Nilesh C Ojha vs. High Court Of Judicature At Bombay

2026 INSC 390
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 5673-5674 OF 2025

NILESH C. OJHA ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
AT BOMBAY THROUGH
SECRETARY & ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
1
2 . The appellant, Nilesh C Ojha , has preferred the
instant appeals under Section 19 of the Contempt of
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Courts Act, 1971, for assailing the order dated 17
September, 2025 passed by a Full Bench of the High
2
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Interim
Application No.3297 of 2025, arising out of Criminal
Suo Motu Contempt Petition No.1 of 2025. By the
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impugned order, the High Court rejected the prayer

1
Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant-contemnor”.
2
Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”.
3
Interim Application No. 3297 of 2025.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2026.04.20
17:01:59 IST
Reason:
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made by the appellant-contemnor seeking
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impleadment of a sitting Judge of the High Court as
a party-respondent. The impleadment was sought in
connection with Interim Application No.2005 of 2025,
filed by the appellant-contemnor for discharge from
the contempt proceedings initiated against him
th
pursuant to a show cause notice dated 9 April,
2025. While disposing of the said application, the
High Court further directed the Registry to register a
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separate suo motu criminal contempt case against
the appellant-contemnor.
3. The appellant-contemnor, has also assailed the
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order dated 16 October, 2025 passed by the High
Court in Interim Application No.3843 of 2025 in
Criminal Suo Motu Contempt Petition Nos.1 of 2025
and 4 of 2025, whereby the High Court dismissed the
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said application seeking recall of the order dated 17
September, 2025.
BRIEF FACTS
4. Succinctly stated, the facts relevant and
essential for disposal of these appeals are noted
hereinbelow.

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Hereinafter, referred to as “Justice X”.
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Criminal Suo Motu Contempt Petition No. 4 of 2025.
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5. The appellant-contemnor had instituted
Criminal Writ Petition No.1612 of 2025 on behalf of
his client, Mr. Satish Salian, inter alia seeking a
direction for investigation by the Central Bureau of
Investigation into the death of his daughter, which
was alleged to have occurred under suspicious
circumstances.
6. Criminal Writ Petition No.1612 of 2025 came to
nd
be listed for admission on 2 April, 2025 before a
Division Bench of the High Court, of which “Justice
X” was one of the Judges constituting the Bench. On
the said date, the appellant-contemnor mentioned
the matter before the said bench and apprised the
Court that the subject-matter jurisdiction to
entertain the matter vested in another Bench of the
High Court. Upon such submission, the Division
Bench directed the Registry to take appropriate steps
in accordance with law and the roster assignment.
st
7. However, on the evening of 1 April, 2025, prior
to mentioning of the matter before the Division
Bench, the appellant-contemnor addressed a press
conference wherein he made certain insinuations,
casting aspersions on the Honourable Judge. In the
course of the said press interaction, he alleged that
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“Justice X” was disqualified from hearing the case on
the ground that her sister was an accused in the FIR
lodged at the instance of his client and was also
stated to be associated with the Nationalist Congress
Party (Sharadchandra Pawar).
8. Upon becoming aware of the aforesaid press
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conference, “Justice X” addressed a letter dated 4
April, 2025 to the then Chief Justice of the High
Court, placing on record the statements made therein
and bringing the same to his notice, and stated that
the aspersions cast by the appellant-contemnor had
not only tarnished her personal reputation but also
impugned and maligned her reputation in the judicial
fraternity.
9. The Chief Justice of the High Court, upon
receipt of the letter forwarded by “Justice X”, took suo
cognizance which in the opinion of the
motu
Honourable Chief Justice tantamounted to contempt.
Consequently, in exercise of the administrative
powers vested in him, the Chief Justice constituted a
Bench of five Judges to consider and adjudicate the
matter in accordance with law. The proceedings were
accordingly drawn up and registered as Criminal Suo
Motu Contempt Petition No.1 of 2025.
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th
10. The matter was listed on 8 April, 2025, when
the High Court took note of the allegations and
imputations levelled by the appellant-contemnor
against “Justice X”. The Court observed that the
statements made during the press conference
demanding the recusal of a sitting Judge, prima facie ,
had the tendency to scandalize the Court, lower its
authority, and interfere with the due course of
judicial proceedings. Consequently, the High Court
directed the Registry to issue a notice to the
appellant-contemnor under Rule 9(1) read with Rule
8 of the Contempt of Courts (Bombay High Court)
Rules, 1994. Accordingly, a show cause notice came
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to be issued by the Registry on 9 April, 2025 and
the same was duly served upon the appellant-
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contemnor on 11 April, 2025.
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11. On 29 April, 2025, the High Court, on the oral
prayer of the appellant-contemnor, granted him time
to file an appropriate application seeking discharge in
the pending contempt proceedings. In pursuance of
the said liberty, the appellant-contemnor instituted
Interim Application No.2005 of 2025, inter alia ,
seeking discharge from the contempt notice issued
against him.
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12. In the interregnum , the appellant-contemnor
filed Interim Application No.3209 of 2025 placing on
record his reply-cum-defence to the show cause
notice, inter alia contending that he had been falsely
implicated at the instance of “Justice X”. The
appellant-contemnor also preferred Interim
Application No.3297 of 2025 seeking impleadment of
“Justice X” as a party respondent to the proceedings
and for issuance of directions to call for the response
thereto.
th
13.
The High Court vide impugned order dated 17
September, 2025, dismissed the Interim Application
No.3297 of 2025, observing that the person who
merely furnishes information to the Chief Justice
cannot be construed as a complainant nor can such
a person be regarded as a necessary or proper party
in the contempt proceedings. While dismissing the
Interim Application No.3297 of 2025, the High Court
suo motu proceeded to take additional cognizance of
the disparaging and scandalous imputations made
by the appellant-contemnor against “Justice X”
within that very application. The Registry was
accordingly directed to register a separate criminal
contempt proceeding against the appellant-
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contemnor, which consequently came to be registered
as Criminal Suo Motu Contempt Petition No.4 of
2025.
14. Furthermore, the High Court held the
appellant-contemnor and the fifteen advocates
representing/associating with him to be equally
liable for contempt and professional misconduct on
account of their collaboration in the drafting and
filing of the said application, characterizing the same
as an “adventure”. While so holding, the High Court
issued a strong advisory to the said advocates, asking
them to remain mindful of their professional
obligations in future rather than directing any
immediate punitive action or interdiction.
15. Aggrieved by the aforesaid findings, the
appellant-contemnor filed Interim Application
No.3843 of 2025 seeking multiple reliefs, including
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the recall of the order dated 17 September, 2025,
which the appellant-contemnor contended was per
, impliedly overruled, and void. The
incuriam
appellant-contemnor had also sought disqualification
of the five-Judge Bench on the ground of alleged
conflict of interest and also pleaded that the learned
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Chief Justice ought to recuse from hearing the
criminal contempt proceedings.
16. The High Court, vide the impugned order dated
th
16 October, 2025, dismissed Interim Application
No.3843 of 2025, holding that if the appellant-
contemnor claimed that the precedents relied upon
had been overruled, the appropriate remedy lay in
assailing the judgment before a higher forum. The
Court further held that the prayer seeking recusal of
the Chief Justice and disqualification of the five
Judges constituting the larger bench, on the ground
of an alleged conflict of interest, was wholly frivolous,
misconceived and amounted to a sheer abuse of the
process of the Court. The High Court also cautioned
the appellant-contemnor that, in the event his
conduct is found to be inappropriate, it would be
constrained to direct that he be taken into custody.
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17. Being aggrieved by the orders dated 17
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September, 2025 and 16 October, 2025, as well as
the consequential directions issued therein, the
appellant-contemnor has approached this Court by
way of the present appeals.


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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
18. The learned counsel appearing for the
appellant-contemnor submitted that the impugned
orders reflect an erroneous, impermissible and
excessive exercise of contempt jurisdiction, inasmuch
as the High Court while initiating suo motu
proceedings proceeded beyond the settled contours
governing criminal contempt. It was contended that
the directions impugned herein, including the
institution of fresh contempt proceedings and the
summary rejection of the appellant-contemnor’s
applications and objections, suffer from manifest
legal infirmities and warrant interference by this
Court.
19. It was submitted that the appellant-contemnor
was well justified in contending that the decisions in
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Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P. , and C.K.
7
Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta , do not continue to govern
the field in view of the subsequent authoritative
pronouncement of this Court in P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv
8
Shankar . Placing specific reliance on paragraph 39

6
1993 Supp (1) SCC 529.
7
(1971) 1 SCC 626.
8
(1988) 3 SCC 167.
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thereof, learned counsel submitted that this Court
unequivocally held that the ratio in C.K. Daphtary
(supra) , stood statutorily eclipsed upon enactment of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and was of no
assistance thereafter. It was thus contended that
raising such a legal submission could not, by any
stretch, constitute contempt, but rather falls within
the permissible bounds of bona fide legal defence.
20. It was also submitted that the ratio laid down in
C.K. Daphtary (supra) no longer holds the field in
In re: C.S.
light of the later decision of this Court in
9
Karnan , wherein a seven-Judge bench, while
examining the contours of contempt jurisdiction,
unequivocally clarified that imputations against a
Judge are not ipso facto impermissible, and that an
allegation founded on demonstrable truth, made
and in public interest, does not
bona fide
automatically constitute contempt.
21. It was further submitted that the finding of
professional misconduct recorded by the High Court
against sixteen advocates is wholly unjustified,
without jurisdiction and void ab initio , inasmuch as

9
(2017) 7 SCC 1.
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the power to initiate and adjudicate disciplinary
proceedings against advocates is statutorily vested
exclusively with the State Bar Council/Bar Council of
India, which is to be exercised strictly in the manner
prescribed under the Advocates Act, 1961 and the
Bar Council of India Rules. It was contended that, in
the absence of initiation of proceedings by the
concerned Bar Council and strict compliance with
the mandatory statutory procedure, any
determination recording professional misconduct by
the High Court amounts to assumption of
jurisdiction not conferred by law, rendering the
impugned finding a nullity, and liable to be set aside.
22. Concluding the submissions, learned counsel
for the appellant-contemnor implored the Court to
allow the present appeals and consequently set aside
the impugned orders as being arbitrary, perverse and
unsustainable in law and on facts.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE
RESPONDENTS

23. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay opposed the
appeals and supported the impugned orders,
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submitting that the same have been rendered upon
proper appreciation of the material on record and for
ensuring proper administration of justice by the High
Court.
24.
It was contended that the orders under
challenge do not suffer from any illegality, perversity,
or procedural irregularity so as to warrant
interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
25. We have heard and considered the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the parties. We have
also carefully perused the impugned orders and sifted
the material available on record.
26. Judicial independence forms a foundational
and non-derogable feature of the constitutional
scheme. It ensures that courts are able to discharge
their adjudicatory functions free from external
influence, fear, favour, or pressure, thereby
safeguarding the rule of law and securing the effective
dispensation of justice. The strength and legitimacy
of the judiciary lie not in any capacity to command or
compel, but in the confidence of the people in its
integrity, neutrality, and institutional independence.
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27. This Court in Shanti Bhushan v. Supreme
10
Court Of India , emphasised that sole strength of
the judiciary lies in the confidence and trust reposed
in it by the public, and proceeded to observe as
follows:-

10
(2018) 8 SCC 396.
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28. In this constitutional backdrop, any unfounded
or intemperate allegations impugning the integrity,
motives, or impartiality of the judiciary, whether
directed against the institution or an individual
15

Judge, assume serious significance. Such
imputations, when made without substantiated basis
and in a manner calculated to erode public faith,
have the potential to diminish the credibility of the
justice delivery system. While fair, reasoned, and
bona fide criticism of judicial decisions remains a
legitimate facet of democratic discourse, reckless
aspersions strike at the very foundation of judicial
independence by undermining the trust upon which
the authority of the judiciary ultimately rests.
29. A litigant aggrieved by a judicial order is
undoubtedly entitled to question its correctness
before a higher forum. However, the legitimacy of
such challenge rests upon civilised and temperate
criticism of the judicial determination and not upon
insinuations directed at the integrity or neutrality of
the Judge. A clear distinction must be maintained
between assailing the correctness of a judicial
decision and personalising the grievance by
attributing motives to the Judge concerned.
30. In the present case, the appellant-contemnor
has levelled serious imputations against “Justice X”,
a sitting Judge of the High Court. The allegations
voiced by the appellant-contemnor during the press
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conference, as well as those reiterated in the Interim
Application No.3297 of 2025, attribute lack of
impartiality and improper motives to a constitutional
functionary discharging judicial duties.
31.
The appellant-contemnor, being a member of
the Bar and an officer of the Court, was under a
heightened obligation to conduct himself in a manner
befitting the dignity of the legal profession and the
institutional sanctity of the judicial process.
Members of the Bar occupy a position of privilege and
responsibility in the administration of justice, and
their conduct, both within and outside the
courtroom, must reflect restraint, sobriety and
fidelity to the ethical standards governing the
profession.
32. In this backdrop, the course adopted by the
appellant-contemnor in addressing a press
conference and publicly voicing allegations against a
sitting Judge cannot be viewed lightly. The act of
carrying a pending judicial controversy into the
public domain in a manner that tends to
sensationalise the proceedings or scandalise the
institution or its constitutional component, i.e., the
Judges, is wholly inconsistent with the discipline
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expected of an advocate. Professional ethics require
that grievances against judicial orders must be
ventilated through established legal remedies before
appropriate judicial forums, rather than through
public commentary capable of influencing perception
about the fairness or integrity of the judicial process.
The manner in which the press conference was
convened and the allegations were projected is, prima
facie , unbecoming of a member of law professional
and falls short of the standards of propriety,
restraint, professional, and ethical responsibility
which the legal profession demands. An advocate,
more than any other stakeholder in the justice
delivery system, bears a heightened duty to uphold
the dignity of the institution and to act with
circumspection in matters touching upon the
administration of justice. Public confidence in the
judiciary constitutes an indispensable foundation of
the rule of law, and any attempt to scandalise or
sensationalise judicial proceedings undermines that
very foundation.
33. Upon a prima facie consideration of the material
on record, the allegations, as presently framed,
appear to traverse that well-recognised boundary.
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They are not confined to identifying any error of law
or fact, but extend to imputing motives without any
demonstrable foundation. Assertions of this nature,
particularly when directed against a sitting Judge of
the High Court, require a degree of responsibility and
substantiation commensurate with their
seriousness. The tenor and sweep of the allegations,
therefore, raise concerns that go beyond the
immediate lis between the parties.
34. In our considered view, allegations of this
character, if left unchecked, possess an inherent
tendency to erode public confidence in the
administration of justice. While accountability and
scrutiny are integral to a constitutional democracy,
imputations of personal nature against a Judge must
rest on unimpeachable material and be pursued
strictly in accordance with law, failing which, they
risk undermining the very edifice of judicial
independence.
35. As an upshot of the above discussion and having
regard to the stage at which the proceedings
presently stand, we are of the opinion that no case for
interference with the impugned orders is made out.
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The issues raised can appropriately be examined by
the High Court in accordance with law.
36. We are, therefore, not inclined to interdict the
proceedings at this stage. We request the High Court
to proceed with the matter expeditiously and to
adjudicate upon all issues arising therein
independently and on their own merits.
37. We clarify that the observations made in the
preceding paragraphs are confined to a prima facie
consideration for the limited purpose of adjudication
of the present appeals. They shall not be construed
as any expression of opinion on the merits of the
controversy, nor shall they in any manner influence
the High Court in the independent exercise of its
judicial functions.
38. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
39. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.

……………………….J.
(VIKRAM NATH)

……………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 20, 2026.

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