Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MOHD. ASLAM
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/03/1996
BENCH:
VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)
BENCH:
VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)
SINGH N.P. (J)
VENKATASWAMI K. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 1611 JT 1996 (5) 566
1996 SCALE (3)65
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
The prayer in this writ petition under Article 32 of
the Constitution of India is for reconsideration of the
judgment in Manohar Joshi vs.Nitin Bhaurao Patil and Another
(1996) 1 SCC 169. The petitioner’s contention, in substance,
is that the judgment is incorrect.
It is sufficient to say that Article 32 of the
Constitution is not available to assail the correctness of a
decision on merits or to claim its reconsideration. This has
been clearly reiterated in the recent decision in Khoday
Distilleries Limited & Anr. vs. The Registrar General,
Supreme Court of India, 1995 (6) Scale 74 wherein the
decision in A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak Anr. 1988 (Suppl. 1)
SCR 1, has been explained. This alone is sufficient to
dismiss the writ petition.
However, in view of certain apprehensions expressed by
the petitioner, we deem it proper to make some further
observations now, which we had considered unnecessary to
incorporate in the judgment in Manohar Joshi. We may observe
that the decision of this Court in S.R.Bommai and Others vs.
Union of India and Others, (1994) 3 SCC 1, did not relate to
the construction of, and determination of the scope of sub-
sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Representation
of the People Act, 1951 and, therefore, nothing in the
decision in S.R. Bommai is of assistance for construing the
meaning and scope of sub-sections (3) and (34)-of Section
123 of the Representation of the People Act. Reference to
the decision in S.R. Bommai is, therefore, inapposite in
this context.
We may also add that the challenge in the writ petition
to the correctness of the decision in Manohar Joshi is based
on a misreading of that decision. In the judgment, the
decision on the question of law is based on earlier
Constitution Bench decisions of this Court by which we are
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bound; and the observation therein which is challenged as
incorrect in this writ Petitions is not the basis of the
decision but an opinion expressed on an assumption if the
making of the alleged statement of the hope of Maharashtra
becoming a Hindu State, in the speech is held to be proved,
without recording a finding that it was so proved. This
allegation was based on a police report and Manohar Joshi
did not admit the making of such a statement in his speech.
Moreover, strong disapproval was expressed of such a
statement, if actually made. This is clear particularly from
paras 62 to 67 of the decision in Manohar Joshi reported in
1996 (1) SCC 169. Specific reference has been made for this
purpose in paras 64 to 67 (SCC) to the decision in Jamaat-E-
Islami Hind vs. Union of India, 1995 (1) SCC 428, to
indicate the standard of proof required for proving a
corrupt practice which had not been satisfied in Manohar
Joshi in view of the absence of legal evidence to prove the
corrupt practice alleged in the case.
A careful and dispassionate reading of the decision
would show that eh apprehensions and misgivings expressed in
the writ petition, are imaginary and baseless. There is no
occasion to read in the judgment in Manohar Joshi, something
which is not said or to say that it conflicts with the
concept of secularism in S.R. Bommai where this question
relating to the meaning of sub-sections (3) and (3A) of
Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act neither
arose, nor was decided. The application of the decision in
Manohar Joshi in cases like Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo vs.
Shri Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte & Others, 1996 (1) SCC 130,
Shri Suryakant Venkatrao Mahadik vs. Smt. Saroj Sandesh Baik
(Bhosale), 1996 (1) SCC 384, and Mohan vs. Bhairon Singh
Shekhawat, 1996 (1) Scale SP3, is another pointer to
indicate that there is nothing in the judgment in Manohar
Joshi to give rise to any such apprehension that it can
enable misuse of religion for making appeal for votes in an
election.
We may add that the deficiency, if any, in the
statutory prohibition enacting the corrupt practice in
Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, has to
be cured by legislation and that deficiency cannot be cured
by reading into a penal provision something which is not
enacted therein. The proposal was made at one time to
perform the legislative exercise of enacting a provision to
prevent any possible misuse of religion during elections,
but it was, unfortunately, abandoned. We do hope that at
least now there would remain no misapprehension in the mind
of anyone.
The writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed.