Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 223 of 2007
PETITIONER:
Manjunath Chennabasapa Madalli
RESPONDENT:
State of Karnataka
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/02/2007
BENCH:
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4077 of 2006)
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Leave granted.
Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a
Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court dismissing the
appeal filed by the appellant. The appellant was found guilty of
offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 302 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ’IPC’) by the trial court
and was sentenced to undergo R.I. for two years and life
respectively. Fine was also imposed with default stipulation.
The High Court set aside the conviction for the offence
punishable under Section 498-A IPC but maintained the
conviction under Section 302 IPC and consequently the
sentence.
The background facts as projected by the prosecution are
as follows:
Sumithra (hereinafter referred to as the ’deceased’), as
the daughter of Siddamma (PW-1) and sister of Hosakerappa
(PW-6) as well as grand daughter of Hanumawwa (PW-7). She
was married to the accused about one year back to the date of
incident. After the marriage, Sumithra went to the house of
her husband to lead a happy family life. Though initially they
led a happy married life, bickerings started between the
accused and his wife as he started abusing and ill-treating her
on the pretext that she does not know how to do the house-
hold work. However, this was only a pretext to extract
additional dowry from the parents of the deceased. As per the
customs during Gowri Festival, the deceased was brought to
her parental place to celebrate the festival and at that time,
the deceased who was pregnant had complained about the ill-
treatment meted out to her by her husband. As such, the
parents, grand-mother and other relatives asked the deceased
to stay back in their house. The accused started visiting the
house of PWs 1 and 7 and was insisting upon the deceased to
come back to his village. On such a visit viz., on 9.3.2001, the
accused again came to the house and picked up a quarrel with
the deceased and her mother and other relatives and insisted
that she should be sent on that day itself. The relatives
informed him that as Sumithra was pregnant, after performing
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certain ceremonies including ’Srimantha’, she would be sent
back later. The accused stayed in the house of the in-laws that
night. On the next day i.e. on 10.3.2001, after taking the night
meals, the accused and the deceased slept inside the room
whereas, the mother, brother and other relatives slept outside
the hall. In the night around 3.00 a.m., they heard cries
coming from the room and when they went inside, they saw
the accused running away and Sumithra lying unconscious on
the ground with bleeding injuries on her head. Immediately,
she was shifted to Government Hospital, Gadag and then to
KIMS Hospital. However, in spite of the medical treatment, she
breathed her last on 13.3.2001. In the meantime, on
11.3.2001 itself Head Constable (PW-18) and SHO of Gadag
Rural Police station on getting the medico legal intimation that
one Sumithra was admitted in the hospital and that she was
assaulted by her husband with an iron implement, he went to
the hospital and made enquiry and found that Sumithra, the
injured was not in a position to give any statement. As such,
he recorded the statement of Siddamma (PW-1) who was
present in the hospital and treating the same as first
information, came back to the Police Station and registered a
case in Crime no. 50/2001 for the offences punishable under
Sections 498-A, 504 and 307 IPC, registering the FIR. He
again went back to the hospital and there, as per the advise of
the Doctor, shifted the injured to KIMS Hospital, Hubli. He
again deputed and sent requisition for recording of the dying
declaration by the authorised Taluka Executive Magistrate,
but the same could not be recorded as Sumithra was in coma.
As already noted, at KIMS Hospital, Hubli, in spite of the
treatment the injured Sumithra breathed her last. After her
death, the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was
altered to Section 302 of IPC and further investigation was
continued.
During the investigation, spot mahazar, inquest
proceedings were undertaken. Statement of witnesses, which
threw light on the incident, were recorded. The dead body was
subjected to autopsy. Search for the accused was carried out
and he was apprehended on 14.3.2001. After securing all the
necessary reports and on completion of the investigation,
charge sheet was filed against the accused.
On committal and on the basis of the charge sheet
materials, the accused was charged for the offences
punishable under Sections 498-A and 302 IPC. As the accused
denied the charges and claimed to be tried, he was tried under
S.C.No.37/2001.
The trial Court found the evidence to be credible and
notwithstanding the fact that the vital witness i.e. the mother
of the deceased (PW-1) had resiled from the statement given
during investigation, held that the residual evidence was
sufficient to hold the accused guilty. Accused was accordingly
convicted and sentenced as aforenoted. It was held that the
circumstantial evidence pressed into service was sufficient to
establish the accusations. The High Court in essence affirmed
the conclusions, but altered the conviction.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that there was practically no evidence
whatsoever and even the so-called circumstances highlighted
by the trial Court and the High Court do not lead to a
conclusion that the accused was guilty of the offence as
alleged.
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Learned counsel for the State on the other hand
supported the judgments of the courts below.
It has been consistently laid down by this Court that
where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the
inference of guilt can be justified only when all the
incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of
any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR
(1977 SC 1063); Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad (AIR
1956 SC 316); Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (AIR
1983 SC 446); State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985
SC 1224); Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC
350); Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. (AIR 1989 SC
1890). The circumstances from which an inference as to the
guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely
connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from
those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR
1954 SC 621), it was laid down that where the case depends
upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the
cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to
negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences
home beyond any reasonable doubt.
We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court
in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P. (1996) 10 SCC
193, wherein it has been observed thus:
"In a case based on circumstantial
evidence, the settled law is that the
circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is drawn should be fully proved and
such circumstances must be conclusive in
nature. Moreover, all the circumstances
should be complete and there should be no
gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the
proved circumstances must be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused and totally inconsistent with his
innocence....".
In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors. (AIR
1990 SC 79), it was laid down that when a case rests upon
circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the
following tests:
"(1) the circumstances from which an
inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must
be cogently and firmly established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a
definite tendency unerringly pointing towards
guilt of the accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively
should form a chain so complete that there is
no escape from the conclusion that within all
human probability the crime was committed
by the accused and none else; and
(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to
sustain conviction must be complete and
incapable of explanation of any other
hypothesis than that of the guilt of the
accused and such evidence should not only be
consistent with the guilt of the accused but
should be inconsistent with his innocence.
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In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992 Crl.LJ
1104), it was pointed out that great care must be taken in
evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied
on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of
the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that
the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been
fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so
established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of
guilt.
Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book "Wills’
Circumstantial Evidence" (Chapter VI) lays down the following
rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial
evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal
inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt
connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof
is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact,
which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of
direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be
adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to
justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable
of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than
that of his guilt, (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted".
There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on
circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touch-
stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by
the this Court as far back as in 1952.
In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. V. State of
Madhya Pradesh, (AIR 1952 SC 343), wherein it was observed
thus:
"It is well to remember that in cases
where the evidence is of a circumstantial
nature, the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in
the first instance be fully established and all
the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused. Again, the circumstances should be
of a conclusive nature and tendency and they
should be such as to exclude every hypothesis
but the one proposed to be proved. In other
words, there must be a chain of evidence so
far complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for a conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and it must be such
as to show that within all human probability
the act must have been done by the accused."
A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1984 SC
1622). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it
has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that
the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in
prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The
conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before
conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be
fully established. They are:
(1) the circumstances from which the
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conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be
fully established. The circumstances
concerned ’must’ or ’should’ and not ’may be’
established;
(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt
of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis except
that the accused is guilty;
(3) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency;
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved; and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and must show that
in all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.
These aspects were highlighted in State of Rajasthan v.
Rajaram (2003 (8) SCC 180) and State of Haryana v. Jagbir
Singh (2003 (11) SCC 261).
In the instant case, the only circumstance which was
highlighted by the trial Court and the High Court was that
there was unnatural death and additionally the so called dying
declaration purported to have been recorded by the then
Tehsildar (PW-16). The mere fact that the deceased had died
an unnatural death cannot by itself be a circumstance against
the accused particularly when Section 498-A has been held to
be inapplicable. Additionally, the conclusion that there was
dying declaration is also not factually correct. The trial Court
itself has referred to the evidence of PW-16 who categorically
stated that though he was requested to record the dying
declaration the same could not be recorded as the doctor was
of the opinion that the deceased was not in a fit condition to
give her statement. Thereafter, no statement was recorded. In
fact he was called to attend the inquest.
Above being the position the conviction as recorded by
the trial Court and upheld by the High Court is indefensible
and is set aside.
The appeal is allowed.