YAMUNA EXPRESSWAY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. M/S SHAKUNTLA EDUCATION AND WELFARE SOCIETY

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4178­4197  OF 2022 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.10015­ 10034 of 2020] YAMUNA EXPRESSWAY INDUSTRIAL  DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ETC.      ...APPELLANT(S)   VERSUS SHAKUNTLA EDUCATION AND WELFARE  SOCIETY & ORS. ETC.                             ...RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4198­4217 OF 2022 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.9891­9910 of 2020] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4218   OF 2022 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.14141 of 2020] CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4219  OF 2022 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.300 of 2022] 1 J U D G M E N T  B.R. GAVAI, J.     Leave granted. 1. 2. This batch of appeals challenge the judgment and order th dated 28  May, 2020, passed by the Allahabad High Court in various writ petitions filed by the allottees of plots of land.  The writ petitions were filed challenging the demand of additional amount   made   by   the   appellant   herein­Yamuna   Expressway Industrial   Development   Authority   (hereinafter   referred   to   as “YEIDA”) in respect of plots of land leased out to the allottees; th the resolution of the Board of YEIDA dated 15   September, th 2014, and the Government Order dated 29  August, 2014, vide which the State Government had permitted YEIDA to recover the additional amount from the allottees.   3. The facts in the present case are not in dispute.  For the sake of convenience, we will refer to the factual details as are found in Writ Petition No.28968 of 2018, filed before the High 2 Court of Allahabad by M/s Shakuntla Education and Welfare Society (the respondent No.1 herein).  4. A vast area of land was acquired by the State of Uttar Pradesh in Gautam Budh Nagar district for public purposes. The said area of land was acquired for the benefit of YEIDA. After the land was acquired, YEIDA invited applications for the allotment   of   plots   of   land   in   the   area   developed   by   it.     In response to the notice inviting applications for such allotment, various allottees including the respondent No.1 herein applied and were allotted plots admeasuring different sizes.   th 5. The respondent No.1 was informed by letter dated 14 September,  2009,  that  a  plot of  50 acres  of  land  has  been th reserved for it.   Subsequently, a letter of allotment dated 10 December, 2009 was issued to the respondent No.1, allotting plot   No.2   in   Sector   7­A,   having   an   area   of   50   acres,   i.e., equivalent to 2,02,350 sq. meter.  In the allotment letter, it was stated that the premium of the land allotted was Rs.1,055/­ per sq. meter.  It was also mentioned that the respondent No.1 had 3 deposited 10% of the premium amount and the balance 90% of the premium amount was payable in monthly installments as specified in the chart contained therein.   The allotment letter further stated that the lease deed shall be executed and the possession of the land shall be handed over after completion of the acquisition proceedings.   It was stated that the land was already in possession of YEIDA. It was the contention of the respondent No.1 that on the 6. basis of the aforesaid allotment letter, a lease deed came to be nd executed in favour of the respondent No.1 on 22   January, 2010 for a period of 90 years after the respondent No.1 had made substantial compliance with the terms and conditions of the allotment and had deposited the necessary amount.   The lease deed provided that in addition to the amount payable by the respondent No.1, as mentioned in the allotment letter, a further amount, i.e., 2.5% of the total premium of the plot was payable as annual lease rent.  4 It was further the case of the respondent No.1 that during 7. measurement, it was found that the plot allotted to it, had an excess area of about 2 acres.   The said excess land was also leased out to it on the same terms and conditions.   It was further the case of the respondent No.1 that it was thereafter given possession of the aforesaid land and on it, a University known as Galgotias University was developed.   8. It   was   further   the   case   of   the   respondent   No.1   that subsequently YEIDA came out with a policy and gave an option to the respondent No.1 to deposit the entire premium amount in lump­sum rather than in installments.  This was subject to certain rebate.  It was stated that in accordance with the said policy, a lump­sum amount was worked out by YEIDA and the same was also paid by the respondent No.1.   An undertaking th was also taken from the respondent No.1 on an affidavit on 7 June, 2012, that in the event there was any clerical error or miscalculation of the lump­sum amount, the respondent No.1 would make good the deficiency.   5 The   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   had   also   made   large­scale 9. acquisition of  lands  for  the  benefit of  New  Okhla Industrial Development Authority (“NOIDA” for short) and Greater NOIDA. A   number   of   writ   petitions   came   to   be   filed   by   farmers challenging the said acquisition on various grounds before the Allahabad High Court.  The main ground of challenge was that there   was   no   urgency   for   acquiring   the   land   and   as   such, invoking   Section   17   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the L.A. Act”) was not warranted.  It was contended that on account of invoking of Section 17 of the L.A. Act, a valuable right available to the writ petitioners under Section 5A of the L.A. Act was taken away.   All the said writ petitions came to be decided vide the judgment and order dated st 21  October, 2011.  In the leading case, i.e.,  Gajraj and others 1 , the Full Bench of the Allahabad vs. State of U.P. and others   High Court came to a finding that the urgency clause ought not to have been invoked and the farmers were unlawfully denied the benefit of Section 5A of the L.A. Act, wherein they could 1 2011 SCC OnLine All 1711 6 raise objections to the acquisition of the land.  However, taking into consideration the subsequent developments that the lands had already been developed and third party rights had accrued, the  Full  Bench  of  the   Allahabad   High  Court  in  the   case of Gajraj   (supra)   considered   it   appropriate   not   to   disturb   the acquisition.  In order to balance the equities, the Full Bench of the   Allahabad   High   Court   directed   payment   of   additional compensation   of   64.7%   plus   some   other   benefits   to   certain class of farmers.   It also directed certain other benefits to be given to the farmers.  The aforesaid additional compensation of 64.7% was worked out by the Court taking into consideration the  fact that  in respect  of  one  of   the   villages,  i.e.,   Patwari, NOIDA itself had entered into negotiations with the farmers and had   extended   the   benefit   of   additional   compensation   at   the aforesaid rate over and above the compensation awarded.   10. The aforesaid judgment and order of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of  (supra) came to be Gajraj  7 confirmed by this Court in the case of  Savitri Devi vs. State 2 of Uttar Pradesh and others .   Since   the   farmers,   whose   lands   were   acquired   for   the 11. benefit   of   NOIDA   and   Greater   NOIDA,   were   being   paid additional compensation of 64.7%, there was unrest amongst the farmers whose lands were acquired for YEIDA.  It appears that on account of agitation by the farmers, vast stretches of lands could not be developed.   As such, the Chief Executive Officer (hereinafter referred to as “CEO”) of YEIDA addressed a th letter   dated   10   April,   2013,   to   the   State   Government, requesting to find a solution.  The State Government, acting on the said letter, instructed the Commissioner, Meerut Division, th Meerut, vide its letter of the same day, i.e., dated 10   April, 2013, to meet various groups of farmers and submit a report.   Accordingly,   the   Commissioner   held   a   meeting   with 12. various   groups   of   farmers   and   the   concerned   District Magistrates, and submitted a report to the State Government 2 (2015) 7 SCC 21 8 th on 16  July, 2013, recommending constitution of a High­Level Committee.  rd 13. The   State   Government   vide   Office   Memo   dated   3 September, 2013, constituted a High­Level Committee under the   Chairmanship   of   Sri   Rajendra   Chaudhary,   Minister   of Prison, State of Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as “the Chaudhary   Committee”).     The   Chaudhary   Committee   also consisted   of   the   Divisional   Commissioner   of   the   concerned Division   and   the   Collector   of   concerned   District.     The Chaudhary Committee submitted its recommendations to the State Government,  inter alia,  recommending for the payment of 64.7%   additional   amount   as   “no   litigation   incentive”   to   the farmers and for its reimbursement from the allottees in the appropriate proportion.   14. The State Government accepted the recommendations of the   Chaudhary   Committee   and   issued   a   Government   Order th dated 29   August, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as “the said G.O.”).   The said G.O. provided that the farmers should be 9 offered 64.7% additional amount on the condition that they withdraw their petitions challenging the acquisition proceedings and undertake not to institute any litigation and create any hindrance in the development work of YEIDA.  It was clarified in   the   said   G.O.   that   the   Government   would   not   bear   the burden of the additional amount.  The said G.O. was placed before the Board of YEIDA in its 15. th meeting,   held   on   15   September,   2014,   and   the   same   was approved   in   the   said   meeting   on   the   very   same   day,   vide th Resolution dated 15  September, 2014.  16. In pursuance to the said G.O. and the Resolution dated th 15  September, 2014 of the Board of YEIDA, additional demand notices   were   issued   to   various   allottees.     In   case   of   the respondent No.1, an additional premium at the rate of Rs.600/­ per sq. meter, for the land allotted and leased out, came to be demanded, totaling to Rs.12,14,10,000/­.   10 It was in this background that various writ petitions came 17. to   be   filed   before   the   Allahabad   High   Court,   including   Writ Petition No.28968 of 2018, filed by the respondent No.1.   th 18. By   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   dated   28   May, 2020, the Allahabad High Court allowed the said writ petitions holding that:­ (i) the decision in the case of  Gajraj  (supra), as approved by this Court in the case of  (supra), was Savitri Devi  not a judgment  in rem  and could not have been applied to proceedings for acquiring the land under different notifications or for YEIDA;  (ii) the said G.O. and the Resolution of the Board of YEIDA th dated   15   September,   2014   were   violative   of   the provisions of the L.A. Act; and (iii) the   policy   of   the   State   Government   was   unfair, unreasonable,   arbitrary   and   in   violation   of   the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.   11 Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals by way of 19. special leave have been filed on behalf of YEIDA, State of Uttar Pradesh and farmers whose lands were acquired. 20. We have heard Shri C.A. Sundaram, Shri C.U. Singh and Shri   Maninder   Singh,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   on behalf   of   YEIDA,   Shri   Vinod   Diwakar,   learned   Additional Advocate   General  appearing   on   behalf   of   the   State   of   Uttar Pradesh,   Shri   Rakesh   U.   Upadhyay   and   Dr.   Surat   Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the farmers whose lands were   acquired,   Shri   Nakul   Dewan,   Shri   Sunil   Gupta,   Shri Ravindra   Srivastava   and   Shri   Sanjiv   Sen,   learned   Senior Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondents­original allottees of land.  21. The   main   contention   of   the   appellants   in   the   present appeals is that the said G.O. was a policy decision of the State Government, taken in public interest.  It is submitted that the said policy decision was taken after taking into consideration the farmers’ agitation, the report of the Chaudhary Committee 12 and all other relevant factors.  It is submitted that in order to avoid acquisitions from being declared illegal, the Cabinet of Ministers   of   the   State   Government   had   taken   a   considered decision   to   adopt   a   formula,   which   was   carved   out   by   the judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of  (supra) and approved by this Court in the case of Gajraj  Savitri Devi  (supra). 22. It is also the contention on behalf of the appellants that the policy of the State Government was in consonance with the decision of this Court in the case of  Centre for Public Interest 3 , Litigation   and   others   vs.   Union   of   India   and   others wherein this Court has held that it is obligatory on the State to ensure that people are adequately compensated for the transfer of resource to the private domain.  Relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of  Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. Union 4 of India and others , it is submitted that the policy of the State Government was formulated by looking at the welfare of 3 (2012) 3 SCC 1 4 (2000) 10 SCC 664 13 the people at large rather than restricting the benefit to a small section of  the society. Relying on various judgments  of this Court, it is submitted that when the change in the policy of the State is in public interest, it will override all private agreements entered into by the State.   23. It is further submitted on behalf of the appellants that, as a   matter   of   fact,   on   account   of   agitation   of   the   farmers, development could not take place in the concerned area.  It is submitted that various plot owners had approached the State Government and its authorities for finding out a solution to these problems, so that the development could proceed further. It   is   submitted   that   the   proceedings   of   the   Chaudhary Committee   would   itself   reveal   that   all   the   stakeholders including   the   representatives   of   allottees   were   heard   by   the Chaudhary  Committee.   Not  only that,  but various allottees had,   in   writing,   agreed   that   they   are   willing   to   pay   the additional   compensation   so   that   the   hindrance   in   the development is removed.   It is therefore submitted that it does 14 not lie in the mouth of the respondents to question the said G.O. and oppose the payment of additional compensation.   24. Relying on various judgments of this Court, it is further submitted on behalf of the appellants that the lease deed itself permitted additions, alterations or modifications in the terms and conditions of the lease.   As such, even as per the lease deed, the appellants were entitled to modify or alter the terms and conditions of the lease.     It is submitted that the word “modify”   has   to   be   used   in   a   broader   sense   and   not   in   a narrower sense.   25. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the   High   Court   fell   in   great   error   in   holding   that   no   writ petitions were pending.  It is submitted that, as a matter of fact, more than 600 writ petitions were pending when the policy decision was taken by the State Government.  It is submitted that the policy decision was taken so as to save the acquisition, which was otherwise liable to be quashed and set aside.  It is submitted   that   it   is,   in   fact,   the   respondents,   who   are   the 15 beneficiaries of the said measure and as such, having taken benefit of the said measure, they cannot be permitted to refuse to pay the additional compensation.   26. It is also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the allotees had an option, either to make additional payment or to take refund with interest.  Having opted not to seek refund with interest, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondents to refuse to pay the additional compensation.   27. It is also submitted on behalf of appellant­YEIDA that it had specifically submitted that stay orders passed by the High Court were in force in most of the cases related to residential plots,   due   to   which   the   development   work   could   not   be completed.  28. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the farmers also support the stand of YEIDA.  It is submitted that the builders had   already   recovered   additional   compensation   from   the homebuyers.     As   such,   the   additional   compensation   was already passed on by the builders to the homebuyers.   It is 16 submitted that if the contention of the respondents is accepted, it   will   amount   to   nothing   else   but   allowing   of   unjust enrichment.   29. It   is   further   submitted   that   the   respondents   were   not entitled   to   the   discretionary   relief   under   Article   226   of   the Constitution of India.   The writ petitions filed by them before the Allahabad High Court were filed without impleading the farmers who were necessary parties as respondents to the writ petitions.   30. Elaborate arguments have been advanced on behalf of the respondents.  To summarize, they are as under: (i) The respondents had not given any undertaking to pay additional compensation, as stated; (ii) The   term   “modification/addition”   with   regard   to payment was restricted only to any clerical or technical error; 17 (iii) The High Court has rightly held that  (supra) and Gajraj  Savitri Devi  (supra) applied only to the peculiar facts and   circumstances   of   those   cases.     In   the   case   of (supra),   the   High   Court   had   done   elaborate Gajraj   exercise of categorizing the cases into three types.   In any   case,   it   is   submitted   that   the   State   itself   was aggrieved by the decision in  (supra), which has Gajraj  been challenged by it before this Court;   (iv) In the present case, many of the acquisitions were by private negotiations and as such, there is no question of applicability of either Section 17 or Section 5A of the L.A. Act;   (v) There  were  concluded  contracts  entered  between the allottees   and   YEIDA.     As   such,   it   was   not   open  for YEIDA to unilaterally change the terms and conditions of the contract and enhance the lease premium;  18 (vi) The   High   Court   has   rightly   held   that   the   so­called policy of the State Government was arbitrary, irrational and therefore not sustainable in law;  (vii) On behalf of the respondent No.19­Supertech Limited, an   additional   submission   was   made   that   the appropriate   authority   has   already   passed   an   order admitting   the   petition   filed   under   Section   7   of   the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016;   (viii) On behalf of the individual plot owners, it is submitted that the said plot owners, who belong to the middle class section of the society cannot be burdened with the additional amount.   (ix) The respondents also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of   ITC Limited vs. State of 5 Uttar Pradesh and others  to support the proposition that   concluded contracts cannot be interfered with or reopened.   5 (2011) 7 SCC 493 19 With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, 31. we have perused the material on record.  32. The main reasons that weighed with the High Court while allowing the writ petitions are thus: (i) That the lands which were acquired for YEIDA in the present case were under different notification than the notification which fell for consideration in the case of Gajraj  (supra); (ii) That this Court in the case of  (supra) has Savitri Devi  categorically held that the directions given in the case of  (supra) were issued by the High Court in the Gajraj  peculiar   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   and therefore, the same could not have been applied to the facts of the present case; (iii) That some other petitions filed before the High Court claiming the benefit on the basis of  (supra) were Gajraj  ultimately rejected by the High Court; 20 (iv) That   the   State   Government   has   to   strictly   act   in accordance   with   the   law   or   statutory   provisions.     It cannot act arbitrarily or in an unfair manner in breach of specific provisions of law; (v) That it is only for the Courts to grant equitable relief and the Government is not entitled to pass order on equitable ground of law.   We are called upon to examine the correctness of these 33. findings.   34. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of  (supra) is reproduced by Gajraj  this   Court   in   the   case   of   Savitri   Devi   (supra).     It   will   be apposite to refer to following observations in the case of  Savitri Devi  (supra): “  In   a   nutshell,   relief   was   categorised   in 20. three   compartments.   In   the   first   instance, those writ petitions which were filed belatedly were dismissed. In the second category, three villages,   namely,   Devala   (Group   40),   Village 21 Yusufpur Chak Sahberi (Group 38) and Village Asdullapur (Group 42) the acquisition was set aside. Land acquisition in respect of remaining 61 villages is concerned, the acquisition was allowed   to   remain   but   the   additional compensation   was   increased   to   64.7%with further   entitlement   for   allotment   of development  abadi  plot to the extent of 10%of the acquired land of those landowners subject to maximum of 2500 sq m.  We   now   reproduce   the   exact   nature   of 21. direction [2011 SCC OnLine All 1711] given by the High Court, which reads as follows: ( Gajraj case  [2011   SCC   OnLine   All   1711]   ,   SCC OnLine All) “In view of the foregoing conclusions we order as follows: 1.  Writ   Petition   No.   45933   of   2011, Writ Petition No. 47545 of 2011 relating to Village Nithari, Writ Petition No. 47522 of 2011 relating to Village Sadarpur, Writ Petition No. 45196 of 2011, Writ Petition No.   45208   of   2011,   Writ   Petition   No. 45211 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45213 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45216 of 2011, Writ   Petitions   Nos.   45223­24   of   2011, Writ   Petition   No.   45226   of   2011,   Writ Petitions   Nos.   45229­30   of   2011,   Writ Petition No. 45235 of 2011, Writ Petition No.   45238   of   2011,   Writ   Petition   No. 45283 of 2011 relating to Village Khoda, Writ   Petition   No.   46764   of   2011,   Writ Petition   No.   46785   of   2011   relating   to 22 Village   Sultanpur,   Writ   Petition   No. 46407 of 2011 relating to Village Chaura Sadatpur and Writ Petition No. 46470 of 2011   relating   to   Village   Alaverdipur which   have   been   filed   with   inordinate delay and laches are dismissed. 2.  ( i )   The   writ   petitions   of  Group 40  (Village Devla) being Writ Petition No. 31126 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 59131 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 22800 of 2010, Writ   Petition   No.   37118   of   2011,   Writ Petition No. 42812 of 2009, Writ Petition No.   50417   of   2009,   Writ   Petition   No. 54424 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 54652 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 55650 of 2009, Writ   Petition   No.   57032   of   2009,   Writ Petition No. 58318 of 2009, Writ Petition No.   22798   of   2010,   Writ   Petition   No. 37784 of 2010, Writ Petition No. 37787 of 2010,   Writ   Petitions   Nos.   31124­25   of 2011, Writ Petition No. 32234 of 2011, Writ   Petition   No.   32987   of   2011,   Writ Petition No. 35648 of 2011, Writ Petition No.   38059   of   2011,   Writ   Petition   No. 41339 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 47427 of 2011 and Writ Petition No. 47412 of 2011 are allowed and Notifications dated 26­5­ 2009   and   22­6­2009   and   all consequential actions  are quashed.  The petitioners   shall   be   entitled   for restoration   of   their   land   subject   to deposit of compensation which they had received   under   agreement/award   before the Authority/Collector. 23

24

25 matter   of   challenge   in   the   writ petitions mentioned at Direction 3. 5.  Greater Noida and its allottees are directed not to carry on development and not to implement the Master Plan 2021 till the observations and directions of the National Capital Regional Planning Board are incorporated in Master Plan 2021 to the   satisfaction   of   the   National   Capital Regional   Planning   Board.   We   make   it clear   that   this   direction   shall   not   be applicable   in   those   cases   where   the development   is   being   carried   on   in accordance with the earlier Master Plan of   Greater   Noida   duly   approved   by   the National   Capital   Regional   Planning Board. 6.  We direct the Chief Secretary of the State   to   appoint   officers   not   below   the level   of   Principal   Secretary   (except   the officers   of   Industrial   Development Department   who   have   dealt   with   the relevant   files)   to   conduct   a   thorough inquiry   regarding   the   acts   of   Greater Noida   ( a )   in   proceeding   to   implement Master   Plan   2021   without   approval   of NCRP   Board,   ( b )   decisions   taken   to change the land use, ( c ) allotment made to   the   builders,   and   ( d )   indiscriminate proposals   for   acquisition   of   land,   and thereafter   the   State   Government   shall take appropriate action in the matter.” (emphasis in original) 26  We   may   point   out   at   this   stage   that   in 22. respect of all these three categories, the High Court has provided its justification for granting relief   in   the   aforesaid   nature.   We   shall   be referring   to   the   same   while   discussing   the cases of the appellants belonging to one or the other category.” 35. After   considering   various   judgments,   this   Court   in   the case of  (supra) observed thus: Savitri Devi  “ 46.  Thus, we have a scenario where, on the   one   hand,   invocation   of   urgency provisions   under   Section   17   of   the   Act and   dispensing   with   the   right   to   file objection under Section 5­A of the Act, is found to be illegal. On the other hand, we have a situation where because of delay in challenging these acquisitions by the landowners,   developments   have   taken place in these villages and in most of the cases,   third­party   rights   have   been created.   Faced   with   this   situation,   the High Court going by the spirit behind the judgment   of   this   Court   in  Bondu Ramaswamy  [(2010) 7 SCC 129 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 1] came out with the solution which is equitable to both sides. We are, thus,   of   the   view   that   the   High   Court considered   the   ground   realities   of   the matter   and   arrived   at   a   more   practical and   workable   solution   by   adequately compensating the landowners in the form of compensation as well as allotment of 27 developed  abadi  land at a higher rate i.e. 10%of the land acquired of each of the landowners against the eligibility and to ( sic  under)   the   policy   to   the   extent   of 5%and   6%of   Noida   and   Greater   Noida land respectively. It could thus be seen that this Court in the said case has 36. found   that   a   peculiar   situation   arose,   where   on   one   hand invocation of urgency provisions under Section 17 of the L.A. Act   and   dispensing   with   the   right   to   file   objections   under Section 5A of the L.A. Act, were found to be illegal, while on the other hand, the developments had already taken place in the villages   and   in   most   of   the   cases,   third­party   rights   were created. Faced with this situation, the High Court came out with the solution which was equitable to both sides.     This Court   found   that   the   High   Court   considered   the   ground realities   of   the   matter   and   arrived   at   a   more   practical   and workable solution by adequately compensating the landowners in   the   form   of   compensation   as   well   as   allotment   of developed  abadi  land at a higher rate.   28 No doubt that this Court in paragraph 50 of the judgment 37. in the  case  of   Savitri  Devi   (supra)  makes  it clear that the directions   of   the   High   Court   were   given   in   the   unique   and peculiar/specific background and therefore, it would not form precedent for future cases.   38. It   is   to   be   noted   that   in   the   case   of   Greater   Noida Industrial Development Authority vs. Savitri Mohan (Dead) 6 , this Court was Through Legal Representatives and others considering the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, wherein it had quashed and set aside the Notification under Section 4(1) and Section 17(4) of the L.A. Act as well as the Notification under Section 6 read with Section 17(1) of the L.A. Act.   A specific question was framed by this Court in the said case in paragraph 10, which reads thus: “ 10.  The only question for consideration is whether the matter is covered by the judgment   of   this   Court   in  Savitri Devi  [ Savitri Devi  v.  State of U.P. , (2015) 7 SCC 21 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 473] , as claimed by the appellant in which case 6 (2016) 13 SCC 210 29 the respondents will be entitled to relief of higher   compensation   and   allotment   of land   instead   of   quashing   of   acquisition proceedings.” Answering the aforesaid question, this Court in the said 39. case observed thus: “ 13.  A perusal of the above shows that compensation   had   already   been disbursed   to   the   extent   of   76%. Thereafter, for the entire land of Village Chhapraula falling in Group 18, the relief granted   is   payment   of   additional compensation and allotment of land. As already noted, the part of the order where relief of quashing of notification has been given is not of the category of the present case.   In   these   circumstances,   we   find merit in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the Division Bench was in error in distinguishing the present case   from   the   judgment in  Gajraj  [ Gajraj  v.  State of U.P. , (2011) 11 ADJ 1 : 2011 SCC OnLine All 1711] . 14.  As observed by this Court in  Savitri Devi  [ Savitri Devi  v.  State of U.P. , (2015) 7 SCC 21 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 473] , in spite   of   the   finding   that   invocation   of urgency   clause   was   uncalled   for,   the relief of setting aside the acquisition was not   granted   having   regard   to   the 30 development   that   had   already   been undertaken   on   substantial   part   of   the land.   However,   to   balance   the   equities higher   compensation   and   allotment   of land   was   ordered   to   meet   the   ends   of justice.   [ Savitri   Devi  v.  State   of   U.P. , (2015) 7 SCC 21, para 17]” 40. It could thus clearly be seen that though this Court in the case of  Savitri Devi  (supra) observed that the judgment in the case of   (supra) has to be construed particularly in the Gajraj   unique   and   peculiar/specific   background,   in   the   case   of Savitri   Mohan   (Dead)   (supra),   this   Court   had   followed   the principle laid down in the cases of  (supra) and  Gajraj  Savitri Devi   (supra)  and   held   that   to   balance   the   equities,   it   was appropriate   to   issue   directions   for   payment   of   higher compensation and allotment of additional land.  It was observed that it was necessary to do so to meet the ends of justice.  41. At   this   juncture,   we   will   have   to   consider   the   policy decision of the State Government as formulated in the said 31 G.O. in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.   42. After the decision of this Court in the cases of   Gajraj (supra)  and   Savitri   Devi   (supra),   64.7%   additional compensation and 10% of the land acquired of each of the land owners,   instead   of   5%   and   6%   was   made   available   to   the farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA as well as Greater NOIDA.   The lands acquired for the benefit of YEIDA  were   also   for   the   development   of   adjoining   areas. Feeling discriminated that they were being paid compensation at much lesser rate as compared to the farmers whose lands were acquired for NOIDA and Greater NOIDA, various farmers’ organizations started agitations.  It is some of the allottees who made   representations   to   the   CEO   of  YEIDA.     One   of   such representations was made by the respondent No.19­Supertech nd Private Limited to the CEO of YEIDA on 22  November, 2013, stating therein that on account of agitation by the Bhartiya th Kisan Union, they had to stop their work with effect from 20 32 November, 2013. The said letter/representation stated that that the main grievance of the office­holders of the Bhartiya Kisan Union   was   that   they   want   increased   compensation   and   for compensating the same, the Authority wants money from the Builders. The said representation states that:  “ “ the   Authority   is   not   resolving   the problems of the Farmers.  The main issue of   farmers   is   that   they   want   increased compensation, and for compensating the same,  the   Authority   wants   money  from the Builders.   Builders are not ready to pay this amount, due to which, we are stopping   the   construction   works   of Builders. ”    During the discussion, it was said by the Company that “We are not against the farmers or against their rights and company gives it’s consent on this fact that whatever the consent would be made   out   between   the   Authority   and Government   on   the   compensation amount   of   farmers,   that   would   be accepted by the company.” 43. The said letter/representation categorically states that the Company was not against the farmers or against their rights and   that   it   was   willing   to   abide   by   whatever   decision   was 33 arrived at between the Authority and the Government on the compensation amount of farmers.   44. Similar representations were made by Orris Greenbay Golf th Village on the same day, by Sunworld City Pvt. Ltd. on 26 th November, 2013, and by Gaursons Realtech Pvt. Ltd. on 4 December, 2013.   45. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   on   account   of   farmers’ resistance   and   their   agitation,   the   development   work   of   the projects was stalled.   When this was brought to the notice of the State Government, the State Government nominated the th Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut vide order dated 10 April, 2013, for looking into the issue.  The Commissioner after holding   various   meetings   with   the   farmers’ th organization/representatives submitted his report on 16  July, 2013,  stating therein that the  lands  have been acquired by YEIDA at large scale and taking into consideration the nature of demands   having   wide   implications,   it   was   necessary   that   a High­Level   Committee   at   the   State   Government   level   for 34 examining   the   demands   of   farmers   be   constituted.     In   this rd background,   the   State   Government   vide   order   dated   3 September,   2013   constituted   a   Committee   under   the Chairmanship of Shri Rajendra Chaudhary, Minister of Prison, State of Uttar Pradesh.   The Divisional Commissioner of the concerned Division and the Collector of the concerned District were   also   the   members   of   the   Chaudhary   Committee.     The Chaudhary   Committee   was   constituted   for   the   purpose   of resolving   the   problems   of   the   villagers/farmers   and   the problems related to the industries.  The Chaudhary Committee considered the following issues: “a.  Demands   raised   by   the   Farmers/ Farmers'   Organizations/ Representatives   and Memorandums/   Demand   Letters produced by them and the favour put   forth   by   them   during   the personal hearing.  b.  Favour   put   forth   by   the Industrialists/   Builders/   Allottees during personal hearing.  35 c.  Favour   and   opinion   of   Yamuna Expressway Authority.” 46. The Chaudhary Committee conducted its proceedings on th 30   September, 2013 with the representatives of the farmers. The   said   Committee   thereafter   held   deliberations   with   the th representatives of the allottees on 29  October, 2013.  It will be apposite to refer to the relevant part of the discussion that took place   in   the   meeting   held   with   the   representatives   of   the th allottees on 29  October,2013, which reads thus: “2.  It was informed by the representative of M/s. SDIL that due to the agitation of local farmers on the issues of their problems/demands,   at   present,   we are   not   available   to   carry   out   any work on the spot, therefore, whatever the   decision   will   be   taken   by   the Committee/ Government for disposal of   the   problems  of  farmers,  we  will cooperate in the same.  3.  It was informed by the representative of M/s. Supertech Pvt. Ltd. that the farmers   are   agitating   in   the   entire area   and   they   are   interrupting   the development work. It is necessary to solve the problems of farmers. It was also   informed   by   him   that   he   will 36 cooperate in the decision to be taken by   the   Government/Committee   for disposal of the problems.  4.  It   was   informed   by   the representatives of M/s. Silverline and other Units/Institutions that due to interrupting their development works as   a   result   of   the   demands   being raised by the farmers of the area, the project cost is getting escalated. Due to   solving   the   problems   of   farmers, the   investment   will   be   increased   in the area and in disposal of the same, they will provide their assistance.  5.  Regarding the demand of giving 10% abadi land in place of 7% abadi land to be given to the ancestral farmers, it was said by the representative of M/s. J.P. Infratech Pvt. Ltd. namely Sh.   Sameer   Gaur   that   earlier,   they have   been   paid   value   of   7%   abadi land and development charges, now, if   any   other   cost   is   imposed,   then, company is not in position to bear the same.” 47. It could thus be seen that even the representatives of the allottees were of the opinion that on account of the agitation of the local farmers, the developers were not in a position to carry 37 out any work on the spot.  It was also impressed upon that on account of this, the cost of the project was getting escalated. As such, it was urged to solve the problem.   48. The   Chaudhary   Committee   also   considered   the submissions made on behalf of the appellant­YEIDA.   It was submitted on behalf of the appellant­YEIDA that on account of the judgment delivered in a similar case, i.e., in the case of Gajraj   (supra), the farmers, whose lands were acquired, were also demanding the compensation on similar lines.   After considering the rival submissions, the Chaudhary 49. Committee gave its recommendation as under: “Recommendation of Committee:­  The   opinion   of   Authority   as   well   as   the demands   of   the   Farmers'   Organizations were   carefully   considered   by   the Committee. In the common order passed in   the   different   Writ   Petitions   filed   by Noida and Greater Noida Authorities, the Hon'ble   High   Court   by   not   finding   the proceedings conducted under Section 17 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to be proper, 38 had directed that the Authority shall pay 64.7%   additional   compensation   to   the farmers and return them 10% developed land.   Also   in   the   Yamuna   Expressway Authority, around 700 Writ Petitions have been filed by the farmers by challenging the   different   notifications,   wherein,   stay orders have been passed in the most of the Petitions,   the   circumstances   which   were existing in the acquisition made by Noida and   Greater   Noida   Authority,   same circumstances are also existed in the most of   the   cases   of   acquisition   of   Yamuna Expressway.   The   lands   acquired   by   the Authority,   have   been   allotted   to   the different allottees for different projects, due to which, the third party rights have been created in this acquired land and if order is   passed   against   the   Authority   in   the Petitioners   filed   against   the   Acquisition Proceedings, then, many difficulties would arise. Therefore, keeping in view the legal expected legal complications, it is required to do the out of court settlement with the affected farmers. At the time of discussion, it   was   assured   by   the   farmers' representatives   that   if   the   Government/ Authority agrees to give 64.7% additional compensation,   then,   the   farmers   will withdraw the Petitions filed in the Court. Therefore, Committee recommends that:­ I .(a) If,   all   the   farmers/   Petitioners   of   a village related to the land acquired/ purchased   by   the   Yamuna Expressway Authority, withdraw their 39 Petitions   filed   in   the   Hon'ble   High Court or in any other Court and if they give written assurance for future that   they   will   not   file   any   claim against the Authority or it's allottees in any Court and will not cause any obstruction   in   the   Development Works, then, like the Greater Noida Authority, the Authority may consider to give amount equivalent to 64.7% additional compensation in the form of No Litigation Incentive/ Additional Compensation,   which   may   be compensated proportionally from the concerned   allottees   and   same   may also be imposed proportionally in the costing of allotment of land available with the Authority.  These benefits shall be allowed also to those farmers, whose' lands have been purchased by the Authority vide Sale Deed on mutual consent basis.  (b) The process of payment of additional compensation,   be   completed villagewise   in   accordance   with   the Schemes/ Priorities of Authority after obtaining   physical   possession   of   on the spot and after withdrawal of all the   Writ   petitions/   Cases   of concerned   village   after   doing settlement with the farmers. In view of   the   financial   condition   of Authority,   if   the   payment   of additional   compensation   is   not 40 possible   in   lumpsum,   then,   the consideration   could   also   be   made regarding payment in installments or in the form of developed land.  2.  Regarding   allotment   of   10% developed   land   in   place   of   7% developed   land,   the   proceedings   be conducted according to the order of Appeal/SLP   filed   by   the Noida/Greater Noida Authorities.  3.  The   proceedings   of   amendment proposed by the  Authority  in Abadi Rules, are at final stage of approval, the proceedings be conducted as per the decision of Government.  4.  Regarding   abolishing   the   distinction between ancestral and non­ancestral, this decision has been taken in the 48th   meeting   dated   08.01.2014   of Yamuna   Expressway   Authority Board, that such land owners of the lands   acquired   or   to   be acquired/purchased   by   the Authority,   whose'   names   have remained   recorded   in   Six   Yearly Register/  Khatauni   on   the   acquired land   prior   to   the   date   of establishment   of   Authority   i.e. 24.04.2001, and the landowners are residents of any village related to any District lying within the notified area of   Yamuna   Expressway   Authority, then, the benefit of 7% abadi land be granted to him against his acquired land.   In   the   decision   of   Authority 41 Board,   this   facility   has   also   been allowed to the successors of eligible land owners, who fulfill the aforesaid conditions.   The   further   proceedings be conducted as per the decision of Authority Board.  5.  In   view   of   the   demands   of   farmers organizations   and   local   public   of District   Mathura,   after   taking   into consideration the proposal submitted by Concessionaire namely M/s. J.P. Infratech   Ltd.,   in   the   48th   meeting dated   08.01.2014   of   Yamuna Expressway   Authority   Board,   a decision in principle has been taken for   construction   of   Exist   &   Entry Ramps   at   Bajna­Nauhjheel   Road   at Yamuna Expressway and by making necessary   amendments   in   DPR accordingly, a letter has been sent to the Concessionaire namely M/s. J,P. Infratech   for   necessary   action.   The further proceedings be conducted as per the decision of Authority Board.  It is recommended by the Committee that the aforementioned additional benefits be granted   to   the   landowners   only   in   that case when they will handover the physical possession   of   land   to   the   Authority   and withdraw   Writ   Petition/Case   pending   in Hon'ble High Court or any other Court and agreement for not causing any obstruction in   future   in   the   development   works   of allottees and for not filing any claim in any Court   against   the   acquisition   of   land   in future. Regarding the other demands, the 42 Committee   will   give   it's   recommendation after further consideration.” 50. It could thus be seen that the recommendations of the Chaudhary Committee were principally intended to resolve the issue between the farmers and the allottees, and to find out a workable solution to the problem.  The Chaudhary Committee recommended   similar   treatment   to   be   given   to   the   farmers whose   lands   were   acquired   for   YEIDA,   as   was   given   to   the farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA.  The Chaudhary Committee found that the same benefits as were given to the farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA in view of the judgment of the High Court in the case of  Gajraj  (supra), as affirmed   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   (supra) Savitri   Devi   should also be given to the farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit of YEIDA.  However, this was made conditional. Additional   benefit   was   granted   to   the   landowners   on   the condition that they would handover the physical possession of 43 land to YEIDA and withdraw the writ petitions/cases filed by them pending before the High Court.   51. The State Government vide the said G.O. gave effect to the recommendations of the Chaudhary Committee. YEIDA too, in th its   Board   meeting   dated   15   September,   2014,   resolved   to implement the decision of the State Government. Accordingly, demand notices came to be issued to the allottees.   52. It could thus be seen that the policy decision of the State Government   is  preceded  by   various   factors.     Firstly,   the farmers’ agitation, after they were denied the benefits which were granted to the farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit   of   NOIDA   and   Greater   NOIDA;   the   report   of   the Commissioner, the appointment of the Chaudhary Committee, the   deliberations   of   the   Chaudhary   Committee   with   various stakeholders,   and   thereafter   the   recommendations   of   the Chaudhary Committee.   It will be relevant to refer to the judgment of this Court in 53. the case of the  Kasinka Trading and another vs. Union of 44 7 , wherein this Court has referred to various India and another earlier pronouncements and the treatise of  Prof. S.A. de Smith on   “ Judicial   Review   of   Administrative   Action”.     The   relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read thus: “ 12.  It has been settled by this Court that the   doctrine   of   promissory   estoppel   is applicable   against   the   Government   also particularly   where   it   is   necessary   to prevent   fraud   or   manifest   injustice.   The doctrine, however, cannot be pressed into aid   to   compel   the   Government   or   the public   authority   “to   carry   out   a representation   or   promise   which   is contrary to law or which was outside the authority   or   power   of   the   officer   of   the Government or of the public authority to make”. There is preponderance of judicial opinion   that   to   invoke   the   doctrine   of promissory   estoppel   clear,   sound   and positive   foundation   must   be   laid   in   the petition   itself   by   the   party   invoking   the doctrine   and   that   bald   expressions, without   any   supporting   material,   to   the effect   that   the   doctrine   is   attracted because   the   party   invoking   the   doctrine has   altered   its   position   relying   on   the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. In our   opinion,   the   doctrine   of   promissory 7 (1995) 1 SCC 274 45 estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved   and   the   public   good   at   large, because while considering the applicability of   the   doctrine,   the   courts   have   to   do equity and the fundamental principles of equity   must   for   ever   be   present   to   the mind of the court, while considering the applicability of the doctrine. The doctrine must yield when the equity so demands if it can be shown having regard to the facts and   circumstances   of   the   case   that   it would   be   inequitable   to   hold   the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation.  The ambit, scope and amplitude of the 13. doctrine of promissory estoppel has been evolved   in   this   country   over   the   last quarter   of   a   century   through   successive decisions of this Court starting with  Union of   India  v.  Indo­Afghan   Agencies Ltd.  [(1968) 2 SCR 366 : AIR 1968 SC 718] Reference in this connection may be made with advantage to  Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd.  v.  Ulhasnagar   Municipal Council  [(1970) 1 SCC 582 : (1970) 3 SCR 854]   ;  Motilal   Padampat   Sugar   Mills   Co. Ltd.  v.  State   of   U.P.  [(1979)   2   SCC   409   : 1979   SCC   (Tax)   144   :   (1979)   2   SCR 641]   ;  Jit   Ram   Shiv   Kumar  v.  State   of Haryana  [(1981) 1 SCC 11 : (1980) 3 SCR 689]   ;  Union   of   India  v.  Godfrey   Philips 46

47

48 “Contracts and covenants entered into   by   the   Crown   are   not   to   be construed as being subject to implied terms that would exclude the exercise of   general   discretionary   powers   for the public good. On the contrary they are to be construed as incorporating an   implied   term   that   such   powers remain   exercisable.   This   is   broadly true of other public authorities also. But the status and functions of the Crown in this regard are of a higher order. The Crown cannot be allowed to tie its hands completely by prior undertakings   is   as   clear   as   the proposition   that   the   Courts   cannot allow the Crown to evade compliance with   ostensibly   binding   obligations whenever   it   thinks   fit.   If   a   public authority   lawfully   repudiates   or departs from the terms of a binding contract in order to have been bound in   law   by   an   ostensibly   binding contract   because   the   undertakings would   improperly   fetter   its   general discretionary powers the other party to   the   agreement   has   no   right whatsoever   to   damages   or compensation under the general law, no matter how serious the damages that party may have suffered.” 49 It   has   been   held   by   this   Court   that   the   doctrine   of 54. promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large.  It has been held that while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the courts  have  to  do  equity and  the  fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present to the mind of the court, while considering the applicability of the doctrine.  It has been held that   the   doctrine   being   an   equitable   doctrine,   it   must   yield when   the   equity   so   requires,   if   it   can   be   shown   by   the Government or Public Authority that having regard to the facts and   circumstances   as   they   have   transpired,   it   would   be inequitable to hold the Government or the Public Authority to the   promise,   assurance   or   representation   made   by   it.     The judgment of this Court in the case of  Kasinka Trading  (supra) has been consistently followed.  If   we   apply   the   principle   as   laid   down   in   the   case   of 55. Kasinka Trading   (supra) to the facts of the present case, it 50 will be clear that the policy decision of the State Government was not only in the larger public interest but also in the interest of the respondents.  The projects were stalled on account of the farmers’ agitation.  The farmers felt discriminated as they found that the compensation paid to them was much lesser than the one being paid to the equally circumstanced farmers in NOIDA and Greater NOIDA.  It was the allottees of the land who had approached the State Government for redressal of the problem. In these circumstances, the Government took cognizance of the problem   and   appointed   the   Commissioner   to   look   into   the issue.  Since the Commissioner recommended appointment of a High­Level   Committee,   the  Chaudhary   Committee  was appointed.     The  Chaudhary   Committee   had   threadbare discussions   with   all   the   stakeholders.   It   also   took   into consideration that on account of stay orders passed by the High Court in various writ petitions, the development of the project was stalled.  On account of pendency of the writ petitions, there was always a hanging sword over the entire acquisition of it 51 being declared unlawful. In this premise, in order to find out a workable solution and that too, on the basis of the law laid down   by   the   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Gajraj   (supra)   as affirmed by this Court in the case of  (supra) and Savitri Devi  followed by this Court in the case of   Savitri Mohan (Dead) (supra),   recommendations   were   made   by   the  Chaudhary Committee.     The   Chaudhary   Committee   specifically recommended   that   the   additional   compensation   and   other incentives   would   be   paid   only   if   the   landowners   agree   to handover   physical   possession   of   the   land   to   YEIDA   and withdraw all the litigations.   56. It could thus be seen that the recommendations, which were accepted by the State Government and formulated in the policy, were made taking into consideration the interests of all the stakeholders.   As held by this Court, it is not only the interest of a small section of the allottees which should weigh with the Government, but the Government should also give due 52 weightage to the interest of the large section of farmers, whose lands were acquired.   57. We   further   find   that   the   High   Court   fell   in   error   in observing   that   no   writ   petitions   were   filed   challenging   the acquisition for YEIDA.  The report of the Chaudhary Committee itself would clarify that YEIDA had itself submitted that insofar as the residential plots are concerned, there were stay orders operating in majority of the writ petitions due to which the development of the project work was stalled.   58. We are therefore of the considered view that the policy decision   of   the   State   Government   was   in   the   larger   public interest.  It was taken considering entire material collected by the Chaudhary Committee after due deliberations with all the stakeholders.  The factors which were taken into consideration by the State Government were relevant, rational and founded on ground realities.  In this view of the matter, the finding of the High Court that the policy decision of the State Government was arbitrary, irrational and unfair, is totally incorrect.   53 The law with regard to interference in the policy decision 59. of the State is by now very well crystalized.  This Court in the 8 case of   Essar Steel Limited   vs   Union of India and others had an occasion to consider the scope of interference in the policy decision of the State.  After referring to various decisions of this Court, the Court observed thus: 

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60. It is trite law that an interference with the policy decision would   not   be   warranted   unless   it   is   found   that   the   policy decision is palpably arbitrary,   mala fide , irrational or violative of the statutory provisions.  We are therefore of the considered view that the High Court was also not right in interfering with 59 the policy decision of the State Government, which is in the larger public interest.   61. It   will   also   be   apposite   to   refer   to   the   following observations of this Court in the case of  APM Terminals B.V. 9 vs. Union of India and another : “ 67.  It has been the consistent view of this Court   that   a   change   in   policy   by   the Government can have an overriding effect over   private   treaties   between   the Government   and   a   private   party,   if   the same   was   in   the   general   public   interest and provided such change in policy was guided by reason. Several decisions have been cited by the parties in this regard in the   context   of   preventing   private monopolisation   of   port   activities   to   an extent   where   such   private   player   would assume a dominant position which would enable   them   to   control   not   only   the berthing of ships but the tariff for use of the port facilities.” 62. It could thus be seen that it is more than settled that   a change in policy by the Government can have an overriding effect   over   private   treaties   between   the   Government   and   a 9 (2011) 6 SCC 756 60 private party, if the same was in the general public interest. The additional requirement is that such change in policy is required to be guided by reason.  63. Insofar as the reliance placed by the respondents on the judgment of this Court in the case of   (supra) is ITC Limited     concerned, in our considered view, the said judgment would not be of any assistance to the case of the respondents.  This Court in the said case in paragraph 107.1 has clearly observed that in the   case   of   conflict   between   public   interest   and   personal interest, public interest should prevail.  A number of judgments of this Court have been cited at 64. the Bar by the respondents in support of the proposition that in view   of   concluded   contracts,   it   was   not   permissible   for   the appellants to unilaterally increase the premium by framing a policy.   65. We have hereinabove elaborately discussed that when a policy is changed by the State, which is in the general public interest,   such   policy   would   prevail   over   the   individual 61 rights/interests.  In that view of the matter, we do not find it necessary to refer to the said judgments.   The policy of the State Government as reflected in the said G.O. was not only in the   larger   public   interest   but   also   in   the   interest   of   the respondents.     66. We further find that the respondents have indulged into the conduct of approbate and reprobate.   They have changed their stance as per their convenience.  When their projects were stalled   on   account   of   the   farmers’   agitation,   it   is   they   who approached   the  State Authorities  for   finding  out  a  solution. When the State Government responded to their representations and came up with a policy which was equitable and in the interest of both, the farmers and the allottees and when the said policy paved the way for development, when called upon to pay   the   additional   compensation,   the   respondents­allottees somersaulted and challenged the very same policy before the High   Court,   which   benefitted   them.     We   have   already hereinabove   made   reference   to   the   various   communications 62 made by the allottees of the land for intervention of the State Government.   67. Insofar as the individual plot owners are concerned, it will be worthwhile to mention that the  residential plot owners in Sectors 18 and 20 of Yamuna Expressway city have formed an association, viz., Yamuna Expressway Residential­Plot­Owners Welfare Association (hereinafter referred to as “the YERWA”). The communication addressed by the president of the YERWA to   the   CEO   of   YEIDA   would   reveal   that   98.5%   of   the allottees/owners have voted in favour of paying the additional premium demanded by the Authority.  The only request made by the YERWA is with regard to making a provision for paying additional premium in installments.   68. It can thus be seen that even insofar as the individual residential plot owners are concerned, more than 98% of the plot owners do not have any objection to the payment of the additional compensation.  63 With respect to the contention of the respondent No.19­ 69. Supertech   with   regard   to   initiation   of   CIRP,   we   are   not concerned with the said issue in the present proceedings.  The law will take its own course. In   conclusion,   we   are   of   the   considered   view   that   the 70. policy decision of the State Government as reflected in the said th G.O. dated 29  August, 2014 and the Resolution of the Board th of YEIDA dated 15  September, 2014 were in the larger public interest, taking care of the concerns of the allottees as well as the farmers.   As already discussed hereinabove, had the said decision not been taken, there was a hanging sword of the acquisition being declared unlawful.   The development of the entire   project   was   stalled   on   account   of   farmers’   agitation. Before   taking   the   policy   decision,   the   State   Government, through the Chaudhary Committee, had done a wide range of deliberations with all the stakeholders including the allottees, farmers and YEIDA.  The policy decision was taken after taking into   consideration   all   relevant   factors   and   was   guided   by 64 reasons.  In any case, it is a settled position of law that in case of   a   conflict   between   public   interest   and   personal   interest, public interest will outweigh the personal interest.   The High Court   was   therefore   not   justified   in   holding   that   the   policy decision of the State was unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary. We are of the considered view that the High Court has erred in allowing   the   writ   petitions.     The   present   appeals,   therefore, deserve to be allowed.   71. In the result, we pass the following order: (i) The appeals are allowed;  th (ii) The   impugned   judgment   and   order   dated   28   May, 2020,   passed   by   the   Allahabad   High   Court   in   Writ Petition No. 28968 of 2018 and companion matters is quashed and set aside; (iii) The writ petitions filed by the respondents covered by th the impugned judgment and order dated 28  May, 2020 passed by the Allahabad High Court are dismissed;  65 72. Applications   for   Intervention   are   allowed.     Pending applications,   including   the   applications   for   directions,   shall stand disposed of in the above terms.   There shall be no order as to costs.  …..….......................J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO] …….........................J.        [B.R. GAVAI] NEW DELHI; MAY 19, 2022. 66