Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MOHAN SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
BHANWARLAL & OTHERS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
03/10/1963
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
SUBBARAO, K.
WANCHOO, K.N.
DAYAL, RAGHUBAR
CITATION:
1964 AIR 1366 1964 SCR (5) 12
CITATOR INFO :
R 1965 SC1243 (5)
F 1967 SC 836 (8)
D 1967 SC1445 (9)
E 1969 SC 872 (21)
D 1970 SC1231 (13)
E 1970 SC2097 (318)
D 1973 SC2513 (12)
R 1976 SC 744 (26,40)
R 1979 SC 154 (36)
RF 1979 SC 234 (40)
F 1985 SC 89 (16,23)
C 1991 SC2001 (21)
ACT:
Election--Corrupt practice--Ingredients--Publication of
leaflets--If and when constitute corrupt practice-
"Gratification" -Meaning of--The Representation of the
People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), ss. 82, 123(1) (B) and 123
(4).
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was declared elected to the Madhya
Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Another candidate Himmat
Singh withdrew his candidature before the date of polling.
Respondent 1 one of the defeated candidates, challenged the
election by a petition under the Representation of the
People Act alleging that the appellant had disqualified
himself by committing corrupt practices. It was alleged that
he had shortly before the polling of votes published two
leaflets in Hindi containing statements of fact with regard
to the personal character or conduct of respondent 1 which
were false and which the appellant believed to be false or
did not believe to be true and that the statements were
calculated to prejudice the prospects of respondent 1 at the
election. The appellant denied
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the said allegations and applied to the Election Tribunal
for dismissing the petition in limine because Himmat Singh
against whom allegations of corrupt practice in regard to
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the withdrawal of candidature were made, was not joined as a
respondent. The Tribunal rejected the application and held
that it was established on the evidence that the appellant
did commit corrupt practice by publishing the two leaflets.
In appeal the High Court agreed with the Tribunal. It was
urged on behalf of the appellant that the election petition
was liable to be dismissed in limine, as it did not comply
with the requirements of s.82 of the Act, that the appellant
did not publish the leaflets, and that in any event the
publication did not constitute a corrupt practice within the
meaning s. 123(4) of the Act.
Held: (i) The election petition was not detective. There
was no allegation of corrupt practice against Himmat Singh.
It was merely alleged that the appellant had offered to
assist or help Himmat Singh in obtaining employment with
"Dalauda Sugar Factory or elsewhere". The acceptance of
offer which constitutes a motive or reward for withdrawing
from the candidature must be acceptance of gratification.
Gratification does not include offers and acceptances of
mere promises, but requires ,an offer and acceptance
relating to a thing of some value, though not necessarily
estimable in terms of money. A mere offer to help in
getting employment is not such offer of gratification within
the meaning of s. 123(1)(B) as to constitute it a corrupt
practice. On the allegations therefore, it was not
necessary to implead Himmat Singh as a respondent to the
petition.
(ii) The onus of establishing a corrupt practice is
undoubtedly on the person who sets it up, and the onus is
not discharged on proof of mere preponderance of
probability, as in the trial of a civil suit; the corrupt
practice must be established beyond reasonable doubt by
evidence which is clear and unambiguous.
(iii) In considering whether a publication amounts to a
corrupt practice within the meaning of s. 123(4) the
Tribunal would be entitled to take into account matters of
common knowledge among the electorate and read the
publication in that background, for one of the ingredients
of the particular corrupt practice is the tendency of the
statement in the publication to be reasonably calculated to
prejudice the prospects of that candidate’s election. The
test in cases under s. 123(4) is whether the imputation,
besides being false in fact, is published with the object of
lowering the candidate in the estimation of the electorate
and calculated to prejudice his prospects at the election.
In ascertaining whether the candidate is lowered in the
estimation of the electorate, the imputation made must be
viewed in the light of matters generally known to them.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 530 of
1963.
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Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 14,
1963, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First Appeal No.
34 of 1962.
U.M. Trivedi, Malik Arjun Das, Shanti Swarup Khanduja
and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant.
G.S. Pathak, U.N. Bhachawat, Rameshwar Nath and S.N.
Andley, for respondent no. 1.
October 3, 1963. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SHAH J.---Eight candidates (including the appellant
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Mohan Singh and the first respondent Bhanwarlal) filed
nomination papers for election to the Madhya Pradesh
Legislative Assembly from the Sitamau constituency. The
nomination of one Hussain Khan was rejected by the Returning
Officer at the initial scrutiny and another candidate Himmat
Singh withdrew his candidature before the date of polling,
which took place on February 24, 1962. On the counting of
the votes Mohan Singh was found to have secured the largest
number of votes at the election, and he was declared
elected.
Bhanwarlal applied under s. 80 read with ss. 100 and 101
of the Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951), to the
Election Commission of India for an order declaring the
election of Mohan Singh void, and Mohan Singh disqualified
because of committing corrupt practices detailed in the
petition and for an order declaring the applicant Bhanwarlal
elected. Among the many grounds of corrupt practices
alleged in the petition, two grounds set out in cls. (c) &
(d) of para 11 of the petition survive for consideration in
this appeal. It was averred in these clauses that Mohan
Singh the successful candidate had shortly before the
polling of votes published two leaflets in Hindi containing
statements of fact with regard to the personal character or
conduct of the applicant Bhanwarlal which were false and
which Mohan Singh believed to be false or did not believe to
be true and that the statements were calculated
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to prejudice the prospects of Bhanwarlal at the election.
Copies of the two leaflets were annexed to the petition, and
were marked annexures ’D’ & ’E’.
The petition was referred for trial by the Election
Commission to the Election Tribunal, Ratlam, under s. 86 of
the Representation of the People Act. Mohan Singh by his
written statement denied that he had published the leaflets
and submitted that the leaflets which appeared to have been
published by the electorate contained "a factual and fair
criticism of the public; activities" of Bhanwarlal and that
they were not calculated to prejudice his prospects at the
election.
Mohan Singh applied to the Tribunal for an order
dismissing the petition in limine on the ground, among
others, that there was non-compliance with s. 82 of the Act,
because one of the candidates at the election named Himmat
Singh--against whom allegations of corrupt practice in
regard to the withdrawal of his candidature were made--was
not joined as a respondent. The Tribunal rejected the
application for dismissal of the petition and held that it
was established on the evidence that Mohan Singh and his
agents did commit, amongst others, the corrupt practice
defined in s. 123(4) of the Act by publishing the leaflets,
annexures ’D’& ’E’, containing statements which were false,
to the knowledge and belief of Mohan Singh, and made with
the knowledge that they would reasonably prejudice the
election chances of Bhanwarlal. In coming to that
conclusion the Tribunal primarily relied upon the testimony
of one Rameshchandra, a compositor in the Maheshwari
Printing Press, Mandsaur, and upon certain corroborative
circumstances.
In appeal by Mohan Singh against the order, the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh on a review of the evidence agreed
with the Tribunal that Mohan Singh was instrumental in
getting printed leaflets annexures ’D’ & ’E’ and the
leaflets were distributed in certain villages in the
constituency by Mohan Singh and his agents Satyanarayan and
Kailash.
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In this appeal with special leave it was urged that the
election petition filed by Bhanwarlal was liable to be
dismissed in limine, as it did not comply with the
requirements of s. 82 of the Representation of the People
Act. On the merits it was urged that Mohan Singh did not
publish the leaflets annexures ’D’ & ’E’ and that in any
event the publication did not constitute a corrupt practice
within the meaning of s. 123 (4) of the Act.
Whether for alleged non-compliance with the requirements
of s. ,82 of the Act, the petition by Bhanwarlal was not
maintainable must first be determined, for if the petition
did not comply with the mandatory provisions of the statute,
irrespective of whether a corrupt practice was committed by
Mohan Singh, the petition must stand dismissed without
further investigation.
In paragraph 11(b) of the petition it was averred that
on January 20, 1962, Mohan Singh, "offered at Nahargarh to
Shri Himmat Singh an independent candidate to help him in
procuring a job for him in Dalauda Sugar Factory or
elsewhere to withdraw his candidature from the election.
That as a consequence of this offer of illegal gratification
Himmat Singh withdrew his candidature from the Sitamau
Assembly constituency." The language used is somewhat
ungrammatical, but the purport is clear--that Mohan Singh
with a view to persuade Himmat Singh to withdraw from the
election offered to help him to secure employment with the
Dalauda Sugar Factory, or with some other employer, and in
consequence of this offer which amounted to illegal
gratification--Himmat Singh had withdrawn himself from being
candidate at the election for the Sitamau constituency.
Section 123 (1) defines the corrupt practice of
"bribery" and by el. (B) receipt of, or agreement to
receive, any gratification, whether as a motive or a
reward--
(a) by a person for standing or not
standing as, or for withdrawing from being, a
candidate; or
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(b) by any person whomsoever for himself or
any other person for voting or refraining from
voting, or inducing or attempting to induce
any elector to vote or refrain from voting, or
any candidate to withdraw his. candidature,
constitutes the corrupt practice of bribery by a person
other than the candidate. It is submitted that by para 11
(b) it was averted that Himmat Singh who had filed his
nomination paper had agreed to receive gratification, as a
motive or a reward for withdrawing from being a candidate,
and that it was necessary in view of s. 82 of the Act to
implied Himmat Singh as ?. party to the petition, and
failure to implied him would involve dismissal of the
petition. To appreciate the argument it is necessary to
refer to certain relevant provisions of the Act. By s. 80
no election is liable to be called in question except by an
election petition presented in accordance with the
provisions of Part VI of the Act. Section 81 prescribes the
g. rounds on which, the persons by whom and the period
during which an election petition may be presented, and also
the procedure for presentation of the petition. By s. 82 it
is enacted that all contesting candidates shall be joined as
party respondents where the petitioner, in addition to
claiming a declaration that the election of all or any of
the returned candidates is void, claims a further
declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been
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duly elected, and where no such further declaration is
claimed, all the returned candidates shall be joined. Again
where allegations of corrupt practice are made against
another candidate, such other candidate shall be joined as a
respondent. Section 79 which is the interpretation section
in respect of Parts VI, VII and VIII (and s. 82 occurs in
Part VI) defines the expression "candidate" as meaning a
person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as
a candidate at any election, and any such person shall be
deemed to have been a candidate as from the time when, with
the election in prospect, he began to hold himself out as a
prospective candidate. If the provisions, among others,
1/SCI/64--2
18
of ss. 81 or 82 have not been complied with, the Election
Commissioner must dismiss the petition (s. 85), and if the
Commission does not so order the Tribunal is enjoined by s.
90(3) to dismiss the petition which does not comply with the
provisions of ss. 81 or 82.
Himmat Singh had filed his nomination paper, and on that
account by virtue of the definition of s. 79 he was a
candidate for the purposes of Parts VI, VII & VIII, and did
not cease to be a candidate merely because he withdrew his
candidature. If therefore the petition contained any
imputation of corrupt practice made against Himmat Singh,
it could not be regarded as properly constituted unless he
was impleaded as a respondent, for, by the definition of
"candidate" in s. 79(b), the expression "any other
candidate" in s, 82(b) must include a candidate who had
withdrawn his candidature. But in our judgment in para 11
(b) there is no allegation of corrupt practice against
Himmat Singh. What is alleged is that Mohan Singh had
offered to help Himmat Singh "in procuring a job in Dalauda
Sugar Factory or elsewhere" and that as a consequence of
that offer Himmat Singh had withdrawn his candidature from
the election. There is no express averment in the petition
about the acceptance of the offer by Himmat Singh, but it
would border upon supererogation to insist that even if
offer to help to procure a job amounted to offer of
gratification, an allegation that in consequence of this
offer Himmat Singh had withdrawn his candidature from the
election did not amount to a plea of acceptance of that
offer unless it was so expressly averred. However in our
view a mere offer of help to secure employment without more
is not offer of gratification within the meaning of s. 123
(1) (B) of the Act. The expression "gratification" is not
defined in the Act but the Explanation to sub-s. (1) of s.
123 furnishes an indication as to what in the view of the
Parliament amounts to gratification. The Explanation
states:
"For the purposes of this clause the term
’gratification’ is not restricted to pecuniary
graft-
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fications or gratifications estimable in money
and it includes all forms of entertainment and
all forms of employment for reward but it does
not include the payment of any expenses
bonafide incurred at, or for the purpose of,
any election and duly entered in the account
of election expenses referred to in section
78."
The Explanation extends the expression "gratification" to
include all forms of entertainment and all forms of
employment for reward but not payment of bona fide
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expenditure incurred at or for the purpose of election if
duly entered in the account of election expenses.
Gratification in its ordinary connotation means
satisfaction. In the context in which the expression is
used and its delimitation by the Explanation, it must mean
something valuable which is calculated to satisfy a person’s
aim, object or desire, whether or not that thing is
estimable in terms of money; but a mere offer to help in
securing employment to a person with a named or unnamed
employer would not amount to such gratification.
There is no plea that Mohan Singh had offered
employment to Himmat Singh with the Dalauda Sugar Factory or
with another employer; it was merely alleged that Mohan
Singh had offered to assist or help Himmat Singh in
obtaining employment with the "Dalauda Sugar Factory or else
where". The acceptance of offer which constitutes a motive
or reward for withdrawing from the candidature must be
acceptance of gratification; and if gratification does not
include all offers and acceptances of mere promises, but
requires, to constitute it, an offer and acceptance relating
to a thing of some value, though not necessarily estimable
in terms of money, a mere offer to help in getting
employment is not such offer of gratification within the
meaning of s. 123(1)(B) as to constitute it a corrupt
practice. It was in the circumstances not necessary on the
allegations made in para 11(b) of the petition to implead
Himmat Singh as a respondent to the petition. We therefore
agree
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with the High Court, though for different reasons, that the
petition filed by Bhanwarlal was not defective.
Counsel for Mohan Singh challenged the finding of the
High Court that Mohan Singh was instrumental in publishing
the leaflets annexures ’D’ & ’E’. He urged that in the
trial of an election petition approach to the evidence must
be as in a criminal trial and no fact may be held proved
unless it is established beyond reasonable doubt. The onus
of establishing a corrupt practice is undoubtedly on the
person who sets it up, and the onus is not discharged on
proof of mere preponderance of probability, as in the trial
of a civil suit: the corrupt practice must be established
beyond reasonable doubt by evidence which is clear and
unambiguous. But the testimony of Rameshchandra
corroborated by the circumstances set out in detail in the
judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court was accepted
and the testimony of witnesses for Mohan Singh who claimed
that other persons without his consent or connivance were
responsible for getting the leaflets printed was
disbelieved. The evidence about the distribution of the
leaflets in question by the appellant and his agents was
also accepted by the Tribunal and the High Court. It was
also found that these leaflets were distributed
simultaneously. In recording their conclusions the Tribunal
and the High Court did not proceed on mere grounds of
probability. The findings recorded by the Tribunal and the
High Court are therefore concurrent findings of fact rounded
on appreciation of oral evidence and no ground is made out
for departing from the settled practice of the Court against
interference with those concurrent findings of fact.
The next question to be considered is whether the
publication of the leaflets amounts to commission of a
corrupt practice within the terms of s. 123 (4) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 123 sets
out what the diverse corrupt practices recognised by the Act
are. Clause (4) defines a corrupt practice by publication
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of false statements calculated
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to prejudice the prospects of a candidate’s election. To
bring a corrupt practice within the purview of el. (4) there
must be a publication by a candidate or his agent or by
another person with the consent of the candidate or his
election agent: the publication must contain a statement of
fact which is false, and which the candidate or his agent
believes to be false or does not believe to be true, the
statement must be in relation to the personal character or
conduct of the candidate; and it must be reasonably
calculated to prejudice the prospects of the candidates
election. The expression "statement of fact" in s. 123 (4)
includes not only an express imputation but also an innuendo
if one such may reasonably be raised from the language in
which it is couched and the manner of its publication
Annexure ’D’ is in Hindi. The caption of that leaflet is
"The surety (security) of Shri Nahata has to be forfeited
because he has defrauded the public and has shown his face
after five years to take votes." Counsel for Mohan Singh
submitted that the expression "defrauded" is not a correct
rendering into English of the Hindi expression "dhoka
diya"; it means "misled". The caption is followed by a
photograph of Mohan Singh together with his election symbol
and it is stated that the ballot paper of Mohan Singh is of
pink colour and that the election symbol is the picture of a
tamp It then proceeds to state that "Sitamau constituency
has awakened. Nahata (Bhanwarlal) has run away. Shinde,
Kishen Gupta Patil Patel, you may safeguard the interests of
your Bhanwarlal Nahata as much as you like but his surety
(security) is sure to be forfeited." Then follow nine
paragraphs the third of which alone is material. That para-
graph reads:
"We have heard that your friend has
collected 28 thousand rupees from several
villages in the name of opium. The
agriculturists did not get the licenses and
those agriculturists who got them had to
spend a lot of money and time and the
licenses for opium were received on execution
of bonds for 8 seers."
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The leaflet concludes by a note which reads:
"Every voter will get’ two ballot papers
one is of pink colour for Legislative
Assembly for Thakur Mohan
Singh . . . Put the seal on the
symbols of lamp on both the ballots pink and
white. You read this pamphlet and give it to
your friends to spread the message from house
to house. Submitted by Nahata Virodhi Morcha
Sitamau Constituency."
Annexure ’E’ bears the caption: "The Bureaucrats of
yesterday--Congressmen of to-day". It consists of two
parts-the first relates to certain allegations against one
Dr. Raghubir Singh who it appears was a candidate from the
constituency for Parliament and the second relates to
Bhanwarlal. The portion dealing with Bhanwarlal Nahata
states:
"Let Sriman Shri 1008 of Shri Nahata tell?
(1) Did you not defraud the
agriculturists with respect to the licences of
opium ?
(the other six questions are not relevant,
and need not be reproduced)
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Public has already decided and now it is not
going to fall prey to your fraud and greed.
On all sides "the public has decided to put
seal on lamp and make it victorious.
Therefore the congressmen should not be misled
while making propaganda. Submitted by Goswami
Mahant Ratnagir."
It is said that the last paragraph is not correctly
rendered into English: it merely stated, it is urged, that
the public have already known the truth and they are not
going to fall a prey to the misleading promises and
inducements etc. No authorised translation of the two
leaflets is furnished, but we will proceed to ascertain the
purport of the relevant parts of the two leaflets as
incorporated in the printed book, with the modifications
suggested by counsel for Mohan Singh.
Paragraph 3 of annexure ’D’ as it stands rendered into
English is not very clear in its import. To a person
completely unacquainted with the local conditions the
expression "in the name of opium" may convey no meaning.
But in considering whether a
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publication amounts to a corrupt practice within the meaning
of s. 123(4) the Tribunal would be entitled to take into
account matters of common knowledge among the electorate and
read the publication in that background, for one of the
ingredients of the particular corrupt practice is the
tendency of the statement in the publication to be
reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that
candidate’s election. The test in cases under s. 123(4) is
whether the imputation beside being false in fact, is it
published with the object of lowering the candidate in the
estimation of the electorate and calculated to prejudice his
prospects at the election? And in ascertaining whether the
candidate is lowered in the estimation of the electorate,
the imputation made must be viewed in the light of matters
generally known to them.
It is common ground that in the territory which forms
the Sitamau constituency, licences for cultivation of opium
are granted by the authorities to agriculturists, and the
statement made in paragraph 3 apparently is that Bhanwarlal
had collected Rs. 28,000 from the agriculturists in the
constituency for securing licences for cultivation of opium
but the agriculturists did not get the licences and even
those who obtained the licences had to spend considerable
sums of money. The innuendo in the statement cannot be
mistaken: it is that a large amount of money was collected
from agriculturists by Bhanwarlal on the ’representation
that he would obtain licences for opium cultivation, but he
did nothing in that behalf and misappropriated the amount.
That is further made clear by paragraph 1 in annexure ’E’
relating to Bhanwarlal. The form in which that allegation
is made is in the interrogative form. By annexure ’E’
certain questions were addressed to Bhanwarlal and one of
the questions was whether he had not defrauded the
agriculturists with respect to the licences of opium? The
interrogative form is often employed not with a view to
secure information but to make and emphasize an assertion.
The use of the interrogative form would not make the
statement any the less an imputation if it is fairly capable
of being
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so read. As we have already observed the evidence
establishes that the leaflets annexures ’D’ & ’E’ were
published simultaneously and annexure ’D’ contains an
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allegation about the collection of Rs. 28,000 by Bhanwarlal
Nahata "in the name of opium", and in annexure ’E’ an
express imputation of defrauding the agriculturists in the
matter of licences for opium cultivation is made.
On a reasonable reading of these two leaflets there
was no doubt that the person responsible for the publication
of these two leaflets intended to convey that Bhanwarlal had
deceived the agriculturists into parting with the sum of Rs.
28,000 on the representation that licences for cultivation
of opium would be obtained for them. The two leaflets also
clearly imply that he misappropriated the fund collected by
him. Bhanwarlal denied that he had utilised any fund
collected from the agriculturists for his own purposes. He
stated that some amounts of money were collected from
cultivators of opium by the District Congress Committee, and
receipts were given by the District Congress Committee in
respect of those collections on behalf of the District
Congress Committee. He denied that he had misled the
agriculturists or that he had misappropriated any amount
collected from the agriculturists. He asserted that the
amounts collected from the agriculturists were for the
District Congress Committee, and did in fact go to that
body. The imputation is undoubtedly in relation to the
personal conduct of Bhanwarlal, and if the testimony of
Bhanwarlal be accepted, the imputation must be held to be
false. No attempt was made at the trial to prove the truth
of the imputations. Even in the written statement filed by
Mohan Singh it was not his plea that the imputations against
Bhanwarlal were true or that he believed them to be true.
From the manner in which and the time when the
leaflets annexures ’D’ and ’E’ were published, there can be
no doubt that those leaflets were published as a part of a
political campaign to injure the prospects of Bhanwarlal at
the election, and if without making an
25
enquiry about the collection of the amount of Rs. 28,000 and
the destination therefore, it was imputed against Bhanwarlal
that he had defrauded the agriculturists and misappropriated
the amount collected, the inference that the statement made
was to the knowledge of the maker false or was not believed
by him to be true, would readily be made. The imputation
was on the face of it one reasonably calculated to prejudice
the prospects of the candidate Bhanwarlal at the election.
The High Court was therefore right in holding that the
corrupt practice charged against the appellant Mohan Singh
under s. 123 (4) was established.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.