Full Judgment Text
| 1<br>Reportable<br>IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA<br>CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION<br>CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.421 OF 2021<br>BOOTA SINGH & OTHERS …Appellants<br>Versus<br>STATE OF HARYANA …Respondent<br>J U D G M E N T<br>Uday Umesh Lalit, J.<br>1. This appeal challenges the judgment and final order dated 03.03.2020<br>passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh dismissing<br>CR A-S-1759-SB-2004 preferred by the appellants and affirming their<br>conviction and sentence under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and<br>Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“the NDPS Act” for short).<br>2. The basic facts and the case of prosecution as recorded by the High<br>ture Not Verified<br>Mlly a rs wig an hed by Court in its judgment are as under:<br>2021.04.16<br>:27 IST<br>on:<br>“2. The facts as put forth by the prosecution are to the effect<br>that on 28.01.2002, S.I. Nand Lal alongwith fellow police | |||
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| 1 | |||
| Reportable | |||
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | |||
| CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION | |||
| CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.421 OF 2021 | |||
| BOOTA SINGH & OTHERS …Appellants | |||
| Versus | |||
| STATE OF HARYANA …Respondent |
| 2 | ||
| officials were present at the canal bridge on Surtia-Rori road,<br>where he received a secret information to the effect that the<br>accused are selling poppy straw in a vehicle bearing registration<br>number GUD-4997 on a ‘kacha path’ at Rori-Jatana road and<br>they can be apprehended if raid is conducted. Accordingly, a<br>raid was conducted and the accused were found sitting in the<br>jeep bearing registration number GUD-4997 at the aforesaid<br>place. Major Singh, co-accused of the appellants, managed to<br>slip away, whereas, the appellants were apprehend at the spot.<br>They were found sitting upon two bags kept in the said jeep.<br>Notices under Section 50 of the Act were served upon them but<br>the appellants reposed faith upon the police officials. The<br>search of the bags led to the recovery of poppy straw. One bag<br>was containing 39 kg of poppy straw and the second bag was<br>containing 36 kg of poppy straw. Two samples weighing 100<br>grams each were separated from each bag. The sample parcels<br>and the bulk parcels were converted into separate parcels and<br>sealed with the seal bearing impression 'CS'. The jeep<br>alongwith weighing scale, two weights of 500 grams each were<br>also recovered and taken into possession vide recovery memos.<br>Ruqa was recorded and dispatched to the police station on the<br>basis thereof, the FIR was registered. Subsequently, Major<br>Singh, co-accused, was arrested. and on completion of<br>investigation, the challan was presented in the Court. | ||
| 3. The charge was framed. The contents thereof were read<br>over and explained to the appellants, to which they pleaded not<br>guilty and claimed trial. | ||
| 4. In support of its allegations, the prosecution has<br>examined four witnesses. Inspector Nand Lal (PW4) has<br>conducted the search of the accused in the presence of ASI<br>Jaswant Singh (PW3). The case property was retained in the<br>malkhana by Kuldeep Singh (PW2) and Constable Gurjit Singh<br>(PW 1) took the sample parcels to the FSL. The prosecution has<br>also 2 of 10 produced documentary evidence to substantiate the<br>version as put forth by it.” | ||
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| 3. By order dated 15.03.2002, on an application preferred by him, the<br>vehicle in question was released by the Trial Court in favour of accused<br>Gurdeep Singh.<br>4. During trial, PW4 Inspector Nand Lal, the Investigating Officer<br>deposed in his examination-in-chief as under:<br>“On 28.1.2002 I was posted as Sub Inspector/SHO in Police<br>Station Rori. On that day, I alongwith ASI Jaswant Singh and<br>other police officials were present at the canal bridge on Surtia<br>Rori-road in connection with patrolling. I received a secret<br>information that all the accused are selling poppy straw in a<br>vehicle bearing no.GUD-4997 upon a 'Kacha Rasta at Rori-<br>Jatana road and can be apprehended red handed if a raid is<br>conducted. I tried to join two persons who were going to water<br>the fields in the investigations but they refused. Thereafter I<br>organised a raiding party and conducted a raid. All the accused<br>were found in the jeep bearing no GUD-4997, upon a kacha<br>rasta by the side of Rori-Jatana Road, Upon seeing the police<br>party, one of the accused, namely, Major fled the spot. I knew<br>the accused Major Singh since long. Remaining three accused<br>were apprehended at the spot. Accused Boota Singh, Gurdeep<br>Singh and Gurmahender Singh alias Mitta were found sitting<br>upon two bags lying in the said Jeep. Thereafter, I served<br>notices Ex.PC, Ex.PD and Ex.PE upon accused Gurdeep, Boota<br>and Gurmahender Singh respectively u/s 50 of NDPS asking<br>them as to whether they desired their search before a gazetted<br>officer or a Magistrate. Vide replies Exl.PC/1.1, Ex.PDA and<br>Ex.PE/I, accused Gurdeep Singh, Boota Singh and<br>Gurmahender Singh alias Mitta declined the offer and reposed<br>faith in the police. …” | 3. By order dated 15.03.2002, on an application preferred by him, the<br>vehicle in question was released by the Trial Court in favour of accused<br>Gurdeep Singh. | ||
| 4. During trial, PW4 Inspector Nand Lal, the Investigating Officer<br>deposed in his examination-in-chief as under: | |||
| “On 28.1.2002 I was posted as Sub Inspector/SHO in Police<br>Station Rori. On that day, I alongwith ASI Jaswant Singh and<br>other police officials were present at the canal bridge on Surtia<br>Rori-road in connection with patrolling. I received a secret<br>information that all the accused are selling poppy straw in a<br>vehicle bearing no.GUD-4997 upon a 'Kacha Rasta at Rori-<br>Jatana road and can be apprehended red handed if a raid is<br>conducted. I tried to join two persons who were going to water<br>the fields in the investigations but they refused. Thereafter I<br>organised a raiding party and conducted a raid. All the accused<br>were found in the jeep bearing no GUD-4997, upon a kacha<br>rasta by the side of Rori-Jatana Road, Upon seeing the police<br>party, one of the accused, namely, Major fled the spot. I knew<br>the accused Major Singh since long. Remaining three accused<br>were apprehended at the spot. Accused Boota Singh, Gurdeep<br>Singh and Gurmahender Singh alias Mitta were found sitting<br>upon two bags lying in the said Jeep. Thereafter, I served<br>notices Ex.PC, Ex.PD and Ex.PE upon accused Gurdeep, Boota<br>and Gurmahender Singh respectively u/s 50 of NDPS asking<br>them as to whether they desired their search before a gazetted<br>officer or a Magistrate. Vide replies Exl.PC/1.1, Ex.PDA and<br>Ex.PE/I, accused Gurdeep Singh, Boota Singh and<br>Gurmahender Singh alias Mitta declined the offer and reposed<br>faith in the police. …” | |||
| In his cross-examination, the witness stated:- |
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| “I did not record the secret information in writing. Wireless in<br>my jeep was out of order at that time. I did not obtain any<br>search warrants for conducting the search of the jeep of accused<br>during night hours. I did not record any ground for not<br>obtaining the requisite search warrants in my police file. The<br>writing work was done while sitting in the jeep.”<br>5. After considering the evidence on record, the Trial Court by its<br>judgment and order dated 12.08.2004, acquitted accused Major Singh but<br>convicted accused Boota Singh, Gurdeep Singh and Gurmohinder Singh,<br>under Section 15 of the NDPS Act and sentenced them to suffer rigorous<br>imprisonment for 10 years with imposition of fine in the sum of<br>Rs.1,00,000/-, in default whereof they were directed to undergo further<br>rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years. | “I did not record the secret information in writing. Wireless in<br>my jeep was out of order at that time. I did not obtain any<br>search warrants for conducting the search of the jeep of accused<br>during night hours. I did not record any ground for not<br>obtaining the requisite search warrants in my police file. The<br>writing work was done while sitting in the jeep.” | ||
| 5. After considering the evidence on record, the Trial Court by its<br>judgment and order dated 12.08.2004, acquitted accused Major Singh but<br>convicted accused Boota Singh, Gurdeep Singh and Gurmohinder Singh,<br>under Section 15 of the NDPS Act and sentenced them to suffer rigorous<br>imprisonment for 10 years with imposition of fine in the sum of<br>Rs.1,00,000/-, in default whereof they were directed to undergo further<br>rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years. | |||
| On the question of applicability of Section 42 of the NDPS Act, the Trial<br>Court stated:- | |||
| “ … Learned counsel sought acquittal of accused due to non-<br>compliance of Section 42 of N.D.P.S. Act. However, above<br>said argument could help the accused if recovery had been<br>effected from the house, building etc. of the accused.<br>Admittedly, recovery in question was effected from the accused<br>while they were sitting on road in a jeep at a public place.<br>Therefore, case of accused would be covered by Section 43 of<br>N.D.P.S. Act and not by Section 42 of N.D.P.S. Act. Under<br>these circumstances, argument of learned counsels for accused<br>is overruled.” | “ … Learned counsel sought acquittal of accused due to non-<br>compliance of Section 42 of N.D.P.S. Act. However, above<br>said argument could help the accused if recovery had been<br>effected from the house, building etc. of the accused.<br>Admittedly, recovery in question was effected from the accused<br>while they were sitting on road in a jeep at a public place.<br>Therefore, case of accused would be covered by Section 43 of<br>N.D.P.S. Act and not by Section 42 of N.D.P.S. Act. Under<br>these circumstances, argument of learned counsels for accused<br>is overruled.” | ||
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| 6. The convicted accused, being aggrieved, preferred the aforementioned<br>Criminal Appeal before the High Court, which was dismissed by the High<br>Court. | |||
| On the question whether the matter came within the scope of Section 42 of<br>the NDPS Act, the High Court observed:- | |||
| 14. Furthermore, in the case in hand, the accused were<br>present in a jeep on a public path and in such circumstance, the<br>provisions of Section 43 and not of 42 of the Act come into<br>play. As per explanation to Section 43 of the Act, the public<br>place includes a<br>conveyance also. Section 43 of the Act contemplates a seizure<br>made in a public place or in transit. As such, Section 42 of the<br>Act is not applicable to the facts of the present case …”<br>7. In this appeal preferred by Boota Singh, Gurdeep Singh and<br>Gurmohinder Singh challenging the correctness of the decisions of the<br>courts below, we heard Mr. Praveen Kumar, learned counsel for the<br>appellants and Mr. Rakesh Mudgal, learned AAG for the State. | 14. Furthermore, in the case in hand, the accused were<br>present in a jeep on a public path and in such circumstance, the<br>provisions of Section 43 and not of 42 of the Act come into<br>play. As per explanation to Section 43 of the Act, the public<br>place includes a | ||
| conveyance also. Section 43 of the Act contemplates a seizure<br>made in a public place or in transit. As such, Section 42 of the<br>Act is not applicable to the facts of the present case …” | |||
| 7. In this appeal preferred by Boota Singh, Gurdeep Singh and<br>Gurmohinder Singh challenging the correctness of the decisions of the<br>courts below, we heard Mr. Praveen Kumar, learned counsel for the<br>appellants and Mr. Rakesh Mudgal, learned AAG for the State. | |||
| 8. Mr. Praveen Kumar submitted inter alia:<br>a. The vehicle in question was a private vehicle belonging<br>to accused Gurdeep Singh and was not a public<br>conveyance, though parked on a public road. | 8. Mr. Praveen Kumar submitted inter alia: | ||
| a. The vehicle in question was a private vehicle belonging<br>to accused Gurdeep Singh and was not a public<br>conveyance, though parked on a public road. | |||
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| b. As accepted by PW4 Inspector Nand Lal, the secret<br>information was not recorded in writing nor any grounds<br>were recorded for not obtaining the requisite search<br>warrants. | ||
| c. The instant case would not be come under Section 43 but<br>would be governed by the provisions of Section 42 of the<br>NDPS Act. | ||
| d. Section 42 having not been complied with at all, the<br>appellants were entitled to acquittal in terms of law laid<br>down in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in<br>Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana , followed in<br>1<br>subsequent decisions in Sukhdev Singh v. State of<br>Haryana , and, State of Rajasthan v. Jagraj Singh alias<br>2<br>Hansa .<br>3 |
1(2009) 8 SCC 539
2(2013) 2 SCC 212
3(2016) 11 SCC 687
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| 9. Countering the submissions, Mr. Rakesh Mudgal, learned AAG<br>submitted that the courts below were right in observing that the instant case<br>would be governed by the provisions of Section 43 of the NDPS Act. It was<br>however accepted by the learned counsel that there was no material on<br>record to conclude that the vehicle in question was a public conveyance.<br>1<br>10. In Karnail Singh , the Constitution Bench of this Court concluded:-<br>“35. In conclusion, what is to be noticed is that Abdul<br>Rashid [(2000) 2 SCC 513 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 496] did not<br>require literal compliance with the requirements of Sections<br>42(1) and 42(2) nor did Sajan Abraham [(2001) 6 SCC 692 :<br>2001 SCC (Cri) 1217] hold that the requirements of Sections<br>42(1) and 42(2) need not be fulfilled at all. The effect of the two<br>decisions was as follows:<br>(a) The officer on receiving the information [of the<br>nature referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 42] from any<br>person had to record it in writing in the register concerned<br>and forthwith send a copy to his immediate official superior,<br>before proceeding to take action in terms of clauses (a) to<br>(d) of Section 42(1).<br>(b) But if the information was received when the officer<br>was not in the police station, but while he was on the move<br>either on patrol duty or otherwise, either by mobile phone,<br>or other means, and the information calls for immediate<br>action and any delay would have resulted in the goods or<br>evidence being removed or destroyed, it would not be<br>feasible or practical to take down in writing the information<br>given to him, in such a situation, he could take action as per<br>clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1) and thereafter, as soon as<br>it is practical, record the information in writing and<br>forthwith inform the same to the official superior. | 9. Countering the submissions, Mr. Rakesh Mudgal, learned AAG<br>submitted that the courts below were right in observing that the instant case<br>would be governed by the provisions of Section 43 of the NDPS Act. It was<br>however accepted by the learned counsel that there was no material on<br>record to conclude that the vehicle in question was a public conveyance. | |||
| 1<br>10. In Karnail Singh , the Constitution Bench of this Court concluded:- | ||||
| “35. In conclusion, what is to be noticed is that Abdul<br>Rashid [(2000) 2 SCC 513 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 496] did not<br>require literal compliance with the requirements of Sections<br>42(1) and 42(2) nor did Sajan Abraham [(2001) 6 SCC 692 :<br>2001 SCC (Cri) 1217] hold that the requirements of Sections<br>42(1) and 42(2) need not be fulfilled at all. The effect of the two<br>decisions was as follows: | ||||
| (a) The officer on receiving the information [of the<br>nature referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 42] from any<br>person had to record it in writing in the register concerned<br>and forthwith send a copy to his immediate official superior,<br>before proceeding to take action in terms of clauses (a) to<br>(d) of Section 42(1). | ||||
| (b) But if the information was received when the officer<br>was not in the police station, but while he was on the move<br>either on patrol duty or otherwise, either by mobile phone,<br>or other means, and the information calls for immediate<br>action and any delay would have resulted in the goods or<br>evidence being removed or destroyed, it would not be<br>feasible or practical to take down in writing the information<br>given to him, in such a situation, he could take action as per<br>clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1) and thereafter, as soon as<br>it is practical, record the information in writing and | ||||
| forthwith inform the same to the official superior. |
| 8 | ||
| (c) In other words, the compliance with the requirements<br>of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) in regard to writing down the<br>information received and sending a copy thereof to the<br>superior officer, should normally precede the entry, search<br>and seizure by the officer. But in special circumstances<br>involving emergent situations, the recording of the | ||
| information in writing and sending a copy thereof to the | ||
| official superior may get postponed by a reasonable period, | ||
| that is, after the search, entry and seizure. The question is<br>one of urgency and expediency. | ||
| (d) While total non-compliance with requirements of sub-<br>sections (1) and (2) of Section 42 is impermissible, delayed<br>compliance with satisfactory explanation about the delay<br>will be acceptable compliance with Section 42. To illustrate,<br>if any delay may result in the accused escaping or the goods<br>or evidence being destroyed or removed, not recording in<br>writing the information received, before initiating action, or<br>non-sending of a copy of such information to the official<br>superior forthwith, may not be treated as violation of Section<br>42. But if the information was received when the police<br>officer was in the police station with sufficient time to take<br>action, and if the police officer fails to record in writing the<br>information received, or fails to send a copy thereof, to the<br>official superior, then it will be a suspicious circumstance<br>being a clear violation of Section 42 of the Act. Similarly,<br>where the police officer does not record the information at | ||
| all, and does not inform the official superior at all, then also | ||
| it will be a clear violation of Section 42 of the Act. Whether<br>there is adequate or substantial compliance with Section 42<br>or not is a question of fact to be decided in each case. The<br>above position got strengthened with the amendment to<br>Section 42 by Act 9 of 2001.” | ||
| (Emphasis added) | ||
| 9 | |||||||
| 3<br>11. In Jagraj Singh alias Hansa , the facts were more or less identical.<br>In that case, the vehicle (as observed in para 5.3 of the decision) was not a<br>public transport vehicle. After considering the relevant provisions and some<br>1<br>of the decisions of this Court including the decision in Karnail Singh , it<br>was observed:-<br>“14. What Section 42(2) requires is that where an officer takes<br>down an information in writing under sub-section (1) he shall<br>send a copy thereof to his immediate officer senior. The<br>communication Ext. P-15 which was sent to the Circle Officer,<br>Nohar was not as per the information recorded in Ext. P-14 and<br>Ext. P-21. Thus, no error was committed by the High Court in<br>coming to the conclusion that there was breach of Section<br>42(2).<br>. . . . . . . . . .<br>. . . . . | 3<br>11. In Jagraj Singh alias Hansa , the facts were more or less identical.<br>In that case, the vehicle (as observed in para 5.3 of the decision) was not a<br>public transport vehicle. After considering the relevant provisions and some<br>1<br>of the decisions of this Court including the decision in Karnail Singh , it<br>was observed:- | ||||||
| “ | 14. | What Section 42(2) requires is that where an officer takes | |||||
| down an information in writing under sub-section (1) he shall | |||||||
| send a copy thereof to his immediate officer senior. The | |||||||
| communication Ext. P-15 which was sent to the Circle Officer, | |||||||
| Nohar was not as per the information recorded in Ext. P-14 and | |||||||
| Ext. P-21. Thus, no error was committed by the High Court in | |||||||
| coming to the conclusion that there was breach of Section | |||||||
| 42(2). | |||||||
| . . . . . . . . . .<br>. . . . . | |||||||
| 10 | ||||||||||
| 16. In this context, it is relevant to note that before the<br>Special Judge also the breach of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) was<br>contended on behalf of the defence. In para 12 of the judgment<br>the Special Judge noted the above arguments of defence.<br>However, the arguments based on non-compliance with Section<br>42(2) were brushed aside by observing that discrepancy in Ext.<br>P-14 and Ext. P-15 is totally due to clerical mistake and there<br>was compliance with Section 42(2). The Special Judge coming<br>to compliance with the proviso to Section 42(1) held that the<br>vehicle searched was being used to transport passengers as has<br>been clearly stated by its owner Vira Ram, hence, as per the<br>Explanation to Section 43 of the Act, the vehicle was a public<br>transport vehicle and there was no need of any warrant or<br>authority to search such a vehicle. The High Court has reversed<br>the above findings of the Special Judge. We thus, proceed to<br>examine as to whether Section 43 was attracted in the present<br>case which obviated the requirement of Section 42(1) proviso.<br>. . . . . . . . . .<br>. . . . .<br>29. After referring to the earlier judgments, the Constitution<br>Bench came to the conclusion that non-compliance with<br>requirement of Sections 42 and 50 is impermissible whereas<br>delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation will be<br>acceptable compliance with Section 42. The Constitution Bench<br>noted the effect of the aforesaid two decisions in para 5. The<br>present is not a case where insofar as compliance with Section<br>42(1) proviso even an argument based on substantial<br>compliance is raised there is total non-compliance with Section<br>42(1) proviso. As observed above, Section 43 being not<br>attracted, search was to be conducted after complying with the<br>provisions of Section 42. We thus, conclude that the High Court<br>has rightly held that non-compliance with Section 42(1) and<br>Section 42(2) were proved on the record and the High Court has<br>not committed any error in setting aside the conviction order.”<br>(Emphasis added) | 16. | In this context, it is relevant to note that before the | ||||||||
| Special Judge also the breach of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) was | ||||||||||
| contended on behalf of the defence. In para 12 of the judgment | ||||||||||
| the Special Judge noted the above arguments of defence. | ||||||||||
| However, the arguments based on non-compliance with Section | ||||||||||
| 42(2) were brushed aside by observing that discrepancy in Ext. | ||||||||||
| P-14 and Ext. P-15 is totally due to clerical mistake and there | ||||||||||
| was compliance with Section 42(2). The Special Judge coming | ||||||||||
| to compliance with the proviso to Section 42(1) held that the | ||||||||||
| vehicle searched was being used to transport passengers as has | ||||||||||
| been clearly stated by its owner Vira Ram, hence, as per the | ||||||||||
| Explanation to Section 43 of the Act, the vehicle was a public | ||||||||||
| transport vehicle and there was no need of any warrant or | ||||||||||
| authority to search such a vehicle. The High Court has reversed | ||||||||||
| the above findings of the Special Judge. We thus, proceed to | ||||||||||
| examine as to whether Section 43 was attracted in the present | ||||||||||
| case which obviated the requirement of Section 42(1) proviso. | ||||||||||
| . . . . . . . . . .<br>. . . . . | ||||||||||
| 29. | After referring to the earlier judgments, the Constitution | |||||||||
| Bench came to the conclusion that non-compliance with | ||||||||||
| requirement of Sections 42 and 50 is impermissible whereas | ||||||||||
| delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation will be | ||||||||||
| acceptable compliance with Section 42. The Constitution Bench | ||||||||||
| noted the effect of the aforesaid two decisions in para 5. The | ||||||||||
| present is not a case where insofar as compliance with Section | ||||||||||
| 42(1) proviso even an argument based on substantial | ||||||||||
| compliance is raised there is total non-compliance with Section | ||||||||||
| 42(1) proviso. As observed above, | Section 43 being not | |||||||||
| attracted, search was to be conducted after complying with the | ||||||||||
| provisions of Section 42. | We thus, conclude that the High Court | |||||||||
| has rightly held that non-compliance with Section 42(1) and | ||||||||||
| Section 42(2) were proved on the record and the High Court has | ||||||||||
| not committed any error in setting aside the conviction order.” | ||||||||||
| (Emphasis added) | ||||||||||
| 11 | |
| 12. The evidence in the present case clearly shows that the vehicle was<br>not a public conveyance but was a vehicle belonging to accused Gurdeep<br>Singh. The Registration Certificate of the vehicle, which has been placed on<br>record also does not indicate it to be a Public Transport Vehicle. The<br>explanation to Section 43 shows that a private vehicle would not come<br>within the expression “public place” as explained in Section 43 of the NDPS<br>Act. On the strength of the decision of this Court in Jagraj Singh alias<br>3<br>Hansa , the relevant provision would not be Section 43 of the NDPS Act<br>but the case would come under Section 42 of the NDPS Act. | |
| 13. It is an admitted position that there was total non-compliance of the<br>requirements of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. | |
| 1<br>14. The decision of this Court in Karnail Singh as followed in Jagraj<br>3<br>Singh alias Hansa , is absolutely clear. Total non-compliance of Section 42<br>is impermissible. The rigor of Section 42 may get lessened in situations<br>1<br>dealt with in the conclusion drawn by this Court in Karnail Singh but in no<br>case, total non-compliance of Section 42 can be accepted. |
| 12 | |
| 15. In the circumstances, the courts below fell in error in rejecting the<br>submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants. We, therefore, allow this<br>appeal, set-aside the view taken by the High Court and acquit the appellants<br>of the charge levelled against them. The appellants be released forthwith<br>unless their custody is required in connection with any other offence. | |
| ……………………..J. | |
| [Uday Umesh Lalit] | |
| ……………………..J. | |
| [K.M. Joseph] | |
| New Delhi; | |
| April 16, 2021. | |