Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
HARYANA WAREHOUSING CORPORATION
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
RAM AVTAR & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/01/1996
BENCH:
KIRPAL B.N. (J)
BENCH:
KIRPAL B.N. (J)
VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 1081 1996 SCC (2) 98
JT 1996 (1) 702 1996 SCALE (1)489
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
KIRPAL,J.
This is an appeal by special leave challenging the
order of the Punjab & Haryana High Court which had allowed
the respondent’s Writ Petition challenging the decision of
the appellant to the effect that the respondent was not
allowed to cross the efficiency bar.
The respondent had joined the service under the
appellant as Mali-cum-Chowkidar in 1972. According to the
appellant, the respondent was not discharging his duties to
the best of his ability and honesty. It was alleged that on
9.3.1987 the respondent attempted to misappropriate one bag
of wheat from the godown of the appellant but was caught
red-handed. The respondent confessed to his guilt and
requested that he may be excused. On an earlier occasion he
had failed to perform a night duty and had also misbehaved
with his senior officer. Vide his letter dated 26.2.1987,
the respondent had admitted having committed the said
mistakes and again requested that he may excused.
In respect of the year 1986-87, an adverse entry was
recorded in the respondent’s Confidential Report to the
effect that his honesty and integrity was doubtful and that
he had not been attending his duties efficiently and had
been lazy, undisciplined and was not performing his duties
satisfactorily. This adverse report was conveyed to the
respondent who submitted his objections on 5.12.1987, but
the same were rejected.
The respondent was in the pay-scale of Rs. 800-15-1010
EB-20-1150 and his case had to be considered for crossing
the efficiency bar w.e.f. 1.2.1988. On the consideration of
the respondent’s entire record of service, including the
adverse entries, decision was taken not to allow him to
cross the efficiency bar for a period of one year and the
matter was to be reviewed thereafter. In the following year
i.e. 1987-1988, the respondent was assessed as ’average’
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the, taking his record into consideration, he was again held
up at the efficiency bar stage of Rs. 1010 for another year
w.e.f. 1.2.1989 vide order dated 5.4.1989.
The aforesaid two orders relating to the stoppage at
the efficiency bar and for deleting the adverse remarks in
the Confidential Report for 1986-87 were challenged by the
respondent in High Court by filing a Writ Petition No. 1836
of 1990. The same was, however, dismissed by a Division
Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court vide its order dated
11.7.1990.
The case of the respondent was again considered for
crossing of efficiency bar w.e.f. 1.2.1990. Vide order dated
6.8.1990, it was again decided to stop the respondent at the
efficiency bar stage for a further period of one year w.e.f.
1.4.1990. This led to the filing of the second Writ Petition
being Civil Writ Petition No. 5848 of 1991 from which the
present appeal arises, where apart from the prayer for
quashing the aforesaid order dated 6.8.1990, it was again
prayed by the respondent that the adverse report for the
year 1986-87 should be quashed. The case of the appellant
herein before the High Court was that earlier Writ Petition
for substantially the same relief had already been
dismissed. Further more, the case of the respondent was
stated to have been reviewed in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 4.8 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules
Vol. 1, Part-1 as applicable to the Government employees in
Haryana and also as per the instructions dated 29.1.1974
issued by the Haryana State Government as amended by
instructions dated 24.11.1974.
By the impugned judgment dated 6.8.1991, the High Court
came to the conclusion that the principles of natural
justice had been violated as the petitioner (respondent
herein) was not afforded an opportunity of being heard or to
represent his case before the orders stopping him at the
efficiency bar were issued. It was further observed that the
right of an employee to have his case for crossing the
efficiency bar being considered every year could not be
taken away by any executive order. While allowing the Writ
Petition, the appellant herein was directed "to afford an
opportunity to the respondent to explain the position and
represent his case regarding the adverse material on the
basis of which he was to be stopped from crossing the
efficiency bar".
It was contended by the learned counsel for the
appellant that the High Court erred in assuming that the
case of the respondent for crossing the efficiency bar was
not considered every year. The positive averment which had
been made is that his case was considered every year in
accordance with the rules. It is further contended that no
opportunity of explaining is required to be given before the
case of an employee is considered with regard to the
crossing of efficiency bar. As far as the consideration of
the adverse material is concerned, it was submitted that the
adverse material for the year 1986-87 had been forwarded to
the respondent who had filed his objections but the same
were rejected. Therefore, the principles of natural justice,
even if they were applicable, had not been violated.
The main contention which has been urged on behalf of
the respondent was that the principles of natural justice
were attracted and that no opportunity has been given before
passing the orders whereby the respondent was communicated
the decision of the appellant not to allow him to cross the
efficiency bar.
The High Court, in our opinion, was not right in coming
to the conclusion that any opportunity should have been
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granted to the respondent before an adverse decision is
taken with regard to non-crossing of efficiency bar. Rule
4.8 of Punjab State Service Rules provides that where an
efficiency bar is prescribed in a time scale, the next
increment above the bar is not to be given to an employee
without the specific sanction of the authority empowered to
withhold increments, provision does not contemplate any
hearing being granted to an employee before a decision is
taken with regard to permitting or non-permitting an
employee to cross the efficiency bar. Note-3 to the said
Rule, on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel
for the respondent, merely provides that the cases of all
officers held up at the efficiency bar should be reviewed
annually with a view to determine whether the quality of
their work has improved and generally whether the defects
for which they were stopped at the bar have been remedied to
an extent sufficient to warrant the removing of the bar. In
the instructions dated 29.1.1974 issued by the Haryana State
Government, it is stated in para 4 as follows:
"It is thus not necessary before it is
decided to stop a Government employee at
an efficiency bar to inform him in
writing of the grounds on which it is
proposed to take such action. The order
stopping an employee at an efficiency
bar should however be a speaking order
and it should give sufficient details so
that, the employee can, if he so
desires, make a representation against
the same. It is desirable that every
case should be scrutinised carefully by
the Departments and good reasons given
in support of an order of stoppage."
The validity of the aforesaid instructions had not been
challenged and, in any case, it appears to us that the
stoppage of an employee at the efficiency bar is not by way
of punishment and does not cause any stigma on an employee.
When an efficiency bar is inserted in a time scale it only
means that at that stage annual increment is not as of right
but the bar will be removed, and an employee allowed further
increments, if the authority concerned comes to the
conclusion that such an employee is not inefficient. An
opinion to this effect has necessarily to be a subjective
one though it must be based on relevant facts. It is further
seen that in the aforesaid instructions, it has been stated
that an order stopping an employee at an efficiency bar
should be by speaking order and sufficient details should be
given so that an employee can, if he so desires, make a
representation against the same. Besides providing for a
post facto hearing, a concept which is not unknown to the
principles of natural justice, the speaking order which is
passed can also be subjected to judicial review, as has been
done in the present case. The passing of speaking order,
however, does not mean that before the authority concerned
comes to the conclusion of stopping of a person at the
efficiency bar stage, an opportunity of hearing must be
given to him. Consideration of all material before taking
the decision is sufficient compliance of the requirement.
A decision not to allow the crossing of efficiency bar
is required to be taken on the basis of the record of the
employee concerned. In the instant case, there was adverse
entry which was recorded for the year 1986-87 in the annual
Confidential Report of the respondent. The said adverse
entry had been communicated to him and the objections filed
thereto were considered, but were rejected. The High Court
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was, therefore, not right in coming to the conclusion that
the principles of natural justice were not complied in the
present case.
From the facts as narrated hereinabove, it is also
apparent that the case of the respondent regarding the
crossing of the efficiency bar had been reviewed every year
in accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Rule 4.8
and, therefore, the High Court was not correct in assuming
that this had not been done in the instant case. The earlier
Writ Petition which had been filed by the respondent
challenging the adverse entry for the year 1986-87 and the
stoppage at the efficiency bar in the first two years was
dismissed. In the judgment under appeal, the High Court has
not even referred to the filing of the earlier Writ Petition
1836/1990 and its dismissal vide order dated 11.7.1990. This
is unsatisfactory to say the least.
For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment under appeal is
set aside. This appeal is allowed. There shall be, however,
no order as to costs.