Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
| IL APPEA | L NO. 41 |
Rajasthan State TPT Corpn. & Anr. …Appellants
Versus
Bajrang Lal …Respondent
O R D E R
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred by the Rajasthan State Road
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Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as `Corporation’)
against the judgment and order dated 8.11.2005 passed by the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan (Jaipur Bench) in S.B. Civil Second
Appeal No. 449 of 2003 upholding the judgment and decree dated
28.1.2003 in Civil Regular Appeal No. 119 of 2002 passed by
Additional District Judge, Jaipur, by which and whereunder, it has
affirmed the judgment and decree dated 30.11.1994 passed by the
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Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) No. 2, Jaipur in Civil Suit No. 1346
of 1988.
| nt while w | orking as a |
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basis was found carrying certain passengers without tickets and, thus,
an enquiry was initiated against him. Two chargesheets dated
11.3.1988 were served upon him. In the first chargesheet, it was
alleged that on 24.2.1988 while he was on duty enroute Kota-Rajpura,
when his bus was checked, it was found that 10 passengers were
traveling without tickets, though he had collected the fare from each
of them. In the second chargesheet, it had been alleged that when he
was on duty on route Kota-Neemuch, his bus was checked and he was
found carrying two passengers traveling on tickets of lesser amount
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though, he had collected the full fare from them. The respondent
submitted separate reply to the said chargesheets which were not
found satisfactory. Therefore, the enquiry officer was appointed to
enquire into the matter and a regular enquiry ensued. The enquiry
officer after conclusion of the enquiry submitted the report holding
that charges leveled against the respondent in both the chargesheets
stood proved against him.
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B. After considering the report, the Disciplinary Authority vide
order dated 5.8.1988 passed order of punishment of removal from the
service. The respondent filed a Civil Suit on 2.9.1988 challenging the
| ging that h | e was not s |
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referred to in the chargesheets, nor was given the enquiry report nor
other documents. More so, the quantum of punishment was
disproportionate to the proved delinquency.
C. The Suit was contested by the appellants denying all the
averments made therein. However, on conclusion of the trial, the Suit
was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 30.11.1994.
D. Aggrieved, the Corporation filed Civil Regular Appeal No. 119
of 2002, which stood dismissed vide judgment and decree dated
28.1.2003.
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E. The Corporation challenged both the aforesaid judgments by
filing Regular Second Appeal No. 449 of 2003, which also stood
dismissed vide impugned judgment and decree.
Hence, this appeal.
3. Shri S. K. Bhattacharya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellants, has submitted that none of the courts below have
examined the case in correct perspective. The stand taken by the
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appellants that the Suit itself was not maintainable, as the only remedy
available to the respondent was to approach the Labour Court under
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act
| roperly ex | amined by |
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the pleadings in the plaint were vague. The respondent/plaintiff
failed to prove any of the allegations made in the plaint, therefore, the
courts below have erred in holding that the enquiry stood vitiated due
to violation of statutory provisions and principles of natural justice.
The enquiry had been conducted strictly in accordance with law, the
provisions of Section 35 of the Standing Order have been fully
complied with and the respondent was given full opportunity to
defend himself. Therefore, the findings of fact recorded by the courts
below in this respect are perverse. The respondent was found to have
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embezzled money of the corporation and the punishment of dismissal
cannot be held to be disproportionate to the proved delinquency.
Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.
4. On the contrary, Shri Anis Ahmed Khan, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent, has opposed the appeal
contending that there are concurrent findings of facts recorded by the
three courts. The trial court as well as the first appellate court have
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recorded the findings of fact that the enquiry had not been conducted
in accordance with law and the punishment of dismissal from service
was disproportionate to the delinquency proved. Therefore, no
interference is called for.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
6. Undoubtedly, the appellant corporation had taken the plea
regarding the maintainability of suit on the ground that the respondent
being a workman ought to have approached the forum available under
the Act 1947 and the civil suit was not maintainable. In order to
fortify this submission Shri Bhattacharya has placed reliance on the
judgments of this Court in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v.
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Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay & Ors., AIR 1975 SC
2238; Uttam Das Chela Sunder Das v. Shiromani Gurdwara
Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1996 SC 2133; Rajasthan
SRTC & Ors. v. Mohar Singh, AIR 2008 SC 2553; Rajasthan
SRTC & Anr. v. Bal Mukund Bairwa, (2009) 4 SCC 299; and
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., v. Deen
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Dayal Sharma , AIR 2010 SC 2662 and asserted that the judgments of
the courts below are without jurisdiction.
| ding the m | aintainabil |
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issue in this regard had specifically been framed. Thus, we are not
inclined in delving into this controversy at all.
8. The relevant part of the plaint reads:
“That the plaintiff was imposed with the charge sheet no.
1158 dated 11.3.88 that on date 24.2.88 on the route
Kota-Rajpura his vehicle was checked and it was found
during the course of the inspection that he was carrying
10 passengers without tickets and another Charge sheet
no. 1159 dated 11.3.88 was imposed with the statement
that on date 27.11.88 the plaintiff was found carrying 2
passengers without tickets during the course of his giving
the duty on the route Kota-Neernuch in the capacity of
the conductor and he was also caught in the case of the
difference in the ticket amount. That if the bus was not
checked in time then the plaintiff would have used the
entire sum of money he recovered from the passengers
found without tickets for his personal use. Whereas as
per the terms and conditions of the Corporation the
plaintiff is required to issue the tickets to all the
passengers and then to get the same entered in the
waybill and that then only the vehicle should have been
departed. The aforesaid charges were totally wrong and
baseless.”
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9. The appellant/defendant in its written statement basically
stated:
| age basis.<br>alary of the | The plain<br>regular p |
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10. After appreciating the material on record, the trial court held:
“In this way the plaintiff has clearly made the
allegation in the plaint that in the inquiry the statement
of the witnesses were not recorded in front of the
plaintiff. He was not given an opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses produced by the defendant
corporation and nor he was given an opportunity to
defend his case and lead the evidence. That he was not
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| circumsta<br>evidence | nces, the<br>of the plai |
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11. The aforesaid findings recorded by the trial court is based only
on the allegations made by the respondent in the plaint and on failure
of the Corporation/defendant to rebut the same, though the trial court
had proceeded with the case clearly observing that the burden of
proving this issue was on the respondent/plaintiff and not on the
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Corporation/defendant. In such a fact situation, no reasoning
whatsoever has been given by the trial court in support of its
conclusion. Neither there is any specific pleading as to what document
had not been supplied to him which has been relied upon by the
enquiry officer or which witness was not permitted to be cross-
examined by him. The trial court did not make any reference to
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enquiry report or contents thereof. The entire case is based on ipsi
dixi.
| e sufficie | nt evide |
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submissions made in the plaint and in case the pleadings are not
complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas.
(Vide: M/s. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Gujarat &
Ors ., AIR 1998 SC 1608; National Building Construction
Corporation v. S. Raghunathan & Ors ., AIR 1998 SC 2779; Ram
Narain Arora v. Asha Rani & Ors ., (1999) 1 SCC 141; Smt. Chitra
Kumari v. Union of India & Ors ., AIR 2001 SC 1237; and State of
U.P. v. Chandra Prakash Pandey , AIR 2001 SC 1298.)
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13. In M/s. Atul Castings Ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan Singh , AIR
2001 SC 1684, this Court observed as under:–
“The findings in the absence of necessary pleadings and
supporting evidence cannot be sustained in law.”
(See also: Vithal N. Shetti & Anr. v. Prakash N. Rudrakar & Ors .,
(2003) 1 SCC 18; Devasahayam (Dead) by L.Rs. v. P.
Savithramma & Ors ., (2005) 7 SCC 653; Sait Nagjee Purushotam
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& Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors ., (2005) 8 SCC 252,
Rajasthan Pradesh V.S. Sardarshahar & Anr. v. Union of India
& Ors. , AIR 2010 SC 2221; Ritesh Tiwari & Anr. v. State of U.P.
| C 3823; an | d Union |
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& Anr . (2012) 8 SCC 148).
14. Therefore, once the trial court has held that the burden of proof
was on the respondent/plaintiff, it could not have come to the
aforesaid findings as there is nothing on record to show how the
averments/allegations made by the respondent stood proved.
15. Even the First Appellate Court misdirected itself while dealing
with the issue as it held:
“ That no evidence was produced by the
defendants/appellants. The statement given by the
plaintiff is unrebutted. That as per the statement of the
plaintiff the statement of the witnesses were not recorded
in front of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was not given an
opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses produced
by the Defendants/Appellants. The plaintiff was not
given an opportunity of leading the evidence and
defending his case. The copies of the documents were not
supplied to the plaintiff. He was also not heard on the
quantum of the punishment. In this way the deposition
given by the plaintiff are not rebutted and due to the
reason of the same been unrebuttable it can be said that
no departmental inquiry was initiated as against the
plaintiff. Due to the reason of not holding the
departmental inquiry the proceeding initiated against the
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| rfere in the | same.” |
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16. The appellate court committed a grave error by declaring the
enquiry as non-est. The termination order as a consequence thereof,
stood vitiated though there is no reference to any material fact on the
basis of which such a conclusion was reached. The finding that copy
of the documents was not supplied to the respondent/plaintiff, though
there is nothing on record to show that how the documents were relied
upon and how they were relevant to the controversy involved, whether
those documents had been relied upon by the enquiry officer and how
any prejudice had been caused by non-supply of those documents, is
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therefore without any basis or evidence. When the matter reached the
High Court in Second Appeal, the High Court refused to examine the
issue at all by merely observing that no substantial question of law
was involved and the findings of fact, however erroneous, cannot be
disturbed in Second Appeal.
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17. With all respect, we do not agree with such a conclusion
reached by the High Court, as Second Appeal, in exceptional
circumstances, can be entertained on pure questions of fact. There is
| High Cou | rt to entert |
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on question of fact where factual findings are found to be perverse.
18. In Ibrahim Uddin (Supra), this Court held:
“65. In Suwalal Chhogalal v. CIT, (1949) 17 ITR 269
(Nag) the Court held as under: (ITR p. 277)
“… A fact is a fact irrespective of evidence by which
it is proved. The only time a question of law can arise in
such a case is when it is alleged that there is no material
on which the conclusion can be based or no sufficient
material.
67 . There is no prohibition to entertain a second
appeal even on question of fact provided the Court is
satisfied that the findings of the courts below were
vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by
showing erroneous approach to the matter and findings
recorded in the court below are perverse. [Vide Jagdish
Singh v. Natthu Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604, Prativa Devi
v. T.V. Krishnan, (1999) 5 SCC 353, Satya Gupta v.
Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423, Ragavendra Kumar v.
Firm Prem Machinery & Co., AIR 2000 SC 534, Molar
Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1261,
Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010) 11
SCC 483 and Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali, (2010 12 SCC
740]
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68. In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala, AIR 2002 SC 1428,
this Court held that (SCC p. 638, para 6) it is permissible
to interfere even on question of fact but it may be only in
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| pection”.<br>as been tak | en in Kash |
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19. As regards the question of disproportionate punishment is
concerned, the issue is no more res-integra. In U.P State Road
Transport Corporation v. Suresh Chand Sharma, (2010) 6 SCC
555, it was held as under:
“22 . In Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh v. Krishnan
Behari, AIR 1996 SC 1249 this Court held as under:
(SCC p. 715, para 4)
“4. … In a case of such nature—indeed, in cases
involving corruption—there cannot be any other
punishment than dismissal. Any sympathy shown in such
cases is totally uncalled for and opposed to public
interest. The amount misappropriated may be small or
large; it is the act of misappropriation that is relevant.”
Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Ruston
& Hornsby (I) Ltd. v. T.B. Kadam, AIR 1975 SC 2025,
U.P. SRTC v. Basudeo Chaudhary, (1997) 11 SCC 370,
Janatha Bazar (South Kanara Central Coop. Wholesale
Stores Ltd.) v. Sahakari Noukarara Sangha, (2000) 7
SCC 517, Karnataka SRTC v. B.S. Hullikatti, AIR 2001
SC 930 and Rajasthan SRTC v. Ghanshyam Sharma,
(2002) 10 SCC 330.”
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20. In view of the above, the contention raised on behalf of the
respondent employee, that the punishment of removal from service is
disproportionate to the delinquency is not worth acceptance. The only
| f the prove | d case of |
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service.
21. As a result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments
of the courts below are set aside and the order of removal from service
passed by the Disciplinary Authority is restored. No order as to costs.
…………......................J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
……….........................J.
(J. CHELAMESWAR)
NEW DELHI
March 14, 2014.
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