Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
VASUDEO VISHWANATH SARAF
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
NEW EDUCATION INSTITUTE & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT05/08/1986
BENCH:
RAY, B.C. (J)
BENCH:
RAY, B.C. (J)
SEN, A.P. (J)
CITATION:
1986 AIR 2105 1986 SCR (3) 458
1986 SCC (4) 31 JT 1986 80
1986 SCALE (2)258
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950- Article 226-Necessity of
making reasoned orders.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioner was initially appointed as an Assistant
Teacher in a school run by the respondent-society,
subsequently promoted as Supervisor and thereafter was
working as Principal till reversion by a Resolution of the
Managing Committee of the respondent-society.
The petitioner challenged the Resolution of reversion
by filing a suit, which was dismissed. The Appellate Court
allowed the appeal holding that the order of reversion was
illegal and bad and further held that the petitioner was
entitled to have all the benefits and emoluments as
Principal.
During the pendency of the second appeal, opposite
party No. 1 commenced a departmental enquiry against the
petitioner, under cl. 77.3 of Secondary School Code, which
related to mistakes in accounting in matters pertaining to
the society and not relating to the school and the Enquiry
Committee recommended the termination of the petitioner’s
services. The petitioner filed an appeal to the Deputy
Director of Education, who held that the order terminating
service was disproportionate to the findings recorded by the
Enquiry Committee and directed that the petitioner’s service
should not be terminated till the decision of the suit. This
order was challenged by the management before the Director
of Education. The joint Director of Education allowed the
appeal and upheld the recommendations made by the Enquiry
Committee regarding the termination of service.
The writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging
the impugned order was rejected by merely recording the
order, ’rejected’.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a suit, and during its
pendency the
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management again commenced an enquiry, which was completed
without any compliance of the principles of natural justice,
and the Enquiry Committee recommended termination of the
services of the petitioner from the post of Assistant
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Teacher.
In appeal, the Deputy Director of Education, without
giving any hearing to the petitioner sent a letter informing
him that under instructions from the Director of Education,
the decision of termination of service on the basis of the
first enquiry held against him being upheld by the Director
of Education it was not necessary to entertain his appeal
against the decision of the subsequent enquiry and,
therefore, the appeal was filed.
On a representation made by the petitioner, the
Government forwarded the appeal to the School Tribunal,
which was dismissed. The writ petition of the petitioner was
also rejected.
The petitioner appealed to this Court by way of Special
Leave Petition.
Allowing the appeal, the court,
^
HELD: 1. The Judgment and Order passed on 8.6.1984 in
Writ Petition No. 4063 of 1984 is set aside, and the Court
below directed to dispose of the said writ petition in
accordance with law after hearing the parties and by passing
a speaking order as expeditiously as possible preferably
within a period of four months. [467B-C]
2. Fair play and justice demands that justice must not
only be done but must seems to have been done. [465F-G]
Mahabir Prasad v. State of M.P., AIR 1970 (SC) 1302 at
1304, Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India &
Ors., [1966] 1 SCR 466, Mahabir Jute Mills v. Shibbon Lal,
AIR 1975 SC 2057 at 2060, Siemen Engineering & Manufacturing
Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 (SC) 785, Bachhan Singh v.
State of Punjab, AIR 1980 (SC) 1355 at 1358 paras 18 & 19
and Rangnath v. Daulat Rao and Others, [1975] (1) SCC 686 at
690 para 7, followed.
3. It is a cardinal principle of the rule of law which
governs our policy that the Court including writ Court is
required to record reasons while disposing of a writ
petition. This is imperative for the fair and
460
equitable adminstration of justice. The recording of reasons
in deciding cases or applications affecting rights of
parties is a mandatory requirement to be fulfilled in
consonance with the principles of natural justice.[465B-D]
4. It is no answer that for the purpose of expeditious
disposal of cases a laconic order like ’dismissed’ or
’rejected’ will be made without passing a reasoned order or
a speaking order. [465D-E]
5. The order must in a nutshell record the relevant
reasons which were taken into consideration by the Court in
coming to its final conclusions and in disposing of the
petition or the cause by making the order, thereby enabling
both the parties seeking justice as well as the superior
Court where an appeal lies to know the mind of the Court as
well as the reasons for its finding on questions of law and
facts in deciding the said petition or cause. [465E-F]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1442 of
1986
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.10.1984 of the
Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 4063 of 1984.
S.B. Bhasme and M.A. Firoz for the Appellant.
V.A. Bobde. A.K. Sanghi and Shyam Murlidhar for the
Respondents.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RAY J. This application for special leave involves a
very short but very important and substantial question of
law namely whether a court while hearing writ petitions is
under an obligation to pass a speaking order-an order
recording in brief at least the reasons which weighed with
the court in determining the salient questions raised by the
parties to the action while dismissing or rejecting the writ
petition in order to enable the parties to know the reasons
for such order, more particularly when there is provision
for appeal including appeal on special leave to this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to apprise
the appellate court of the reasons of the order in order to
conform the basic principles of justice and fair play and as
well as the rule of law which pervades our constitutional
system and also in consonance with the principles of natural
justice. On this vital ground we
461
deem it just and proper to grant special leave and
accordingly special leave granted.
The facts of the case in brief are inter alia that the
petitioner a B.Sc. with 2nd Class honours, was appointed as
an assistant Teacher in 195 I in the New English Institute
Girls High School conducted and managed by a registered
society named New Education Institute, the respondent No. 1.
The petitioner was transferred in New High School in June
1953. The petitioner passed the Secondary Teacher’s
Certificate Examination and he also passed the Diploma of
Education Examination conducted by Basic Training Centre,
Dhule. This diploma is considered as equivalent to Bachelor
of Education Degree for the purpose of considering
suitability for additional benefits. The petitioner was
promoted as supervisor in the same school in 1961 and
thereafter From June 1968 he was working as Principal till
his reversion by a resolution of the managing committee of
the Institute dated October 28. 1973.
The petitioner challenged the said resolution of
reversion in a suit being regular Civil Suit No. 755 of
1973. The said suit was dismissed. The petitioner challenged
the said degree of dismissal in Civil Appeal No. 107 of
1979. The appellate court allowed the appeal on reversing
the degree of the trial court holding inter alia that the
order of reversion was illegal and bad and the petitioner
was entitled to have all the benefits and emoluments as
principal of the said institution. The opposite party No. 1
preferred a Second Appeal No. 162 of 1981 in the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay which is pending for hearing.
During the pendency of the said appeal the opposite
party No. 1 commenced a departmental enquiry against the
petitioner under the provisions of Clause 77.3 of Secondary
School Code. A notice to show cause was issued to the
petitioner wherefrom it would appear that the said
proceeding mainly related to mistakes in accounting in
matters pertaining to the society and not relating to the
school. The Enquiry Committee on 7.4.1975 recommended the
termination of the petitioner’s services. Against that
recommendation the petitioner filed an appeal to the Deputy
Director of Education, Nasik, the respondent No. 4. The
respondent No. 4 by his order dated 27.12.1975 was of the
opinion that the order terminating service of the petitioner
was disproportionate to the findings recorded by the Enquiry
Committee and directed that the petitioner’s service should
not be terminated till the Civil Court would decide the
suit. This order of respondent No. 4 was challenged by the
management in an appeal filed to the Director of
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462
Education. Though it was submitted that the said appeal was
not maintainable under the said Secondary School Code, the
Joint Director of Education however after hearing allowed
the said appeal by his order dated 6.9.1979 holding that all
the charges levelled against the petitioner were of account
matters. He further held that the management was equally
responsible in as much as it left financial matters
pertaining to the management of the society to the
Headmaster and his clerks. Since it was not the duty of the
Headmaster he could not be held responsible in management of
accounts in the capacity of Headmaster. Some of the charges
pertaining to the duties as Head Master had been fully
proved and some partly against the petitioner. To be guilty
under a single charge pertaining to financial matters is
very serious. The Joint Director, therefore, held that the
recommendations made by the Enquiry Committee regarding the
termination of the service of the petitioner had to be
upheld.
The petitioner, thereafter, challenged the impugned
order in writ petition No. 1837 of 1980 before the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay. On 12.8.1980 the writ
petition was rejected by merely re cording the order,
’rejected’. No reasons whatsoever were recorded which
impelled the court to reject the petition.
The petitioner, thereafter, brought an action being
Civil Suit No. 199 of 1981 in the Court of Civil Judge,
Senior Division, Nasik, which is pending for hearing.
During the pendency of these proceedings the management
again commenced an enquiry under the provisions of Clause
77.3 of the Secondary Schools Code. This enquiry was
completed without any compliance of the principles of
natural justice in as much as the petitioner was not served
with the chargesheet by the Enquiry Committee nor his
nominee one Mr. R.G. Kunte, a teacher, was allowed to
participate in the proceedings of the Enquiry Committee. It
was also alleged that out of 75 documents which the
petitioner demanded inspection of only 25 documents were
given inspection and the Enquiry Committee merely supplied
him its findings without giving copy of summary of the
proceedings of the Enquiry Committee. The findings recorded
by the Enquiry Committee was received by the petitioner on
26.4.1979 recommending termination of his service from the
post of Assistant Teacher. The management also, sent its
order terminating the petitioner’s service and this was
received by him on 26.4.1979. It was submitted that the
entire procedure adopted by the Enquiry Com-
463
mittee was in violation of Clause 77.3 of Secondary Schools
Code and in fact the enquiry was exparte. Petitioner prayed
for setting aside the order of the Enquiry Committee and for
allowing the appeal.
The Deputy Director of Education, Nasik without giving
any hearing to the petitioner sent a letter dated 12.2.1980
informing the petitioner that under instruction from the
Director of Education the decision of termination of service
on the basis of the first enquiry held by the management of
the Institute against him being upheld by the Director of
Education it was not necessary to entertain his appeal
against the decision of the enquiry subsequently held. The
appeal was, therefore, filed. The respondent No. 4, the
Deputy Director of Education, thus did not at all consider
and decide the appeal after hearing the parties including
the petitioner.
The petitioner then made a representation to the
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Government by letter dated 8.4.1981 to decide the appeal in
accordance with law. The government by letter dated
24.4.1981 informed the petitioner that his appeal and his
letter with the enclosures had been forwarded to the School
Tribunal for hearing of the appeal and deciding it. This
School Tribunal dismissed the said appeal without giving any
decisions on merits.
Against the order of the School Tribunal the
petitioner filed a writ petition No. 4063 of 1984 before the
High Court, Bombay. This writ petition was rejected by
recording the following order:
"Heard. In view of the earlier rejection of W.P.
as well as the application to file appeal to
Supreme Court, this W.P.is also rejected.
Aggrieved by the said judgment the petitioner filed the
instant petition for special leave to appeal in this Court.
lt was pleaded in the special leave petition that the
third enquiry proceeding was commenced by the management
under the provisions of Clause 77.3 of the Secondary School
Code. During the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings it
was further pleaded that the enquiry committee while
proceeding with the enquiry arbitrarily violated the
principles of natural justice as well as the provisions of
Clause 77.3 of the said code. The Headmaster who was biased
against the petitioner was appointed as one of the members
of the Enquiry Com-
464
mittee and he did not permit the petitioner’s nominee to be.
present in the enquiry which was held exparte. The
petitioner was asked by the opposite party No. 1, the New
Education Institute, by its letter dated 15.1.1979 to
nominate his representative. The petitioner by his letter
dated 29.1.1979 enquired of the management whether his
nominee should be a Headmaster or an Assistant Teacher or a
member of the Governing Council as the charges related to
his actions as Headmaster as well as Assistant Teacher. No
reply was received by the petitioner to this letter; on the
other hand an intimation was received by him on February 28,
1979 about the formation of the Enquiry Committee.
Immediately, he nominated Mr. R.G. Kunte as his nominee in
the Enquiry Committee. The Enquiry Committee did not permit
Mr.R.G. Kunte to be associated with the enquiry and it did
neither send any chargesheet to the petitioner nor did it
supply him the proceedings of the Enquiry Committee. It
merely communicated to the petitioner its findings recorded
on 25.4.1479 and the same was received by the petitioner on
26.4.1979 whereby the service of the petitioner as Assistant
Teacher was terminated. The appeal filed by the petitioner
against the said order to the respondent No. 4 Deputy
Director of Education, Nasik was also not heard and decided
after giving hearing to the petitioner. But respondent No. 4
merely communicated by his letter dated 12.2.1980 to the
petitioner that as the decision of termination by the
management on the basis of the first enquiry had been
upheld, so the appeal was filed.
It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the
representation made by him to the Government was sent to the
School’s Tribunal with a direction to hear the appeal of the
petitioner. The School’s Tribunal dismissed the appeal
without at all considering and determining the relevant
questions involved in the appeal by simply holding that
since writ petition against the earlier order of termination
of service of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court,
the petitioner had no right to prefer any appeal to this
Tribunal for agitating the same question though the appeal
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was filed against the subsequent order of termination made
by the managing committee of the Institution. It was also
urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Enquiry Committee
was biased against the petitioner and one of the nominee; in
the Enquiry Committee was the Headmaster of the Institute
who was the original complainant against the petitioner and
therefore he was nominated by management to act as a Judge
of his own cause. It was also submitted that the High Court
of Bombay did not at all consider and decide both
465
the writ petitions i.e. the writ petition No. 1837 of 1980
and writ A petition No. 4063 of 1984 on merits which were
dismissed by recording the laconic order ’rejected’. No
speaking order was made assigning any reason whatsoever for
rejecting the aforesaid two writ petitions which involved
substantial questions of law and facts.
It is a cardinal principle of rule of law which
governs our policy that the Court including Writ Court is
required to record reasons while disposing of a writ
petition in order to enable the litigents more particularly
the aggrieved party to know the reasons which weighed with
the mind of the Court in determining the questions of facts
and law raised in the writ petition or in the action
brought. This is imperative for the fair and equitable
administration of justice. More so when there is a statutory
provision for appeal to the higher court in the hierarchy of
courts in order to enable the superior court or the
Appellate Court to know or to be apprised of the reasons
which impelled the court to pass the order in question. This
recording of reasons in deciding cases or applications
affecting rights of parties is also a mandatory requirement
to be fulfilled in consonance with the principles of natural
justice. It is no answer at all to this legal position that
for the purpose of expeditious disposal of cases a laconic
order like ’dismissed’ or ’rejected’ will be made without
passing a reasoned order or a speaking order. It is not,
however, necessary that the order disposing of a writ
petition or of a cause must be a lengthy one recording in
detail all the reasons that played in the mind of the court
in coming to the decision. What is imperative is that the
order must in a nutshell record the relevant reasons which
were taken into consideration by the Court in coming to its
final conclusions and in disposing of the petition or the
cause by making the order, thereby enabling both the party
seeking justice as well as the superior court where an
appeal lies to know the mind of the court as well as the
reasons for its finding on questions of law and facts in
deciding the said petition or cause. In other words fair
play and justice demands that justice must not only be done
but must seem to have been done.
It is pertinent to refer in this connection some of the
decisions rendered by this Court. In Mahabir Prasad v. State
of M.P., A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1302 at 13()4 it has been observed
as follows:
"opportunity to a party interested in the dispute
to present his case on questions of law as well of
fact, ascertainment of facts from materials before
the Tribunal after disclosing
466
the materials to the party against whom it is
intended to use them, and adjudication by reasoned
judgment upon a finding of the facts in
controversy and application of the law to the
facts found, are attributes of even a quasi
judicial determination. It must appear not merely
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that the authority entrusted with quasi-judicial
authority has reached a conclusion or the problem
before him, it must appear that he has reached a
conclusion which is according to law and just, and
for ensuring that end he must record the ultimate
mental process leading from the dispute to its
solution. Satisfactory decision of a disputed
claim may be reached only if it be supported by
most cogent reasons the appeal to the authority.
Recording of reasons in support of a decision on a
disputed claim by a quasi-judicial authority
ensures that the decision is reached according to
law as is not the result of caprice, whim or fancy
or reached on the grounds of policy or expediency.
A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to
know the grounds on which the authority has
rejected his claim if the order is subjected to
appeal, the necessity to record reasons in greater
for with out recorded reasons, the appellate
authority has no mate rial on which it may
determine whether the facts were properly
ascertained, the relevant law was correctly
applied and the decision was just."
This decision was rendered in connection with the
cancellation of the license of a wholesale distributor in
sugar under U.P. Sugar Dealer’s Licensing order, 1962, by
the District Magistrate and the rejection of the appeal by
the State Government without recording any reasons.
The above decision referred to in the case of Madhya
Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India Ors., [1966] 1
S.C. R. 466 where it has been observed that the practice of
the executive authority dismissing statutory appeals against
order which seriously prejudice the rights of the aggrieved
party without giving reasons is a negation of rule of law.
Similar observations have been made in the case of Mahabir
Jute Mills v. Shibbon Lal, A.l.R. 1975 SC 2057 at 2060. The
same view was also reiterated in Siemen Engineering &
Manufacturing Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 and
Bachhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1355 at 1358
paras 18 & 19 and it was observed that where an authority
made an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial func-
467
tion it must record its reasons in support of the order it
made. Similar A view was expressed by this Court in the case
of Rangnath v. Daulat Rao and others, [1975] 1 SCC 686 at
690 para 7. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by
reasons. This well-settled principle will undoubtedly apply
to orders made by a Court in disposing of writ applications.
In the premises aforesaid the appeal is allowed and
the judgment and order passed on 8.10.1984 in writ petition
No. 4063 of 1984 is hereby set aside. The Court below is
directed to dispose of the said writ petition in accordance
with law after giving hearing to the parties and by passing
a speaking order as expeditiously as possible preferably
within a period of four months from the date of receipt of
the records by the court below. Let the records be sent to
the court below forthwith. There will, however, be no order
as to costs.
A.P.J. Appeal allowed.
468