Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
TEA DISTRICTS LABOUR ASSOCIATION,CALCUTTA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
EX-EMPLOYEES OF TEA DISTRICTS LABOURASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
09/03/1960
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
WANCHOO, K.N.
CITATION:
1960 AIR 815 1960 SCR (3) 207
CITATOR INFO :
R 1964 SC1617 (9)
R 1968 SC1002 (7)
R 1969 SC 90 (8)
RF 1970 SC1960 (3)
ACT:
Industrial Dispute-Closure of business centres held mala
fide--If no closure in the eye of law in spite of actual
closure-lndustrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950
(XLVII Of 1950), SS. 22, 23,25F(C).
HEADNOTE:
As there was appreciable decline in the activities and busi-
ness of the appellant it decided, by means of a resolution,
to close down two local agencies at Koraput and Berhampur
(Ganjam) by May 31, 957. About the same time the appellant
also thought of retrenching its employees and decided to
retrench ten of its employees with effect from December 1,
1956. An industrial dispute having arisen as a result of
the said closure and
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retrenchment it was referred to the industrial tribunal for
adjudication. Before the industrial Tribunal it was
conceded on behalf of the appellant that the retrenchment of
ten employees was invalid as the statutory notice required
by S. 25F(c) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal)
Act had not been served. It was also stated afterwards that
the statutory compensation had been paid to the retrenched
workmen. As regards the question of closure the tribunal
came to the conclusion that the closure was not bona fide,
and it held that the legal consequence was that there was
not a real closure. Accordingly it directed the appellant
to reinstate the ten retrenched workmen and to pay all its
workmen employed at the two centres as though the centres
had not been closed and were actually working. On appeal by
special leave :
Held, that when the two agencies had in fact been closed the
finding about malafides could not justify the conclusion
that the said two agencies should be deemed to continue and
the tribunal was not entitled to make an award on that
basis.
Banaras Ice Factory Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1957] S.C.R. 143,
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explained and distinguished.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 169 of
1959.
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated June 26, 1958,
of the Industrial Tribunal, Orissa, at Cuttack in Reference
No. 2 of 1957.
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Vidya Sagar
and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants.
M.S. K. Sastri and R. Patnaik, for respondent No. 1.
B. Patnaik, for respondent No. 2.
1960. March 9. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from
an industrial dispute between the appellant, the Tea
Districts Labour Association, and the respondents the ex-
employees of the appellant and another. The dispute which
was referred to the industrial tribunal for its adjudication
consisted of two items:,,(a) Whether the retrenchment of ten
workers of Koraput and Ganjam Agencies of Tea Districts
Labour Association effected on the 30th November, 1956, was
justified, if not, to what relief those workers are
entitled?
(b)Whether the closure of the Koraput and Ganjam Agencies
contemplated by Messrs. Jardine Henderson Ltd,
Secretaries, Tea District, Labour
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Association with effect from the 31st May, 1957, is bona
fide: If so, whether the affected workers are entitled to
some other alternative employment in any other establishment
under the same management. If not bona fide, to what relief
those workers are entitled ? "
On this reference the award which was passed by the Tribunal
directs the appellant to pay to the ten retrenched workmen
all the pay and allowances to which they were entitled from
November 30,1956, to May 31, 1957, and it further orders the
appellant to pay all its employees of the Berhampur and
Koraput agencies, including the said ten retrenched workmen,
all their pay and allowances from May 31, 1957, till one
month after the publication of the award within which time
the Management, if it so chooses, may close down the
agencies, and in that event there would be no necessity for
further notice of retrenchment to those ten retrenched
workmen. The award has further added that if no bona fide
closure is effected the ten retrenched workmen would be
entitled to statutory notice if the Management still wants
to retrench them. In regard to the other employees the
award provides that they shall be entitled to all their pay
and allowances as before and the agencies will in the eye of
law be continuing agencies. The validity of the latter por-
tion of the award in particular is challenged before us by
the appellant in the present appeal by special leave.
The appellant is a Company Limited by Guarantee of
performance of service only for its members and was formed
in 1917. The appellant’s members are the owners of several
tea gardens in West Bengal and Assam and its chief object is
to recruit labour from different parts of India and to
supply it to the said tea gardens according to their
requirements. Jardine Henderson Ltd. have since 1953 been
and still are the Secretaries of the appellant. The
appellant had a number of establishments in different parts
of India which were known as Local Agencies, Local
Forwarding Agencies and Forwarding Agencies. The function
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of Local Agencies and Local Forwarding Agencies was mainly
to recruit labour and the function of
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Forwarding Agencies was mainly to accommodate and feed
labour while in transit to and from tea gardens.
Towards the end of the appellant’s financial year 1955-56,
the appellant’s Secretary received estimates from the
constituent members regarding their estimated requirements
of labour for the seasons from 1956 to 1959, and it appeared
that these estimates were between 6,000 to 10,000 adults per
annum, whereas in the past the appellant’s organisation
catered for the recruitment of about 30,000 laborers per
annum. This appreciable decline in the activities and
business of the appellant raised the problem of closing some
of its agencies. In or about the beginning of March, 1957,
it became apparent to the appellant that the requirement of
labour was rapidly falling and that it would be necessary to
close some of its agencies. Thereupon, the question was
considered by the appellant’s general committee held on
March 7, 1957, and it was decided inter alia that the two
local agencies at Koraput and Berhampur (Ganjam) should be
closed, if possible by April 1, 1957. It was in pursuance
of this resolution that the. appellant ultimately decided to
close down the said two agencies by May 3 1, 1957. One of
the points referred to the Industrial Tribunal is in regard
to this closure.
About the same time the appellant also thought of
retrenching its employees and in pursuance of its decision
in that behalf ten employees were retrenched with effect
from December 1, 1956. This retrenchment is the other issue
referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication.
Before the Industrial Tribunal it was conceded on behalf of
the appellant that the impugned retrenchment of ten
employees was invalid in view of the fact that the statutory
notice required by s. 25F(c) had not been served, and the
appellant agreed that the said ten persons would therefore,
be entitled to the same pay and privileges that they were
getting on the date of retrenchment until May 31, 1957,
which was the date of the closure. Thus the position with
regard to the impugned retrenchment was not in doubt.
In regard to the question of closure the tribunal has
observed that what it had to consider was whether
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the closure was real and bona fide. It considered the
evidence and it was inclined to hold that the apprehensions
entertained by the appellant in regard to the fall in its
activities and work were not justified and that the
appellant could have carried on with the two agencies in
question. The tribunal also considered the fact that soon
after the closure of Koraput and Berhampur agencies the
appellant opened another agency at Vizianagaram, which is a
place in Andhra Pradesh but is at some distance from Koraput
in Orissa. The tribunal was not satisfied that the expla-
nation given by the appellant for reopening of the
Vizianagaram agency, which had been closed on the 6th
September, 1956, was satisfactory. In the result the
tribunal came to the conclusion that the closure was not
bona fide, and it held that the legal consequence was that
it was not a real closure. It is on the basis of this
conclusion that it issued a direction to the appellant to
reinstate the ten retrenched workmen and to pay all its
workmen employed at the two centres as though the centres
had not been closed and were actually working. In reaching
this conclusion the tribunal has relied on the observations
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made by this Court in Banaras Ice Factory Ltd. v. Its
Workmen (1).
It is common ground that the compensation, due to the
employees on the footing that the closure was not justified,
has been duly paid to all the employees concerned, and the
learned Attorney General has stated to us that so far as the
ten retrenched workmen are concerned they have also been
paid the statutory compensation. On behalf of the appellant
the learned Attorney General had made it perfectly clear
that even if the appeal were to succeed the appellant would
not claim any amount back from any of its employees
concerned though it would be entitled in law to do so.
The main grievance made before us by the appellant is about
the direction of the tribunal that the closure must be
treated as non est and that the agencies must be held to be
continuing and must continue to function despite their
factual closure. The argument is
(1)[1957] S.C.R. 143.
212
that even if the closure may not be bona fide it does not
follow that the closure in fact has not taken place. It is
not a case where closure is a pretence or the plea of
closure is unreal in the sense that having purported to
close the agencies, the same agencies have been functioning
all the time, under a different garb. In fact the agencies
have been closed even according to the finding of the
tribunal. It is contended that the finding about the mala
fides of the closure is open to serious doubt because the
said finding is not supported by any legal evidence, and in
a sense is opposed to the weight of the evidence on the
record. We are inclined to think that there is considerable
force in this contention. But assuming that the closure is
not shown to be bonafide, does it necessarily follow that
the closure is a fiction and it is unreal in the sense that
the agencies can be treated to be in existence in the eye of
the law ? That is the very narrow point which arises for our
decision in the present appeal.
As we have already indicated the conclusion of the tribunal
on this point is based on the observations of this Court in
the case of Banaras Ice Factory Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1). It
will, therefore, be necessary to examine those observations
and decide whether they really justify the conclusion of the
tribunal. In that case this Court was dealing with the
decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal on a complaint
filed before it under s. 22 of the Industrial ’Disputes
(Appellate Tribunal) Act (Act No. XLVIII of 1950), hereafter
called the Act. It appears that during the pendency of an
appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal the appellant
Company decided to close down its business and gave notice
to all the workmen that their services would be terminated
upon the expiry of 30 days from July 16, 1952. That led to
the complaint under s. 23 of the Act on the allegation that
s. 22 of the said Act had been contravened. The Labour
Appellate Tribunal had found that the closure was bona fide.
It conceded that the appellant had the right to close its
business for bona fide reasons; but nevertheless it took the
view that permission should have been obtained before the
said closure. That is why according to it the appellant was
guilty of contra-
(1) (1957] S.C.R. 143.
213
vening s. 22(b) of the Act. This decision was reversed by
this Court. In doing so, the true scope and effect of ss.
22 and 23 of the Act were considered and it was held that if
the impugned closure was bona fide then neither of the two
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sections came into operation. Thus the position was that
the closure was bona fide and that the appellant had
committed no breach of s. 22(b) of the Act. In dealing with
the scope and effect of s. 23 this Court observed: "There is
hardly any occasion for praying for permission to lift the
ban imposed by s. 22, when the employer has the right to
close his business and bona fide does so, with the result
that the industry itself ceases to exist ". Then it was
added: " If there is no real closure but a mere pretence of
a closure or it is mala fide, there is no closure in the eye
of the law and the workmen can raise an industrial dispute
and may even claim under s. 23 of the Act". It is on this
latter observation that the Tribunal has founded its
decision. With respect we do not read the observations as
laying down an. unqualified and categorical proposition of
law that wherever a closure is mala fide it must be deemed
to be unreal and non-existent. What this Court has said is
that in cases of pretence of closure no closure in fact has
taken place and for the purpose of s. 23 of the Act with
which the Court was dealing a mala fide closure may
conceivably be treated as falling in the same class as a
pretence of closure. But in the present case the facts are
not in dispute. There has been a closure and the agencies
have been closed and their business has been wound up. If
it is found that the closure was not bona fide the
consequences would be the liability of the employer to pay
the higher compensation under s. 25-FFF of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. But it is difficult to see how when the
two agencies have in fact been closed the finding about mala
fides can justify the conclusion that the said two agencies
should be deemed to continue and how the award can make an
order on that basis. Besides, as we have already indicated
even the finding about the mala fides of the closure is
itself open to serious doubt. In our opinion the said
finding is
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based on mere surmises and is entirely opposed to the weight
of evidence adduced in this case.
The result is that portion of the award which issues
directions to the appellant on the basis that the closure,
in the eyes of law, had not taken place is set aside. The
appeal succeeds to that extent and must be allowed. There
will be no order as to costs in the circumstances.
Appeal allowed.