
the Act. In that view he held that notices under Sec. 34
were valid and accordingly made an assessment. The Appeal
to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was without success,
though similar contentions were raised before him with
particular reference to the privileges which the Rulers
enjoyed under International Law both in respect of Civil and
Criminal matters. The assessee appealed against this order
to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal where, however,, there
was a divergence of view between the two Members and
therefore the matter was referred to the President of the
Tribunal. After considering the decisions in regard to the
exemption of the sovereign from all Civil and Criminal Laws
of another State, the Judicial Member held that no
assessment could be made on the assessee under the Act as he
was the Ruler of a sovereign State during the assessment
years under consideration. In this view he did not express
any opinion on the question of the legality of the
proceedings under Sec. 34 of the Act. The Accountant Member
however, after considering the various provisions in the Act
whereby exemption was granted to the Rulers in regard to
certain types of income and the various decisions held that
the assessee was liable to assessment in respect of his
personal income arising or accruing to him from British
India from his private properties. He also held that the
proceedings under Sec. 34 of the Act were perfectly legal
and valid. In view-of the difference of opinion,, the
matter was referred to the President of the Tribunal under
Sec. 5A(7) of the Act on the following question
"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances
of the case the assessee was immune from tax
under the Indian Income-tax Act on his private
income viz., dividends and interest income as
also the Capital Gains earned in British
India."
The President of the Tribunal held in favour of the assessee
by relying on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
the case of H. E. H. Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur Nizam & Raj-
permukh of Hyderabad v. Commissioner of Income-Tax(1), where
it was stated thus :
"Indisputably, a sovereign ruler enjoys
immunity from taxation under International Law
and it is only in cases where this rule is
superseded by express words that this should
be denied to him. If a legislature wants to
depart from these principles and bring such
(1) Case No. 35 of 1959.
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ruler to tax, there must be clear indication
in the enactment itself. In the absence of
such express words, the statute must be
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interpreted in conformity With International
Law. Simply because the Municipal Law did’
not provide for such an exemption, the
principles of International Law should not be
regarded as having been superseded".
In the aforesaid view the Andhra Pradesh High Court had held
that notwithstanding the fact that His Exalted Highness the
Nizam had lost the character of a sovereign ruler after 26-
10-1950, he is still immune from taxation in respect of the
income derived by him prior to that date.
Following this decision the President held that the assessee
was immune from taxation under the Act on his private
income. In view of this decision on an application by the
Revenue under Sec. 66(1) of the Act the following question
was referred to the High Court :-
"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the
case, the assessee was not liable to tax under
the Indian; Income-tax Act, 1922, in respect
of his personal income accruing or arising to
him in British India in the two assessment
years 1946-47 and 1947-48."
The High Court relying upon the decision of this, court in
Commissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh v. H. E. H. Mir
Osman Ali Bahadur(1), which reversed the decision of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court referred to and relied upon by the
President of the Tribunal held against the assessee. It is
contended before us that the facts and circumstances in the
Nizam’s case are totally different and the decision of this
Court is clearly distinguishable. The learned Advocate
contends that in that case the assessments related to the
assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52, the corresponding
accounting year for which was the, period between 1st April
1949 and 31st March 1950, and 1st April 1950 and 31st March
1951 respectively, which years being after the inauguration
of the Constitution on 26th January 1950, clearly make the
Act which was made applicable from 1st April 1950 to all the
Part B States, applicable to the assessee. But-it is
submitted that in the case before us there could be no ques-
tion of Act being made applicable to Faridkot State as the
assessment years and the accounting years are prior to the
inauguration of the Constitution and the application of the
Act. The learned Advocate cited a large number of decisions
in support of his contention that the Native States in India
had International.
(1) 59 I.T.R. 666.
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personality and their Rulers had ’immunity similar to those
that were accorded to any other Head of a State under
International Law. It was also argued that though these
princely States in India may have been ’protected States; it
was not necessary for the recognition of the privileges and
immunities of the Rulers of such States to possess all the
attributes of sovereignty and complete independence in
support of which the decisions of Mighall ,v. Sultan of
Jahore(1), Duff Development Co. Ltd. v. Govt. of Kelantan &
Anr.(2), Stathem v. Stathem & H. H. the Gaekwad of
Baroda(3), were referred to. It was therefore contended
that in this country also the position was the same as that
recognised by the Common Law of England for which
proposition, decisions were referred to from Punjab Recorder
onwards. A reference was also made to several cases
pertaining more specifically to the immunity enjoyed by the
Rulers from payment of Income-tax on the basis of their
status under International Law. These are : The Patiala
State Bank v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay(4), Rani
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Amrit Kunwar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, C.P. & U.P.(5),
The Accountant General, Baroda State v. Commissioner of
Income-tax, Bombay City(6), A. H. Wadia, as Agent of the
Gwalior Durbar v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay (7),
and Maharaja Bikram Kishore of Tripura v. Province of Assam
(8).
On behalf of the Revenue reliance is placed on Commissioner
of Income-tax Andhra Pradesh v. H. E. H. Mir Osman Ali
Bahadur(9), to sustain the Judgment under appeal and it is
conceded that if this decision was not applicable to the
facts and circumstances of this case, the position as
contended by the assessee would be that the Indian Rulers
prior to the Constitution were granted immunity from
taxation, and in any case this was so in respect of the
income from the property of the State as, distinct from the
private or personal property of the Ruler though there were
observations in some- of the cases that it was difficult ’to
distinguish public or private property owned by a ruler.
At this stage we think it necessary to advert to one
argument .adduced on behalf of the assessee namely that the
Income-tax authorities-particularly the Income-tax Officer,
had accepted the International status of the assessee and
the immunity from .taxation of income from public property,
but only rejected the claim for such immunity in respect of
income from private or Personal property. It is therefore
contended that the status of
(1) [1894] I. Q. B. 149.
(3) (1912) Probate 92.
(5) XIV ITR 561.
(7) XVII ITR 63.
(9) 59 I.T.R.
(2) [1924] A. C. 797.
(4) XI ITR 617.
(6) XVI ITR 78.
(8) XVII ITR 220.
(9) 59 I.T.R.666
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the assessee as an international personality is not in issue
before.us s, what is in issue is whether his income from
private property is exempt from taxation. We do not think
this contention has, validity, because the High Court has
specifically While rejecting, the second contention
addressed on behalf of the assessee ruled;, that the status
of the assessee as a ruler of the Indian State could.’ not
be equated with that of a sovereign in international law.
Even the reference to the High Court does not limit or
circumscribe the matter for consideration as contended for
but on the, other hand enables us to deal with the question
whether as an, erstwhile ruling prince the assessee can at
all be entitled to the.. immunity from taxation.
In considering the question referred to by the Tribunal it,,
may be useful to examine briefly the basis and extent of the
privilege and immunity enjoyed by Head of State in
International Law, particularly having regard to the lengthy
arguments. addressed before us. In International Law the
Head of a State,. represent* the State as such and not as an
individual representing his own rights. In that capacity he
enjoys certain extra, territorial privileges in other States
which are friendly and in peace, known as the receiving
States, with the State he represents. These are, ceremonial
honours for himself, the Members of his, family and his
retinue; special protection to his person, and’ exemption
from Criminal jurisdiction; the grant of extra terri-
toriality, on the basis that one sovereign does not have any
powerover the other, such as immunity from filing of suits
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against him except where he is himself a plaintiff and from.
other civil processes; exemption from taxation rating and
other fiscal enactments and the invilobility of immovable
property in which he of, the representatives of the State
accorded diplomatic immunity. reside etc. Some of these
privileges and immunities are political and are generally
the subject of executive and administrative instructions
such as ceremonial honours, Police protection. exemption
from customs in accessability of their residences to
officers of Justice, Police or Revenue officials unless
consented to by them. There are yet others in relation to
the applicability of the Municipal Laws, the immunity from
which are either recognised by the Common Law and which
Courts will not enforce as. in England or are dealt with by
those laws themselves by affording the necessary exemption.
There are yet others which may be regulated by Treaties or
international covenants. Whatever may be the various
aspects of the immunity and privileges enjoyed by the Heads
of the State under the Laws of the Country where questions
relating to them arise, what we are concerned with at the
very thresh-hold of this argument dealing with the immunity
is whether the rulers of the erstwhile native States as.
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they were called enjoyed the same or similar privileges as
those ,of the Heads of States recognised as Members of the
family of nations ln International Law.- It is clear from
the very nature of the native States in ’India that they
were subject to the sovereignty and protection of British
Crown. While their relations with the Crown were governed
by treaties, though initially on terms of equality, as time
went by and the British Crown in India ,became paramount,
the relationship between it and the Rulers ,became unequal
with the result that these treaties became subject to the
reservation that they could be disregarded where the
interests of the British Empire or those of the subjects of
the native States were involved.
When the Nizam claimed equality with the British Crown, the
then Viceroy Lord Reading informed him on 27th March 1926
that "The sovereignty of the British Crown is supreme in
India and therefore no Ruler of an Indian State can
justifiably claim to negotiate with the British Government
on an equal. footing". After giving a few illustrations to
negative the claim of the Nizam, the Viceroy proceeded to
observe "other illustrations could be added no less
inconsistent than the foregoing with the suggestion that the
Government of your Exhalted Highness and the British
Government stand on a plane of equality ... (1). This
paramountcy was described by Shah, J, as he then was, as
"brazen faced autocracy" in H. H. Maharajadhiraj Madhav Rao
Jivaji Rao Bahadur of Gwalior etc. v. Union of India (2).
What then becomes of the claim of these States or their
rulers to recognition. as International personality. The
answer to this specific question is furnished even towards
the end of the 19th Century. The status of these native
States as International personalities was negatived. in the
Notification of the Government published in Gazette of India
Part 1, dated 21st August, 1891 at page 485, which was a
resolution containing a proclamation regarding the trial of
accused persons in Manipur and the regrant ,of the Manipur
State. In this regard the following passage at page 488 is
of interest :
"The principles of the International law have
no bearing upon the relations between the
Government of India as representing the Queen-
Empress on the one hand, and the Native States
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under the suzerainty of Her Majesty on the
other. The paramount supremacy of the former
presupposes and implies the subordination of
the latter. In the exercise of their high
prerogative, the Government of India have, in
Manipur as in other protected States, the
unquestioned right to remove by
(1) Vide Appendix I of the White Paper on Indian States.
(2) [1971] (1) S. C. C. 85-p. 161.
23
.lm15
administrative order any person whose presence in the State,
may seem objectionable. They also have the right to summon
a Darbar through their political representative for the
purpose of declaring their decision upon matters connected
with the expulsion of the ex-Maharaja.... through their
Officers."
After stating that any one resisting the decision and not
complying with orders will be liable to arrest, the
declaration went on to say
"In the opinion of the Governor-General in
Council any armed and violent resistance to
such arrest was an act of rebellion, and can
no more be justified by a plea of self-defence
than could resistance to a police officer
armed with a Magistrate’s warrant in British
India."
In the recent case of this Court in H. H. Maharajadhiraja
Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior(1),
referred to above the majority expressed the view that "the
States had no International personality". Nonetheless the
status of these rulers in England was recognised as being on
par with other Rulers in the matter of personal immunity
from being sued in their Courts. In so far as British India
was concerned these were governed partly by Acts of the
Legislatures particularly the provisions contained in Civil
Procedure Codes and by Notifications of the executive under
taxation laws as well as by executive or administrative
instructions relating to their privileges.
It is therefore apparent that in so far as this country is
concerned the immunity from legal-proceedings which is
recognised in the common law has been the subject matter of
legislation under which the ruling princes of India,
notwithstanding that they were not recognised as
International personalities, were however accorded this
immunity. Sec. 433 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882
and subsequently Sections 84 to 87 of the Civil Procedure
Code of 1908 deal with these matters. Gajendragadkar, C.J.,
in Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani v. United Arab Republic &
Anr.(2), cited with approval the observations of Strachey,
J, in Chandulal Khushalji v. Awed Bim Umar Sultan Nawaz Jung
Bahadur(3), as correctly representing the result of the
provisions of Sec. 433 as much as of those contained in Sec.
86(1). It may be mentioned that Strachey, J, after pointing
out that in India before the enactment of Sec. 433 of the
Code, the privilege of independent sovereign princes stood
on exactly the same footing as in England, observed
(1) [1971] 1 S.C.C. 85-p. 161. (2) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 319.
(3) 21 I. L. R. Bom. 351 at 371-372.
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.lm15
"No doubt the question of privilege now depends on the
construction of Sec. 433, and I am alive to the danger of
pressing too far an analogy between a rule of international
law and a specific enactment of the Legislature."
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It is apparent from a perusal of Sec. 86 of the Civil
Procedure Code that there is no absolute prohibition against
a Ruler of a foreign State being sued in India. A Ruler can
be sued with the consent of the Central Government certified
in writing by a Secretary to that Government. It is also
provided that such consent should not be given unless it
appears to the Central Government that the Ruler has
instituted a suit in the Court against the person desiring
to sue him or by himself or another, trades within the local
limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, or, is in posses-
sion of immovable property situate within those limits and
is to be sued with reference, to such property or for money
charged thereon, or has expressly or impliedly waived the
privilege accorded to him by this Section.
In view of these provisions the several cases cited by the
learned Advocate for the assessee which deal with immunity
from suits against ruling princes under the English law have
no application.
In so far as the question whether there exists a rule of
international law exempting a State, or the property which
it owns, from taxation by a foreign State, is concerned,
there seems to be no uniform practice followed by the
various States. It is however suggested that immunity from
taxation "appears as a logical accompaniment of the
principle of immunity of foreign State owned property from
judicial process" and on this basis it is sought to be
contended that even personal, private property of the Head
of a State is exempt. It is unnecessary for us to examine
this position because even if there was such an immunity the
Rulers of an Indian State could only avail of it, if they
are recognised as international personalities which, as we
have seen, they are not. Any exemptions which they may be
given, must, in our view be under the relevant taxing Acts.
The learned Advocate for the Assessee however points out
that if the Rulers of Indian State were not exempted from
tax apart from the statute, there was no need to make a
provision in Sec. 3 of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax
Act IV of 1944, specifically making every Ruler of an Indian
State liable to Agricultural Income-tax. On the other hand
it would appear to us that this provision would itself
militate against the assumption of immunity from taxation of
the property of the Rulers and at any rate the legislature
may have been acting ex abundanti cautale. It may however
be noticed that in so far as the Income-tax Act is
25
concerned exemption of the Income of the Ruters derived from
Central Government securities was specifically given under
Sec. 60 of the Act which implies that the Rulers were not
exempt from other provisions of law. This position also
finds support from a case cited by the learned Author on the
"Immunity from taxation on foreign owned Property" in the
Americal Journal of International Law XLI at page 239, where
the Suppreme Court of Ceylon in the Suprintendent of the
Government Soap Factory, Bangalore v. Commissioner of
Income-tax, held that the profits ade in Ceylon by the
Mysore Government Soap Factory could be taxed by Ceylon
without violation of international law. The Ceylon Court
held that the State of Mysore had no position in
international law and could not,invoke any immunity arising
by virtue of international law’
In any case so far as, immunity from taxation of the income
from personal property of the Rulers of the Native States is
concerned this is now concluded by a decision of this Court
in the Commissioner of Income-Tax, Andhra Pradesh ’,v.
H.E.H. Mir Osman Ali Bahadur(1). In that case the question
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directly arose as to whether the Ruler of the Hyderabad
State prior to 26th January ’50 could claim immunity from
taxation under international law, namely whether the
assessee enjoyed immunity from taxation under the Act in
respect of income which accrued or arose to him, and which
was received by him upto 26th January 1950. The learned
Advocate for, the revenue had contended that under the
International law, a foreign sovereing was not immune from
taxation in respect of his private properties situated in
the Taxing State; even if there was such an immunity under
the international law, the assessee being under the
suzerainty or ,he paramountcy of the British Crown, had
never enjoyed the status of a sovereign as understood in the
international law and, therefore, was not governed by that
law; and that in any event, as on January 26, 1950, the date
when he became liable to tax, he was no longer a sovereign
and therefore he could not claim exemption under the
international law. Respondent’s Advocate claimed that the
assessee was not liable to Income-tax on the ground that
under the Act, income-tax was charged on the assessee’s
income received during the accounting year and that as
during the accounting year the assessee was a ruling chief,
he was exempt from taxation under the international law. He
argued that under the international law, as understood by
English Courts, a foreign sovereign was exempt from
taxation, that the said interpretation of the law had become
the common law of England and that the said common law was
the law of India before the Constitution and it continued to
have force thereafter reason of Article 372.
(1) [1959] I.T.R. 666
256SupCI/72
26
We have noticed these contentions to show that there is no
validity in the submission of the learned Advocate for the
assessee, that that question did not directly arise in that
case because the Nizam was being assessed in respect of
assessment year 1950-1951 and 1951-52, when he was not a
ruling prince. This Court specifically dealt with-this
matter as can be seen from the observations of Subba Rao J,
as he then was at page 670
"International’ law vis-a-vis the liability of
a sovereign to taxation in respect of his
private property is in a process of
evolution’. It has not yet become cry-
stallized."
After referring to Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition,
Volume 20, page, 589 and Oppenheim’s International Law, 8th
Edition, Volume 1, page 759 and the Article on immunity from
taxation of foreign State owned property in the American
Journal of International Law, to which we have already
adverted,. observed "that the question is not free from
difficulty and that it requires serious consideration when
it directly arises for decision. Assuming for the purposes
of these, appeals that a foreign sovereign who has acquired
an international- personality has such an immunity from
taxation, he proceeded to examine the question whether His
Exalted Highness the Nizam had ever acquired international
personality. After examining the position he concluded at
page 675 : ". . . that Hyderabad State did not acquire
international personality under the international law and So
its Ruler could not rely upon international. law for
claiming immunity front taxation of his personal
properties".
We are not here concerned with the alternative argument in
that case, that the Act having applied to the State of
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Hyderabad-, after the inauguration of the Constitution on
‘6h January ’50, the charge as well as the manner of
computation of income did not depend on the pre-existing law
but only upon the provisions of the Act because in these
appeals that question does not arise.
in view of this legal position we do not propose to burden
this Judgment with any detailed examination. of the several
decisions of the High Courts which were prior to the
decision of this Court cited by the learned Advocate in
support of the proposition that the ruling chief of an
Indian State has the same immunity from taxation as enjoyed
by other foreign sovereigns. Two of ’those cases arose
under the Government Trading Taxation Act 1926 where
different considerations were applicable (The Patiala State
Bank v. C.I.T., Bombay(1), A. H. Wadia, as Agent of the
Gwalior Durbar v. C.I.T., Bombay (2). At any rate in one
other case i.e. in Maharaja Bikram Kishore of Tripura v.
Province of Assam(3), a distinction was sought to be drawn
(1) XI I.T.R. 617. (2) XVII I.T.R.63. (3) XVIT I.T.R. 220.
27
between the property of the State and the private property
of the ruler. In that case the question whether the income
derived from Chakla Roshanabad Estate was liable to tax
under Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act, by assessment upon
the State of Tripura or by assessment on the ruler of
Tripura. It was held that the Chakla Roshanabad was the
State property and not personal property of the then ruling
Raja who held it in his capacity as a Ruler. No doubt in
the other two cases refunds were not given for tax deducted
at source on the assumption that, the Rulers were not
assessees.
In the view we have taken the answer of the High Court to
the reference was clearly right and the appeals are
accordingly dismissed with costs-one set.
S.N. Appeals dismissed.
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