Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
BHUT NATH METE
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
DATE OF JUDGMENT08/02/1974
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
CITATION:
1974 AIR 806 1974 SCR (3) 315
1974 SCC (1) 645
CITATOR INFO :
R 1974 SC 816 (3)
R 1974 SC 832 (3)
F 1974 SC 895 (3)
F 1974 SC1739 (4)
F 1974 SC2120 (5)
RF 1974 SC2240 (1)
D 1974 SC2337 (15)
F 1975 SC 255 (1)
E 1975 SC 550 (8)
RF 1975 SC 602 (7)
R 1975 SC 638 (11)
E 1975 SC 775 (4)
R 1975 SC 919 (4)
R 1976 SC1207 (207)
RF 1976 SC1508 (13)
E 1979 SC1945 (3,8)
RF 1980 SC 326 (21)
RF 1980 SC1789 (106)
RF 1989 SC1933 (28)
F 1990 SC1361 (13)
ACT:
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971--s.
3--Continuance of emergency not a justiciable issue--Order
of detention if bad because criminal prosecutions failed--If
Government should pass a speaking order--Communication of
facts cornerstone of right of representation--Poverty and
illiteracy if relevant to S. 3.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioner was detained under s.3 of the Maintenance of
Internal Security Act, 1971 on the ground that he broke open
wagons and looted wheat and tea. The report which was sent
by the Police to the District Magistrate was forwarded to
the Government and the Board. It contained information that
the petitioner was poor and illiterate, had associates in
notorious wagon-breakers and anti-social elements, had
developed the spirit of lawlessness and aptitude for anti-
social activities and that many of the reported and
unreported cases of recent and criminal activities existed
to his credit besides the instances communicated to the
detenu.
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It was contended that (1) there was no real emergency and
yet the proclamation of emergency remained unretracted with
consequential peril to fundamental rights; (2) that sections
3(3) and 10 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act
violated art. 22(5) of the Constitution; (3) that the order
was male fide because it was made after and on account of
the discharge of the petitioner in the relative criminal
cases; (4) that a speaking order should be passed by the
government or by the Advisory Board while approving or
advising continuance of detention and (5) that some
irrelevant and uncommunicated charges had influenced the
authority, vitiating the order of detention.
Allowing the petition,
HELD:(1) Academic exercise in constitutional law are not for
courts but jurists and it is not possible to hold that the
continuance of emergency was void. it is outside the orbit
of judicial control and wandering into the para-political
sector. The argument is political, not a justiciable issue
and the appeal should be to the polls and not to the courts.
[321 H]
Rex v. Governor of Wormwood Scrubbs Prison, [1920] 2 K.B.
305, The King v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260, 270 and Ringkan
v. Government of Malaysia, [1970] A.C. 379; 390; 391;
referred to.
(2) There is no inconsistency with or erosion of the
opportunity of making a representation against the order The
soul of art. 22 is the fair chance to be heard on all
particulars relied on to condemn the detenu to preventive
confinement. But sec. 3(3) does not and cannot transcend
this trammel and never states that particulars conveyed to
government and eventually to the Board may be behind the
back of the detenu. Reading the provisions liberally and as
owing allegiance to Art. 22(5), it is right to say that all
particulars transmitted under s.3(3) beyond the grounds of
detention must in no way detract from the effectiveness of
the detenu’s right of representation about them. The
guarantee of Art. 22(5) colours the construction of s. 3.
[324 A-C]
(3) It is not correct to say that the order of detention
was bad because the criminal prosecutions have failed. it is
well-settled that even unsuccessful judicial trial or
proceeding would not operate as a bar to a detention order
or render it mala fide. [324 E-G]
Subrati v. State of West Bengal, [1973] 3 S.C.C. 250, M. S.
Khan v. C. C. Roze, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1670 and Rameswar Lal
v. State of Bihar, [1968] 2 S.C.R. 505;511, followed.
316
(4) There is no substance in the argument that a speaking
order should be passed by government or by the Advisory
Board while approving or advising continuance of detention
although a brief expression of the principal reasons is
desirable. The communication of grounds, the right to make
representation and the consideration thereof by the Advisory
Board made up of men with judicial experience, the subject
matter being the deprivation of freedom, clearly implies a
quasi-judicial approach. The bare bones of natural Justice
in this context need not be clothed with the ample flesh of
detailed hearing and elaborate reasoning. A speaking order,
like a regular judicial performance, is neither necessary
nor feasible. A harmonious reconciliation between the
claims of security of the nation and the liberty of the
citizen through the process of effective representation
before deprivation and fair consideration by the executive
and the Advisory Board are the necessary components of
natural justice, no more. [326 F]
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(5) The detention was illegal for denial of opportunity to
make effective representation. Sec. 3(3) read with Art.
22(5) stands contravened and the right to represent rendered
barren. Particulars prejudicial to the detenu played over
the judgment of the authorities but the petitioner never
knew of such injurious information, and could not answer
back. Communication of facts is the cornerstone of the
right of representation and orders passed on uncommunicated
materials are unfair and illegal. Poverty and illiteracy
arc irrelevant to S. 3. The spirit of lawlessness and
aptitude for antisocial activities are neither here nor
there vis-a-vis s.3. Other reported and unreported
instances, though relevant, are kept back from the
petitioner. [328 B]
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 1456 of 1973.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution for issue of a writ in
the nature of habeas corpus.
S. J. S. Fernandez, for the petitioner.
P. K. Chakravarty, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.-The petitioner, undergoing inhibitive in-
carceration in West Bengal, seeks this Court’s writ to be
liberated on grounds of substantive innocence and processor
injustice. Judicial vigilance is the price of liberty and
freedom of the person is a founding faith of our Republic.
So it behaves us to examine the legal circumstances of the
detention in the light of the constitutional constraints
under art. 22 and the procedural safeguards of the Act (the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971).
A brief calendar bearing on the landmark events, giving the
core facts relevant to the legality of the detention, is
necessary right at the beginning. The order of the District
Magistrate, Burdwan, which cast the petitioner into jail
recited that he was ’satisfied’ that with a view to
preventing the petitioner ’from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the community’ the direction for detention
under S. 3 of the Act was being made, impeccably adhering to
the mantra of the law. The, grounds which induced the
authority’s satisfaction were concomitantly furnished as
required by S. 6(1), read with s. 3(2), of the Act. "You
are being detained" runs the communication .... on the
grounds that you have been acting in a manner prejudicial to
the supplies and services essential to the community as
evidenced by the particulars given below :--" Three specific
instances were set out of November 21, 1971, November 24,
1971 and
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January 13, 1972-all over seven months prior to the
detention order alleging that the petitioner and his
associates (not named) broke open wagons and ’looted’ wheat
and tea. There is also a statement that ’the said activity
of yours thus attracts Sec. 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the ... Act."
It is a trifle mystifying that the detention order is passed
many months after the three criminal break-ins, and equally
strange it is that the prisoner is arrested only on February
22, 1973, many months after the order of detention was
passed, there being no justification of absconders. Long
before the grounds of detention were served on the detenu
(February 22, 1973) the State Government had approved the
District Magistrate’s order which it did on September 2,
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1972. Shortly thereafter, the State Government placed the
case of the detenu before the Advisory Board under s. 10 of
the Act, although the actual detention was effected only in
1973. The affidavit-in-opposition by the Deputy Secretary
to Government does not explain these time lags between the
prejudicial acts and the preventive detention order, and
between the order and the detention. The petitioner’s
averment in this context becomes disturbingly meaningful,
for, according to him, the instances were false and when he
was prosecuted in Court, the cases ended in his favour. He
has stated in his representation to the Advisory, Board that
"over the grounds No. 1, 2 and 3 Burdwan P. S. Case No.
G.R.P.S. No. 10(1)71, 9(11)71, and 6(1)72 was started. The
petitioner was arrested in connection with aforesaid case.
But as the charges are false, so no prima facie case was
established against the petitioner was discharged by the
learned S.D.J.M., Burdwan. But soon as the petitioner was
discharged from the case, the petitioner again arrested and
arbitrarily detained under MIS Act."
We will consider these aspects in a little detail later.
Suffice it to say that the Advisory Board considered the
representation of the detenu and the material placed before
it by the State, and concluded on April 28, 1973 that there
was sufficient cause for the detention of tile petitioner.
Thereafter, by order dated May 7, 1973, the State Government
continued the detention "until the expiration of twelve
months from the date of his detention or until the expiry of
D.I. Act, 1971, whichever is later."
Both the State Government and the Advisory Board had before
them, while deciding on the propriety of the detention, the
criminal biography of the petitioner, and, indeed, counsel
for the State fairly stated that the opinion and the advice
were based upon the specific instances furnished to the
petitioner in the grounds of detention as well as on the
dossier furnished by the Superintendent of Police, a copy of
which has been produced in Court. It looks as if this is a
routine procedure and there is a proforma for the history
sheet. Column 7 thereof, apart from setting out the three
instances communicated to the detenu also mentions certain
relevant and injurious circumstances relating to the
petitioner, which may be extracted here :
"The subject Bhut Nath Mete s/o L. Sambhu Nath
Mete of Belari, P.S. Ausgram, Dist. Burdwan,
was born in a poor
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318
family. He got no education in his childhood.
He worked is a day labour. He used to mix up
with the notorious wagon breakers and anti-
social elements. This inspired in him the
criminal propensities which shaped his future
career. But to his association with the
railway criminals and antisocial elements he
developed the spirit of lawlessness and
acquired special aptitude for anti-social
activities and acts prejudicial to the
maintenance of supplies and services essential
to +the community. For fear of assault and
manhandling one of the local people dare to
say anything against him and his associates to
the Police or to any authority as a result of
many cases remain unreported to the Police.
Besides many of the reported and unreported
cases some of the instances of his recent
anti-social and criminal act wish were
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prejudicial to the maintenance of the supplies
and services essential to the community are
mentioned below. . . . "
It is apparent,-and indeed it is not denied,-that the total
impact of these materials on the District Magistrate, the
State Government and the Advisory Board, resulted in the
initial detention and subsequent continuation in
incarceration.
We have now to see what the grounds of challenge are and the
sustainability thereof in the eye of the law and the
Constitution.
Before getting to grips with the contentions we may indicate
the constitutional dimensions of the freedom of which the
judges are, in part, sentinels on the qui vive. Civil
liberty, a constitutional guarantee, is a strange bed-fellow
with detention without trial, a British bequest. Begun from
the days of the East India Company, our freedom fighters,
including the Father of the Nation, have endured its
repressive impact and so when the somber, colonial story
came to a close, our founding fathers enshrined freedom of
the person as a fundamental right. But as realists they
know that we became free amidst blood bath and chaos and the
environs oil belligerency. The, delicate balance between
security and liberty had to be kept, conscious that, in the
contemporary world, war is to peace near allied and ’this
partition do their bounds divide’ and the defenses of a
nation can be destroyed and the morale of its people broken
not only by external aggression but also by internal
disruption. The sensitive underside of the nation can be
wounded by those who break up public order, breach State
security, blow up essential supplies and services; and so,
as an unhappy necessity, preventive detention, apart from
punitive prison term, was recognised and provided for.
Being committed to the rule of law, primary article of
faith, the framers of the Constitution mistrusted
uncanalised power in the Executive and wrote into the
paramount law provisions regulating preventive detention and
proclamations of emergencies. After all, Lord Anton’s
dictum that absolute power corrupts absolutely was for them
no new knowledge, and Lord Atkin’s great words in Liversidge
V. Anderson(1) that amid the clash of arms the laws are not
silent, that
(1) [1942] A. C. 205
319
they may be changed, but they speak same language in war and
peace, reverberated in their ears. Therefore, where freedom
is in peril and justice is threatened the citizen shall
receive the fullest protection from the Court within the
four corners of art. 22, benignantly stretched, and the
safeguards of the Act liberally interpreted-within
legitimate limits. The worth of the human person is a
cherished value carefully watched over by the Court. Such
is the judicial perspective in the application of art. 22 to
the MISA, which it contains, controls and animates.
Indeed, this Court. by a series of creative pronouncements
has built into vast powers vested in the Administration by
the MISA and its predecessors legal bulwarks, breakraters
and blinkers which have largely humanised the harsh
authority over individual liberty otherwise exercisable
arbitrarily by executive fiat. In this case, we, are
concerned with a limited canvass, for, in a sense, the
court’s control through review is peripheral,. processor and
yet crucial. The area of judicial ‘embudsmania’ which
obtrudes into our attention in the present case relates to
the observance- of natural justice to the partial but
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compulsory extent the law of the Constitution and the law
under the Constitution, obligate. There is a limited
’judicialisation’ of administrative acts that art. 22
insists on, which is express, explicit and mandatory and
admits of no exceptions.
Article 22(5) is principled and pragmatic, flexible but firm
and enforces the right to be heard without overloading the
administrative process with judicial trappings. It reads
"(5) When any person is detained in pursuance
of an order made under any law providing for
preventive detention, the authority making the
order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to
such person the grounds on which the order has
been made and shall afford him the earliest
opportunity of making a representation against
the order."
The fundamental constitutional mandates are that the
authority (a) shall communicate to the detainee ’the grounds
on which the order has been made-nothing less than all the
material grounds which operate to create that subjective
satisfaction in the authority which spells suspension of the
citizen’s liberty-and (b) shall afford him the earliest
opportunity of making a representation against the order-no
avoidable delay, no shortfall in the material communicated
shall disable the prisoner making an early, yet
comprehensive say on every particular or fact which has
influenced the detainer or other body to order, approve or
advice the deprivation of an individual’s freedom. Such is
the fairness and justice ’untouchably’ entrenched in art.
22(5) when administrative action preventively drowns a
sacred human right in the name of public good and organised
society. The power and its limits co-exist in
constitutional amity and the MISA has effectuated this great
policy in S. 3(1) and (3) read with ss. 5(1) 10 and 11(i)
and (ii). The humanist restraint so woven into the law
against executive extravagance or indifference must be
strictly applied since casual and careless and
320
uninformed disposal of other’s freedom is to break faith
with the constitutional tryst. The admonition of Patanjali
Sastri, C.J., is inspirational :
" Preventive detention is a serious invasion
of personal liberty and such meager safeguards
as the Constitution has provided aga
inst the
improper exercise of the power must be
jealously watched and enforced by the Court.
In this cast;, the petitioner has the right,
under article 12(5), as interpreted by this
Court by a majority, to be furnished with
particulars of the grounds of his detention
"sufficient to enable him to make a
representation which on being considered may
give relief to him. We are of opinion that
this constitutional requirement must be
satisfied with respect to each of the grounds
communicated to the person detained, subject
of course to a claim of privilege under clause
(6) of article 22."(1).
The strict construction of the statute setting
the court’s face sternly against encroachment
on individual liberty, keeping the delicate
balance between social security and citizens’
freedom, is perfectly warranted by this
Court’s observation in Kishori Mohan Bera v.
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State of West Bengal(2)
"The Act confers extraordinary power on the
executive to detain a person without recourse
to the ordinary laws of the land and to trial
by courts. Obviously, such a power places the
personal liberty of such a person in extreme
peril against which he is provided with a
limited right of challenge only. There can,
therefore, be no doubt that such a law has to
be strictly construed. Equally, also, the
power conferred by such a law has to be
exercised with extreme care and scrupulously
within the bounds laid down in such a law."
In a sense this approach is only an
application of the insistence of fairness when
power is exercised to effect other’s rights,
particularly the most sensitive of all rights-
personal freedom. Natural justice is the
index of fairness, although as Sachs, L.J.,
indicated in In re-Pargemon Press Ltd.(3) :
"In the application of the concept of fair
play there must be real flexibility so that
very different situations may be met without
producing procedures unsuitable to the object
in hand". In A. K, Krapak v. Union of
India(4) this Court qualified :
"The concept of rule of law would lose its
validity if the instrumentalities of the State
are not charged with the duty of discharging
their functions in a fair and just manner. The
requirement of acting judicially in essence is
nothing but a requirement to act justly and
fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously."
After all, one could never be too just or too
fair when dealing with civil liberty.
(1) Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v State of
Delhi [1953] S. C. R. 708.
(2) A. 1. R. 1972 S. C. 1749.
(3) [1971] 1 Ch. D. 368.
(4) A. 1. R. 1970 SC 150,
321
With these background observations, the
statutory ’musts’ of the MISA may now be
delineated.
We are concerned, as earlier stated, only with
some aspects of the preventive detention
jurisprudence, in the present case, and we
confine ourselves to them. The District
Magistrate should be bona fide satisfied about
the prejudicial activities of the detainee.
Absence of bona fides in this context does not
mean proof of malice, for an order can be
malafide although the officer is innocent.
The important point is that the satisfaction
of the public functionary, though subjective,
must be real and rational, not colourable,
fanciful, mechanical or unrelated to the
objects enumerated in s. 3(1) of the Act.
Viscount Haldane, L.C., in Shearer v.
Shields(1) drew the, line neatly thus :
"Between malice in fact and malice, in law
there is a broad distinction which is not
peculiar to, any particular system of
jurisprudence. A person who inflicts an
injury upon another person in contravention of
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the law is not allowed to say that he did so
with an innocent mind; he is taken to know the
law, and he must act within the law. He may,
therefore, be guilty of malice in law,
although, so far as the state of his mind is
concerned, he acts ignorantly, and in that
sense innocently."
The attack on the order of detention has been delivered on
the following grounds : (1) that the grounds are ambivalent,
vague and void; (2) that the particulars suffer from
insufficient communication thus crippling the constitutional
right of representation; (3) that the detention is mala fide
having been made with ulterior and extraneous purpose of
making up for the discharge of the petitioner in the,
criminal cases; (4) that a few acts of theft, not proximate
in time to the detention order after judicial proceedings
had failed, have no rational relation to potential
prejudicial activities to stanch which it professes to have
been made; (5) that the materials impelling the detention
order and supplied to the Government and the, Board add
substantially to the facts disclosed to the detenu thus
hitting him below the belt and denying him the plenary
opportunity to answer the uncommunicated but damaging
charges with a futuristic import; (6) that the MISA violates
art. 22(5) and is unconstitutional; and (7) that the
detention has been arbitrary and may continue indefinitely
if the Proclamation of Emergency becomes a constant fact of
constitutional life and must therefore be regarded as
unconstitutional. The last two were urged in another habeas
corpus application heard shortly before this one and are
dealt with in a way here also.
We have to reject summarily the last Submission as falling
outside the orbit of judicial control and wandering into the
para-political sector. It was argued that there was no real
emergency and yet the Proclamation remained unretracted with
consequential peril to fundamental rights. In our view,
this is a political, not justiciable issue and the appeal
should be to the polls and not to the courts. The
traditional
(1) [1914] A. C. 808.
322
view, sanctified largely by some American decisions, that
political questions fall outside the area of judicial
review, is not a constitutional. taboo but a pragmatic
response of the court to the reality of its inadequacy to
decide such issues and to the scheme of the constitution
which has assigned to each branch of government in the
larger sense a certain jurisdiction. of course, when a
problem-which is essentially and basically constitutional-
although dressed up as a political question, is
appropriately raised before court, it is within the power of
the judges to adjudicate. The rule is one of self-restraint
and of subject-matter, practical sense and respect for other
branches of government like the Legislature and the
Executive. Even so, we see no force in the plea. True, an
emergency puts a broad, blanket blindfolding of the seven
liberties of art. 19 and its baseless prolongation may
devalue democracy. That is a political matter do hours our
ken, for the validity of the proclamation turns on the
subjective satisfaction of the President that a grave
emergency, of the kind mentioned in Part XVIII, or its
imminent danger, exists. In Rex v. Governor of Wormwood
Scrubbs Prison(1) the Earl of Reading observed, on a similar
contention
". . even if it is material to consider
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whether the military emergency has come to an
end, it is not a matter which this Court can
consider; whether the emergency continues to
exist or not it is for the executive alone to
determine.. . . . "
The argument of abuse of power was urged in
England but repelled. In The King v.
Halliday(2) Lord Dunnedin met it thus :
"That is true. But the fault, if fault there
be, lies in the fact that the British
Constitution has entrusted to the two Houses
of Parliament, subject to the assent of the
King, an absolute power untrammeled by any
written instrument obedience to which may be
compelled by some judicial body. The danger
of abuse in theoretically present :
practically, as things exist, it is in my
opinion absent."
And Lord Wright in Liversidge v. Anderson(3)
added effect to the point in these words :
"The safeguard of British liberty is in the
good sense of the people and in the system of
representative and responsible government
which has evolved. If extraordinary powers
are here given, they are given because the
emergency is extraordinary and are limited to
the period of the emergency."
of course, the British have no written
constitution but the argument remains.
In the recent ruling of the Privy Council in
Hinakan v. Government of Malaysia(4), the
vires of a proclamation of emergency was put
in issue as unconstitutional and a fraud on
power. The Judicial Committee made short
shrift of the submission in these words :
(1) [1920] 2 K. B. 305.
(2) [1917] A. C. 260, 270.
(3) [1942] A. C. 206.
(4) [1970] A. C. 379; 390; 391.
323
"Although an "emergency" to be within the
article must be not only grave but such as to
threaten the security or economic life of the
Federation or any part of it, the natural
meaning of the word itself is capable of
covering a very wide range of situations and
occurrences, epidemics and the collapse of
civil government."
"It is not for their Lordships to criticise or
comment upon the wisdom or expediency of the
steps taken by the Government of Malaysia in
dealing with the constitutional situation
which had occurred in Sarawak, or to inquire
whether that situation could itself have been
avoided by a different approach."
"These were essentially matters to- be
determined according to the judgment of the
responsible Ministers in the lights of their
knowledge and experience. And although the
Indonesian Confrontation had then ceased, it
was open to the Federal Government, and
indeed its duty, to consider the possible
consequences of a period of unstable
government in a State that, not so long
before, had been facing the tensions of
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Confrontation and the subversive activities
associated with it. That the appellant
regarded
the, Federal Government’s actions as aimed at
himself is obvious and perhaps natural; but he
has failed to satisfy the Board that the steps
taken by the Government, including the
proclamation and the impugned Act, were in
fraudum legis or otherwise unauthorised by the
relevant legislation."
Justifiability was left open is that case, but the limits of
judicial propriety were clearly drawn. The U.S. Supreme
Court has frowned on forensic examination of subjects of
politics and policy which belong to the other branches of
government although in Baker v. Carr(1) a landmark ruling
and Gray v. Senders(2), constitutional questions with
considerable political consequences were boldly handled.
Even the Viet Nam war came for judicial consideration. But
this large and sensitive debate about the court’s power
hardly arises here because basically it is a matter least
fit for adjudication by judicial methods and materials, and
clearly the onus of establishing the effective end of
emergency and absence of any grounds whatever for the
subjective satisfaction of the President, heavy as it is,
has hardly been discharged. Academic exercises in
constitutional law are not for courts but jurists and we
decline to hold the continuance of emergency void. Nor are
we impressed with the argument that S. 3 (3) and S. 10
violate art. 22(5) of the Constitution. The vice, according
to counsel, is that the detaining authority forwards to
Government not merely the grounds of detention but "such
other particulars as in his opinion have
(1) 369 U. S. 186 (1962)
(2) 372 U. S. 363 (1963)
324
a bearing on the matter"--which matter may be beyond what is
communicated to the detenu. If so, the effective
opportunity to make representations against such extra
material is absent and the right under art. 22 (5) is
stultified. No doubt, the soul of art. 22 is the fair
chance to be heard on all particulars relied on to condemn
the detenu to preventive confinement. But s. 3(3) does not-
cannot-transcend this trammel and never states that
particulars conveyed to Government and eventually to the
Board may be behind the back of the detenu. Reading the
provisions literally and as owing allegiance to art. 22(5),
it is right to say that all particulars transmitted under s.
3(3) beyond the grounds of detention must, if they have a
bearing on the determination to detain, in no way detract
from the effectiveness of the detenu’s right of
representation about them. The guarantee of art. 22(5)
colours the construction of s. 3. So viewed, there is no
inconsistency with or erosion of the ’opportunity of making
a representation against the order. Whether, in this case,
any unconstitutional deficiency in communication of such
material has occurred: will be tested later.
Is there any substance in the grievance that order is mala
fide, made after and on account of the discharge of the
relative criminal cases ? The detention is not punitive but
preventive and the District Magistrate’s order recites to
that effect. In this case, the petitioner’s representation
mentions the cases challenge and the discharge of the
accused by the court in regard to the very incidents pressed
into service to found the detention order. The long
interval between the incidents and the orders lends
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probability to the petitioner’s plea that there were cases
which ended in his favour, particularly because no denial
nor explanation is forthcoming on these aspects in the
return. The question is whether for the reason that
criminal prosecutions have failed the detention order is
bad. We think not, and there is authority for it. in
Subrace v. State of, West Bengal(1) this Court rejected an
identical argument, the, purposes of preventive detention
being different from conviction and punishment and
subjective satisfaction being enough in the former while
proof beyond reasonable doubt being necessary in the latter.
"The Act creates in the authorities concerned a new
jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention on
their subjective satisfaction on grounds of suspicion of
commission in future of acts prejudicial to the community in
general. This jurisdiction is different from that of
judicial trial in courts for offences and of judicial orders
for prevention of offences. Even unsuccessful judicial
trial or proceeding would, therefore, not operate as a bar
to a detention order, or render it male fide. The matter is
also not res integra." In M. S. Khan V. C. C. Bose(2) a
similar view was expressed and now a host of decisions had
made the legal position unchallengeable. A note of caution,
however, needs to be struck since absolute scrupulousness is
expected of authorities exercising this exceptional power.
This is not a power to put behind bars anyone you regard as
dangerous or rowdyish or irrepressible or difficult of being
got rid of by proof of guilt in court. This is an
instrument for protecting the community against specially
(1) (1973) 3 SCC 250. (2) A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1670.
325
injurious types of anti-social activity statutorily
enunciated. If extraneous motives adulterate the use of
power, the court must nullify it. Observations in Rameshwar
Lal v. State of Bihar(1) serve as a warning :
"The appellant was tried for the offence and
acquitted as far back as February 1967. This
ground discloses carelessness which is
extremely disturbing. That the detaining
authority does not know that the appellant was
tried and acquitted months before, and
considers the pendency of the case against him
as one of the grounds of detention shows that
due care and attention is not being paid to
such serious matters as detention without
trial. If the appellant was tried and
acquitted, Government was required to study
the judgment of acquittal to discover whether
all these allegations had any basis in fact or
not. One can understand the use of the case
if the acquittal was technical but not when
the case was held to be false."
After all, however well-meaning Government may be, detention
power cannot be quietly used to subvert, supplant or to
substitute the punitive law of the Penal Code. The immune
expedient of throwing into a prison cell one whom the
ordinary law would take of, merely because it is irksome to
undertake the inconvenience of proving guilt in court is
unfair abuse. To detain a person after a court has held the
charge false is to expose oneself to the criticism of
absence of due care and of rational material for subjective
satisfaction. After all, the responsible officer, aware of
the value of civil liberty even for undesirable persons,
must make a credible prediction of the species of
prejudicial activity in s. 3(1) before shutting up a person.
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It may perilously hover around illegality, if a single act
of theft or threat, for which a prosecution was launched but
failed, is seized upon after, say, a year or so, for
detaining the accused out of pique, The potential executive
tendency to shy at courts for prosecution of ordinary
offences and to rely generously on the easier strategy of
subjective satisfaction is a danger to the democratic way of
life. The large number of habeas corpus petitions and the
more or less stereotyped grounds of detention and inaction
by way of prosecution, induce us to voice this deeper
concern. Moreover, a criminal should not get away with it
as an unconvicted detenu if the rule of law is a live force.
The ritualistic recital of one or two thefts followed by
incantatory statutory phrases in the order, unsupported even
by the affidavit of the detaining authority may in some
circumstances lead to an inference that the order is in
fraudum legis. In the present case such an argument has
been made but we are not satisfied that there was foul
exercise of power merely because the courts have discharged
the accused or a competent affidavit has not been filed.
True, we should have expected an affidavit from the
detaining authority but even that is felt too inconvenient
and a Deputy Secretary who merely peruses the records and
swears an affidavit in every case is the poor proxy. Why is
(1) [1968] 2 S. C. R. 505; 511.
326
an affidavit than needed at all? The fact of subjective
satisfaction, solemnly reached considering relevant and
excluding irrelevant facts, sufficient in degree of danger
and certainty to warrant preemptive casting into prison, is
best made out by the detaining District Magistrate, not one
who professionally reads records and makes out a precise in
the form of an affidavit. The purpose is missed, going by
the seriousness of the matter, the proof is, deficient,
going by ordinary rules of evidence, and the Court is denied
the benefit of the word of one who takes responsibility for
the action, if action has to be taken against the detainer
later for misuse. We are aware that in the exigencies of
administration, an officer may be held up far away,
engrossed in other important work, thus being unavailable to
swear an affidavit. The next bust would then be the oath of
one in the Secretariat Who officially is cognisant of or has
participated in the process of approval by Government--not
one who, long later, reads old files and gives its gist to
the court. Mechanical means are easy but not legitimate.
We emphasize this infirmity because routine summaries of
files, marked as affidavits, appear in the returns to rules
nisi, showing scant courtesy to the constitutional gravity
of deprivation of civil liberty. In some cases where a
valid reason for the District Magistrate’s inability to
swear affidavits directly has been furnished, this Court has
accepted the concerned Deputy Secretary’s affidavit. This
should, however, be the exception, not the rule. We may
refer in this context to the rulings in Ranjit Dam v. State
of West Bengal, (1), J. N. Roy v. State of West Bengal, (2)
and Shaik Hanif and others v. State of West Bengal.(3)
We need not proceed further with this aspects, in the
ultimate view we take on this writ petition.
We are not persuaded that a speaking order should be passed
by Government or- by the Advisory Board while approving or
advising continuance of detention although a brief
expression of the principal reasons is desirable. The
communication of grounds, the right to make representation
and the consideration thereof by the Advisory body made up
of men with judicial experience the subject-matter being the
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deprivation of freedom, clearly implies a quasi-judicial
approach. Indeed. where citizen’s rights are affected by an
authority, the question is not so much the mould into which
the nature of the act should be fitted but the nature of the
consequence which obligates impartiality, judicial
evaluation and reasoned conclusion on facts. as
distinguished from policy formulation and zealous imple-
mentation regardless of two sides and weighing of evidence.
Thebare bones of natural justice in this context need not be
clothed with the ample flesh of detailed hearing and
elaborate reasoning. It must be self-evident from the order
that the substance of the charge and the essential answer in
the representation have been impartially considered. We do
not think that a speaking order like a regular Judicial
performance is either necessary or feasible. Article 22(5)
(1) A. I. R. (1972) SC 1753. (2) A. I. R. (1972) SC 2143.
(3) Writ Petitions Nos. 1679 etc; judgment on February 1,
1974.
327
also does not compel us to reach a different conclusion.
After all,. we must remember that a harmonious
reconciliation between the claims of security of the nation
and the liberty of the citizen through the process of
effective representation before deprivation and fair
consideration by the Executive and the Advisory Board are
the necessary components of natural justice. Not more. In
times of emergency, security of the State and essential
supplies and services of the community assume great
importance and demand quicker action. At the same time, we
cannot underrate the right of the citizen and cannot forget
the words of Justice Jackson in Knaff v. Shaughnassy : (1)
"Security is like liberty in that many are the
crimes committed in its name. The menace to
the security of this country be it great as it
may, from this girl’s admission is as
nothing compared to the menace to free
institutions inherent in procedures on this
pattern.... The plan that evidence of guilt
must be secret is abhorrent to free men,
because it provides a cloak for the ma
levolent,
the misinformed, the meddlesome and the
corrupt to play the role of informer
undetected and uncorrected."
What has to be underscored is the obligation to make a
fair communication of the grounds and the particulars
sufficient to enable the detainee to explain his innocence.
Faceless informers flourish where confrontation by cross-
examination is absent, and orders with the inscrutable face
of a sphinx are not uncommon where subjective satisfaction
is sufficient. All the more reason why there should be a
meaningfull comprehensive furnishing of essential
particulars so that the executive agencies may be rigorously
held to the standards implied by the courts in art. 22(5).
Otherwise, in the language of Justice Frank further, "he
that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that
sword." Administrative absolution is incongruous with our
constitutional scheme. If control of liberty in an
emergency-Barbed-wire entanglements of freedom by the
executive--is necessary. control of control is in some
measure healthy because power in the minions of government
can be ’of an encroaching nature’. Reference was made at the
bar in this context to Allen’s "Law and Orders", and
Markose’s "Judicial Control of Administrative Action"-
In the petitioner’s case the gravamen of his ’grievance is
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that some irrelevant and uncommunicated charges have
influenced the authority, vitiating the order. We would not
view with unconcern violation on this score, if made out. It
is common ground that the police have sent to the District
Magistrate (who in turn has forwarded to the Government and
the Board) a blistering bio-data. It states that (a) he is
poor and illiterate, (b) has associates in notorious wagon
breakers and anti-social element, (c) has developed spirit
of lawlessness and aptitude for anti-social activities, (d)
many of the
(1) 338 U. S. 537.
328
reported and unreported cases of recent anti-social and
criminal activities exist to his credit besides the
instances communicated to the detenu. Fairly considered,
this report has been present to the minds of the authorities
but withheld from the affected party, Poverty and illiteracy
are outrageously irrelevant to S. 3. The spirit of law-
lessness and aptitude for anti-social activities are neither
here nor there vis-a-vis s. 3. Other reported and
unreported’ instances though relevant are kept back from the
petitioner. If such be the case. s. 3(3)., read with art.
22(5), stands contravened and the right to represent
rendered barren. And yet particulars prejudicial to the
detenu played over the judgment of the authorities but the
petitioner never knew of such injurious information, and
could not answer back. This Court in many weighty
pronouncements over two decades has stressed that art. 22(5)
vests a real, not illusory right, that communication of
facts is the cornerstone of the right of representation and
orders based on uncommunicated materials are unfair and
illegal.
Before parting with this case,( we wish to express our
disquiet that more theft even of copper wire, unless in
association with other facts may not give rise to an
inference of proclivities of the type mentioned in s.3(1).
Some proximity in time between the acts and the order. sonic
indications of activities disrupting supplies and services
to the community and more ’trendy’ behaviour warranting pre-
ventive measures. must be available before the extreme step
of detention without trial is clamped down. A sober
prognosis by the District Magistrate of the detainee’s
dangerous behaviour must be wellgrounded, even if impervious
to judicial probe. We cannot dismiss as accidental that in
this area of the law, in two leading cases, two judges,
Bose. J., and Bhagwathy. J., have referred to the,
Bestille not that we express our approbation of its use.
Executive care and Advisory Board’s vigilance are the
hopeful sentinels checking on the misapplication of the
MISA. unwittingly to rob the people of the Republic of civil
liberties.
We may emphasise that to minimise processor justice to mere
communication and consequent representation is not to reduce
that prescription to a rove of sand, and to make subjective
satisfaction a sufficient prerequisite to detention is not
to reduce judicial review to a brutum fulmen.
We hold that the detention in this case is illegal for
denial of opportunity to make effective representation and
direct that the petitioner be set free.
P. B. R.
329