Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
AJAIB SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
GURBAX SINGH & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT17/11/1987
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
OZA, G.L. (J)
CITATION:
1988 SCR (1)1099 1988 SCC (1) 143
JT 1987 (4) 516 1987 SCALE (2)1045
ACT:
Indian Contract Act, 1872: Agreement of sale-Specific
performance of-Major portion of sale price paid by buyer-
Possession of property with buyer in part performance of
agreement-Documents of title not executed-Limitation bar
pleaded-Held High Court erred in denying specific
performance on account of hardship without deciding whether
claim was barred by limitation.
HEADNOTE:
%
Under an agreement of sale entered into by respondents
the appellant had paid the major portion of the agreed price
long time ago and the balance thereof that was to be paid at
the time of execution of the documents was a sum of Rs. 75
only. Possession of the premises was with the appellant for
all these years in part performance of the agreement.
Upon failure of the respondents to execute documents of
title, the appellant sought specific performance of the
agreement. The respondents canvassed the question of
limitation before the High Court. The High Court, however,
without deciding that question took the view that due to
passage of time prices of lands had gone up sky high and it
would be unjust to enforce the agreement of sale.
Allowing the appeal by special leave,
^
HELD: The High Court exercised discretion on wrong
principles. Without deciding the question whether the claim
of the plaintiff was barred by limitation or not it
proceeded to refuse to grant the relief on the ground that
there has been good deal of delay and the parties would
suffer if specific performance of the agreement was granted.
This principle was not applicable to the facts of the case
and the exercise of discretion was not proper. The matter
remanded to the High Court for decision in merits. [1100G;
E; 1101B]
Madamsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yellogi Rao & Ors.,
[1965] 2 SCR 221; Dr. Jiwan Lal & Ors. v. Brij Mohan Mehra &
Anr., [1973] 2 SCR 230 and Debendra Nath Mandal v. Sakhilal
Kar & Ors., AIR 1950 Calcutta 526, referred to.
1100
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JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3066 of
1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.7.1986 of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 163 of 1978.
Mala Ram Ghana and Dalveer Bhandari for the
Appellant.
M.S. Gujral and Dr. Meera Aggarwal for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. Special leave granted.
The High Court in its judgment and order dated 9th
July, 1986, has observed that the question of limitation has
been canvassed before the High Court. The High Court
expressed the view that there was a lot of conflict between
the various High Courts on the interpretation of Article 54
of the Limitation Act which governed the point of
limitation. The High Court, however, did not decide this
question and expressed the view that due to passage of time
prices of lands had gone up sky-high and it would be unjust
to enforce the agreement of sale entered into. In other
words, it appears that without deciding the question whether
the claim of the plaintiff was barred by limitation or not,
the High Court exercised its discretion in refusing to grant
the relief on the ground that there has been good deal of
delay and the parties would suffer if specific performance
of the agreement was granted. It appears from the facts that
in this case the major portion of the agreed price had been
paid long time ago and the balance thereof was to be paid at
the time of execution of the documents was a sum of Rs. 75
only. It further appears that possession of the premises was
with the appellant for all these years in part performance
of the agreement. In those circumstances, the principle upon
which the High Court refused to exercise its discretion, in
our opinion, was not applicable and such discretion was not
proper. The High Court exercised discretion on wrong
principles. See in this connection Madamsetty Satyanarayana
v. G. Yellogi Rao & Two others, [1965] 2 SCR 221; Dr. Jiwan
Lal & Ors. v. Brij Mohan Mehra & Another, [1973] 2 SCR 230
and see also the observation in Debendra Nath Mandal v.
Sakhilal Kar & Ors., AIR 1950 Calcutta 526
In that view of the matter, we cannot sustain the
exercise of discretion in the manner done by the High Court.
This, however, does
1101
not decide the matter because the High Court declined to go
into the facts and decide the question of limitation on
merits, the High Court took the view in exercise of its
discretion. Since we are not sustaining the High Court’s
exercise of discretion hence the order and the Judgment of
the High Court are set aside but the matter is remanded to
the High Court for its decision on the merits. The matter
should be disposed of by the High Court as early as
possible. The appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as
to costs.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.
1102