BHASKER vs. AYODHYA JEWELLERS

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 10-05-2023

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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.          OF 2023 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.3714 of 2018)   Bhasker & Anr.        …Appellants versus Ayodhya Jewellers         ...Respondent J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T ABHAY S. OKA, J. 1. Leave granted. FACTUAL ASPECTS 2. The issue which arises for consideration in this appeal is   what   is   the   starting   point   of   limitation   for   filing   an application under Rule 95 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Signature Not Verified Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’). Digitally signed by Indu Marwah Date: 2023.05.10 18:50:33 IST Reason:   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 1 of 22 3. The property subject matter of this appeal held by the appellants was sold in execution of a decree passed against the appellants in a public auction.  The respondent is the purchaser of the property.  The order of confirmation of sale in accordance with sub­rule (1) of Rule 92 of Order XXI of th CPC was passed on 16   July 2009.   The sale certificate under   Rule   94   of   Order   XXI   of   CPC   was   issued   by   the th Executing Court to the respondent on 5   February 2010. th On   27   July   2010,   the   respondent   filed   an   application under Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC before the Executing Court.  The said application was allowed by the Executing Court.  The appellants applied for a review of the said order. The   prayer   for   review   was   dismissed   by   the   Executing Court.     The   appellants   challenged   the   orders   of   the Executing Court by filing a Civil Revision Application before the High Court of Judicature at Kerala.   By the judgment th dated 11  April 2017, which is impugned in this appeal, the High Court dismissed the revision application by holding that   the   starting   point   of   limitation   for   making   an application under Rule 95 of Order XXI was the date on which   the   sale   certificate   was   issued   by   the   Executing Court.   The High Court relied upon the decision of this   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 2 of 22 Court   in   the   case   of   United   Finance   Corporation   v. 1 M.S.M. Haneefa (dead) thr. LRs. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES 4. The   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   appellants invited our attention to Article 134 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the Limitation Act’).   He pointed out that Article 134 is specifically applicable to an application made under Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC.   It provides one year for filing such an application from the date the sale becomes absolute.  He submitted that in this th case, the sale was confirmed on 16   July 2009, and the application was moved by the respondent after more than th one year i.e. on 27  July 2010.  He relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of  Pattam Khader Khan v. Pattam 2    He submitted that this Court has Sardar Khan & Anr . clearly held that the starting point of limitation for filing an application under Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC is the date on which the auction sale is made absolute in accordance with   sub­rule   (1)  of   Rule   92   of   Order   XXI   of   CPC.     He submitted   that   the   High   Court   committed   an   error   by 1 (2017) 3 SCC 123 2 (1996) 5 SCC 48   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 3 of 22 relying upon the decision in the case of   United Finance 1 .     In   the   said   case,   a   revision   application Corporation against the order rejecting the application for setting aside the sale was filed before the High Court in which, further proceedings were stayed.   While computing the limitation, the period of stay was excluded and that is how this Court held that the application made in the said case was within limitation. 5. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent in support of the impugned order is that the application made by the  respondent will  be  governed by residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act, which provides for   a   period   of   limitation   of   three   years.     He   would, therefore,   submit   that   in   any   case,   the   decision   of   this 1   Court   in   the   case   of   United   Finance   Corporation has been rightly applied by the High Court. OUR VIEW 6. We have carefully considered the submissions.   It is necessary to reproduce Rules 92, 94 and 95 of Order XXI of CPC, which read thus:  “92. Sale when to become absolute or be set aside.­   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 4 of 22 (1) Where   no   application   is   made under   rule   89,   rule   90   or   rule   91,   or where   such   application   is   made   and disallowed,   the   Court   shall   make   an order   confirming   the   sale,   and thereupon   the   sale   shall   become absolute. Provided that, where any property is sold in execution of decree pending the final disposal of any claim to, or any objection to the attachment of, such property, the Court shall not confirm such sale until the   final   disposal   of   such   claim   or objection. (2) Where such application is made and allowed,   and   where,   in   the   case   of   an application   under   rule   89,   the   deposit required by that rule is made within sixty days   from   the   date   of   sale,   or   in   cases where the amount deposited under rule 89 is   found   to   be   deficient   owing   to   any clerical or arithmetical mistake on the part of the depositor and such deficiency has been made good within such time as may be fixed by the court, the Court shall make an order setting aside the sale: Provided that no order shall be made unless notice of   the   application   has   been   given   to   all persons affected thereby: Provided further that the deposit under this sub­rule may be made within sixty days in all such cases where the period of thirty days, within which the deposit   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 5 of 22 had to be made, has not expired before the commencement of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002. (3) No suit to set aside an order made under this rule shall be brought by any person against whom such order is made. (4) Where   a   third   party   challenges   the judgment­debtor’s   title   by   filing   a   suit against the auction­purchaser, the decree­ holder and the judgment­debtor shall be necessary parties to the suit. (5) If the suit referred to in sub­rule (4) is decreed, the Court shall direct the decree holder to refund the money to the auction­ purchaser,   and   where   such   an   order   is passed the execution proceeding in which the sale had been held shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be revived at the stage at which the sale was ordered.” … … … … … … … … “94.   Certificate   to   purchaser. ­   Where   a sale   of   immoveable   property   has   become absolute,   the   Court   shall   grant   a certificate   specifying   the   property   sold and the name of the person who at the time   of   sale   is   declared   to   be   the purchaser. Such certificate shall bear date the   day   on   which   the   sale   became absolute.    Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 6 of 22 95. Delivery of property in occupancy of judgment  debtor.­   Where   the   immoveable property   sold   is   in   the   occupancy   of   the judgment­debtor  or of  some  person on his behalf or of some person claiming under a title   created   by   the   judgment   debtor subsequently   to   the   attachment   of   such property   and   a   certificate   in   respect thereof has been granted under rule 94, the Court shall, on the application of the   order   delivery   to   be   made   by purchaser, putting such purchaser or any person whom he   may   appoint   to   receive   delivery   on   his behalf in possession of the property, and, if need   be,   by   removing   any   person   who refuses to vacate the same. (emphasis added) 7. Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is also material, which reads thus:
Description of<br>ApplicationPeriod of<br>LimitationTime from<br>which period<br>begins to run
134.For delivery of<br>possession by a<br>purchaser of<br>immovable<br>property at a<br>sale in execution<br>of a decree.One YearWhen the sale<br>becomes<br>absolute
  Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 7 of 22 8. Article   134   provides   that   the   starting   point   of limitation for making an application under Rule 95 of Order XXI is the date on which the sale is confirmed.  Under Rule 92 of Order XXI, the Executing Court is required to pass an order   making   an   order   of   confirmation   of   sale.     Upon passing the said order, the sale becomes absolute.  Rule 94 of Order XXI requires a sale certificate to be issued to the purchaser.  However, the date of the certificate shall be the date on which the sale became absolute.  Rule 95 of Order XXI   of   CPC,   on   its   plain   reading,   incorporates   two conditions, which are as under: i. The immovable property sold must be in occupancy of the judgment­debtor or of some person on his behalf   or   of   some   person   claiming   under   title created by the judgment­debtor, subsequent to the attachment of the property; and ii. A certificate in respect of the sale has been granted under Rule 94 of Order XXI of CPC. Only if both conditions are fulfilled, the Executing Court, on the application of the purchaser, is empowered to pass an order of delivery of possession of putting the purchaser in   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 8 of 22 possession of the auctioned property.   Thus, on the one hand, Rule 95 of Order XXI mandates that an application for possession of the auctioned property can be made by the auction­purchaser only after a sale certificate in accordance with Rule 94 of Order XXI is issued.  But on the other hand, the starting point for making an application under Rule 95 of   Order   XXI,   in   accordance   with   Article   134   of   the Limitation   Act,   is   the   date   on   which   the   sale   is   made absolute in accordance with Rule 92 of Order XXI.  It is the obligation   of   the   Executing   Court   to   issue   the   sale certificate as per Rule 94 of Order XXI of CPC.  In practice, we   often   notice   a   substantial   delay   in   issuing   the   sale certificate.     In   this   case,   the   delay   is   of   more   than   six months.   In many cases, there is a procedural delay in issuing   the   sale   certificate   for   which   no   fault   can   be attributed to the auction purchaser. 9. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the decision of this Court in 2 the case of  read thus: Pattam Khader Khan    Order   21   Rule   95   providing   for   the “11. procedure   for   delivery   of   property   in occupation   of   the   judgment­debtor   etc., requires an application being made by the purchaser   for   delivery   of   possession   of property in respect of which a certificate has been   granted   under   Rule   94   of   Order   21.   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 9 of 22 There is nothing in Rule 95 to make it incumbent  for   the   purchaser   to   file   the certificate along with the application.   On the   sale   becoming   absolute,   it   is obligatory on the court though, to issue the certificate. That may, for any reason, get delayed. Whether there be failure to issue the certificate or delay of action on behalf of the court or the inaction of the purchaser   in   completing   the   legal requirements and formalities, are factors which have no bearing on the limitation prescribed   for   the   application   under Article 134.   The purchaser cannot seek to extend the limitation on the ground that the certificate   has   not   been   issued.   It   is   true though   that   order   for   delivery   of possession cannot be passed unless sale certificate   stands   issued.   It   is   manifest therefore   that   the   issue   of   a   sale certificate  is   not  “sine   qua  non”   of the application, since both these matters are with the same court.   The starting point of limitation   for   the   application   being   the date when the sale becomes absolute i.e. the   date   on   which   title   passed,   the evidence   of   title,   in   the   form   of   sale certificate,   due   from   the   court,   could always be supplied later to the court to satisfy the requirements of Order 21 Rule .   See   in   this   regard   Babulal   Nathoolal 95 v.  Annapurnabai  [AIR   1953   Nag   215   :   ILR 1953   Nag   557]   ,   which   is   a   pointer.   It   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 10 of 22 therefore becomes clear that the title of the court   auction­purchaser   becomes   complete on the confirmation of the sale under Order 21 Rule 92, and by virtue of the thrust of Section  65   CPC,  the   property   vests   in  the purchaser   from   the   date   of   sale;   the certificate of sale, by itself, not creating any title   but   merely   evidence   thereof.   The   sale certificate   rather   is   a   formal acknowledgement   of   a   fact   already accomplished, stating as to what stood sold. Such   act   of   the   court   is   pristinely   a ministerial one and not judicial. It is in the nature of a formalisation of the obvious. 12.  Such   being   the   state   of   law   on   the subject, we fail to see how the High Court could have come to the conclusion that even though   the   sale   becomes   absolute   on confirmation under Order 21 Rule 92 CPC effectively passing title, the same can only be complete when evidenced by a sale certificate issued   under   Order   21   Rule   94,   and   that unless   the   sale   certificate   is   issued, limitation cannot start for the purpose of an application under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC, vis­ à­vis, Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The   High   Court,   in   our   view   erred   in holding that it is only from the date when a   sale   certificate   is   issued,   that   the limitation starts running . Such view of the High Court would not only cause violence to the   clear   provisions   of   Article   134   of   the Limitation   Act   but   have   the   effect   of unsettling the law already settled.   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 11 of 22 (emphasis added) 10. Paragraph 11 takes the view that there is nothing in Rule 95 of Order XXI which makes it incumbent for the purchaser   to   file   a   sale   certificate   along   with   the application.    However,  on  a  plain  reading   of  Rule  95  of Order XXI, unless a certificate of sale is granted under Rule 94 of Order XXI, the auction­purchaser does not get a right to apply for delivery of possession by invoking Rule 95 of Order XXI.  Therefore, the view expressed in paragraph 11, prima   facie ,   may   not   be   correct.     The   said   view   is   not supported by the plain language of Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC. 11. At this stage, we may note here the decision of this 1 Court in the case of   United Finance Corporation .   In paragraph   11,   the   Bench   expressed   doubt   about   the correctness   of   what   is   held   in   paragraph   11   of   Pattam 2 .  Paragraph 11 of the decision in the Khader Khan’s case case of  reads thus:  United Finance Corporation11.  By careful reading of Order 21 Rule 95 CPC, the language of the provision is indicative that   application  for   delivery   of   possession  of property purchased in the court auction can be filed where “a certificate in respect thereof has been   granted   under   Rule   94   of   Order   21”.   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 12 of 22 Having regard to the language of Order 21 Rule 95   CPC   “a   certificate   in   respect   thereof   has been granted in Rule 94, the court shall, on the application of the purchaser, order delivery to be   made…”   we   have   our   own   doubts regarding   the   view   taken   by   this   Court in Pattam   Khader   Khan   case [Pattam Khader Khan v. Pattam Sardar Khan, (1996) 5 SCC 48] that “…there is nothing in Rule 95 to make it incumbent for the purchaser to   file   the   certificate   along   with   the application”   and   “…   that   the   issuance   of sale certificate is not a sine qua non of the application …”. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are not inclined to refer the question to a larger Bench   —   whether   issuance   of   sale certificate is a sine qua non or not for filing the application under Order 21 Rule 95CPC and the question is left open. ” (emphasis added) However, considering the facts of the case before it, this Court observed that it was not inclined to refer the question to   a  larger   Bench.     Therefore,   a  Co­ordinate   Bench   has already expressed a   prima facie   view that what is held in 2 paragraph   11   of   Pattam   Khader   Khan’s   case ,   may require reconsideration by a larger Bench.     Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 13 of 22 12. We   have   already   noted   the   twin   conditions   which should be fulfilled as a condition precedent for enabling the Executing Court to pass an order of delivery of possession in   favour   of   the   auction­purchaser.     One   of   the   two conditions is that the auction­purchaser who applies under Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC for delivery of possession, must possess  a sale  certificate  issued  under  Rule  94  of Order   XXI   of   CPC.     Once   there   is   a  confirmation  of   an auction sale in accordance with sub­rule (1) of Rule 92 of Order XXI of CPC, the Executing Court, in the absence of the   prohibitory   order   of   a   superior   Court,   is   under   an obligation   to   issue   a   sale   certificate   to   the   auction­ purchaser in accordance with Rule 94 of Order XXI of CPC. However, the law does not provide for a specific time limit within which, a certificate under Rule 94 of Order XXI of CPC should be issued.  In a given case, there can be a long procedural delay in issuing the sale certificate for which the auction purchaser cannot be blamed.  In the present case, the delay is of more than six months.  With greatest respect to the decision of this Court in the case of  Pattam Khader 2 ,   we are unable to agree with the view Khan prima facie,   that  an application  under  Rule 95 of  Order  XXI can be made even before the certificate of sale is granted to the   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 14 of 22 auction­purchaser in accordance with Rule 94 of Order XXI of CPC. 13. Therefore,   in   our   prima   facie   view ,   the   order   of confirmation of sale under sub­rule (1) of Rule 92 of Order XXI of CPC does not give a cause of action to the auction­ purchaser to apply for possession by invoking Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC.   He cannot make such an application unless   the   Executing   Court   issues   a   sale   certificate. Though CPC does not permit an application under Rule 95 of Order XXI to be filed before the sale certificate is issued, Article 134 of the Limitation Act proceeds on the footing that   cause   of   action   becomes   available   to   the   auction­ purchaser to apply for possession on the basis of the order of confirmation of sale made under sub­rule (1) of Rule 92 of Order XXI of CPC. 14. Therefore, there is an apparent inconsistency between the provisions of Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC and Article 134 of the Limitation Act.  The question is whether the rule of   purposive   interpretation   can   be   used   to   set   right   the inconsistency or anomaly.   We may note here that even if the delay is on the part of the Executing Court in the issue of   the   sale   certificate,   the   delay   in   filing   an   application under Rule 95 of Order XXI cannot be condoned as Section   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 15 of 22 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the applications filed under Order XXI. 15. In paragraphs 20 and 21 of the decision of this Court in the case of  AFCONS Infrastructure Limited and Anr. v.   Cherian   Varkey   Construction   Company   Private 3 , the issue of purposive interpretation Limited and Ors. has been discussed in detail.  The said two paragraphs read thus:
“20. The principles of statutory<br>interpretation are well settled. Where the<br>words of the statute are clear and<br>unambiguous, the provision should be given<br>its plain and normal meaning, without<br>adding or rejecting any words. Departure<br>from the literal rule, by making structural<br>changes or substituting words in a clear<br>statutory provision, under the guise of<br>interpretation will pose a great risk as the<br>changes may not be what the legislature<br>intended or desired. Legislative wisdom<br>cannot be replaced by the Judge's views. As<br>observed by this Court in a somewhat<br>different context:
“6. … When a procedure is prescribed by<br>the legislature, it is not for the court to<br>substitute a different one according to its<br>notion of justice. When the legislature
3 (2010) 8 SCC 24   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 16 of 22
has spoken, the judges cannot afford to<br>be wiser.”
(See Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt.<br>Governor of Delhi [(1975) 4 SCC 298] ,<br>SCC p. 301, para 6.)
21. There is however an exception to this<br>general rule. Where the words used in the<br>statutory provision are vague and<br>ambiguous or where the plain and normal<br>meaning of its words or grammatical<br>construction thereof would lead to<br>confusion, absurdity, repugnancy with<br>other provisions, the courts may, instead<br>of adopting the plain and grammatical<br>construction, use the interpretative tools<br>to set right the situation, by adding or<br>omitting or substituting the words in the<br>statute. When faced with an apparently<br>defective provision in a statute, courts prefer<br>to assume that the draftsman had committed<br>a mistake rather than concluding that the<br>legislature has deliberately introduced an<br>absurd or irrational statutory provision.<br>Departure from the literal rule of plain and<br>straight reading can however be only in<br>exceptional cases, where the anomalies make<br>the literal compliance with a provision<br>impossible, or absurd or so impractical as to<br>defeat the very object of the provision. We<br>may also mention purposive interpretation to<br>avoid absurdity and irrationality is more<br>readily and easily employed in relation to
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procedural provisions than with reference to<br>substantive provisions.”
(emphasis added)
As a normal rule, while interpreting the statute, the 16. Court will not add words or omit words or substitute words. However, there is a well­recognized exception to this rule which is found in a decision of the House of Lords in the case   of   Inco   Europe   Limited   &   Ors.   v.   First   Choice 4 Distribution   (A   Firm)   &   Ors. ,   wherein   the   Court   held thus: 
“The court must be able to correct<br>obvious drafting errors. In suitable cases,<br>in discharging its interpretative function<br>the court will add words, or omit words or<br>substitute words. Some notable instances<br>are given in Professor Sir Rupert Cross’s<br>admirable opuscule, Statutory<br>Interpretation, 3rd ed.(1995), pp.93­105. He<br>comments at p.103:
“In omitting or inserting words the judge<br>is not really engaged in a hypothetical<br>reconstruction of the intentions of the<br>drafter or the legislature, but is simply<br>making as much sense as he can of the<br>text of the statutory provision read in its<br>appropriate context and within the limits<br>of the judicial role.”
4 (2000) 2 ALL ER 109   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 18 of 22 This   power   is   confined   to   plain   cases   of drafting   mistakes.   The   courts   are   ever mindful that their constitutional role in this field   is   interpretative.   They   must   abstain from   any   course   which   might   have   the appearance of judicial legislation. A statute is expressed in language approved and enacted by   the   legislature.   So,   the   courts   exercise considerable   caution   before   adding   or omitting   or   substituting   words.   Before interpreting   a   statute   in   this   way   the court  must  be  abundantly  sure  of three matters: (1) the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; (2) that by   inadvertence   the   draftsman   and Parliament   failed   to   give   effect   to   that purpose in the provision in question; and (3)   the   substance   of   the   provision Parliament   would   have   made,   although not   necessarily   the   precise   words Parliament would have used, had the error in   the   Bill   been   noticed.   The   third   of these conditions is of crucial importance. Otherwise   any   attempt   to   determine   the meaning of the enactment would cross the boundary   between   construction   and legislation. (emphasis added) 17. The   principle   laid   down   in   the   said   decision   was reiterated by this Court in the case of  Surjit Singh Kalra   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 19 of 22 5 v. Union of India & Anr .     In paragraph 19, this Court held thus:  “ 19.  True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but “where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been   accidentally   omitted,   or   adopting   a construction which deprives certain existing words   of   all   meaning,   it   is   permissible   to supply the words” (Craies Statute Law, 7th edn., p. 109). Similar are the observations in Hameedia   Hardware   Stores v. B.   Mohan Lal   Sowcar [(1988)   2   SCC   513,   524­25] where   it   was   observed   that   the   court construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the   statute   in   which   the   said   provision   is enacted   the   court   should   construe   it   in   a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the   relevant   provisions   as   to   advance   the remedy intended by the statute. (See: Sirajul Haq   Khan v. Sunni   Central   Board   of Waqf [1959 SCR 1287, 1299 : AIR 1959 SC 198].)” 18. Coming back to the relevant provisions of Order XXI of CPC, on a conjoint reading of sub­rule (1) of Rule 92 and Rule 94 of Order XXI of CPC, it is apparent that the order of 5 (1991) 2 SCC 87   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 20 of 22 confirmation of sale under sub­rule (1) of Rule 92 of Order XXI culminates into a grant of a sale certificate under Rule 94 of Order XXI.  The date of sale to be incorporated in the sale certificate is the date of passing of the order of sale confirmation.     The   very   fact   that   Rule   94   of   Order   XXI incorporates   a   requirement   of   issuing   a   sale   certificate shows that the Legislature was of the view that mere order of   confirmation   of   auction   may   not   be   sufficient.     The certificate  is ultimately the evidence of the  fact that the auction in favour of the person to whom a certificate is issued, has been confirmed by the Executing Court. it   appears   to   us   that   the   only   way   of 19. Prima   facie,   avoiding  inconsistency   between   Rule  95   of   Order   XXI  of CPC and Article 134 of the Limitation Act is to read into Article 134 that the starting point for making an application under Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC is the date on which a certificate recording confirmation of auction sale is actually issued to the purchaser.  Such interpretation will satisfy the three tests laid down in the case of  Inco Europe Limited & 4 Ors.  Therefore, in our considered view, the decision of the 2 Co­ordinate Bench in the case of   Pattam Khader Khan and   especially,   what   is   held   in   paragraph   11,   requires reconsideration   by   the   larger   Bench.     In   our   considered   Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 21 of 22 view, the larger Bench will have to decide the issue relating to the starting point of limitation for making an application under Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC.  We direct the Registrar (J­I) to place this appeal along with a copy of this order before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to enable him to take appropriate decision on the administrative side. .…..….……………J.  (Abhay S. Oka) .…...………………J.            (Rajesh Bindal) New Delhi; May 10, 2023.      Civil Appeal @ S.L.P .(C) No.3714 of 2018 Page 22 of 22