Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 1150-1151 of 2001
Appeal (crl.) 42-43 of 2002
PETITIONER:
Chittarmal, Moti
RESPONDENT:
State of Rajasthan
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/01/2003
BENCH:
N. SANTOSH HEGDE & B.P. SINGH.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
B.P. SINGH, J.
These appeals by special leave have been preferred by
Chittarmal and Moti who have impugned the judgment and order
of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur
in DB Crl. Appeal No.563 of 1997 and DB Cr. (Jail) Appeal No. 1
of 1998 dated 5th September, 2000. The High Court while
acquitting the other accused of the charges levelled against them,
found the appellants guilty of the offences punishable under
sections 302 and 307 IPC. The appellants who had been sentenced
to death by the trial court for committing the offence punishable
under section 302 IPC, were sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life declining the death reference. The trial
court had also sentenced the appellants to undergo five years
rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/- for the
offence punishable under section 307 IPC, in default of payment of
fine, six months simple imprisonment, which was upheld by the
High Court. The conviction of the appellants under section 148
IPC was, however, set aside.
The case of the prosecution is that on the night intervening
27th - 28th April, 1989 deceased Bhura and Ram Narain and Lal
Chand, PW.1 were sleeping in their house in village Joshian Ki
Dhani when the appellants herein alongwith five other persons
entered the house at about 10 or 11 p.m. and brutally assaulted
Bhura and Ram Narain as also Lal Chand, PW.1. Bhura and Ram
Narain succumbed to their injuries but Lal Chand, PW.1, who
suffered as many as 24 injuries survived the assault. Bhura was
the father of Ram Narain and the father-in-law of Lal Chand,
PW.1. The first information report Ex.P.1 was lodged by Bhenru,
PW.5 another son of Bhura (deceased) alleging that on the night of
occurrence Moti (appellant) alongwith Ramsi, Ratan, Lala,
Chhagan, Jaggu and 2-3 others armed with axes, farsies and
swords entered the house of Bhura and mounted a murderous
assault as a result of which Bhura and Ram Narain lost their lives
while Lal Chand, PW.1 was severely injured. It may be noticed at
this stage that Chittarmal was not named as one of the accused in
the first information report. On the basis of the first information
report a case was registered under sections 147, 148, 302, 307 and
447 IPC at P.S. Sanganer. In the course of investigation blood
stained clothes and the weapons of offence are said to have been
recovered at the instance of accused persons. The post-mortem
examination of the bodies of Bhura and Ram Narin was conducted
by Dr. Nirmal Kumar Sharma, PW.18 and Dr. H.C. Bairwa,
PW.14. Lal Chand, PW.1 was examined by Dr. B.C. Temani,
PW.15, who prepared the injury report Ext.P.26. The report
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discloses that Lal Chand, PW.1 had suffered as many as 24
injuries, most of them incised wounds which, in the opinion of the
doctor, could have been caused by a heavy long sharp edged
weapon. Injuries No. 9 and 17 were of grievous nature, which
were described as follows in the report :-
"(9) Traumatic amputation in an area of 12 cm x 4
cm x cut bones (metacarpols rounded clear cut)
chopping from 2cm above wrist joint, little and
ring finger missing out of the left hand with
incised wound 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep on
postero-medial part of middle finger.
(17) Incised wound ( V shaped ) 4 and half cm x
half cm x muscle bone deep on postero-medial
and lateral aspect of proximal and terminal
phalynx covering anterior aspect of thumb. "
After investigation charge sheet was submitted only against
the appellants herein since the investigating agency found no case
against the other accused persons. After the trial commenced
before the Sessions Court and 7 witness had been examined, the
public prosecutor moved an application for summoning the
remaining accused for trial under section 319 Cr. P.C. The said
application was allowed by the Sessions Judge by his order dated
30th March, 1992 and the remaining five accused namely, - Ramsi,
Rattan, Chhagan, Jaggu and Lala were also summoned for trial.
Initially when the appellants were put up for trial charges
were framed against them under sections 307 and 302 IPC and in
the alternative under sections 307/149 IPC and 302/149 IPC.
However, after the remaining accused were summoned for trial the
charges were re-framed and they were all charged under sections
148, 302/149 and 307/149 IPC. At the trial the informant Bhenru,
PW.5 claiming to be an eye witness stated that at about 10 or 11
p.m. he was at the house of Ramjiwan where they were enjoying a
smoke. He heard noise from the side of his house and, therefore,
rushed to his house followed by his cousin Bhanwar. When he
reached his house, he saw the appellants Moti and Chittar inflicting
injuries to Lal Chand while the remaining accused namely,
Chhagan, Jaggu, Ramsi, Ratan and Lala were surrounding him.
The accused also caused injuries to his father Bhura and brother
Ram Narain. He cried for help which attracted Ramjeewan,
Hanuman, Kesra and Chittar to the place of occurrence, but by that
time the accused had fled. The prosecution also examined
Bhanwar Lal, PW.2, Chittar, PW.3, Ramjiwan, PW.4, Kesra, PW.6
and Hanuman, PW.7 to support the version given by the informant.
Lal Chand (PW.1), an injured witness, was also examined to prove
the case of the prosecution. Accepting the testimony of the
witnesses the trial court found all the accused guilty of the offence
under sections 148 IPC. It convicted the appellants Moti and
Chittarmal of the offences under sections 302 and 307 IPC while
finding the remaining accused guilty of the offences under sections
302 read with section 149 IPC and 307 read with section 149 IPC.
The trial court sentenced the appellants herein to death for the
offence under section 302 IPC and made a reference to the High
Court for confirmation of the death sentence.
The appellants as well as the other accused preferred appeals
before the High Court which were heard alongwith the death
reference. The High Court while declining the death reference
allowed the appeals in part in as much as the accused, other than
the appellants herein, were acquitted of all the charges levelled
against them while the appellants herein were found guilty of the
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offences punishable under sections 302 and 307 IPC.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their
assistance we have perused the evidence on record.
The High Court did not accept the claim of Bhenru, PW.5 of
being an eye witness. In a detailed judgment the High Court has
recorded its clear finding and given good and cogent reasons for
disbelieving the claim of the informant of being an eye witness.
The High Court noticed the evidence of the other witnesses and
finding considerable inconsistency in the testimony of the
witnesses came to the conclusion that neither Bhenru nor those
witnesses had witnessed the occurrence. In all likelihood they had
reached the place of occurrence after the assailants had made good
their escape. After perusing the evidence on record we find
ourselves in complete agreement with the High Court on this
aspect of the matter. Moreover the acquittal of the remaining
accused is not the subject matter of challenge before us in these
appeals, nor has the State preferred an appeal against acquittal of
the remaining accused. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to
consider in detail the evidence pertaining to the complicity of the
accused who have been acquitted by the High Court.
The High Court, however, found that so far as Lal Chand,
PW.1 was concerned, his presence at the place of occurrence could
not be disputed. He was subjected to merciless assault and had
suffered as many as 24 injuries. According to Lal Chand, PW.1 on
the night of occurrence he was sleeping in the house of his father-
in-law Bhura. His brother-in-law Ram Narain was also sleeping
there on a separate cot. At night he heard the sound of ’thali’ and
woke up. He saw Moti assaulting his brother-in-law Ram Narain
with a sword while Chittar was assaulting his father-in-law Bhura
with a sword. When he got up he was also assaulted by both of
them with swords and he suffered a large number of injuries on his
head, hands and legs. At the trial, this witness no doubt implicated
Chhagan, Jaggu, Ramsi, Ratan and Lala as well stating that they
were with the appellants with axes and farsies and that all of them
had caused injuries to him. This part of the evidence of Lal Chand
has not been accepted by the High Court and for good reasons. Lal
Chand in his statement before the police had not stated that the
remaining accused, apart from the appellants, had come armed
with the appellants and had assaulted him. His statement before
the police was to the effect that when the appellants were going
away from the place of occurrence he had seen Chhagan, Ramsi
and Lala standing by the side of the wall near the babool tree. The
other two accused were not even named by him. The babool tree
was at a distance of about 60 yards from the place of occurrence.
The High Court, therefore, rightly held that this part of his
evidence was clearly an improvement and ought to be ignored.
However, the rest of the evidence of Lal Chand was accepted by
the High Court as truthful and on the basis of his evidence the
High Court recorded the conviction of the appellants herein.
We have carefully read the evidence of Lal Chand and we
are in agreement with the High Court that his evidence cannot be
discarded on the grounds urged by the defence. It was sought to be
urged before us that there is no mention of any artificial light at the
time of occurrence. The High Court has discussed the evidence on
record and come to the conclusion that there was an electric bulb in
front of the gate of the house. It was so found by the investigating
officer who had prepared the site inspection memo Ext.P.2 on 28th
April, 1989. He was not cross-examined on this aspect of the
matter even though he had asserted that he had seen the site and
had prepared the site inspection memo correctly. Moreover the
failure to mention about existence of electric light in the FIR was
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not of much consequence and was not fatal to the case of the
prosecution particularly when on site inspection such an electric
bulb was found in front of the gate of the house. Moreover, as
noticed by the High Court, the assailants belong to the same village
and were known to Lal Chand. They had caused numerous injuries
to Lal Chand with swords and, therefore, Lal Chand had abundant
opportunity to identify them even if there was no light. Moreover
the testimony of Lal Chand was corroborated by the medical
evidence on record. It was also sought to be urged that though Lal
Chand stated that he woke up on hearing sound of ’thali’, he had
not said so in his police statement. That also to our mind is not of
much significance because he was sleeping next to his father-in-
law and brother-in-law in a same room on a separate cot. When
the appellants attacked his father-in-law and brother-in-law, that
would have awakened Lal Chand from his sleep because in normal
course the two persons sleeping next to him on being attacked
must have resisted the attack and in that process there must have
been some noise enough to awaken the witness. It is too much to
assume that two persons sleeping on two separate cots nearby in
the same room would be assaulted and killed and the sleep of the
third person sleeping in the same room will not be disturbed.
Having considered all aspects of the matter and perused the
evidence on record, we find ourselves in complete agreement with
the High Court that on the testimony of Lal Chand, PW.1 the
participation of the appellants in the commission of the crime must
be held to have been proved. Both the courts have concurrently
found Lal Chand, PW.1 to be a reliable witness and even though he
sought to make an improvement in the course of his deposition by
naming the other accused persons, for that reason his entire
evidence cannot be rejected. The High Court has rightly ignored
that part of his evidence which appears to be in the nature of
embellishment.
It was then urged by counsel for the appellants that the High
Court was in error in convicting the appellant for the offence under
section 302 IPC in the absence of any specific charge framed under
that section. It was contended, relying upon several decisions of
this Court including Subran @ Subramanian and others vs. State of
Kerala : (1993) 3 SCC 32 that a person charged of an offence
under section 302 read with section 149 IPC cannot be convicted
of the substantive offence under section 302 IPC without a specific
charge having been framed against him as envisaged by law. It
was submitted that section 149 creates a specific and distinct
offence and, therefore, a specific charge under section 302 IPC is a
mandatory requirement of law before one can be found guilty of
the offence under section 302 IPC. The fact that a charge under
section 302 read with section 149 IPC is framed, is not sufficient.
On the other hand counsel for the State submitted, relying
upon the decision of this Court in Willie (William) Slaney vs.
State of Madhya Paradesh AIR 1956 SC 116 and State of Andhra
Pradesh vs. Thakkdiaram Reddy and others : JT 1998 (5) SC 398
that in all cases of constructive liability the absence of specific
charge under one or other head of criminal liability by itself is not
fatal and no conviction can be set aside unless prejudice is shown
by such defective charge. The true test is whether the error,
omission or irregularity in the proceedings has in fact occasioned a
failure of justice. In the facts of this case, she submitted no
prejudice was caused to the appellants and no failure of justice was
occasioned by convicting the appellants under section 302 IPC
even in the absence of a specific charge under section 302 IPC.
We do not consider it necessary, in the facts and
circumstances of this case, to consider the aforesaid submissions,
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because we are clearly of the view that in any event the conviction
of the appellants can be sustained under section 302 read with
section 34 IPC.
It is well settled by a catena of decisions that section 34 as
well as section 149 deal with liability for constructive criminality
i.e. vicarious liability of a person for acts of others. Both the
sections deal with combinations of persons who become
punishable as sharers in an offence. Thus they have a certain
resemblance and may to some extent overlap. But a clear
distinction is made out between common intention and common
object in that common intention denotes action in concert and
necessarily postulates the existence of a pre-arranged plan
implying a prior meeting of the minds, while common object does
not necessarily require proof of prior meeting of minds or pre-
concert. Though there is substantial difference between the two
sections, they also to some extent overlap and it is a question to be
determined on the facts of each case whether the charge under
section 149 overlaps the ground covered by section 34. Thus, if
several persons numbering five or more, do an act and intend to do
it, both sections 34 and section 149 may apply. If the common
object does not necessarily involve a common intention, then the
substitution of section 34 for section 149 might result in prejudice
to the accused and ought not, therefore, to be permitted. But if it
does involve a common intention then the substitution of section
34 for section 149 must be held to be a formal matter. Whether
such recourse can be had or not must depend on the facts of each
case. The non applicability of section 149 is, therefore, no bar in
convicting the appellants under section 302 read with section 34
IPC, if the evidence discloses commission of an offence in
furtherance of the common intention of them all. (See Barendra
Kumar Ghosh Vs. King Emperor : AIR 1925 PC 1; Mannam
Venkatadari and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh : AIR 1971
SC 1467 ; Nethala Pothuraju and others vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh : AIR 1991 SC 2214 and Ram Tahal and others vs. State
of U.P. : AIR 1972 SC 254).
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we find
no difficulty in convicting the appellants under section 302 read
with section 34 IPC, even though the charge framed was one under
section 302 read with section 149 IPC. On the facts proved, it
must be held that the appellants came together armed with lethal
weapons and simultaneously started the assault on Ram Narain and
Bhura, who succumbed to their injuries. When Lal Chand, PW.1
woke up, he was also mercilessly assaulted by both of them
inflicting as many as 24 injuries. The remaining accused, apart
from the appellants, have been acquitted on a finding that they did
not come with the appellants duly armed, they did not share the
common object, nor did they take part in the assault on the two
deceased or PW.1. Thus the charge under section 302 read with
section 149 could not stand, the number of participants in the crime
being less than five.
But so far as the appellants are concerned, it cannot be
doubted on the findings recorded that they shared a common
intention and had acted pursuant thereto. Overt act and active
participation is indicative of common intention of the persons
perpetrating the crime, and in the facts and circumstances of this
case we have no doubt that the appellants shared the common
intention to commit the murders of the deceased and acting in
concert they executed their pre-arranged plan to eliminate them.
Their conviction under section 302 read with section 34 can be
safely recorded.
Accordingly the conviction of the appellants is altered to one
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under section 302 read with section 34 IPC instead of one under
section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment is
maintained. Subject to the above, the appeals are dismissed.